1. The facts of the case, in beief, are that the appellants imported a consignment of 3832 bales of rayon grade wood pulp and the same was stored in their bonded warehouse on 16-6-1984. The warehousing period was three months and it expired on 15-9-1984. Within the warehousing period, i.e., upto 15-9-1984, the appellants cleared the goods in part from time to time except 832 bales which were left un-cleared in the warehouse. The appellants did not apply for extension of the warehousing period under Section 61(l)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962. The warehousing period of three months was not, therefore, extended. The appellants paid a sum of Rs. 8,03,458.32 as duty for 800 bales of wood pulp under State Bank of India Treasury Challan dated 15-2-1985. On 8-5-1985, the Assistant Collector of Customs (Technical), Collectorate of Customs (Preventive) issued a demand under Section 72(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 directing the appellants to pay Customs Duty of Rs. 6,73,885.80 and CV duty of Rs. 1,63,657.98 (Total Rs. 8,37,543.78) on the 832 bales of in bond imported wood pulp which were still lying in the warehouse, alongwith the interest @ 12% per annum amounting to Rs. 66,003.52 calculated for the period from 16-9-1984 to 15-5-1985 in terms of Section 72(l)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962. Since, however, an amount of Rs. 8,03,458.32 was already deposited by the appellants towards customs duty and CV duty on 800 bales of wood pulp, the same amount was allowed to be deducted from the total amount payable as per the above demand notice. The appellants were, therefore, asked to pay the balance amount of Rs. 1,01,088.98 plus interest accrued till the date of actual physical removal of the goods from the warehouse after 15-5-1985 upto which date interest had been included in the above amount. It was also made clear in the demand notice that if the amount was not paid within 7 days from the date of receipt of the notice, the amount would be recovered in terms of provision of Section 72(2) of the Customs Act. In their letter dated 30-5-1985, the appellants replied to the above demand notice dated 8-5-1985. In the said reply the appellants contended that on 17-3-1985 the Central Govt. issued a Notification No. 63/85-Cus. exempting, inter-alia, "pulp" derived by mechanical or chemical means from any fibrous vegetable material and falling under Heading No. 47.01 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 from the whole of the basic customs duty and CV duty and as the wood pulp imported by them had been derived by mechanical/chemical means from fibrous vegetable material, the same was wholly exempted from the basic customs duty and CV duty under the aforesaid notification. They also stated that under Notification No.95/85-Cus., dated 17-3-1985, the said goods were also exempted from the auxiliary duty of customs. Therefore, according to them-832 bales of rayon grade wood pulp which were till then lying in the warehouse stood exempted from basic customs duty, CV duty and auxiliary duty by virtue of the aforesaid two notifications from 17-3-1985. They also contended that the rate of duty applicable to the warehoused goods was the rate prevailing on the date of actual removal of the goods from the warehouse as provided under Section 15(l)(b) of the Customs Act. They, therefore, contended that no duty was payable by them on 832 bales of wood pulp to be removed by them from the warehouse and requested that the wood pulp may be released for home consumption without payment of duty and the duty of Rs. 8,03,458.32 already deposited by them should be refunded to them with interest. In reply to their letter dated 30-5-1985, the Supdt. of Customs (Technical), vide his letter dated 10-6-1985, intimated to the appellants that the Assistant Collector of Customs (Technical) had granted a personal hearing to the appellants on 7-6-1985 in his Chamber and since they did not appear on that date for personal hearing, the Assistant Collector was pleased to give them another chance of personal hearing on 24-6-1985 "before taking any decision on the demand notice as referred above". On receipt of the letter dated 10-6-1985, the appellants wrote a letter dated 21-6-1985 to the Assistant Collector of Customs (Technical) stating that they were in urgent need of the wood pulp (832 bales in all) stored in the bonded warehouse. Hence, they have no alternative but to pay the amount of Rs. 1,01,088.98 under protest and without prejudice to their rights and contentions in the matter. Accordingly, the appellants deposited a sum of Rs. 1,01,088.98 on 22-6-1985 as the balance amount of duty plus interest upto 15-5-1985 leviable on 832 bales of wood pulp kept in the warehouse.
