Judgment:
T.N. Singh, J.
1. This appeal came up for hearing before R. C. Lahoti, J., who found an apparent conflict between the view taken in three decisions rendered by learned single Judges of this Court on the question mooted in the appeal. The matter, thereafter, came up before a Division Bench of which he was also a member. However, he found unable to persuade himself to agree with the Presiding Judge (S. K. Dubey, J.) and as a result of difference of opinion between them, the controversy is to be finally resolved by me.
2. This is defendant's second appeal. Two courts have decreed the suit of the plaintiff/ respondent for his eviction on the 'ground' contemplated under Section I2(1)(e) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, for short, 'Act'. The plaintiff's case was that she had purchased the suit premises on 18-9-1972 from one Noor Beg but she did not get vacant possession as the defendant was occupying the same as Noor Beg's tenant. After her purchase, for defendant's eviction, she instituted the suit on 25-6-1973 basing her claim on Clauses (e) and (o) of Section 12(1). During the trial of the suit, on 10-4-1980, para 6A was inserted in the plaint to add further the 'ground' contemplated under Clause (e) of Section 12(1). The short question surfaced for decision in this Reference is the effect of the said amendment on defendant's rights and interests in the suit premises and on the validity of the decree passed accepting plaintiff's claim for his eviction on the 'ground' incorporated by that amendment.
3. The view expressed by S. K. Dubey, J., is that amendment necessarily would relate back to the date of institution of the suit and plaintiff's entitlement would, therefore, be hit by Sub-section (4) of Section 12 because one year's period had not elapsed between her purchase of the suit premises and institution of the suit. According to him, the decision in M/s. Bhanwarilal Trilokchand v. Bannatwala Jain & Co., 1980 MPRCJ (Note) 87 did not lay down the law correctly and that the decisions to the contrary, Chandabai v. Phulchand, 1966 MPLJ 1080, Hari Singh v. Madanlal, 1974 MPRCJ 65, Deenanath v. Kishore Kumar, 1981 (1) MPWN 110 and E. V. Subba Rao v. Udakchand, 1982 MPRCJ (Note) 36 stated the law correctly. Taking the opposite view, R. C. Lahoti, J., has observed that Section 12(4) is to be subjected to norms of purposive interpretation and excluded from operation of the doctrine of 'relation back'. According to him, Bhanwarilal Trilokchand (supra) has laid down the law correctly and the contrary view expressed in the other decisions is incorrect. In their orders, the learned Judges have referred to a large mass of case-law to support their respective views to which, I shall have occasion to refer briefly in due course.
4. First, it is necessary to extract relevant portions of Section 12 of the Act:
'12. Restriction on eviction of tenants.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only namely;
** ***(e) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned;
(f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned;
** **'(4) Where a landlord has acquired any accommodation by transfer, no suit for the eviction of tenant shall be maintainable under Sub-section (I) on the ground specified in Clause (e) or Clause (f) thereof, unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of the acquisition.
(5) Where an order for the eviction of a tenant is made on the ground specified in Clause (e) of Sub-section (1), the landlord shall not be entitled to obtain possession thereof before the expiration of a period of two months from the date of the order-
(6) Where an order for the eviction of a tenant is made on the ground specified in Clause (f) of Sub-section (1), the landlord shall not be entitled to obtain possession thereof-
(a) before the expiration of a period of two months from the date of the order; and
(b) if the accommodation is situated in cities of Gwalior (including Lashkar and Morar), Indore, Ujjain, Ratlam, Bhopal, Jabalpur, or Durg or such other towns or cities specified by the State Government by a notification in that behalf unless the landlord pays to the tenant such amount by way of compensation as may be equal to-' ** **
5. Before referring to the other provisions of the Act, a bit of legislative history, relevant to the controversy, may be injected at this stage. The Act was amended in 1983 when Clauses (e) and (f) of Sub-section (1) and Sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) of Section 12, were omitted. Simultaneously, anew Chapter, Chapter III-A, with Sections 23A to 231, was inserted. That Chapter carries the heading, 'Eviction of Tenants on Grounds of 'Bona Fide' Requirement'. However, the Act was again amended by Act No. 7 of 1985 w.e. from 16-1-1985 replacing an ordinance promulgated on 10-1-1985. Sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) along with Clauses (e) and (f) of Sub-section (1) have been reinserted in Section 12, allowing, at the same time, the new Chapter III-A to continue in an amended form by incorporating in that Chapter new Section 23J and at the same time, in Chapter III, a new provision, Section 11A is simultaneously inserted.
