ORDER
J.K. Mohanty, C.J.
1. This revision has been filed b' the State of Sikkim praying thai sentence of fine imposed on the respondents while convicting them Under Section 292, Penal Code IS. 293 perhaps has not been mentioned due to inadvertence) is not according to law. As per the l.P.C, as it stood on the date of commission of the offence, sentence of imprisonment should have been imposed. In this case accused-respondents were prosecuted for having committed offences Under Sections 292, 293, l.P.C. and Section 14, Indian Cinematograph Act. They pleaded guilty and the Magistrate imposed fine of Rs. 100.00 Under Section 292, l.P.C, Rs. 150.00 Under Section 292, l.P.C. and Rs. 40.00 Under Section 14, Indian Cinematograph Act. The reason for imposing sentence of fine only as mentioned in the order was that the amendment made in the Penal Code in the year 1969 making imprisonment compulsory does not apply to the State of Sikkim. According to the learned Magistrate l.P.C. as it stood on 10-7-1953 was adopted, promulgated and enforced in Sikkim by the then Maharaj of Sikkim by the Notification No. 160/O.S.dt. 10th July, 1953. The learned Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the State of Sikkim submitted that the l.P.C. as amended from time to time should be made applicable and not as it stood on the date of the notification as mentioned above.
2. The only question for determination, therefore, is whether the l.P.C. as amended from time to time after 10-7-1953 shall be applicable or not to the State of Sikkim.
3. In order to substantiate his arguments ihe learned Advocate-General relied on : 1975CriLJ1639 , State of Madhya Pradesh v. M. V. Narasimhan where it has been held:
Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act, then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This principle, however, will not apply in the following cases : (a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other; (b) where the two Acts are in pari materia: (c) where the amendment in the previous Act if not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworka-ble and ineffectual; and (d) where the amendment of the previous Act,either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act.
It was further held:
Having regard to the preamble and the object of 1947 Act and the Penal code, there can be no doubt that the Act was a statute supplemental to the Penal Code. Therefore, the definition of 'public servant' borrowed from Section 21 of the Penal code must be read into Section 2 of the Act not only at the time when it was borrowed (i.e. 1947) but even at the material date when the offence is committed. This being the position, it is manifest that, by virtue of the amendments 1958 and 1964 which inserted twelfth clause to Section 21 of the Penal Code, an employee of the Heavy Electricals (India) Ltd., Bhopal, committing an offence under the 1947 Act after 1964, clearly comes within the meaning of 'public servant'. Further, the Prevention of Corruption Act, being a social Legislation, its provisions must be liberally construed so as to advance the object of the Act. This can only be done if an extended meaning is given to the term 'public servant' as referred to in Section 2 of the Act by applying .he enlarged definition contained in Clause 12 inserted in the Penal Code by the two amendments referred to above.
However, it cannot be held that the Act and the Penal Code were statutes in pari materia and form part of one system. The Act is a completely self-contained statute with its own provisions and has created a specific offence of criminal misconduct which is quite different from the offence of bribery as defined in the Penal Code. Both these statutes have different objects and create offences with separate ingredients.
Reference was also made to the decision in Bajya v. Gopikabai : [1978]3SCR561 where it has been held:
Broadly speaking, legislation by referential incorporation fails in two categories : First, where a statute by specific reference incorporates the provisions of another statute as of the time of adoption. Second, where a statute incorporates by general reference the law concerning a particular subject, as a genus. In the case of the former, the subsequent amendments made in the referred statute cannot automatically be read into the adopting statute. In the case of latter category, it may be presumed that the legislative intent was to include all the subsequent amendments also made from time to time in the generic law on the subject adopted by general reference.
