Faizanuddin, J.
1. The order passed in this petition shall also govern the disposal of Misc. Petition No. 2471 of 1984 (Ram Lakhan Gupta v. Awadhesh Pratap Singh Vishwavidyalaya & 2 others) as common questions of law and facts arise in these two petitions.
2. The petitioners in the two petitions had passed B.Com. Examination securing marks less than 40 per cent in aggregate. The petitioner, Rajesh Namdeo had passed the said B.Com. Examination in 1980. whereas the petitioner Ram Lakhan Gupta had passed the B.Com Examination in 1982. Both of them applied to the then Education Minister to permit them to be admitted in LL. B. Part-1 as a special case in the Law College, Satna, respondent No. 3, which is affiliated to Awadhesh Pratap Singh Vishwavidyalaya, Rewa (hereinafter referred to as the 'respondent-University'. The Education Minister directed the respondent No. 3 to admit the two petitioners in LL.B. Part-I, as a special case. The Examination of LL.B. Part I had to be held in March 1984. The petitioner Rajesh Namdeo (Misc. Petition No. 2640/84) was served with a memo dated 12th March, 1984 1 Annexure-E) cancelling his examination, on the ground that he had secured less than 40% marks in the qualifying B.Com. Examination. The petitioner Ram Lakhan Gupta (Misc. Petition No. 2471/84) had appeared in the first paper on 31st March, 1984, but before he could appear in the second paper, he was also served a similar memo, cancelling his examination on the same ground, that is to say, he too has secured less than 40% of marks in B.Com Examination. These are the two orders in these petitions which are under challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
3. The respondents Nos. 1 and 2 alone have filed their separate returns in Misc. Petition No. 2640/84 which have been adopted in other petition also (Misc. Petition No. 2472/84). In their returns, the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had taken the stand that the respondent No. 3 had admitted the two petitioners in LL.B. Part-1 against the rules of admission framed by the Bar Council of India and, therefore, their admission as well as examination was rightly cancelled by the respondent-University, by the impugned orders. It has been stated that in accordance with the Rule 5 of the Rules framed by the Bar Council of India, no student is eligible for admission to the course of instruction in law unless he had, inter alia, obtained at least 40% marks in the qualifying examination. The respondents have thus relied on Rule 5 and the instruction (Annexure. R-l) issued by the Bar Council of India in that behalf and have thereby supported the action taken by the University.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners first submitted that the Minister of Education was competent to grant the permission for their admission in LL.B. Part-I by condoning the requirement of 40% marks and, therefore, the respondent-university was not justified in cancelling the admission and examination of the petitioners. Relying on the decision in the case of Shri Krishnan v. Kurukshetra University, AIR 1976 SC 376. He also submitted that the petitioners were once admitted and allowed to appear in the examination, their candidature could not be withdrawn, in our opinion, there is no force in any of the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners and the decision in the case of Shri Krishnan (supra) has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
5. It has not been disputed by the petitioner themselves that they had secured less than 40% marks in B.Com. The petitioner Rajesh Namdeo had secured 39.5% marks in aggregate whereas the petitioner Ram Lakhan Gupta had secured 38.5% marks in aggregate in B.Com Examination, which was the qualifying examination for the purpose of admission in LL.B. Part-I. Section 49 of (he Advocates Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') relates to the powers of the Bar Council of India to make regulations to carry, out the purpose of the act generally and on specified matters. Section 49 of the Act reads as under: --
'Section 49 :-- General Power of The Bar Council of India to make Rules : --
(1) The Bar Council of India may make rules for discharging functions under this Act, and, in particular, such Rules may prescribe : --
(af) The minimum qualification required to admission to a course of degree of Law in any recognised University.
(d) The standards of legal education to be observed by the Universities in India and the Inspection of Universities for that purpose.'
The Bar Council of India in exercise of the powers conferred on it by section 49 of the Act reproduced above, has framed rules in Part-IV of the Bar Council of India Rules, Rule 5 of which reads as under : --
'Rule 5 : Admission of student to the course of instruction in Law shall ordinarily be on the basis of merit. No student shall be admitted to the course of instruction in law unless he has inter alia, obtained 40% marks in the qualifying examination for admission.'
6. A plain reading of Rule 5 reproduced above abundantly and explicitly makes it clear that no student can be admitted to the course of instruction in law unless he had secured at least 40% marks in the qualifying examination for admission. Admittedly, none of the two petitioners in the two petitions, had secured 40% marks in their B.Com. Examinations. Consequently, the petitioners were not eligible for admission in LL.B. Part I course. In view of the statutory rule debarring the admission of a student to the course of instruction in law who had secured marks less than 40% in the qualifying examination, neither the Education Minister nor any of the respondents would be competent to direct admission of the petitioners who had obtained marks less than 40% as no power of relaxation of the said requirement vests either in the Education Minister or in the respondents or any of them. It is a settled principle that if law requires a thing to be performed in a particular manner it has to be done in that manner alone or not at all. That being so, the admission of the petitioners in LL.B. Part-I was wholly without jurisdiction and contrary to the provisions contained in Rule 5 referred to above.
7. Learned-counsel for the petitioners next submitted that the respondents Nos. 1 and 3 were well aware of the fact that the petitioners had not secured 40% of marks in their B.Com. examination, yet they were permitted to prosecute their studies and, therefore, the respondents' action in cancelling the admission is hit by the principles of promissory estoppel. In our considered opinion, there is absolutely no substance in this contention too, for the reason that the principles of estoppel or promissory estoppel cannot be applied against any statute. As discussed above, Rule 5 is a statutory rule according to which no student can be admitted to the course of instruction in law unless he has, inter alia, obtained 40% marks in the qualifying examination for admission. Since the obtaining of 40% marks in the qualifying examination is the condition precedent for the eligibility for admission to the course of instruction in law, mere acquiescence or permission granted by the respondent No. 3 to the petitioners on the recommendation of the then Education Minister to prosecute their studies cannot operate as estoppel, the same being contrary to the statutory rule. It may not be out of place to mention that the application form for ad mission to LL.B. Part I filed by the petitioner Ram Lakhan Gupta, was produced before us on which a note is appended to the effect that he was admitted only provisionally. If, ultimately, for the reasons stated above, it was found that he was not eligible for admission according to Rule 3, the cancellation of his admission cannot be said to be unjustified or bad in law.
8. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioners relying on a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Bal Krishna Tiwari v. Reg. of A.P.S.U., 1978 MPLJ 172 : (AIR 1978 Madh Pra 86) contended that the impugned orders cancelling the admission was bad in law as before issuing the same, the petitioners were not given any opportunity to show cause as to why their admission and examination may not be cancelled. After careful examination of the Full Bench decision referred to above we find that the present case of the petitioners before us is quite distinguishable from the Full Bench decision of this Court and, therefore, the same does not advance the case of the petitioner. In the Full Bench decision referred to above, the result of the petitioners in that case was withheld by the University on the ground he was not eligible to appear in the examination as an Ex-student candidate and that the admission accorded to him was under a mistake. This Court, therefore, took the view that as interpretation of expression 'Ex-student candidate' in Ordinance 6(1). M. P. Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam admitted of two interpretations and one of the two views could have been profitably placed by the petitioner before the authorities if he had been given an opportunity to do so and, therefore, in those circumstances, it was held that there was a violation of natural justice in not affording this opportunity to the petitioner of thatcase. But in the case before us the admitted position is that the petitioners were not eligible for admission by virtue of the statutory Rule 5 referred To above and it was for this reason that they had approached the then Education Minister to permit their admission as a special case because they had not secured qualifying 40% marks in their B.Com. Examination. This being, the admitted position and there being no power of relaxation vesting either in the Education Minister or in any of the respondents, it would not have been in any manner profitable to the petitioner even if, an opportunity of being heard in that behalf was afforded to them before their admission and examination was cancelled and the absence of such an opportunity in the special facts and circumstances of the present case has not resulted in any prejudice or in any injustice to the petitioners as admittedly the petitioners were not eligible for the said admission. That is why only provisional admission on the recommendation of the Minister was given and on examination of rules when it was found that the petitioners could not be legally admitted, their admission and examination was cancelled.
9. In the result, both the petitions (Misc. Petition No. 2640/84 and Misc. Petition No. 2471/84) fail and are hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs. The outstanding amount of security, if any, be refunded to the respective petitioners.