6. Much light is shed on the controversy mooted in this appeal by the object of the amendment made in the Act firstly, in 1983 and then, in 1985. The foremost duty of this Court is indeed to divine legislative will and to effectuate the same by construing relevant provisions to fulfil the object sought to be achieved by the exercise undertaken by the Legislature. Although at the inception, among other grounds of eviction of a tenant under the special law enacted care was taken to contemplated eviction on the ground of 'bona fide' requirement of the landlord, it was found that the provision needed special treatment and, therefore, special forum was provided for expeditious adjudication of the claim of the landlord to evict his tenant on the ground of his bona fide requirement of the premises for occupation as residence or for business for him or for any member of his family as specified in the relevant provisions. Cognizance was taken of the notorious fact that in Civil Courts procedural hassles result in final determination of such claim being in ordintely delayed thereby defeating the purpose of those provisions.
7. Chapter III-A requires the Rent Controlling Authority (vide Section 23D) at whose forum application made under Section 23A by the landlord is to be lodged, to 'commence the hearing of the application as early as practicable and decide the same, as far as may be, within six months of the order of granting of leave to the tenant to contest application'. Section 23E bars appeal against any order passed by the said Authority under Chapter III A and provides instead a 'revision' only directly to the High Court. Section 23F restricts the duration of stay order which may be granted by the High Court against an eviction order passed by the Authority to 'a total period of (not) more than six months'. The provisions of (a) and (b) of Section 23A are substantially in pari materia with those of Clauses (e) and (f) of Section 12(1). However, it may also be noted that the proviso of Section 23A contemplates on the lines of Section 12(4) that, 'where a person who is a landlord has acquired any accommodation or any interest therein by transfer, no application for eviction of tenant of such accommodation shall be maintainable at the instance of such person unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of such acquisition.'
8. For the view I have taken in this matter, reasons will follow hereinafter, but at this stage even, I would immediately observe that the doctrine of 'relation back' has no statutory sanction. That position has appeared to me undisputable. It is, indeed, for this reason, that I have taken care to examine some of the relevant provisions of Act meticulously to see if the Act affords to the doctrine any quarter. Neither Section 12(4) nor any other provision inheres any strain of that doctrine. I confess that I have not been able to subscribe to the view that the uncodified procedural doctrine must prevail to defeat any substantive statutory right of any litigant. It is one of the cardinal principles of civil jurisprodence that procedures are handmaids of justice and it is equally also fundamental that no vested right can be claimed in respect of a procedural matter.
9. Principles of civil litigation are codified in India dealing with right of action of parties by prescribing the procedure for enforcement of any statutory or other right in a 'suit of Civil nature' as contemplated in Sections 3, 4 and 9 C.P.C. Indeed, in terms of Section 4(1), Courts in india are required to examine right of action of parties and it is to be noted that expressly excluded pro tan to from operation of CPC is 'any special jurisdiction or power' conferred under any 'special or local law' in respect of 'any special forum or procedure prescribed'. Obviously, to any 'suit filed' in any civil Court to enforce any right contemplated under Section 12(1) of the Act, the procedure of CPC apply proprio vigore in full force and only in respect of any 'application submitted' to Rent Controlling Authority under Section 23A, provision of CPC have no operation to the extent of derogation contemplated thereunder. It is necessary to comprehend in this context the implications of Section IIA of Chapter III of the Act which contemplates that 'the provisions of the Chapter so far as they relate to matters specially provided in Chapter III-A shall not apply to the landlord defined in Section 23-J', Rights and obligations created in Chapter III-A are invested in virtue of Section 11A with immunity against impingement thereon resulting from the operation of any provision contained in Chapter III.
10. Joinder of 'grounds' for the same relief of 'eviction' of any tenant is expressly contemplated in Section 12(1). As a result of Apex Court's Seven-Judge Bench decision in Dhanapal Chettiar, AIR 1979 SC 1745 it has been authoritatively settled that 'cause of action' for a landlord to evict his tenant arises only in terms of the 'grounds' statutorilly contemplated and the concept of contractual tenancy has vanished; the landlord's right to recover possession from his tenant of the premises let out is enforceable in terms of his statutory entitlement and jurisdiction of the Court to pass order for tenant's eviction is similarly regulated. The scheme of Section 12 inheres inbuilt limitations contemplated under Sub-sections (2) to (10), on courts' power, to deliver 'possession' of the suit premises to the landlord even if the suit is decreed in landlord's favour because, even after an 'order' for tenant's eviction is made under Clauses (e) of (f) of Section 12(1), the landlord is not 'entitled to obtain possession' of the suit premises because Sub-sections (5) and (6) mandate expiration thereafter of two months and in case of an order passed under Section 12(1)(f), compensation also paid to the tenant.
11. A transferee-landlord's right to obtain 'possession' of the suit premises to fulfil his own 'bona fide' need in terms of Clauses (e) and (f) of Section 12(1) is obviously not regulated thereby only, but also by Subsections (4), (5) and (6). What is forbidden by Section 12(4) is filing of a suit by such a landlord on the solo 'ground', whether it relates to Clause (e) or Clause (f), making such a suit not 'maintainable' when that is 'filed' without satisfying the condition-precedent of expiry of one year from the date of purchase of the suit premises. Indeed, as contemplated under Order VII, Rule 11(a), CPC, the plaint filed without satisfying the condition precedent has to be returned by the Court in such a case for want of cause of action. Order VI, Rule 1, requires the plaintiff to specify the 'relief claimed, state 'facts' constituting the 'cause of action' and establish further, by facts stated in the plaint, that the suit is not barred by any law. Obviously, in such a case, there will be no scope for amending the plaint and it cannot, therefore, be the purpose of Section 12(4) to deal with transferee-landlord's procedural right of amending the plaint aliunde at any time, after or in the course of the trial of the suit. The view expressed in this Court's Full Bench decision in Chhotelal v. Akbar Ali, AIR 1983 MP 50 is to the same effect. Although Section 12{4) was not interpreted in that case, it was held, however, that addition of a 'new ground' in a suit for eviction already filed is not forbidden by Section 12(1).
12. To be more precise and candid, right of a transferee-landlord of evicting his tenant on a 'ground' envisaged under Clause (e) or (f) of Section 12(1) arises really in terms of Section 12(4) because his cause of action cannot arise without the basic requirement contemplated therein being fulfilled of his completing one year's waiting period. It will be a travesty of justice if he is held not entitled to continue the suit already filed on any other ground or grounds and claim the same relief of 'eviction' on any additional 'ground' specified in Clause (e) or (f). If a fresh suit on one of those grounds after expiry of one year from the date of his purchase of the suit premises is maintainable during the pendency of the suit earlier filed on other ground or grounds, by what logic his right to add a 'new ground' in the pending suit for the same relief of 'eviction' can be negatived when the language of Section 12(4) does not yield to that construction? Provisions neither of Order VI, Rule 17, CPC nor of Order VII, Rule 8, bar his right to do so. To exercise the substantive right of evicting his tenant on expiry of one year from the date of his purchase on the ground of his bona fide need of the suit premises, procedural entitlement is contemplated in terms of Order VI, Rule 17 which enables a Court to entertain and allow prayer made for amending the plaint 'for determining the real question in controversy between the parties' which would be the question indeed of landlord's obtaining possession of suit premises in terms of Sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 12.
13. The imperative underlying Section 12(4) is only that on the date of making the 'order' of eviction, Court must be satisfied that a transferee-landlord has completed one year's waiting period contemplated under Section 12(4) and he is entitled to have an 'order' from the Court which may be enforced in terms of Sub-section (5) or (6) of Section 12 to 'obtain possession' of the suit premises from his tenant. That really is the purport of Section 12(4) and that plain legislative intendment cannot be frustrated by importing consideration of any extra-statutory theory of equitable content from the realm of uncodified procedural jurisprudence. If it was the intention of the Legislature to take away, by enacting Section 12(4), transferee-landlord's right, contemplated under Order VI, Rule 17, CPC to amend his plaint of the pending suit, that intention could have been expressed in terms of appropriate legal fiction by incorporating the equitable concept of 'relation back' statutorily; but that has not been done. Power and jurisdiction to allow pleading to be amended is exercisable at 'any stage of the proceedings' and discretion is vested in the Court to expressly do so' on such terms as may be just'. If Legislature's intention was to take away the discretion and in its wisdom it thought it would not be 'just' for the amendment to be made effective from the date of the order, or if it thought that institution of a fresh suit should be the condition-precedent for exercise by the transferee-landlord of his right to evict a tenant under Section 12(4), that position could have been made clear by use of a non-obstante clause to tear off the right contemplated under Section 12(4) from its mooring provided by Section 12(1) and Clauses (e) and (f) thereof. But, that has not been done.