Reference has also been made to : [1982]2SCR1 , Western Coalfields Ltd. v. Spl. Area Development Authority where it has been held:
The principle, broadly, is that where a statute is incorporated by reference into a second statute, the repeal of the first statute by a third does not affect the second (see Clarke v. Bradlaugh (1881) 8 QBD 63 (69)). Likewise, logically, where certain provisions from an existing Act have been incorporated into a subsequent Act, no addition to the former Act, which is not expressly made applicable to the subsequent Act, can be deemed to be incorporated in it : (see Secretary of State for India in Council v. Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. (1931) 58 Ind App 259 : AIR 1931 PC 149. But these rules are not absolute and inflexible. In the case last cited, the Privy Council qualified its statement of the law by saying that the principle, that an amendment of the first law which is not expressly made applicable to the subsequent incorporating Act cannot be deemed to be incorporated into the second Act, applies 'if it is possible for the subsequent Act to function effectually without the addition' (page 267) (of Ind App) : (at p. 152 of AIR). Besides, as held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty (1962) 3 SCR 786 : : 1983ECR2198D(SC) the decision of the Privy Council could not be extended too far so as to cover every case in which the provisions of another statute are adopted by absorption (see page 837) (of SCR) at p. 336 of AIR). Finally, in State of M.P. v. M. V. Narsimhan (1976) 1 SCR 6 : : 1975CriLJ1639 this Court held, after an examination of the relevant decisions, that the broad principle that where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act is subject to four exceptions, one of which is that the principle will not apply to cases, 'where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other.
4. The above decisions lay down the principles to be followed in cases of legislation by incorporation and undoubtedly these have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
5. The Maharaja of Sikkim by notification No. 160/O.S. dt. 10-7-1953, notified in Sikkim Darbar Gazette which is as follows:
Whereas it is desirable to adopt a substantive Criminal Law, and the Indian Penal Code has hitherto been used to guide the Courts, the Indian Penal Code as it exists on this dale is now adopted and promulgated and will be enforced by the Courts throughout Sikkim with the modification stated below:
(1) Section 303 - deleted.(2) Chapter 20 - deleted.GangtokThe 10th July, 1953. TASHI NAMGYAL Maharaja of SikkimFrom the above notification it is evident that the Indian Penal Code as it existed on this date (i.e., on 10-7-1953), was adopted and promulgated and this should be enforced by the Courts throughout Sikkim. It will mean, therefore, that the Maharaja of Sikkim, who was the sovereign authority was competent to enact penal laws for the State, made Indian Penal Code as it existed on the appointed day, i.e., on 10-7-1953 applicable to the State of Sikkim, This is not legislation by incorporation as in the aforesaid cases cited by the learned Advocate-General. So words (as it existed on this date) are significant. Where the words are clear there is no room for applying any of the principles of interpretation which are merely presumptions. The following passages quoted from Craies on 'Statute Law', 7th Edition, can usefully be referred to in this case:
Where the words of an Act of Parliament are clear, there is no room for applying any of the principles of interpretation which are merely presumptions in cases of ambiguity in the Statute.' (Croxford v. Universal Insurance Co. (1936) 2 KB 253, 281.
The safer and more correct course of dealing with the question of construction is to take words themselves and arrive, if possible, at their meaning without, in the first place, reference to cases.'(Warrington, L. J. in Barrell v. Fordree (1932) AC 676, 682. 'I prefer to avoid exegesis of the statutory language unless they are absolutely necessary : for the result would otherwise tend thereafter to sulvs itute for the problem of construction of parliamentary language the problem of the construction of the judgments of the Court', said Evershtd M.R. in Bawtay v. British Bata Shoe Co. (1959) 1 WLR 45. The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. If the words of the statutes are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves: alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the law-giver.' 'The language of Acts of Parliament and more especially of modern Acts must neither be extended beyond its natural and proper limits, in order to supply omissions or defects, nor strained to meet the justice of an individual case.' 'If we depart from the plain and obvious meaning on account of such views, we do not in truth consider the Act but alter it. We add words to it, or vary the words in which its provisions are couched. We supply a defect with the Legislature which the Legislature could easily have supplied, and are making the law, not interpreting it (Lord Brougham in Gwynne v. Burnell (1840) 7 Cl & F 572, 6%. 'We are bound to take the Act of Parliament as they have made it: a cause (casus ?) omissus can in no case be supplied by a Court of law for that would be to make the law.
