ORDER
A.K. Patnaik, C.J.
1. In this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the validity of notification dated 10-10-2005 issued by the State Government under Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 as well as the vires of Sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the said Act.
2. The facts relevant for the purpose of disposal of the petition are that under Entry 22 of List III to the Second Schedule to the Constitution read with Article 246 of the Constitution, both Parliament and State Legislature have concurrent power to make law relating to trade union and industrial and labour disputes. In exercise of such powers, the State Legislature has enacted the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (for short 'the Act') with the assent, of the President of India. Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act provides that Section 1 and Section 112 of the Act shall come into force at once and the State Government may, by notification, bring any or all of the remaining provisions of the Act into force in respect of (a) any or all industries, or (b) undertakings in industries were the number of employees on any day during 12 months preceding the date of notification or any day thereafter was or is more than such number as may be specified in such notification, on such date as may be specified therein. In exercise of such powers under Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act, by notification dated 31-12-1960, the State Government directed that all the provisions of the Act other than Sections 1 and 112 thereof shall come into force on 31-12-1960 in respect of undertakings or the industries specified in the Schedule to the notification wherein the number of employees on any date during 12 months preceding or on the date of the notification or any day thereafter was more than 100. In the Schedule to the said notification, 32 industries were specified. 'Electrical goods' industry is one of the 32 industries specified and hence industry of the respondent No. 3 in Madhya Pradesh came within the purview of the Act. The petitioner which is trade union of employees working in the industry of the respondent No. 3 was recognised by the Registrar under Chapter III of the Act. The Act regulated the relations between the employees and the industry of the respondent No. 3 and all industrial disputes between the employer and the employees in the industry of the respondent No. 3 were settled in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
3. In May, 2000, M.P. Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 2000 (for short 'the Amendment Act, 2000) was enacted and in Section 1, Sub-section (4) was introduced providing that the State Government may, by a notification, direct that the provisions of the Act shall cease to apply to such industry in such area and from such date as may be specified in the notification. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act, 2000 stated that at present the State Government had no power to displace the application of the provisions to the industry to which the Act has already been applied and the need of this power has been felt at different times, hence the proposed amendment. Subsection (2) of Section 1 of the Amendment Act, 2000 provided that the Amendment Act shall come into force on such date as the State Government may, by notification, specify. As yet, the State Government has not issued a notification appointing the date from which the Amendment Act, 2000 shall come into force. The result is, Sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the Act introduced by the Amendment Act, 2000 has not been brought in force. Yet by the impugned notification dated 10-10-2005, made in purported exercise of powers under Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act, the State Government has amended the notification dated 31-12-1960 so as to delete from the said notification dated 31 -12-1960 the industries specified against Serial Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 15 and 16 including electrical goods industry. By the impugned notification, therefore, the industries mentioned against the said serial numbers including 'electrical goods industry' are sought to be excluded from the purview of the Act.
4. Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act empowers the State Government to bring all or any of the remaining provisions of the Act into force in respect of all or any of the industries or undertakings in an industry on such date as may be specified therein. He submitted that Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act is a piece of conditional legislation inasmuch as it empowers the State Government to determine the industries or undertakings in respect of which the provisions of the Act will come into force and once this power is exercised by the State Government by issuing a notification bringing all or any of the remaining provisions of the Act into force in respect of any industry or undertakings the power of the State Government under Sub-section (3) of Section 1 is exhausted and the State Government can not issue another notification under Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act so as to amend the previous notification or exclude from the purview of the Act an industry or industries or undertakings in respect of which the Act is enforced by the previous notification.
He submitted that Section 21 of the M.P. General Clauses Act, 1957 is a rule of statutory interpretation and will not vest in the State Government the power to amend a notification issued under Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act bringing all or any of the remaining provisions of the Act into force in respect of any or all industries or undertakings in an industry. In support of these submissions, he relied on the opinion of the Supreme Court in Re. Delhi Laws Act, AIR 1951 SC 332, as well as the decision of the Supreme Court in Lachmi Narain v. Union of India : [1976]2SCR785 . He submitted that the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Bhure Balram Brahman v. Gomatibai 1981 MPLJ 377 lays down the correct law that the rule enacted in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is presumptive and can be displaced by the object and context of the statutory provision conferring the power. He argued that the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in M.P. Dainik Vetan Bhogi Karmachari Sangh, Jabalpur v. State of M.P. 2003(4) M.P.H.T. 199, holding that Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act read with Section 21 of the M.P. General Clauses Act, 1957 vests the power in the State Government to amend a notification already issued under Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act bringing the provisions of the Act in relation to an industry or undertaking is not good law and should be over ruled. Mr. Shrivastava submitted that the State Legislature itself was aware that the State Government has no power under Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act to amend or withdraw a notification issued thereunder bring all or any of the remaining provisions of the Act into force in respect of any or all industries or undertakings as it has enacted the Amendment Act, 2000 introducing Sub-section (4) in Section 1 empowering the State Government to direct by a notification that the provisions of the Act shall cease to apply to such industry in such area and from such date as may be specified in the notification. He submitted that Sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the Act introduced by Amendment Act is ultra vires because it empowers the State Government to repeal the provisions of the Act after they are made applicable to an industry or establishment and under the Constitution the power to repeal an Act is that of the State Legislature and can not be delegated to the State Government. He, however, submitted that since the Amendment Act, 2000 has not been brought into force as yet by any notification and sub- section (4) of Section 1 of the Act has not come into force, it is not necessary for the Court to decide the question as to whether Sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the Act introduced by Amendment Act, 2000 is ultra vires. He submitted that on account of the impugned notification, all proceedings pending before the Labour Courts and the Industrial Courts under the Act in relation to industries specified in the impugned notification will have to come to an end as there is no provision in the Act as to how such pending proceedings will be dealt with. He also submitted that the consequence of the impugned notification would be that the employees would be without any remedy for enforcing their rights in the Industrial and Labour Courts established under the Act and the petitioner Union will no longer have any right to represent the employees in such proceedings and in other matters.
5. Mr. Sanjay Yadav, learned Deputy Advocate General for the State Government on the other hand submitted that Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act may be a piece of conditional legislation but the power conferred by a piece of conditional legislation does not necessarily get exhausted once it is exercised and such power can be repeatedly exercised by the State Government from time to time, he submitted that in Brij Sunder Kapoor v. 1st Additional District Judge : AIR1989SC572 , the decision of the Supreme Court in Lachmi Narain v. Union of India (supra) was cited as an authority in support of the argument that the power of the Central Government under Section 3 of the Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957 can not be exercised for the second time, but the Supreme Court rejected the said contention and held that the power under Section 3 of the said Act could be exercised relying on the provisions of Sections 14 and 21 of the General Clauses Act. He submitted that the power conferred under an Act on the Government to exempt any class of persons, goods or property from levy of tax is also a piece of conditional legislation, as has been held by the Supreme Court in I.T.C. Bhadrachalam Paperboards and Anr. v. Mandal Revenue Officer A.P. and Ors. : (1996)6SCC634 . He submitted that it is well settled that the power of Government to issue a notification of exemption would also include the power to rescind or amend such notification by virtue of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. He submitted that the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in M.P. Dainik Vetan Bhogi Karmachari Sangh, Jabalpur v. State of M.P. (supra), that the power of the State Government under Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act read with Section 21 of the M.P. General Clauses Act, 1957 will include the power to amend or rescind a notification issued under the said Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act lays down the correct law.
6. Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act and Section 21 of the M.P. General Clauses Act, 1957, which are relevant for deciding this case are quoted herein below:--
Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960
1. Short title, extent and commencement.--
(1) *** *** *** #** ***
(2) *** *** *** *** ***
(3) This section and Section 112 shall come into force at once and the State Government may, by notification, bring all or any of the remaining provisions of this Act into force in respect of--
(a) any or all industries; or
(b) undertakings in any industry wherein the number of employees, on any day, during twelve months preceding or on the date of the notification or on any day thereafter, was or is more than much number as may be specified in, such notification;
on such date as may be specified therein.' Section 21 of the M.P. General Clauses Act, 1957
21. Power to make, to include, power to add, to amend, vary or rescind orders etc.-- Where, by any Madhya Pradesh Act, a power to issue notification, orders, rules or bye- laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanctions and conditions, if any, to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws, so issued.
A bare reading of Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act quoted above would show that after the State Government brings all or any of the remaining provisions of the Act into force in respect of any or all industries or undertakings in any industry by a notification, there is no such power conferred by the said sub- section enabling the State Government to issue a notification amending or rescinding such previous notification. The contention of Mr. Yadav, learned Counsel for the State of M.P., however, is that such implied power is available under Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act read with Section 21 of the M.P. General Clauses Act, 1957. The question to be decided in the case, therefore, is as to whether the State Government can amend or rescind the notification dated 31-12-1960 bringing the remaining provisions of the Act into force in respect of the industries or undertakings specified in the said notification dated 31-12-1960.