14. Apex Court's decision in B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan, AIR 1975 SC 1146 has, indeed a direct bearing on the instant controversy. A similar provision of a similar 'Rent Act' of West Bengal was construed not only with reference to its language and setting, but also to its object. The question of vires of an Amending Act was challenged on, among the ground, inter alia, of retrospectivity, but speaking on the object of the relevant provision, their Lordships observed: 'the purpose of the law is to interdict for a brief spell of three years (unlike one year under M.P. Act), institution of suits on grounds (f) and (ff) of Section 3A of the amended Act' which were relatable to the bona fide need of the transferee-landlord, for personal use and occupation and also for rebuilding. The provision, they held, was meant to 'disenchant speculative purchases and provide occupants time to seek alternative housing'. High Court's decision striking down the retrospectivity clause was reversed with the avowed object of saving the tenant from 'litigative waste' observing that 'social justice and substance of the matter find fulfilment when fresh pleadings are put in subject to the three year interval ....' and that could be done even at the appellate stage. Obviously, institution of a fresh suit was ruled out to pre-empt 'litigative waste' and no statutory sanction was also found for such a course.
15. In the later decision, Rameshwar v. Jot Ram, AIR 1976 SC 49, a different point arose concerning the construction of a different provision of a different statute but in that case also notwithstanding the equal concern for the 'cherished reform' and the salutory rule of 'processual equity', the later was denied operation to sabotage the reform. On a 'plain reading' of relevant Section 18 of Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act, it was held that 'once thhe deposit is made, the title to the land vests in the tenant' on the footing that 'rights of the parties are determined on the day when they came to force'. The significant feature of the holding is its emphasis on the event of statutory moment of the birth of the substantive right of ownership and its indefeasibility. Right of ownership acquired by tenants got vested in them and judicially that was immunised against the 'subsequent event' of the 'large' land-owners' death during pendency of the appeal. His successors had become 'small' land-holders and under law they could resist tenant's claim hut judicial care was taken that the agrarian reform was not sabotages. Dealing with the concept of 'subsequent event', their Lordships held that its impact on the pending action was determinable by several considerations, such as, 'whether right to remedy depends, under the statute itself, on the presence or absence of certain basic facts at the time the relief is to be ultimately granted; the Court, even in appeal, can take note of such supervining facts with fundamental impact'. The decision in P. Venkataswarlu v. Motor & General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409, was referred to and it was observed : 'Where cause of action is deficient, but later events have made up the deficiency, the Court may, in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation, permit the amendment and continue the proceeding provided no prejudice is caused to the other side'. Approving Privy Council's dictum in Chokalingam Chetty, (1928) 54 Mad LJ 88 : (AIR 1927 PC 252) it was held that rights vested by virtue of a statute cannot be defeated by any equitable doctrine. Judicial cognizance of 'post-natal' events is to be tampered by the consideration that 'by its own manipulations a change in situation' is not obtained by the party to plead for relief on the altered basis'.
16. Reference is also made by my learned Brothers in their orders to two other decisions, in Hasmat Rai, AIR 1981 SC 1711 and Gulabbai, AIR 1991 SC 1760, which are to be examined now. In the first case, this Court's decision was in appeal finding unwarranted this Court's reluctance to apply the law laid down in P. Venkateswarlu (AIR 1975 SC 1409) (supra). In the Second Appeal this Court had rejected the tenant's plea for consideration of landlord's disentitlement to* the decree for eviction due to subsequent event, in terms of Clause (f) of Section 12(1). It was contended that during the pendency of the Second Appeal, the landlord had obtained possession of 'other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own' and his need was thereby satisfied. That was upheld by the Apex Court in allowing the appeal. There was no occasion for Court to expound the scope of Section 12(4) and determine rights and obligations contemplated thereunder of the landlord and tenant. In Gulabbai (AIR 1991 SC 1760), rendered on the provisions of Section 13(1)(a), Bombay Rent, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, Easmat Rai's and P. Venkateswarlu (supra) were found handy precedents and to the later decision rendered in the case of Variety Emporium, AIR 1985 SC 207 the Court also referred. High Court's judgment was upheld, rendered on the basis of additional evidence adduced under Order XLI, Rule 27, CPC of the landlord's need vanishing on construction of a bungalow and his residing therein during the pendency of the lis in the High Court.