On 25-6-1985, the Assistant Collector of Customs passed another order with reference to the appellant's letter dated 10-4-1985 in which they requested for de-bonding their bonded warehouse. In the said order dated 25-6-1985, the Assistant Collector directed that 832 bales of rayon grade wood pulp should be released to the appellants on realising further interest, if anything is due. He ordered that the appellants' bonded warehouse at Mogra would be treated as de-licensed from the date on which the goods stored therein were cleared in the manner as stated in his order and after the action regarding cancellation of the bond is completed. It was also clarified by the Assistant Collector in the said order that the warehoused goods which would be cleared on the basis of that order should not be cleared on ex-bond bill of entry as it was not a case of clearance under Section 68 of the Customs Act, but on realising the charges under Section 72 ibid.
The appellants filed an appeal before the Collector of Customs (Appeals), Calcutta against the Assistant Collector's order dated 25-6-1985 (supra). In the said appeal, however, the appellants contested the duty collected on 832 bales of wood pulp and contended that no duty was payable thereon as the rate of duty was "nil" on the date of removal of the said goods from the warehouse after 17-3-1985 by virtue of the two notifications relied on by them. They also contended that under Section 15(l)(b) of the Customs Act, the rate of duty in force on the date of actual removal of the goods from the warehouse was applicable and since in their case the rate of duty was "nil" on the date of removal of 832 bales of wood pulp in question, they were not liable to pay any duty. The appeal was disposed of by the Collector of Customs (Appeals), Calcutta by the impugned order. In terms of the Assistant Collector's order dated 25-6-1985, the 832 bales wood pulp was actually removed from the warehouse during the period from 29-6-1985 to 2-7-1985. The Collector (Appeals) did not accept the appellants' claim that the rate of duty applicable in the instant case should be the rate of duty in force on the date of actual removal of the goods from the warehouse under Section 15(1) (b) of the Customs Act. He has held that this Section is applicable in the case of goods cleared under Section 68 of the Customs Act by presenting a bill of entry in the prescribed form and after obtaining an order for clearance of the goods from the proper officer after paying duty and all charges.
He has observed that the appellants have not proved by submission of bill of entry that an order for clearance of the impugned goods was obtained from the proper officer. The appellants also failed to assign any reason as to how the goods were lying in the warehouse beyond three months limit without extension of time-limit as required under Section 61 of the Customs Act. He has, therefore, rejected the appeal filed before him. Hence, the present appeal before this Tribunal.
2. During the hearing before us, Shri Naik for the Revenue raised a legal objection stating that no appeal was filed by the appellants against the demand notice dated 8-5-1985 which was in the nature of an order-in-original. The duty on 832 bales and interest were demanded in the said order. Since no appeal was filed against that order, the said order has become final. By the order-in-original dated 26-5-1985, the Assistant Collector has order de-bonding of the warehouse and for recovering the balance amount. He has, therefore, argued that the present appeal before this Tribunal is not maintainable. In reply to this objection of the learned JCDR, Shri Bagaria for the appellants has drawn our attention to the Assistant Collector's letters dated 8-5-1985,3-6-1985 and 10-6-1985 and the appellant's letters dated 30-5-1985 and 22-6-1985. He has argued that no cross-objection was filed by the Revenue against this appeal of the appellants. He has, therefore, argued that a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the appeal cannot be raised by the Revenue at this stage. In support of this argument, he has relied on the following decisions:-Isher Singh v. Sarwan Singh and Ors. (ii) (1979) 117 ITR 930 (at page 937) -Additional Commissioner of Income-tax, Mad. I v. Dalmia Magnetite Corporation.
(iii) (1968) 67 ITR 823 (at page 837 & 838) - Kanan Devon Hills Produce Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax, West Bengal.
(iv) (1978) 112 ITR 622 (at page 625) - L.K. Shaik Mohammed Brothers v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras.
(v) (1958) 33 ITR 82 (at page 92) - Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City v. T.M. Bhumraddi and Anr.
(vi) (1981) 128 ITR 388 (at page 392) - Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi I v. Anand Prasad and Ors.Commissioner of Income-tax v. Associated Cement Co. Ltd. 3. On merits of the case, Shri Bagaria has argued that according to the provision of Section 72(l)(b) of the Customs Act, duty and interest are required to be paid in respect of the goods not cleared from the warehouse within the warehousing period. While calculating the duty, the rate of duty as in force on the date of actual removal of the goods from the warehouse should be applied according to the provision of Section 15(l)(b) of the Customs Act. Except this Section, there is no other section in the Customs Act laying down the provision regarding which rate of duty should be applied. Since the goods in question stood exempted from the whole of customs duty, CV duty and auxiliary duty w.e.f. 17-3-1985 by virtue of two notifications issued by the Central Government, according to the provisions of Section 15(l)(b) no duty should be charged on the goods at the time of actual removal from the warehouse in this case. In support of this argument, the learned Advocate relied on the following decisions :-Chowgule & Co, Pvt. Ltd. and Anr.
v. Union of India and Ors.Prakash Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. B. Sen and Ors.Jain Shudh Vanaspati Ltd. and Anr.
v. Union of India and Ors.
(iv) 1985 (22) E.L.T. 644 (Bombay) - Apar Private Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.Allibhoy Mohamed v. Collector of Customs, Bombay.Collector of Customs, Bombay v. New India Industries, Bombay.Sarabhai Chemicals Ltd., Bombay v. Collector of Customs, Bombay.Chowgule Matrix Hobs Ltd., Bombay v. Collector of Customs, Bombay.
4. On merits of the case, Shri Naik has argued that in the present case the clearance was not ex-bond clearance under Section 68 of the Customs Act, but it was under Section 72, ibid. Section 15(l)(b) applies to clearance under Section 68 of the Customs Act. Since in this case, it is not so, Section 15(l)(b) is not applicable. He has also stated that no ex-bond bill of entry was used for removal of the goods on the basis of the Assistant Collector's order dated 25-6-1985 against which an appeal was filed before the Collector (Appeals). He has also argued that the goods ceased to be warehoused goods after expiry of the warehousing period. The rate of duty mentioned in the into-bond bill of entry is applicable for removal of goods under Section 72 of the Customs Act. The same has been done by the Department in this case. He has also argued that none of the decisions relied on by the learned Advocate is applicable to the present case as the facts are different.
He has, therefore, prayed that the appeal may be dismissed.
5. We have perused the records and have considered the arguments of the learned Advocate and the learned JCDR. We shall first deal with the preliminary objection raised by the learned JCDR. The learned Advocate has cited a number of decisions in support of his argument that no preliminary objection can be raised at this stage regarding maintainability of the present appeal in the absence of any cross-objection or cross-appeal filed by the Revenue. The decisions relied on by the learned advocate have been listed in paragraph-2 (supra). In the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the appellate court has jurisdiction to construe the terms of Section 96, Civil Procedure Code-and even if the construction placed by the said court be erroneous, the appellate judgment is not a nullity and cannot be disregarded or attacked collaterally as passed by a Court not competent to entertain the appeal. It is also held that the question whether the matter was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit has to be decided (a) on the pleadings in the former suit, (b) the issues struck therein, and (c) the decision in the suit. In (1979) 117 ITR 930, it was held by Madras High Court that if an intermediary appellate authority purported to deal with a matter in appeal as if that intermediary authority had jurisdiction to deal with that appeal, though in fact that authority had no jurisdiction to deal with that appeal, the order of that appellate authority would become appealable to a higher appellate authority and, hence, the Tribunal was not right in holding that the appeal to it was not maintainable because the appeal taken before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner itself was not competent. The learned Advocate has argued that this judgment is directly on the similar circumstances of appeal as in the present case.
In (1968) 67 ITR 823, the facts were that the assessee in that case appealed to the Appellate Tribunal against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Revenue did not prefer any appeal, but shortly before the hearing of the appeal before the Tribunal, filed a petition stating that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was wrong in allowing exemption of Rs. 3,58,996, being the value of stationary wire ropes, etc., under Section 5(l)(ix) of the Wealth-tax Act, and praying that the value thereof be included in the taxable assets of the assessee, in exercise of the powers of the Appellate Tribunal under Section 24(5) of the Wealth-tax Act. On a reference to the High Court, the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court held that the Tribunal was right in rejecting the petition of the department under Section 24(5) of the Wealth-tax Act in respect of the sum of Rs. 3,58,996/-, which had been allowed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and in respect of which the Department had not preferred a cross-appeal or cross-objection. In (1978) 112 ITR 622, the Hon'ble Madras High Court has held that the Department cannot enlarge the scope of appeal to consider a point not so raised before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In the said case the Department did not challenge the point decided by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in favour of the assessee either by filing separate appeal or by cross-objection. In (1958) 33 ITR 82, it was held by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court that no new ground might be raised for the first time before the Tribunal by the respondent. In (1981) 128 ITR 388 also it was held by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court that normally a new point is not to be permitted to be raised at the second appeal stage before the Tribunal. In the case reported in (1979) 119 ITR 855, the assessee filed an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against the order of the Income-tax officer. According to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, the orders of the Income-tax Officer which were subject-matters of appeals before him were passed to give effect to the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement, and did not amount to assessment. In the Assistant Commissioner's view the assessment which had been originally made, had been made under Section 23(3) of the Income-tax Act and the said assessment had become final and conclusive long ago. If the assessee's company had grievence about the original assessment, it could have filed appeals at that time, but not having done so it could not prefer an appeal at a later stage.
6. In the case before us, the Assistant Collector of Central Excise raised a demand notice under Section 72(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 on 8-5-1985 asking the appellants to deposit duty of Rs. 8,37,543.78 and interest of Rs. 67,003.52 for the period from 16-9-1984 to 15-5-1985.
On receipt of the said demand notice, the appellants submitted a detailed reply stating their contentions in their letter dated 30-5-1985. The Assistant Collector entertained that letter and gave personal hearing to the appellants on 24-6-1985. As their contentions were not accepted by the Assistant Collector and they required the imported wood pulp lying in the warehouse for urgent use, they paid the entire amount demanded till then including the amount of interest under protest. The Assistant Collector issued his order dated 25-6-1985 with reference to the appellants' request dated 10-4-1985 for de-bonding their bonded warehouse. While passing the said order dated 25-6-1985, the Assistant Collector discussed the liability of the appellants towards customs duty and interest, the amount already calculated and demanded from the appellants in demand notice dated 8-5-1985 and the requirement of payment of further interest for the period from 16-5-1985 to the date of actual removal of 832 bales of wood pulp from the warehouse. It is true that the appellants did not file an appeal before the Collector (Appeals) against the Assistant Collector's order dated 8-5-1985, but filed an appeal against the order dated 25-6-1985.
In the said appeal they raised their contentions challenging the demand for duty and interest. The Collector (Appeals) has entertained the said appeal and, in the impugned order, he has dealt with all the issues raised in the appeal including the liability of the appellants towards payment of duty and interest. In the impugned order, the Collector (Appeals) has held that the provision of Section 15(l)(b) of the Customs Act is not applicable in the present case as the duty and the interest were demanded in terms of Section 72(l)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962. He has rejected the appellants' contention regarding applicability of Section 15(l)(b) ibid. The revenue did not file any appeal challenging the Collector's order on the ground that he could not decide the issues regarding demands for duty and interest and the applicability of the Section 15(l)(b) of the Customs Act as no specific appeal was filed against the Assistant Collector's order dated 8-5-1985. Having failed to do so, the learned JCDR could not now raise the preliminary objection that an appeal against the impugned order of the Collector (Appeals) before this Tribunal is not maintainable on the ground that the appellants did not file an appeal against the Assistant Collector's order dated 8-5-1985. In similar circumstances, in the case of Additional Commissioner of Income-tax v. Dalmia Magnesite Corporation, reported in (1979) 117 ITR 930, the Hon'ble Madras High Court has held that the Tribunal was not right in holding that the appeal before it was not maintainable because the appeal taken before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner itself was not competent. We are of the view that in the case before us, the Assistant Collector granted personal hearing to the appellants after issuing the demand notice dated 8-5-1985. In his order dated 25-6-1985, he dealt with the appellant's liability towards payment of duty and interest under Section 72(1) of the Customs Act. In our view, the Assistant Collector's order dated 8-5-1985 and 25-6-1985 got merged together and the Collector (Appeals) also decided the issues relating to the appellants' liability to payment of duty and interest. In the circumstances, the preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the present appeal before us is not sustainable and hence the preliminary objection is rejected.
7. On merits of the case, the learned Advocate has argued that the rate of duty in force on the date of actual removal of these 832 bales of wood pulp should be applicable according to the provision of Section 15(l)(b) of the Customs Act. In support of this argument, he has relied on eight decisions as listed in the paragraph-3 supra. None of these decisions is applicable to the present case as those judgments were on different facts and situations not similar to those of the present case. The facts of those cases, in nutshell, were as follows :- Ex-bond bill of entry was filed on 9-6-1980. There was delay in passing the bill of entry. Before the goods were cleared from the warehouse, the concession envisaged in Notification No. 29/79-Cus.
was withdrawn. Tribunal held that the rate of duty in force on the date of removal of goods from the warehouse was applicable under Section 15(l)(b) of the Customs Act.
At the time of import, i.e., when the goods entered territorial waters of India, the goods were exempted from payment of CV duty, vide Exemption Notification No. 364-Cus., dated 2-8-1976, but the exemption notification was subsequently rescinded by Notification No. 63-Cus., dated 1-3-1979. The goods were removed from bonded warehouse after 1-3-1979. It was held by the Tribunal that CV duty was payable as the rate of duty prevalent on the date of removal of warehoused goods was applicable under Section 15(l)(b).
A bill of entry for clearance of goods for home consumption was filed on 27-11-1975. As there was dispute about classification of goods and I.T.C. Licence, the importer requested the Assistant Collector on 27-12-1975, for permission to warehouse the goods. An into bond bill of entry was filed on 1-1-1976 and the goods were warehoused on 23-1-1976. After the disputes were settled, the importer filed ex-bond bill of entry on 9-2-1977 for removal of the goods from the warehouse and paid duty levied on that bill of entry on 26-2-1977. The importer contended that the rate of duty prevalent at the time of entry of the goods into the territorial waters of India should be applicable and not the rate of duty in force on the date of ex-bond clearance from the warehouse. Tribunal held that the rate of duty in force on the date of actual removal from the warehouse was chargeable.
The importers imported goods and got them assessed as 'Project Import" under Tariff Heading 84.66 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
The goods were kept in the bonded warehouse. At the time of clearance of the goods ex-bond, the importers claimed concessional rate of assessment at 25% ad valorem under Notification No. 40/78-Cus., dated 1-3-1978. The claim was dis-allowed by the Assistant Collector on the ground that the imports had taken place under 'project import' regulation and as such the case being a concessional import under a specific provision of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, the importers were not further entitled to claim concession under a notification. As the Notification No. 40/78-Cus., dated 1-3-1978 was in operation at the time of clearance of the goods from the bonded warehouse, this Tribunal held that the importers were entitled to concessional rate of duty under that notification subject to fulfilment of the conditions thereof.
The Hon'ble High Court has held that the taxable event in the case of imported goods occurs when the goods are imported into India, i.e., when they enter into the territorial waters of India and does not postpone till they are actually off-landed on the land mass or till the goods are valued under Section 14 or till the date for determining the rate at which customs duty should be levied under Section 15 arrives. If the goods are wholly exempt on the date when they entered the territorial waters of India, no duty is chargeable even if the exemption is subsequently withdrawn. If the goods were partially exempted from customs duty when they entered the territorial waters of India and such partial exemption was withdrawn prior to submission of Bill of Entry under Section 15, such imported goods be chargreable to customs duty at the value and rate of duty prevalant on the date of clearance of goods. If, however, the goods are wholly exempt on the date when they entered the territorial waters of India, no duty is leviable even if exemption is subsequently withdrawn, The Hon'ble High Court has held that irrespective of the date when the ship entered the territorial waters, calculation for the purpose of the rate of duty must be done with reference to the date mentioned in Section 15 of the Customs Act. It was also held that the moment the goods entered the territorial waters of India it would be subject to the control of the Customs authorities and would also be subject to the provisions of Customs Act and the provisions of prohibition and other restrictions placed on the import and the manner of import of those goods. But entry in the territorial waters though amount to import, yet will not, for fiscal purposes, determine the date and the time for the purpose of calculating the rate of duty which is leviable under Section 15 of the Customs Act.
In different situation the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that under Section 15 of the Customs Act, the rate of duty and the tariff valuation in the case of goods entered for home consumption under Section 46 shall be as on the date when the Bill of Entry is presented, in the case of goods cleared from a warehouse under Section 68 as on the date on which the goods are actually removed from the warehouse and in the case of any other goods as on the date of payment of duty.
The facts of the case reported in this judgment have been stated in paragraph-2 of the judgment itself, which is reproduced below: - "The appellants obtained licences for the import of 102 cases of 3,000 kgs. of nylon yarn. The yarn was shipped to Bombay on the basis of a letter of credit in favour of the foreign suppliers. When the shipment arrived, the appellants received the bill of lading and other documents of title from the bankers on or about August 23,1965, and paid for the same. They lodged the bill of entry the same day, and it has been claimed that the goods were assessed for duty by the customs authorities at a certain figure. The appellants stored the goods in the warehouse on December 22,1965. They cleared 32 cases for "home" consumption on May 10,1966, and there is no controversy in regard to it. The currency was devalued on June 6,1966, and the Customs (Amendment) Ordinance, 1966, was promulgated on July 7, 1966, by which Sections 14 and 15 of the Customs Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, were amended. The Ordinance was replaced by the Customs (Amendment) Act, 1966. The appellants cleared 12 cases of the aforesaid consignment on or about September 1, 1966. Another 12 cases were cleared on October 10,1966 and 46 cases were cleared in two lots on or about December 30,1966 and February 20, 1967. Their grievance was that the cases were allowed to be cleared on payment of "enhanced" duty according to the amended provisions of the Act. They paid the duty under protest and applied for refund of the excess payment on the ground that the amended law was not applicable as the consignments had been received, stored and assessed to duty before the promulgation of the ordinance. The applications for refund were rejected by the customs authorities, and their appeals were dismissed by the Appellate Collector of Customs on the ground that the amended Sections 14 and 15 of the Act were applicable to the consignment in question. The appellants filed revision application before the Central Government, but they were dismissed by the aforesaid common impugned order, dated January 16, 1969. They have therefore approached this court for a redress of their grievance." On these facts of the case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Customs Act, the rate of duty, rate of exchange and tariff valuation application to any imported goods shall be the rate and valuation in force on the date on which the warehoused goods are actually removed from the warehouse. The facts of the case did not show that the goods were removed from the warehoused after expiry of the bonding period.
In none of the above cases, the goods were removed from the warehouse after expiry of the bonding period. The facts of those cases are thus different from the present case. The judgments/decisions relied on by the learned Advocate cannot, therefore, be applied to the present case.
8. In the present case, the goods were not cleared from the warehouse under Section 68 of the Customs Act. The goods were removed on the basis of Assistant Collector's order dated 26-5-1985. Section 68 of the Act ibid provides as follows :- "The importer of any warehoused goods may clear them for home consumption if - (a) a Bill of Entry for home consumption in respect of such goods has been presented in the prescribed form; (b) the import duty leviable on such goods and all penalties, rent, interest and other charges payable in respect of such goods have been paid; and (c) an order for clearance of such goods for home consumption have been made by the proper officer.
In this case, no ex-bond bill of entry for home consumption was filed by the appellants in the prescribed form and no order for clearance for home consumption was made by the proper officer on the Bill of entry.
The conditions of Section 68 of the Customs Act were not fulfilled by the appellants. Section 15(1) (b) of the Customs Act becomes applicable when the goods are cleared from a warehouse under Section 68. In the present case, 832 bales of the imported wood pulp were not cleared from the warehouse under that section. After expiry of the warehouse period, the goods ceased to be warehoused goods. The removal of the goods was under an order passed by the Assistant Collector under Section 72 of the Customs Act. In such a case, the rate of duty applicable to the goods will be the rate of duty in force on the date of filing of the into bond bill of entry as provided in Section 15(1) (a) of the Customs Act read with proviso to Section 15(1) and Section 46 ibid. In the present case, the Customs Department has charged duty at the said rate.
According to the provision of Section 72, the interest is also recoverable from the appellants for storage of the goods after expiry of the bonding period. We, therefore, do not find any illegality in the order passed by the Assistant Collector.
9. In view of the above discussions, we do not find any justification to interfere with the orders of the lower authorities. In the result, the impugned order is upheld and the appeal is dismissed.