T.N. Singh, J.
1. On 15-1-1985, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Ater, in District Bhind, passed an order (Annexure A/3) constituting a trust in respect of 'Shri Ram-janki Mandir' and also appointed 'Trustees', evidently exercising his powers under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951, for short, the 'Act'. By subsequent order passed on 3-7-1986 (Annexure A/9), he made changes in the Register in respect of entries concerning the names of Trustees earlier appointed. His subsequent action and the order passed by him in exercise of his powers under Section 9 of the Act are challenged on the Writ side before us.
2. What appears clear on the face of Annexure A/3 is that steps to constitute the Trust were taken by the S.D.O. in pursuance of the direction made in that regard by Collector, Bhind, in his order passed on 11-4-1983 in Revenue Appeal No. 13/81-82. That order is also on record. That is Annexure R/1 of return of respondents Nos. 1 to 3. They are, State of Madhya Pradesh through the Chief Secretary, Government of Madhya Pradesh, Collector, Bhind and the Registrar of Trusts-cum-Sub-Divisional Officer, Ater, District Bhind. The fourth respondent impleaded in this petition is Shriram Shastry. It appears that the said Shriram Shastry had filed an appeal complaining that the Court below had illegally appointed, in his place respondent Vidyaram, Gram Sarpanch, as Pujari of the temple and had vested in him authority to manage and administer the properties of the temple. He submitted that since the death of Pujari Prabhu Dayal, whose brother he was, he has been performing religious duties of the Office of Pujari and has also been looking after the properties of the temple. In appeal, the learned Collector took the view that the lower Court had not addressed itself at all to the question of the merit of respondent Vidyaram to hold the Office of Pujari, mainly on the ground that he was a resident of the village, his appointment was made. The fact that he was neither educated nor well-versed in the performance of religious rights and ceremonies was not considered. The matter was remanded to the Court below to reassess merits of respective candidates and to make a fresh appointment of the Pujari of the temple. No direction of interim nature was made and evidently, therefore, respondent No. 4 continued to act as Pujari of the temple. Indeed, in the concluding paragraph of the Collector's judgment, the relevant direction for constitution of Trust only was made.
3. The assertion of respondent No. 4 in his return that he continued as Pujari of the temple has been buttressed by the averments made in the common return aforesaid of respondents Nos. 1 to 3, They have stated that the lands of the temple were owned by the State and were managed by the Aukaf Department and that respondent No. 4 was Pujari of the temple, but he was neither heard nor was he made a 'Trustee' when the order Annexure A/3 was passed. Indeed, the occasion for passing the impugned order (Annexure A/ 9) arose when respondent No. 4 complained that the Order, Annexure A/3, had been obtained fraudulently on misrepresentation of facts and he made a prayer for the Trustees being changed because they were closely related to each other and they had a covetous eye on the properties of the Mandir which they intended to misappropriate. They had got Gram Sarpanch Vidyaram appointed as Pujari with that motive and the fact is that petitioner No. 2 Shyambabu Sharma is brother of Vidyaram. Admittedly, an application was filed by Shyambabu Sharma describing himself as President of 'Mandir Ramjahki Sewa Samiti', by which he prayed for constitution of a Trust under the Act in respect of the properties of the temple. That is Annexure A/1. In that application, he had named as many as 12 persons as Trustees and given particulars of the temple building without naming the owner of the lands attached to the temple in the total area of 7.316 hectares. With the petition has also come Annexure 1/2, a Gazette Notification dated 15-6-1984, published under the signature of the S.D.O., Ater, that it appeared to him that properties described in the Schedule thereof was 'Public Trust' and he proposed to hold enquiry in regard to that matter on 14-8-1984. Be it mentioned here that neither in the Gazette Notification nor in the application of petitioner Shyambabu, any mention was made of order of Collector passed on 11-4-1983. The short order (Annexure A/3) recited that no objection pursuant to Gazette Notification was received and as such, Trust was declared, as prayed, in respect of the temple and its properties and Trustees were named. However, all the 12 persons named as Trustees in the application, Annexure A/1, were not recorded as Trustees; only seven of them were so recorded.