17. The subsequent event of acquisition of a new 'ground' of eviction by the transferee-landlord under Section 12(4) during pendency of his suit is, in terms of decision in Rameshwar's case (AIR 1976 SC 49) (supra), an event of creation of a new right. On vesting of that right in the plaintiff in virtue of Section 11 A, the change in situation acquires other bearings as well. This may be demonstrated with the help of a hypothetical case of a widow and a physically handicapped person, specified in Section 23 J. If such natural calamity as loss of husband by a woman or of a limb by man or woman visits the plaintiff who is a transferee-landlord, during the pendency of his/her suit filed on one or more other 'ground' and the event occurs after plaintiff's completion of one year's waiting period, he or she gets a vested right to submit application under Section 23A, but why such a plaintiff be required to make a fresh application and be incompetent to get the plaint amended. It should be possible for trial of the claim of such a plaintiff to proceed at the new forum on amended plaint when that is returned under Order VII, Rule IDA, C.P.C. or when an order is passed by High Court under Section 24, CPC transferring the case to the Rent Controlling Authority for trial. Otherwise, the primacy accorded under Section 11A to rights of such a plaintiff may loss its pendency. Indeed, de novo 'application' and its trial de novo would enure only to tenant's benefit, fortuitously acquired and not statutorily contemplated. On the other hand, deprivation of the benefit of the continuity of the trial at Rent Controlling Authority's forum will manifest frustration of the object of Section 11A and Chapter III-A. Courts always take notice of the legislative history of the amandatory enactment and its total effect to discern the object it is meant to fulfil and the amended provisions are accordingly construed. To construe Section 12(4), it would be legitimate to abide by this imperative.
18. On a proper construction of Section 12(4) in the backdrop of the legislative history and on its language and setting in the context of its object, I reiterate, transferee-landlord's right of action to enforce his substantive right 'created' thereunder like his substantive right of eviction, cannot be defeated by importing the equitable concept of 'relation back' and denying him the right to amend his plaint in a suit earlier instituted when the situation changes naturlly and not owing to his manipulation. Time and tide are natural phanomena impervious to human 'manipulation'. As soon as the period of one year elapses of the transferee-landlord's acquiring the suit premises, he becomes entitled in terms of sub-sec. (4) of Section 12 to seek eviction of his tenant to fulfil his bona fide need, namely, on the 'ground' specified in Clause (e) or Clause (f) of sub-sec. (1). Referential incorporation of a statutory provision is a well-recognised drafting technique and its implications are well-known. The 'referred' provision becomes part of the 'incorporating provision. On amendment prayed being allowed to add in the plaint the claim to the 'relief' of eviction on the 'ground' specified in Clause (e) or Clause (f), no prejudice is caused to the tenant/defendant. He is not taken by surprise. To the birth of new right he cannot protest and raise defence in that regard. When the transferee-landlord files the suit in terms of Section 12(1) for his eviction, he mentions the date of his acquisition of the suit premises and cognizance of the lapse of time is taken by the Court to effectuate the judicial mandate. There is no compulsion in the language of any part of Section 12 or in any other provision of the Act as makes the landlord liable to institute a fresh suit on the expiry of one year's period contemplated under Section 12(4) and disables him to continus the suit already filed to claim in that suit the relief of tenant's eviction on an additional 'ground' or cause of action, statutorily contemplated. The tenant cannot claim any vested right in procedure and be a party to a 'litigative waste' by raising the defence that to obtain relief on additional ground the landlord must file a fresh suit and suffer the travail of another round of litigation when at the appellate stage itself in any Court he becomes entitled to that relief in terms of his vested substantive right. Relevance in this context of the impact of Sections 11A and 23-J discussed in the last para is to be stressed once again. Section 12(4) is to be so construed as to promote effectively and not restrict operation of Order VII, Rule 17, C.P.C. so that its real object is duly fulfilled. Courts cannot ignore the legislative care for landlord's 'bona fide' need of the tenanted accommodation for his own use and occupation because right to shelter and livelihood is a constitutional right contemplated under Article 21. See, in this connection, Olga Tellis, AIR 1985 SC 180; Sodan Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1988. Legislature's balancing exercise between competing rights is amply manifested in Section 12(4) which contemplates waiting period to benefit simultaneously the tenant and the landlord reasonably and equitably.
