G. G. Sohani, Ag. C.J.
1. The Order in this case will also govern the disposal of Misc. Petitions Nos. 3836, 3770, 3892, 3827, 4075, 4079, 4098, 4099, 4144, 4145, 4150, 4157, 4158, 4159, 4160, 4168, 4170, 4172, 4175, 4182, 4186, 4189, 4204, 4207, 4210, 4216, 4221, 4247, 4234, 4235, 4237, 4249, 4251, 4259, 4262, 4275, 4278, 4282, 4283, 4284, 4296, 4297, 4305, 4329, 4332, 4333, 4336, 4337, 4346, 4353, 4354, 4365, 4365, 4366, 4372, 4373, 4374, 4375, 4378, 4379, 4383, 4384, 4386, 4387, 4388, 4389, 4390, 4394, 4395, 4396, 4397, 4398, 4399, 4401, 4416, 4426, 4430, 4449, 4459, 4463, 4464, 4465, 4466, 4469, 4474, 4476, 4480, 4481, 4482, 4499, 4505, 4511, 4512, 4514, 4515, 4516, 4517, 4518, 45!9, 4522, and 4524 of 1988 and 5,6,10,26,32,34,35,37,38,39,41,42,47,48, 51,53,55,65,66,76,80,82,83,85,89,91,92, 93,97,98,99,100,109,116,118,120,124,131, 133, 135, 137, 144, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 164, 165, 167, 170, 172, 173, 176, 177, 178, 186, 187, 192, 193, 194, 195, 202, 205, 206, 207, 208, 218, 222, 224, 226, 228, 229, 231, 232, 234, 235, 236, 243, 249, 250, 255, 256, 262, 269, 272, 273, 276, 277, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 289, 291, 305, 306, 308,347, 355, 368, 370, 375, 387, 388, 389, 394, 397, 404, 413, 416, 417, 419, 432, 441, 443, 460, 461, 470, 482, 486, 490, 494, 495, 497, 499, 500, 501, 503, 505, 514, 507, 520, 529, 530, 543, 546, 547, 548, 549, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 562, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 573, 599, 607, 616, 618, 624, 636, 639, 650, 654, 657, 682, 685, 686, 687, 696, 698, 737, 740, 752, 753, 771, 788, 799, 820, 832, 836, 837, 841, 842, 933, 970, 977, 984, 997,1008,1009,1012,1014,1025,1059,1072, 1078, 1094, 1103, 1104, 1106, 1107, 1108, 1109, 1123, 1146, 1147, 1148, 1150, 1158, 1159, 1160, 1164, 1165, 1178, 1179, 1189, 1194, 1196, 1198, 1200, 1203, 1206, 1216, 1218, 1222, 1231, 1241, 1244, 1248, 1250, 1252, 1257, 1258, 1259, 1260, 1267, 1280, 1281, 1290, 1291, 1312, 1316, 1331, 1334, 1335, 1336, 1347, 1350, 1353, 1358, 1360, 1362, 1364, 1365, 1384, 1385, 1387, 1389, 1401, 1402, 1406, 1422, 1424, 1426, 1428, 1431, 1432, 1433, 1434, 1435, 1436, 1437, 1440, 1443, 1446, 1448, 1453, 1456, 1462, 1463, 1464, 1466, 1472, 1484, 1486, 1497, 1500, 150!, 1504, 1509, 1511, 1512, 1513, 1514, 1516, 1517, 1518, 1520, 1522, 1555, 1559, 1566, 1584, 1626, 1633, 1641, 1667, 1668, 1669, 1691, 1744, 1748, 1749, 1751, 1752, 1753, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1759, 1762, 1763, 1764, 1765, 1767, 1769, 1779, 1780, l784, 1791, 1792, 1793, 1795, 1796, 1806, 1807, 1811, 1825, 1826, 1833, 1859, 1907, 1908, 1938, 1939, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1947, 1948, 1966, 1967, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2051, 2052, 2072, 2099, 2117, 2112, 2114, 2135, 2137, 2143, 2146, 2153, 2157, 2158, 2160, 2! 83, 2202, 2205, 2224, 2233, 2244, 2257, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2286, 2291, 2292, 2295, 2301, 2317, 2336, 2379, 2400, 2406, 2437, 2441, 2460, 2470, 2475, 2486, 2545, 2548, 2552, 2580, 2594, 2598, 2637, 2661, 2734, 2740, 2748, 2770, 2773, 2782, 2789, 2818, 2820, 2826, 2853, 2860, 2881, 2891, 2691, 2969, 3008, 3022, 3118, 3191, 3210, 3210, 3219, 3284, 3291, 3323, 3389, 3402, 3533, 3587, 3613, 3697, 3701, 3813, 3815 and 3827 of 1989.