4. The only contention forcefully pressed by Shri Tomar, appearing for the petitioners is that the S.D.O., acting as 'Registrar' under the Act, had no power to pass the impugned order, Annexure 1/9. As soon as the Trust was declared and Trustees were named by the order earlier passed on 15-1-1985 (Annexure A/3), the Registrar/S.D.O. became functus officio. With regard to the application of respondent No. 4, the only jurisdiction that he had could be exercised under section 26 of the Act. Counsel's submission is that only Civil Court has jurisdiction to make any change as respects one or more Trustess of the 'Public Trust' constituted under the Act. The argument is attractive, but it has failed to appeal us for reasons to follow.
5. According to Section 26(1), 'If the Registrar on the application of any person interested in the public trust or otherwise is satisfied' in respect to matters enumerated in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof, 'he may after giving the working trustee an opportunity to be heard, direct such trustee to apply to Court for directions within the time specified by the Registrar'. As per Sub-section (2), if no application is made by the Trustee, as directed, and the Registrar himself 'considers it expedient to do so', he can make such an application to the Court/What is to be noted importantly is the scope of jurisdiction of the Registrar to act under Section 26 as that is circumscribed by twin requirements. Firstly, there has to be an application for him to act thereunder made by any person 'interested in the public trust' and in the absence of such an application, he has to be 'satisfied' himself about matters in respect of which grievance can be made in the application, as enumerated in Clauses (a), (b) and (c). Obviously, according to those Clauses, action under Section 26 can be taken when the complaint is that the object of the public trust has failed or that the trust property is not being properly managed or administered or that direction of the Court is necessary for administration of the public trust. It is true, according to Section 27(2), the Civil Court is vested with the jurisdiction, inter alia, of removing any Trustee or appoint-ing a new Trustee. But, that power can only be exercised when the Civil Court is able to take seisin of the matter on reference being made to it by the Registrar under Section 26 of the Act. We have no doubt that the provisions of Sections 26 and 27 are not in derogation of other provisions of the Act to which we shall presently refer. These provisions, in our opinion, do not impinge on the competence of the Registrar to act otherwise, in accordance with Section 9 of the Act. Truly speaking, the special provisions of the Act being in derogation of the general provisions contained in Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the primacy of the other provisions of the Act vesting jurisdiction under the Act in the Registrar to make any change in the consti-tution of the Trust, in our opinion, can be overlooked and ignored only at the risk of incurring the disapproval of Legislature and acting without jurisdiction. Sections 26 and 27 operate only when there is a validly constituted 'public trust' under the Act and the Registrar is satisfied that the trust has become non-functional or that the trust pro-perty is not properly managed or administered so that for those matters, Civil Court's direction is necessary as, in regard to those matters, he is unable to act under the other provisions of the Act. He cannot act under other provisions, when jurisdiction was exercised by him validly under Sections 5, 6 and 7 (infra).
6. Sub-sections (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (9) of Section 2 define respectively the terms 'Prescribed', 'Public Trust'. 'Register', 'Registrar', 'Trustee' and 'Working Trustee'. Rules are made under the Act to prescribe 'Matters to be dealt with under the Act'. A temple, among others, can be subject-matter of an 'express or constructive trust for public, religious or charitable purpose', to be so registered under the Act. As per Section 3(2), a 'Register' is required to be maintained by the 'Registrar' of Public Trusts. A 'trustee' is a person in whom 'either alone or in association with other person, the trust property is vested and includes a manager'. The 'Working Trustee' means any person 'who for the time being either alone or in association with some other person or persons administers the trust property.....' As per subsection 4(1), 'the working trustee of every public trust shall apply to the Registrar having jurisdiction for the registration of the public trust' and the informations to be given in relation to such a public trust are mentioned in sub-section (3). Either on receipt of an application under Section 4 or on his own motion, the Registrar is required to make an enquiry 'in the prescribed manner for the purpose of ascertaining facts enumerated in sub-clauses (i) to (viii), as per Section 5(1) and sub-section (2) requires that the Registrar 'shall give in the prescribed manner public notice of the inquiry proposed to be made under sub-section (1) and invite all persons interested in the public trust under inquiry to prefer objections'. On completion of the inquiry under section 5, the Registrar is required under Section 6 to 'record his findings with reasons therefor as to the matters mentioned in the said section'. We propose to quote now relevant portions from the next three sections :--
'7. Registrar to make entries in the Register.-- (1) The Registrar shall cause entries to be made in the Register in accordance with the findings recorded by him under section 6 and shall publish on the notice board of his office the entries made in the register.