19. Privy Council's decision in Ma Shwe Mya v. Maung Mo Hnaung, AIR 1922 PC 249 is cited by respondent's counsel, Shri Ramji Sharma, vocalising the proposition on which I have focussed light in dealing with this controversy. A new case could not be set up by way of amendment but 'to secure to the proper administration of justice', their Lordships observed, rules of Courts 'should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose so that full powers of amendment must be enjoyed and should always be liberally exercised' provided, however, one distinct cause of action could not be substituted for another. Other decisions which he has cited also support the view I have taken.
20. In Majati Subbarao, AIR 1989 SC 2187, plea taken by tenant denying landlord's title for eviction was held to constitute a ground for his eviction and for enforcing the right in that regard, separate proceeding was not necessary. In the same suit, the relief of eviction could be obtained by amending the plaint and indeed, omission of landlord to do so was also held as not fatal to landlord's claim if the trial proceeded on that basis with full knowledge of parties. In M. Laxmi & Co., AIR 1973 SC 171, the general principle was stated that Court can take notice of subsequent events to shorten litigation, to preserve rights of both the parties and to subserve the ends of justice. My attention is also rivetted by Shri Sharma on para 29 of the Report in Nair Service Society, AIR 1968 SC 1165 to the dictum pronounced there that when during the course of trial, the law changes affecting the rights of the parties, courts may allow an amendment pleading the changed circumstances to avoid circuity of action and grant relief on the basis of the new cause of action pleaded. That was a case under Specific Relief Act. In another case, Babulal, AIR 1982 SC 818, relief was also claimed on the basis of the said Act and the same view was expressed in that case also.
21. Appellant's counsel, Shri Naik, has supported the view taken by Dubey, J. and relied on the decisions cited in his order. However, he has also cited further, Nand Kishore, AIR 1987 SC 2284. But, on facts, that is distinguishable. A different provision of a different enactment was construed and it is difficult to equate the provision construed in that case with Section 12(4) because that was not a case of a transferee-landlord and nor indeed, of his bona fide nee9. Mohinder Kumar, AIR 1986 SC 244, is also distinguishable for the same reason. Indeed, in that case vires of the relevant provision was challenged, but without success, though it may be stated still that similar provision was construed in that case concerning inapplicability of the Act for the period specified in respect of houses constructed and tenanted during the period. Legislature's power to fix the exemption period was held indisputable. Ramesh Chandra's case, 1992 AIR SCW 991, is a decision rendered on the same question on a similar provision; that related to suit for eviction filed prior to completion often years' exemption period. That too is obviously distinguishable, for the same reasons.
22. Now, those decisions of this Court are to be reviewed which form the core of controversy in this case. Bhanwarilal Trilok-chand (1980 MPRCJN 87) (supra) may be dealt with briefly first became that decision agrees with my view having held that during pendency of a suit instituted on other grounds, a transferee-landlord cannot be denied the right to amend his plaint and claim relief of eviction on the grounds contemplated under clauses (e) and (f) of Section 12(1) of the Act. It is a short decision and no reasons are given; there is no consideration of the purport and object of Section 12(4), but the view taken is the correct view for the detailed reasons which I have already given above. The other line of decisions which created problem for the Referring Judges are twosome, Deenanath (1981 (1) MPWN 110) and E. V. Subbarao (1982 MPRCJ N 36) (both supra) rendered by two other learned Judges of this Court separately.
23. In Dcenanath's ease there is reference in the head note only to the provisions of CPC (Order VI, Rule 17 and Order VII, Rule 7) along with Sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 12 of the Act, but discussion in the judgment is only on the latter provision. Although reference is made to the decision in B. Banerjee's case (AIR 1975 SC 1146) (supra), the holding thereof was found in applicable merely because another single Judge in Hari Singh (1974 MPRCJ 65) (supra) said so. Indeed, summarily, it was also held 'it could not be disputed that in ease the proposed amendment was allowed it would take effect from the date of the suit'. The Aher case, E. V. Subbarao was decided by the same learned Judge, G. L. Oza, J. (as he then was) on the lines of Hari Singh, cited in Deenanath. After dealing with B. Banerjee's case he expressed the view that Section 12(4) was susceptible to the general concept of 'relation back' and that B. Banerjee's ease was concerned with the effect of an Amending Act and, therefore, it had no direct bearing on the interpretation of Section 12(4). In Harisingh is extracted B. Banerjee dictum, at para 13 of the Report --'.... not to be ritualistic in insisting that a return of the plaint and representation thereof incorporating amendments is the sacred requirement of law'; there should have carried weight with the Court. Unfortunately, even no notice was taken in Harisingh of exposition of the rationale of the 'waiting period' contemplated in the similar provision construed in B. Banerjee. In all the three decisions- Deenanath, Harisingh and Subbarao, the signature tune of B. Banerjee was regrettably missed; innocently the general concept of 'relation back', carefully negatived by Apex Court, came to be insinuated in Section 12(4) without its implications affecting rights of parties governed by Special Law being analysed.