2. By these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have assailed the validity of certain provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings (Amendment) Act 1989, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Amending Act').
3. Before we proceed to appreciate the contentions advanced on behalf of the parties, it would be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act 1960, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), prior to its amendment by the Amending Act. The object of the Act is to provide for a more equitable distribution of land by imposition of ceiling on agricultural holding and by acquisition and disposal of surplus land to needy persons. Section 7 of the Act, therefore, lays down that as from the appointed day, no holding would be entitled to hold land in excess of the land specified therein. Section 9 of the Act casts a duty on every holder who holds land in excess of the ceiling area, to furnish within a period of three months from the appointed day, a returrn containing requisite information. Sectfon 10 of the Act empowers the competent authority to require any person to furnish return of land held in excess of the ceiling area,,in case he fails to submit the return. By Section 11(1) of the Act, the competent authority is required to prepare a draft statement in respect of each person holding land in excess of the ceiling area. Sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act provides for publication and service of the draft statement in the manner prescribed. It further provides that any objection to the draft statement received within 30 days of the publication, shall be considered by the competent authority who shall pass an order after giving the objector an opportunity of being heard. Sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the Act lays down that while considering the objections or otherwise, if the competent authority finds that any question has ariseen regarding the title of a particular holder and such question has not already been decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction, the competent authority shall proceed to enquire summarily into the merits of the question and pass such orders as it thinks fit. The proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 4 lays down that if such question is already pending for decision before a competent Court, the competent authority shall await the decision of theCourt. Sub-section (5) of Section 11 provides that a party aggrieved by the decision of the competent authority under Section 11(4) of the Act may institute a suit in the civil court to have the order set aside. Sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act provides that after all such objections, pending proceedings and the suit, if any, filed under Sub-section (5) of Section 11, have been disposed of, the competent authority shall accordingly make necessary alterations in the draft statement' and shall publish a final statement declaring the surplus land held by each holder. Section 12 of the Act lays down that all surplus land shall be deemed to be needed for public purpose and shall vest in the State absolutely free from all encumbrances with effect from the commencement of the agricultural year next following the date, on which it is declared surplus. Section 35 of the Act lays down that surplus land vesting in the State under Section 12 of the Actshal be allotted to agricultural labourers and other persons specified in that section. Section 41 of the Act provides for appeals from orders passed under the Act and Section 42 confers revi-sional jursidiction on the authorities mentioned therein.
4. With a view to arm the competent authority to dispose of the ceiling cases under the Act cxpeditiously, the Act was amended by Ordinance No. 8 of 1988 which came into force on 1-11-1988. Subsequently, the Amending Act was enacted which was published in the M.P. Gazette (Extraordinary), dated 19th April, 1989. By virtue of Section 1(2) of the Amendment Act, it would be deemed to have come into force on 1-11-1988. The provisions which have been assailed on behalf of the petitioners, are Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 11-A, Section 11B and Section 42-A of the Act inserted by the Amending Act and the amendments in Section 41, Section 42 and Section 46 of the Act by the Amending Act. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 11-A inserted by the Amending Act are as follows :
'11-A (2) : The Civil Court before whom the cases arising out of Section 11, as it stood immediately before 1st November 1988 were pending, may deal with those cases, but such pendency before the Civil Court shall not prevent the competent authority from disposing of the cases under this Act, notwithstanding any stay granted or other process issued by the Civil Court debarring the competent authority for doing so.