(2) The entries so made shall, subject to the provisions of this Act and subject to any change recorded under any provision of this Act or a rule made thereunder, be final and conclusive.
8. Civil Suit against the finding of the Registrar.-- (1) Any working trustee or person having interest in a public trust or any property found to be trust property, aggrieved by any finding of the Registrar under section 6, may within six months from the date of the publication of the notice under Sub-section (i) of section 7, institute a suit in a Civil Court to have such finding set aside or modified.
9. Change.-- (1) Where any change occurs in any of the entries recorded in the register, the forking trustee shall, within ninety days from the date of the occurrence of such change or where any change is desired in such entries in the interest of the administration, of such public trust, report in the prescribed manner such change or proposed change to the Registrar.
(3) The provisions of section 8 shall apply to any finding under this section as they apply to a finding under section 6'
7. The conspectus of the provisions aforesaid brings out in bold relief the totality of Registrar's competence in the matter of registration or declaration or legal constitution, for that matter, of a 'public trust' under the Act. The extent of his powers in the matter of registration of the public trust and the conditions precedent for exercise of those powers are also clearly laid down. If the Registrar acts on an application under Section4(I), to hold inquiry contemplated under Section 5, he has to be satisfied that the applicant was the 'working trustee' and when he acts suo motu under Section 5(1), he has still to make the inquiry contemplated thereunder in the 'prescribed manner' and for making such an inquiry, he is required to give 'in the prescribed manner public notice of the inquiry proposed'. The 'findings' which the Registrar is required to record 'with reasons' are with respect to matters such as names and addresses of the trustees and the Manager of the trust and the mode of succession to Office of trustees of such trust which are enumerated in clauses (iv) and (v) of Section 5(1) and are also stated in Clauses (iii) and (iv) of Section 4(3). The Registrar has to make entry in respect thereof in the 'Register in accordance with such findings and as per Section 7(2) the entries are regarded as 'final and conclusive' albeit 'subject to any change recorded under any provision of the Act or rules made thereunder'.
8. Deputy Advocate General Shri M. C. Jain, appearing for respondents Nos. 1 to 3 and Shri V. G. Khot, appearing for respondent No. 4, have submitted that when the S.D.O. had passed his first order on 15-1-85-(Annexure A/3), he failed to satisfy himself that the applicant Shyambabu Sharma (peti-tioner No. 2) was a 'Working Trustee' and indeed, he could not do so because of appel-late order of the Collector dated 11-4-1983 (Annexure R./1). In his application. Shyam babu had suppressed the material fact that respondent was 'Pujari' and as per Col-lector's appellate order, his position in regard to that office or management of the property of the temple was not disturbed. If anybody could be regarded as 'working trustee' under the Act on the date of constitution of the Trust on 15-1-1985, that person was respondent No. 4. That apart, the relevant informations furnished by Shyambabu in his applica-tion were neither complete nor correct even otherwise so as to meet the requirements of Section 4(3) of the Act. However, the main emphasis of the counsel is on jurisdictional requirement in the matter of registration of a 'public trust' by the Registrar contemplated under Section 5. It is their submission that the enquiry has not been held in the 'prescribed manner' and that public notice of the inquiry in the 'prescribed manner' had not been given to all persons interested in the public trust and they have submitted that this fact is noted by the S.D.O. in the impugned order rendered subsequently on 3-7-1986.