24. Khumansingh's decision, though also rendered on Section 12(4), dealing with the question of amendment and holding that impermissible, relied simply on Deenanath (1981 (1) MPWN 110) and the Full Bench decision in Chhotelal (AIR 1983 Madh Pra 50). It is obviously of the same pattern. There is a mere reference to these decisions and there is no discussion of the statutory provision. In the short order passed in Chandabai (1966 MPU 1080), the holding is based on the construction of the expressions 'maintainability' and 'filing of the suit' and on the distinction between the two. There was no occasion for the Court to construe the impact of any provision of CPC on sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 12 of the Act. No amendment was prayed or allowed and, indeed, at para 22 of the Report, that crucial question was deliberately left open very carefully. This decision obviously, therefore, has no impact on the controversy mooted in this Reference and it is of a different category.
25. Without any hesitation, I reiterate once again, that the scope and purport of Section 12(4) has so far eluded careful analysis. Not only its language and setting but its object as well that of the amendatory exercise of the legislature attaching significance to the 'ground' of landlord's 'bona fide' need and ! bestowing on it special attention, have a compelling message and it would be an act of constitutional sacrilege if it is ignored. Plaintiff/ landlord can be non-suited under Section 12(4) on two conditions: if he has not completed one year's waiting period and if he has no 'bona fide' need of the suit premises which could be established obviously during the course of trial. The Court is bound to obey the legislative mandate and allow the plaintiff to amend his plaint of the pending suit to enforce his statutory right contemplated under Section 12(4), but it shall have jurisdiction still to pass appropriate order specifying 'terms' for trial of the new plea. Indeed, the amendment would not result in the suit being ipso facto decreed. It will be plaintiff's burden still to establish that his need was 'bona fide' and in the course of trial he would be required also to satisfy the requirements contemplated under clauses (e) and (f) of Section 12(1). Indeed, as held in B. Banerjee (AIR 1975 SC 1146), even at the earlier stage, such 'new pleadings' can be put in. Hashiat Rai's case (AIR 1981 SC 1711) and other decisions of that category also emphasised the judicial duty to adjuciate the rights and obligations created under 'Rent Acts' by any subsequent event without considering whom it benefits. Both landlord and tenant are entitled to plead 'subsequent event' in the pending lis, which terminates only when 'possession' is delivered or refused to the landlord under the decree/ order passed in that regard. Lachhobai Rathore, 1987 MPRCJ 23 : 1988 Jab LJ 213, rendered on Section 12(1)(a) for the first time focussed on this aspect in refusing 'possession' to landlord in the execution proceedings on tenant's paying the arrear rent and purging the statutory default. A lis of this type is a moving panorama. If it is fossilized judicially at its birth by 'relation back', the social objective to which the Act caters would get frustrated.
26. Having discussed the decisions cited at the Bar and referred in their Orders by my learned Brothers S. K. Dubey and R. C. Lahoti, JJ., and given anxious consideration to the different aspects of the controversy mooted in this Reference, I have reached carefully after due deliberation the conclusion that Bhanwarilal Trilokchand (1980 MPRCJ (Note) 87) was correctly decided. I am also of the considered opinion that the view to the contrary, expressed in Harisingh (1974 MPRCJ 65); E. V. Subbarao (1982 MPRCJ (Note) 36) and Deenanath (1981 (1) MPWN 110) is not correct; and that Section 12(4) of the Act, has not been properly construed in those decisions. Similarly, Khumansingh's case has not been correctly decided in so far as it concerns the interpretation of Section 12(4) of the Act. Chandabai (1966 MPLJ 1080) was decided on its own facts and in that case, very carefully and appropriately, the question of amendment which did not arise in the case, was kept open.
27. The matter shall now go before the learned Referring Judge for final disposal of the appeal.