(3) If the final disposal of the case pending before the Civil Court results in declaration of the title of land to a person other than the holder of the land who had filed return under this Act, such person shall not be entitled for the land of which he had claimed the title, if such land already stands distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Act and in that event, the said person shall be paid market value of the said land calculated in such manner as may be prescribed.'
Section 11-B inserted by the Amending Act, reads as under :
11- B. If the final dispoal of the case before the Appellate Authority or Revisional authority results in-
(i) declaration of title of land to a person other than the holder of the land who has filed return under this Act; or
(ii) declaration of land to be exempted from the provisions of this Act; or
(iii) entitlement of holder or person other than holder under any of the provisions of this Act;
Such person shall not be entitled for the land of which he had claimed the title or such holder shall not be entitled for the land in respect of which he had claimed exemption or the holder or such other person shall not be entitled for land declared in his favour under (iii) above as the case may be, if such land already stands distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Act and in that event, the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 11-A shall apply to such persons or holder as the case may be.'
The proviso which has been added to Section 41, is as follows :
'Provided that the surplus land vested in the State Government shall not revert to the holder thereof as a consequence of remand of the case.'
The proviso which has been added to Section 42, reads as under :
'Provided also that the surplus land vested in the State Government shall not revert to the holder thereof as consequence of remand of the case.'
Section 42-A inserted by the Amending Act, is as follows :
'42-A. No stay shall be granted by appellate authority under Section 41 or by the revisional authority under Section 42 :
Provided that the stay granted before 1st Novermber 1988, shall, on 1st November 1988, stand vacanted.'
Section 46 of the Act is substituted as follows :
'46. Have as expressly provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall have any jurisdication :
(i) to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act, require to be settled, decided or dealt with by the competent authority ; and
(ii) to grant stay in any case under this Act.'
5. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that by the impugned provisions, the Legislature has attempted to overrule or set at naught the decision of the Courts and authorities exercising judicial powers, which is not permissible under our constitutional scheme. It is urged that these provisions attempt to make a direct inroad into the judicial powers of the State and are violative of the rule of law which is a basic and essential feature of our constitution. In reply, it is contended on behalf of the State that prolonged litigation has frustrated effective implementation of the Act and that the amendments have been made with a view to remove the legal obstacles which were coming in the way of expeditious disposal of ceiling cases. It is further contended that the invalidity, if any, in the impugned provisions, is cured by the declaration made in Section 2 of the Amending Act that the said Act is for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing principles specified in Clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 and Article 46 of the Constitution of India.
6. The question as to whether the provisions of the Amending Act have the protec-tive umbrella of Article 31(c), need not detain us because even assuming it to be so, it would only bar challenge to the validity of the provisions of the Amending Act on the ground that they are violative of the provisions of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. But the challenge of the petitioners to the validity of the impugned provisions is not based on the ground that they are inconsistent with or that they take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by Article 14 and 19 of the Constitution. The grievance of the petitioners is that these provisions make a direct inroad into the judicial powers of the State and are, therefore, violative of the Rule of law which is a basic and essential of our Constitution. It is, therefore, necessary to examine this aspect of the matter.
7. Now what is meant by judicial power of the State The following observations of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Vora Fiddali Badruddin Mithibarwala, AIR 1964 SC 1043 are pertinent : (Para 126)
'In the ultimate analysis, the legislative power is the power to make, alter, amend or repeal laws and within certain definite limits, to delegate that power. Therefore, it is power to lay down a binding rule of conduct. Executive powers is the power to execute and enforce the laws and judicial power is power to ascertain, construe and determine the rights and obligations of the parties before a Tribunal in respect of a transaction on the application of the laws and even in an absolute regime, this distinction of the functions prevails.'
The distinction between a 'judicial act' and a 'legislative act' is thus well settled. Adjudication of the rights of the parties according to . law enacted by the Legislature is a judicial function. It has been held in I. N. Saksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 2250 that while the Legislature cannot, by a bare declaration without more, directly overrule, reverse or override ajudicial decisions, it may, in exercise of the plenary powers-conferred on it by Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution, render a judicial decision ineffective by enacting a valid law on a topic within its legislative filed, fundamentally altering or changing with retrospective, curative or neutralizing effect the conditions, on which such decision is based. As held in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality, AIR 1970 SC 192 a Court's decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based, are so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances. A mere declaration by the Legislature that the decision of a Court or a Tribunal shall not bind or would not be given effect to, is tantamount to reversing that decision. This would amount to exercise of judicial power which the Legislture does not possess. In the light of these well settled principles, let us examine the validity of the impugned provisions.