9. The manner for holding inquiry for registration is prescribed in Rule 5 of the relevant rules framed under the Act in 1962. The requirement thereof is for publication of notice, 'in addition to its publication in official gazette, at the office of the Registrar of public Trust, but importantly also 'at the place at which the immovable property of the trust is situate'. In the instant case, as noticed earlier, in registering the trust on 15-1-1985, the Registrar assumed jurisdiction to do so on the basis merely of publication of gazette notification. That apart, he has not recorded any 'finding', much less, giving 'reasons' for the finding with respect to the several matters contemplated in Clauses (i) to (viii) of Section 5(1). Although he named the 'Trustees', he did not name the 'Manager of the Trust' and did not record the reasons for the finding about the persons named by him as trustees that they were holding office as such or were competent to hold office and to be appointed as such. The entire proceedings which culminated in entries being made in the 'Register' (as per Annexure A/4) with respect to the names of trustees were evidently illegal and without jurisdiction and the proceedings in that regard must be deemed void.
10. Our attention is drawn in this connection to this Court's decision in Ramsharan v. Mahipatrao, AIR 1987 Madh Pra 29, rendered on the provisions of Administration of Evacuee Property Act as to Custodian's jurisdiction under that Act to declare a property as 'Evacuee Property'. It was observed that in the event of non-compliance with any of the conditions precedent for exercise of jurisdiction thereunder by the authority concerned, any order rendered in exercise of the powers conferred in the relevant provision of the Act must be deemed to be without jurisdiction and, therefore, nothing but nullity. Such order would be stillborn and ineffective. Because, a public functionary invested with power and jurisdiction to deal with civil rights must act strictly in accordance with the requirements of the statutory provisions and any decision rendered by such authority overlooking and ignoring statutory requirement and requisite legal criteria would be void. This legal principle was enunciated on the basis of Apex Court's decision in Dhulabhai's case AIR 1969 SC 78 and Privy Council's decision in Mask and Co., AIR 1940 PC 105. Applying these propositions to the instant case, we find no difficulty to conclude at once that appointment of trustees under S.D.O.'s earlier ordered, rendered on 15-1-1985, is a nullity. This we say because we have no hesitation to hold that the requirement of 'public notice', and also of the inquiry to be held in 'prescribed manner', contemplated under S.5 of the Act, are conditions precedent for assumption by the Registrar of jurisdiction in the matter of constitution of any 'public trust' under the Act. The other requirements of recording 'finding' and giving 'reasons' therefor, contemplated under Section 6, are also salutary and are of mandatory nature. To hold otherwise would be defeating the object of the Act and render otiose its other provisions, e.g., Sections 7(2), 8 and 9. By contemplating at once 'finality', challenge of any 'finding' in a Civil Court and conditional 'change' in any entry, strict compliance with procedural requirement is envisaged. In rendering the order on 15-1-1985, provisions of Sections 5 and 6 were grossly violated and as such, in terms of Section 7(2), the S.D.O. had the jurisdiction to entertain and decide objections in respect thereto raised by respondent No. 4 in his application and to pass order thereon under section 9 after making proper enquiry contemplated under the Act.
11. Although Shri Tomar seriously challenged the application under Section 9 preferred by respondent No. 4 contending that he could only institute a Civil Suit under Section 8(1) of the Act, that contention is meritless. The Section envisages a 'finding' by the Registrar with 'reasons' under Section 6, as can validly give rise to any grievance, but in the instant case, as pointed out, the Registrar failed to render any 'finding' or give 'reasons'. Although he named some persons (including petitioner No. 2) as 'Trustees', he gave no finding as to whether and how their claim as existing trustees was found established.
In our opinion, Section 7(2) is the complete answer to Shri Tomar's contention because the right to apply for a 'change' under Section 9 is expressly saved thereunder with respect to any 'entry' in the Register, including those of 'trustees'. It is expressly contemplated under Section 7(2) that as regards any 'entry' in the Register, finality is attached subject to the right contemplated under Section 9 and that position is buttressed in section 9(3). Accordingly, we find very attractive and plausible the contention of the counsel for the respondents that against the impugned order, petitioner No. 2 has appropriate remedy to be pursued by way of civil suit as contemplated under Section 8(1) read with Section 9 of the Act.
