Judgment:
A.N. Varma, J.
1. Through the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the judgment and orders dated 29.9.2004 as well as 24.5.2001 passed by opposite parties No. 1 and 2, contained in Annexures-1 and 2 to the writ petition respectively. It has further been prayed that a writ, direction or order in the nature of mandamus be issued commanding opposite parties not to evict the petitioner from over the house in question.
2. The petitioner who was working as an Office Superintendent with the opposite parties attained the age of superannuation on 31.10.1996. By virtue of his employment he was allotted an accommodation by the opposite parties. Upon his retirement the petitioner was required and was asked to vacate the premises in question, which he, however, did not vacate and instituted a suit being Regular Suit No. 138 of 2001 against the opposite parties praying for a decree that he be not evicted otherwise than in due course of law. An application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. was also preferred for grant of an ad-interim injunction praying therein that the opposite parties be restrained from evicting the petitioner otherwise than in due course of law. The trial court vide judgment and order dated 24.5.2001 rejected the petitioner's application for grant of ad-interim injunction on the ground that since he had retired with effect from 31.10.1996, therefore, he had no right to stay in the accommodation allotted to him by virtue of his appointment. This finding was arrived at on the ground that the petitioner had no prima facie case, nor was there any balance of convenience in his favour. Being aggrieved against the said judgment and order, the petitioner filed an appeal being Misc. Civil Appeal No. 45 of 2001. The opposite party No. 1 vide its judgment and order dated 29.9.2004 (Annexure-1) dismissed the appeal and maintained the judgment and order passed by the Trial Court (Annexure-2).
3. I have heard Sri Rakesh Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Sri R.K. Srivastava, learned standing counsel.
4. Sri Rakesh Kumar Srivastava vehemently argued that the learned courts below committed manifest error in rejecting the petitioner's application for grant of an ad-interim injunction on the ground that there was no prima facie case, nor was there any balance of convenience in his favour. His submission is that even an unauthorized occupant is required to be evicted in accordance with law. In support of his argument he placed reliance upon two decisions in Krishna Ram Mahale v. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao, : AIR1989SC2097 as well as Anamallai Club v. Govt of Tamil Nadu and Ors., 1997 LCD 263. Upon the strength of the said decisions his argument is that even if the petitioner became an unauthorized occupant after his retirement, still he was required to be evicted in accordance with law. The opposite parties could not proceed to evict him forcibly.
5. In both the aforesaid cases referred by the petitioner, the occupants had entered the premises as lessees and after the expiry of the period of lease they were being forcibly evicted. The Apex Court in that context said that even an unauthorized occupant cannot be evicted except in due course of law. After the expiry of the lease the occupants became unauthorized and therefore, even such unauthorized occupants are entitled for ejectment in accordance with law. Forceful dispossession of unauthorized occupants was deprecated.
6. In the case at hand the petitioner was allotted a public premises by virtue of his employment with the opposite parties. Right to stay in a Government accommodation at one particular place comes to an end by transfer, retirement of an employee. In such circumstances the employee is under an obligation to vacate the premises immediately after he has been transferred or attained the age of superannuation. Such an employee has no. right to retain the accommodation which he was permitted to occupy by virtue of his employment with the department. The cases referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner have no application to the case at hand.
7. Sri R.K. Srivastava, learned standing counsel placed reliance upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Special Appeal No. 987 of 2003, K.M. Raizada v. Ngar Ayukt, Nagar Nigam Aligarh and others. The appellant in the said appeal was in employment with Nagar Nigam, Aligarh and in that capacity was allowed an official accommodation. He retired in February 2003, but did not vacate the official accommodation in his possession. A writ petition was filed by him which was dismissed whereupon he preferred a special appeal which too was dismissed. While dismissing the said special appeal the Division Bench observed as follows :
'We further direct that throughout U. P. all official accommodation must similarly be got vacated within one month of the retirement/transfer of the employee of the Government, local bodies, public sector undertakings, statutory bodies, etc. by police force unless the employee voluntarily vacates it earlier. The employees who have already retired or have been transferred more than one month before this judgment will be evicted from the official accommodation in their possession within a week.
Let Registrar General of this Court, send a copy of this order to the Chief Secretary, Home Secretary, L.R. and D. G. P. U. P. forthwith.'
Thus in view of the fact that the petitioner retired from service way back in October 1996 and still continued to retain the premises thereafter, cannot subsequently turn around and say that he cannot be evicted otherwise than in due course of law. An employee who is transferred from one place of posting to another place, or stands retired is under a legal and moral obligation to vacate the premises within a reasonable time, in order to accommodate other incumbents who come to join the place of posting from another district or those employees who despite having joined the services are deprived of an accommodation because of the fact that transferred or superannuated employees continue to retain accommodation even after their retirement or transfer.
8. In the present case the relationship between the petitioner and the opposite parties is that of an employee and employer and not that of a lessor or lessee. The premises in question is not a private accommodation, but a public premises, the allotment and eviction of which is not governed by Rent Control Act or by Transfer of Property Act, but by virtue of transfer or posting of employees of the concerned aepartment.
9. In view of what has been said hereinabove, the writ petition lacks merit and as such is whereby dismissed.