7. In Lachmi Narain v. Union of India (supra), cited by Mr. Shrivastava, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, a similar question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. Section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950 empowered the Central Government to extend by notification in the Official Gazette to any Part C State or any part of such State with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment which is in force in Part A State. In exercise of this power, the Central Government by notification dated 28-4-1951 extended to the then Part C State of Delhi the Bengal Finance (Sales-tax) Act, 1941 with some modifications. The result was that the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 with such modifications came into force in the then State of Delhi. Thereafter by notification dated 7-12-1957 in the official Gazette, the Central Government made an amendment in the said notification of the Government of India dated 28-4-1951. It was contended before the Supreme Court on behalf of the appellant that the power given by Section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950 was a power of conditional legislation and is different from the power of delegated legislation and such power of conditional legislation was not a recurring power and it exhausts itself once the provisions of the Act are extended and therefore the Central Government did not have the power to issue the notification dated 7-12-1957 amending the previous notification dated 28-4-1951. It was contended on behalf of the Union of India, on the other hand, that under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, the Central Government had the power to amend or rescind the notification dated 28-4-1957. The Supreme Court held that the power given by Section 2 exhausts itself on extension of enactment and it can not be exercised repeatedly under Section 21 of the M.P. General Clauses Act which is only a rule of construction and can not be construed to widen the statutory limits of the power given by the statute. Relevant portions of Paragraphs 58, 59 and 81 of the said decision of the Supreme Court as reported in : [1976]2SCR785 , which contain the reasons for the aforesaid conclusion are quoted herein below :--
Bearing in mind the principles and the scope and meaning of the expression 'restrictions and modifications' explained in Re: Delhi Laws Act AIR 1951 SC 332 let us now have a close look at Section 2. It will be clear that the primary power bestowed by the section on the Central Government, is one of the extension, that is, bringing into operation and effect, in a Union Territory, an enactment already in force in a State.
The power given by Section 2 exhausts itself on extension of the enactment; it can not be exercised repeatedly or subsequently to such extension. It can be exercised only once, simultaneously with the extension of the enactment. This is one dimension of the statutory limits which circumscribe the power.Nor could the respondents derive any authority or validity from Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, for the notifications withdrawing the exemptions. The source from which the power to amend the Second Schedule, comes is Section 6(2) of the Bengal Act and not Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. Section 21 as pointed out by this Court in Gopichand v. Delhi Administration : 1959CriLJ782 embodies only a rule of construction and the nature and extent of its application must be governed by the relevant statute which confers the power to issue the notification. The power, therefore, had to be exercised within the limits circumscribed by Section 6(2) and for the purpose for which it was conferred.
(Emphasis supplied)
8. In Brij Sunder Kapoor v. 1st Addl. District Judge (supra), cited by Mr. Yadav, learned Counsel for the State of M.P., a similar question arose for consideration, Section 3 of the Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957 empowered the Central Government to extend by a notification to any Cantonment with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit any enactment or legislation of control of rent and regulation of house accommodation, which is in force in the State in which the Cantonment is situated. By notification dated 3-4-1972 issued under Section 3 of the said Act, the Central Government extended the provisions of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947) to the Cantonments in the State of U.P. but soon thereafter the U.P. Act 3 of 1947 itself was repealed and replaced by U.P. Act 13 of 1972 and accordingly the Central government issued a notification dated 1-9-1973 in supersession of the earlier notification dated 3-4-1972 and extended to all the Cantonments in U.P., the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 as it stood on the date of notification in the State of U.P. with some modifications. Relying on the decision in Lachmi Narain (supra), the appellant contended that the power of the Central Government under Section 3 of the Cantonment (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957 got exhausted when the notification dated 3-4-1972 was issued extending the provisions of the Act 3 of 1947 to the Cantonments in U.P. and therefore, the second notification dated 1-9-1973 purporting