8. Sub-section (2) of Section 11-A, as, inserted by the Amending Act, empowers a competent authority to dispose of a case under the Act notwithstanding any stay granted or other process issued by the Civil Court debarring the competent authority for doing so. Similarly, the proviso to Section 42-A inserted by the Amending Acr, lays down that the stay granted by the appellate authority before 1st of November 1988 shall, on 1st November, 1988 stand vacated. No doubt the power to grant stay by a Civil Court or by an appellante or revisional authority in any case arising under the Act has been taken away by the Amending provisions, but these provisions have been brought into force with effect from 1-11-1988. We shall later on deal with the question as to whether the provisions of the Amending Act taking away with effect from 1-11-1988 the power of the Court or the appellate authority or revisional authority to grant stay, are or are not valid. But in any event, prior to 1-11-1988, the Civil Court and the appellate or revisional authority had power to grant stay. Section 11A(2) and the proviso to the Section 42-A, as inserted by the Amending Act, enables the compctant authority to flout an order passed by a Civil Court or an appellate or revisional authtority in exercise of judicial power. In our opinion, it is not permissible for the Legislature to say that an order of a Court or Tribunal properly constituted and passed in exercise of its judicial powers in a matter brought before it shall be deemed to be ineffective. See Jana-pada Sabha Chhindwara v. Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd., AIR 1971 SC 57. In this connection, we may also usefully refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in P. Samba-murthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1987 SC 663. The Supreme Court in that case had to consider the validity of the proviso to Clause (5) of Article 371-D which provided that the State Government may, by special order, notify or annul any order of the Administrative Tribunal before it becomes effective. The Supreme Court held that if a decision given in exercise of the judicial power can be set at naught by the State Government by overruling the decision given against it, it would sound the death knell of the Rule of law. The principles for determining as to whether the State while purporting to amend the Act, has encroached upon the judicial power, have been summarised by the Supreme Court in Utkal Contractors and Joinery (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR SC 2310 (Para 14) as follows :
'The legislature may, at any time, in exercise of the plenary power conferred on it by Arts. 245 nd 246 of the Constitution, render a judicial decision ineffective by enacting a valid law. There is no prohibition against retrospective legislation. The power of the legislature to pass law postulates the power to pass it prospectively as well as retrospectively. That, of course, is subject to other constitutional limitation. The rendering ineffective of judgments or orders of competent Courts by changing their basis by legislative enactment is a well known pattern of all validating acts. Such validating legislation which removes the causes of ineffectiveness or invalidity of action or proceedings, cannot be considered as encroachment on judicial power The legislature, however, cannot by a bare declaration, without more, directly everrule, reverse or set aside any judicial decision. Hari Singh v. Military Estate Officer (1973) I SCR 515 : AIR 1972 SC 2205; Govt. of Andhra Pradesh v. Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd., (1975) Supp SCR 394 : AIR 1975 SC 2037; I. N. Saksena v. State of M.P., (1976) 3 SCR 237 : AIR 1976 2250 and Misri Lal Jain v. State of Orissa, (1977) 3 SCR 714 : (AIR 1977 SC 1686). In the instant case, the legislature, by abare declaration in Sub-section (2) of Section 11, has enacted that the order of a Civil Court passed agaist a competent authority shall not bind it. Similarly, by a bare declration in the proviso to Section 42-A, the legislature has enacted that the stay granted by the appellate or revisional authority before 1-11-1988 shall stand vacated. This amounts to exercise of judicial power by he legislature because the effect of these provisions is to render the order of stay properly passed by a Civil Court or by an appellate or revisional authority under the Act inoperative. These provisions cannot but be held to be violativc of the Rule of law which is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution. These provisions, therefore, deserve to be struck down.'