The general rule is that the language of an Act is to be read according to its ordinary grammatical construction unless so reading it would entail some absurdity, repugnancy, or injustice..........But I utterly repudiate the notion that it is competent to judge to modify the language of an Act in order to bring it in accordance with his views of what is right or reasonable.' (Willes J., in Abel v. Lee (1871) LR 6 CP 365,371).
Regarding the construction of penal Acts it is said that penal statutes must be construed strictly. 'We must be very careful in construing the Section, (while interpreting which imposes penalty). If there is a reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any particular case, we must adopt that construction.' (Lord EsherM.R. in Tuck & Sons v. Priester (1887) 19 QBD 629, 638.Where there is no enactment which may email penal consequences, you ought not to do violence to the language in order to bring people within it, but ought rather to take care that no one is brought within it who is rot brought within it by express language.' (Rumball v. Schmidt) (1882) 8 QBD 603,608. In R. v. Smith (1870) LR 1 CCR 266, the question arose whether a person could be convicted Under Section 91 under Larceny Act, 18dl, of receiving a chattel, 'knowing 'iie same to have been feloniously stolen', where the stealing of partnership property had been committed by a partner in a firm. The offence of larceny by a partner was not made felony until passing of Larceny Act, 1868 : consequently the question was whether the Act of 1861 could be extended by implication so as to impress an offence which was not felony at the time of the act was passed and the Court held, it could not be so extended.
6. In Maxwell 'On the Interpretation of Statutes'- Twelfth Edition, it is observed:
The strict construction of penal statute seems to manifest itself in 4 ways : in the requirement of express language for the creation of an offence; in interpreting strictly words setting out the elements of an offence; in requiring the fulfilment of the letter of statutory conditions precedent to the infliction of punishment; and in insisting on the strict observance of technical provisions concerning criminal procedure and jurisdiction.
7. Mahajan, C. J., observed in AIR 1954 SC 4 : AIR1954SC4 at p. 1335, Tolaram v. State of Bombay, 'if two possible and reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal provision the Court must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty. It is not competent to the Court to stretch the meaning of an expression Led by the Legislature in order to carry out the intention of the legislature.'
8. In C.I.T. v. T. V. Sundaram Iyenger (P) Ltd. (1976) 1 SCC 77 at p. 86 : AIR 1976 SC 255 at p. 262, it has been held:
Penal statutes have to be construed strictiy in the sense that if there is a reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty, that interpretation ought to be adopted : 'When the Legislature imposes a penalty, the words imposing it must be clear and distinct.
9. Nothing has been brought to my notice that any amendment has been made in the Penal Code in its application to the State of Sikkim by the competent authority. Also Article 371F(K) lays down:
(K) All laws in force immediately before the appointed day in the territories, comprised in the State of Sikkim or any part thereof shall continue to be in force therein until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent authority;
Considering the facto of the case I am of the view that it has been clearly mentioned in the notification 'as it existed on this date', i.e., on 10-7-1953, and these words are significant and should not be stretched to give a different meaning and should be expounded in their ordinary and natural sense. The amendments made to the Indian Penal Code after the notification (dt. 10-7-1953) have no application to the State of Sikkim.
10. Before parting with this case I may observe that in the State of Sikkim even old Cr.P.C, 1898 is still being applied. This brings out an anomalous position because Courts are applying the procedures which are a mixture of old and the new Cr.P.C. (1974). Even the Courts do not have a copy of the old Cr.P.C. for their reference as it is not available in the market. Similarly, there are lots of anomalies in respect of other laws also. It is high time that this matter should engage the attention of the State Government and appropriate steps be taken for resolving such anomalies.
11. The revision petition is dismissed.