to extend provisions of the Act 13 of 1972 to Cantonments in U.P. was illegal and nonest. The Supreme Court rejected the said contention and held that there was a basic difference in the situation and the nature and purpose of the legislation in the case of Lachmi Narain and in the case of Brij Sunder Kapoor. The Supreme Court held the provisions of Section 3 of the Act of 1957 in the circumstances is to be construed so as to enable the Central Government to issue notifications from time to time and that the provisions of Sections 14 and 21 of the General Clauses Act would apply and it will be open to the Central Government to extend another legislation or further legislation to Cantonments in place of one that had been repealed. Paragraph 14 of the decision of the Supreme Court in Brij Sunder Kapoor v. 1st Additional District Judge, as reported in AIR which contain the reasons for the said conclusion is quoted hereinbelow :--
It will be at once dear that there is a basic difference between the situation in Lachmi Narain : [1976]2SCR785 (supra), and that in the present case. In both cases, the power conferred is to extend the provisions of another Act with modifications considered necessary. In Lachmi Narain this had been done by the 1951 notification. The Bengal Finance (Sales-tax) Act had been extended to Delhi with certain modifications. The object of the 1957 notification was not to extend a Part A legislation to Delhi, it was to modify the terms of an extension notified earlier. This was held to be impermissive inasmuch as all that the section permitted was an extension of the laws of a Part A State to Delhi which, ex facie, had already been done in 1951. Here the nature of the legislation in question is totally different As we shall explain, later, the whole purpose of Act XLVI of 1947 (1957) was to ensure that the cantonment areas in a State have the same rent laws as the other areas thereof. Thus when Act III of 1947 ceased to be in force in the rest of the State, no purpose would be served by its continuing in force in the cantonment areas alone. So also when the provisions of the law in force in the State got amended, there should be a power to extend the amended law in the cantonment. This was, obviously, the reason why Act 22 of 1972 amended Section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957 to omit the words 'on the date of the notification' retrospectively, the provisions of Section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957 should, in the circumstances be construed so as to achieve this purpose and as enabling the Central Government to issue notifications from time to time and not as exhausted by a single invocation as in the case of the statute considered in the Delhi Laws Act case AIR 1951 SC 332 (supra). Section 3 could, therefore, be invoked from time to time as occasion arises and the notifications dated 1-4-1973 and 17-2-1982 are valid and intra vires. In such a situation, we think, the limitation suggested in the above decision will not operate. On the other hand, the provisions of Section 14 and Section 21 of the General Clauses Act will apply and it will be open to the Government to extend another legislation or further legislations to cantonments in place of the one that had been repealed.
(Emphasis supplied)
9. An analysis of the reasons given by the Supreme Court in the two decisions quoted above would show that the Court will have to examine the statutory provision which confers the powers on the Government to issue a notification for the purpose of finding out the purpose for which the notification is issued and the dimensions or limits of the statutory power and then decide as to whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act could be invoked to issue a second notification to amend or rescind an earlier notification issued under the statutory provision. This is because Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is only a rule of construction and as has been held by the Supreme Court in Gopichand v. Delhi : 1959CriLJ782 , the nature and extent of application must be governed by the relevant statute which confers the power to issue the notification and as has been held by this Court in Bhure Balram Bramhan v. Gomati Bai (supra) the rule in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is only a presumption which can be displaced by the object and context of the statutory provision conferring the power to issue the notification. It is not that the power under every piece of conditional legislation once exercised gets exhausted and can not be exercised successively. As to whether such power gets exhausted once exercised 'will depend on the nature, character, limits, dimensions and object of the piece of conditional legislation conferring the power. Hence, the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act which confers the power on the State Government to issue the notification has to be examined for the purpose of finding out as to whether in the absence of a provision in the said Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act can be invoked for issuing a notification amending or rescinding a notification previously issued under Sub-section (3) of Section 1 bringing the provisions of the Act into force in respect of an industry or any undertaking.