9. Let us now turn to the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 11-A, Section 11-B and the proviso to Sections 41 and 42 of the Act, as amended by the Amending Act. The effect of these provisions is that notwithstanding any order or decision by a Court or an appellate authority, a person shall not be entitled to land, but only to compensation. These provisions, therefore, have the effect of modifying an order or decision given by a Court or a Tribunal in exercise of judicial power so that even of a person becomes entitled to land by virtue of an order properly passed in exercise of judicial power, it is declared by the legislature that such person would not be entitled to that land. There can be no manner of doubt that these provisions have the effect of modifying an order passed by a Court or a Tribunal in exercise of judicial power without changing the basis of that order. This would, therefore, amount to encroachment on judicial power. It was contended on behalf of the State that the said provisions were protected by the second proviso to Article 31A of the Constitution. The contention cannot be upheld. The challenge to the provisions in question is not on the ground that there is no provision for payment of compensation in accordance with the provisions of the second proviso to Article 31A or that these provisions offend the provisions of Article 14 or 19 of the Constitution. The validity of these provisions is assailed on the ground that they are violative of the Rule of law inasmuch as they lay down that full effect shall not be given to an order properly passed by a Court or a Tribunal in exercise of judicial power and hence these provisions constitute encroachment on judicial power by the legisla-ture. In our opinion, these provisions are violative of th Rule of law which is a basic and essential feature of out Constitution. These provisions, therefore, deserve to be struck down.
10. The next question for consideration is about the validity of Section 42-A of the Act. That provision lays down that in appeals or revisions directed against the order passed by a competent authority, no stay shall be granted by the appellate or revisional authority. Now, it cannot be disputed that the right of appeal or revision is creature of statute. The legislature may not confer that right and may also lay down conditions for the exercise of that right. The question for consideration, however, is whether once an appeal or a revision has been properly filed and entertained, can the power of the appellate or revisional authority to pass orders incidental or supplemental to the exercise of its powers for the purpose of doing justice between the parties, be taken away? An appeal or a revision is a remedy provided by law for getting an order passed by any authority cancelled or modified by approaching the higher authority in that behalf. If an appellate or revisional authority is prohibited from passing an order or stay in cases where a strong prima facie case is made out, then even if ultimately the impugned order passed by the competent authority declaring any land as surplus is set aside, restitution would be practically impossible if the land in question has already been distributed to other persons, as provided by the Act. For the effective exercise of appellate jurisdiction, an appellate authority grants stay. That is why it has been observed by the Supreme Court in Income-tax Officer, Cannanore v. M. K. Mohammad Kunhi, AIR 1969 SC 430 that the appellate Tribunal must be held to have the power to grant stay as incidental or ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction. In order that an appellate authority may not exccise this power in a routine way, the statute may provide that no order lor stay be passed unless certain conditions are satisfied so that the appellate authority acts rightly and fairly towards all the parties concerned. But by prohibiting an appellate or revisional authority from passing an order stayig the order of the competentauthority, whose order is the subject-matter of appeal or revision, the decision of the appellate or revisional authority setting aside the order of the competent authority is likely to be rendered ineffective in so far as restoration of land distributed by the competent authority is concerned. This would, therefore, virtually amount to modification of the order passed by the appellate or revisional authority and would, in a sense, constitute encroachment by the legislature on the judicial power exercised by the appellate or revisional authority. The provisions of Section 42-A arc, therefore, violative of the Rule of law and deserve to be struck down.
11. As regards Section 46, substituted by the Amending Act, learned counsel for the petitioners were unable to point out any invalidity in that provision. The jurisdiction of a Civil Court to decide matters falling in Clause (i) of Section 46. has been taken away by the Amending Act which has received the assent of the President. It has not been urged that the legislature is.not competent to enact such a provision. We see no cogent reason for holding Section 46 of the Act as amended, to be invalid.
12. For all these reasons, these petitions arc partly allowed and it is declared that Subsections (2) and (3) of Section 11-A, Section 11-B, the proviso to Section 41, the proviso to Section 42 and Section 42-A of the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act I960, as amended by the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings (Amendment) Act 1989, are void and unconstitutional. These provisions are accordingly struct down. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of these petitions. Security amount, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioners.