Judgment:
ORDER
1. Early hearing. Shri Ramji Sharma prayed of this matter and that is given to him. The petition is disposed of after hearing counsel on both sides at sufficient length.
2. In the first place, Shri Ramji Sharma contended that respondent No. 2 was not to be considered in terms of Annexure P/6 because he is aged 22 years and the petitioner being aged 36 years was eligible to be considered thereunder for the grant of the quarry lease in question. His second contention is that though non-petitioner No. 2 made an application prior in time to the application of the petitioner, both applications had to be considered together and even if an order is passed granting quarry lease in favour of non-petitioner No. 2 reasons should have been communicated to the petitioner for refusing to grant him the lease. These are the maincontentions pressed before us today in this petition.
3. In so far as the first contention is concerned, we find no merit in that contention for the short and simple reason that there is in Annex. P/6 a non-statutory guideline merely laid down. Although clause 2 of that circular issued by the State Government on 25-10-75 to the Collectors speaks of quarry leases to be granted to unemployed educated of the age of 33 years there are other conditions too expressed more clearly and categorically. Clause 2 is not to be read in isolation. We do not think if that clause is a mandatory condition and the petitioner, who had eligibility otherwise, is not to be granted lease because he had not attained 33 years age; that is merely a directory and not a mandatory provision. The beneficent object contemplated under the circular is of providing employment to unemployed educated which is not to be frustrated. It is stated in the circular that even those candidates who had passed higher secondary examination could be granted quarry lease. If that be so, what such a person will be doing until he has attained the age of 33 years because usually a boy passes the higher; secondary examination on attaining the age of 16 or 17 years. The object of the provision made is to help the unemployed educated and not to help those who have already been established otherwise in life.
One cannot be expected to lead a wasteful life of a vagrant in the prime of his youth and further away the benefit of education to turn it into a wasteful expenditure. A reasonable view to take of the age-index is to regard it as one of the outer limit; otherwise it would have been specified expressly that no lease to a person of lesser age (below 30 years) would be granted. In any case, the close and immediate nexus between education and employment is to be given due weight as special provision conferring special privilege on the special category is made.
4. To meet the second contention our attention is drawn to the return to the petitionfiled by the respondent No. 1 Collector, Gwa-lior. At sub-para (ii) of para 5 of the return, there is a clear statement that 'after considering all applications' received for the quarry lease for the survey number in question, the application of respondent No. 2 was granted on the ground that the application was received earlier in time.
5. It is submitted by Shri Ramji Sharma that statutory provisions of Rule 9 of M.P. Minor Mineral Rules, 1961 are mandatory. He has submitted that even if the application of the petitioner is refused, the Collector or the State Government was bound to communicate in writing the reasons to the petitioner inasmuch as against that order, passed against him, he has a right of appeal and revision which he can enforce only when that is done. In that contention, we have seen merit because we have not been satisfied by respondent No. 1 that reasons had been duly communicated to the petitioner of the refusal to grant him the quarry lease applied by him.
6. In the result, we dispose of this petition by making a short direction to respondent No! I that within a week he shall communicate to the petitioner the reasons as contemplated in Rule 9 of the M.P. Mineral Rules, 1961. That indeed is a mandatory provision. We also leave it open to the petitioner to challenge that order before appropriate authority in accordance with law exercising the right of review, appeal or revision as may be contemplated in law and when that is done, the limitation would be considered to run from the date of communication of the reasons to the petitioners.