12. Reliance by Shri Tomar on decisions cited may be tested now. In Phoolchand, AIR 1974 Madh Pra 55, what is held is that when the trust-deed does not provide for automatic termination of office on completion of term of trustees, the Registrar cannot remove the existing trustees and nominate new trustees in their place though that power can still be exercised by the Civil Court under Section 25(3) of the Act. In the case of Sheoprasad Dubey, 1972 Jab LJ (SN) 6 Page 5(2), the lis, similarly, was of a different complexion. It was held that the Registrar had no jurisdiction to make even 'interim management' when action had already been taken by him under Section 26(1) of the Act and decision was taken for referring the matter to the Civil Court. If Mahant Narayandas, 1962 MPLJ (SN) 97 Page 46(1) serves any useful purpose, it supports the view taken by us. It was held that Registrar had power under Section 9 to direct changes to be made in the register maintained under the Act in respect to the office of Sarbarahkar. In that case, one part of the Registrar's order was held illegal because he had made a further direction for property belonging to the temple to be placed in possession of the Sarbarahkar so recorded. It was held that such a direction can always be made by Civil Court acting under Section 26 of the Act. In the case of Dalludas, 1971 Jab LJ (SN) 135 Page 108(1), the view expressed is that Registrar cannot act suo motu under Section 26 to remove an existing trustee because that power can only be exercised thereunder by the Civil Court. Evidently, in that case, there was no application under Section 9 of the Act by the Working Trustee for any change to be made with regard to any entry concerning the Manager which the Registrar had made in that case. As a matter of fact, the trust in that case did not have any 'Manager' so recorded in the Register maintained under the Act. The decisions cited by Shri Tomar are evidently distinguishable on facts and indeed, in not a single case, the question which confronts us came up for consideration of the Court. We have already indicated that Registrar's power to act under Section 9 and of Civil Court to act under Sections 26 and 27 are of different shades and complexions and are mutually exclusive. The Registrar becomes functus officio when a 'Public Trust' is validly constituted under the Act in accordance with the provisions of the Act. That apart, his power to act under Section 9 or for that matter, even under Section 25 to meet exigencies contemplated under those provisions, suffer no derogation on account of the jurisdiction vested in the Civil Court to act in accordance with the provisions of Sections 26 and 27. While Section 9 is wide enough to enable the Registrar to make any change in the entries recorded in the Register 'in the interest of administration of a Public Trust'. Section 25 specifically provides the Registrar with jurisdiction to make direction to the Working Trustees and also act himself for filling up of interim vacancy in the Board of Trustees in such manner as is not inconsistent to the instrument of the trust or the mode of succession specified in the Register. Those powers are not touched by Sections 26 and 27 as the Act vests in the Registrar jurisdiction in the matter of registration and constitution of a public trust under the Act and empowers him to act in incidental matters to make meaningful his supervision on such institutions.