10. If we examine the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act quoted above, we find that Section 1 and Section 112 of the Act have come into force at once with the enactment and publication of the Act on 31 -12-1960. Sub-section (1) of Section 1 says that the Act will be called as M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960. Sub-section (2) of Section 1 states that the Act shall apply to the whole of Madhya Pradesh. Sub-section (3) of Section 1 states that besides Section 1, Section 112 shall come into force at once. Section 112 of the Act is quoted hereinbelow:--
112. Repeal and Savings.-- The Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 (XXIII of 1947) and the Madhya Bharat Industrial Relations (Adaptation) Act, Samvat, 2006 (31 of 1949) are hereby repealed :
Provided that--
(a) every appointment, order, rule, notification or notice made, issued or given under the provisions of the Acts so repealed in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions of this Act, unless and until superseded by any appointment, order, rule, notification or notice made, issued, or given under this Act;
(b) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the Act so repealed shall not be affected and any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation or liability shall so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be made, instituted, continued or enforced as if the said Acts had not been repealed and continue in operation;
(c) any proceedings pending under the provisions of the Acts so repealed or any proceedings maintainable under the said Acts in pursuance of the provisions of clause (b) before a Court or Authority specified in column (1) of Schedule HI shall, as the case may be, stand transferred to or, be instituted in or before the Court or Authority specified in the corresponding entry in column (2) thereof, and shall thereupon be disposed of or proceeded with as if the said Acts had not been repealed and any penalty imposed in such proceedings shall be recovered under the Acts so repealed;
(d) any agreement or settlement recorded or registered, submission registered, awards made or orders passed by the State Industrial Court, the Industrial Court, a District Industrial Court or a Labour Court, under the provisions of the Acts so repealed shall be deemed to have been registered, recorded, made or passed by the appropriate authority under the corresponding provisions of this Act;
(e) any union registered for any local area as the Recognized Union or the Representative Union for any industry under the Acts so repealed shall be deemed to be recognised as the Representative Union for the Industry and the local area concerned under Section 13 of this Act.
It will appear from the provisions of Section 112 of the Act quoted above that the Central Provinces & Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 and the Madhya Bharat Industrial Relations (Adaptation) Act Samvat, 2006 (31 of 1949) were in force before the enactment of the Act. By Section 112 of the Act which came into force immediately, the said two Acts were repealed. The Proviso to Section 112 of the Act quoted above, however, provides for matters which have been saved notwithstanding the repeal of the said two Acts. By the notification dated 31-12-1960 issued under Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act bringing all the remaining provisions of the Act in respect of the industries and undertakings specified therein, the provisions of the Central Provinces & Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947, and the Madhya Bharat Industrial Relations (Adaptation) Act Samvat, 2006 (31 of 1949) were no longer be applicable to such industries and undertakings specified in the said notification dated 31-12-1960 and instead the provisions of the Act became applicable to such industries and undertakings. With effect from 31-12-1960, all the remaining provisions of the Act providing for settlement of industrial disputes through conciliation, Industrial Courts, Labour Courts and Arbitration, relating to recognition of representative unions and recognition of employers, agreements between the employer and the employees and changes in such agreements, appeals, references and review, illegal strikes and lock-outs, protection of employees, penalties for contravention of the provisions of the Act etc., became applicable to the industries specified in the notification dated 31-12-1960 and accordingly, rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities accrued under the said provisions of the Act, agreements, settlements, awards and orders made by the Industrial Courts and Labour Courts under the said provisions of the Act and different proceedings have been instituted and are pending before different authorities under the Act. There is no provision in Sub-section (3) of Section 1 or any other Section of the Act saving the rights, privileges, obligations or liabilities, which have accrued under the different provisions of the Act or saving such agreements, settlements, awards and orders made by Industrial Courts and Labour Courts under the Act or saving the proceedings pending before different authorities under the Act on the issue of such amending notification under Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act. Obviously, the legislature could not have intended such drastic consequences affecting adversely the rights of the employers and the employees and would have made a provision in the Act saving such rights, if the legislative intent of the said Sub-section (3) of Section 1 was to empower the State Government to issue an amending notification amending the first notification bringing the remaining provisions of the Act into force to the industries or undertakings specified in the first notification. Hence, we can not hold that under Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act read with Section 21 of the M.P. General Clauses Act, the State Government can by notification under Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act amend the notification dated 31-12-1960 so as to exclude industries or undertaking in respect of which the remaining provisions of the Act were brought into force by the notification dated 31-12-1960. In our considered opinion, the nature, limits and dimensions of the power of the State Government under Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act are such that it can not include the power to amend or rescind the notification dated 31-12-1960. The Division Bench judgment of this Court in M.P. Dainik Vetan Bhogi Karmachari Sangh Jabalpur v. State of M.P. (supra) in so far as it holds to the contrary, is thus not a good law and is over-ruled. Since Sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the Act has not been brought into force as yet, we refrain from deciding the vires of the said provision.
11. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned notification dated 10-10-2005 issued by the State Government is quashed and the writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. But considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.