13. We have no doubt that Registrar/ S.D.O. had full jurisdictional competence to act under Section 9 of the Act in this matter, at the instance of respondent No. 4. Although a 'public trust' in respect of Shri Ramjanki Mandir was registered on 15-1-1985 that was done pursuant to direction made in that regard on 11-4-1983 by the Collector, Bhind. We have also demonstrated how, under that order of the Collector, respondent No. 4 continued to be in charge and management of the affairs of the Mandir. We have clearly shown above how Registrar/S.D.O. could not act on the application made under Section 4(1) of the Act by petitioner No. 2 Shyam-babu as that application contained incomplete and incorrect particulars and was made in suppression of real and actual facts. If it had revealed that as per Collector's order, petitioner No. 1 could not validly make that application as he was not a 'Working Trustee', because respondent No. 4 could claim that status, or if it had disclosed the real fact that the lands attached to the temple were property of the State Government, managed by the Aukaf Department, in his order passed on 15-1-1985, the Registrar/S.D.O. would have clearly stated that the application was not maintainable and that he was acting suo motu under Section 5(1) pursuant to Collector's direction. Even if respondent No. 4 was not vested with the right to hold the trust property either under the order of the Collector or otherwise, the fact established in this case is that he managed, or in other words, 'administered' the trust property. He could be. therefore, validly recorded as a 'Working Trustee' under Section 2(9) of the Act despite the facf that he was not a 'Trustee' as defined under Section 2(7) of the Act. The definition of the term embraces evidently a de facto trustee as also a trustee de son tort and respondent No. 4 clearly fulfilled that role by managing trust property to the exclusion of others even though he was doing so while acting only as a Pujari of the temple. We may appropriately refer in this connection to Apex Court's decision in Ishwardas, AIR 1968 SC 1364 in which Section 2(18) of Bombay Public Trust Act was considered. The distinction between a Manager or Shebait of the properties of an idol and trustee of the properties of the idol indicated by the Bombay High Court was duly stressed to observe that such Manager or Shebait being charged with administration or management of the property for and on behalf of the idol may not be the legal owner of the property and may not, therefore, be 'landlord', like a 'trustee'. The Act has also evidently made distinction between a 'Trustee' and a 'Working Trustee' and has advisedly empowered the 'Working Trustee' to initiate proceedings, whether under Section 4(1) or 9 of the Act.
14. Before we conclude, we may also note briefly the contention advanced by Sarvashri M. C. Jain and V. C. Khot that in any view of the case, the petition must fail. Indeed, they have rightly submitted that petitioner No. 1 Ramjanki Mandir Trust, can have no grievance against the impugned order as the Trust duly constituted on 15-1-1985 continues to enjoy that status under the impugned order dated 3-7-1986. It is only petitioner No. 2 Shyambabu who is aggrieved because the 'trustees' named in the order dated 15-1-1985 are changed under the impugned order and he is dropped. The appointment of those trustees, it is submitted, being without jurisdiction, for reasons aforesaid, this Court shall not issue a Writ to restore the invalid appointment. In that connection, counsel have relied validly on two Bench decisions of this Cosurt. (See Punjab Sikh Regular Motor Service, 1987 MPLJ 776 : (AIR 1988 Madh Pra 43) and Babbusingh, 1989 MPLJ 322). Reliance on A. M. Allispn, AIR 1957 SC 227, in facts and circumstances of the case, is also most apposite. It has been held by the Apex Court that in certiorari proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court has a power to refuse writ if it is satisfied that there was no failure of justice and interference on facts with the impugned order was not warranted.
15. We entertain no doubt at all about lack of standing of petitioner No. 2 in challenging jurisdiction competence of Registrar/ S.D.O. in passing the impugned order on 3-7-1986 and changing thereby the entry in the Register maintained under the Act with respect to his name or of other Trustees. His conduct in suppressing material fact in his application under Section 4(1) of the Act, is sufficient to deny him standing in this petition. Otherwise too, we do not think if it will be in public interest to allow closely related persons such as the father, sons, brothers and nephews to constitute a 'Public Trust 'and in this case, that position would obtain if the Trustees, as earlier named in the earlier order dated 15-1-1985, are brought back by setting aside the impugned order dated 3-7-1986. Before passing the impugned order care was taken to remove the defects afflicting the earlier order. After a proper spot enquiry and hearing all parties (including villagers), some of the trustees earlier named in the Register were changed and a representative body with some new trustees (one of them also designated as 'Manager' as required under the law) was constituted in accordance with law. As all the old members were not dropped, entry in respect of their names was not affected. True, petitioner No. 2 Shyambabu, was dropped, but both contenders for the office of Pujari, Vidyaram and respondent No. 4, were included in the new Committee which was directed to make appointment of a qualified person as Pujari of the temple.
16. For all the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in this petition and it is dismissed; but in the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.