B.S. Chauhan, J.
1. This petition and all the other petitions referred to in the Schedule appended to this judgment, question the validity of the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the 'Act'), in respect of the area notified under Sections 4 and 6 of the aforesaid Act spread over seven revenue villages of district Kanpur Nagar, Uttar Pradesh. All these cases raise common questions of law and fact, and therefore they have been heard together and are being decided by this common judgment, which shall govern them.
2. The facts are not in dispute. A notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued for planned development of New Kanpur City in the official gazette of the State of Uttar Pradesh on 9th August, 1996 in respect of a huge area of land of seven Revenue Estates. Substance of the said notification was published in different newspapers. The last such publication was made on 20.12.1996. The declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on 17.12.1997 in the official gazette, covering the entire land which stood notified under Section 4 of the Act. It may also be pertinent to mention here that the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act were resorted to. Some persons filed writ petitions, i.e. Writ Petition No. 201 of 1998 Kanwar Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors; Writ Petition No. 627 of 1998 Gomti Nagar Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd.v. The State of U.P. and Ors.; Writ Petition No. 624 of 1998 Mahabir Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd.v. The State of U.P. and Ors.; and Writ Petition No. 716 of 1998 Akanksha Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd.v. The State of U.P. and Ors., challenging the acquisition proceedings mainly on the ground that they had not been given opportunity of hearing while deciding their objections under Section 5A of the Act. The said writ petitions were allowed by a common judgment and order of the Court dated 26.03.1999, by which the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act were quashed, insofar as they related to the land belonging to the petitioners therein. Being aggrieved, the Kanpur Development Authority, Kanpur (hereinafter called the 'Authority') challenged the said judgment and order before the Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 5517 - 5521 of 1999, and 3442-3446 of 2000. The Hon'ble Apex Court decided the said appeals vide judgment and order 06.10.2004 reported in (2005) 10 SC 320, holding that notification under Section 4(1) of the Act could not have been quashed as there were no exceptional circumstances, like the one where the notification suffered from incurable irregularity, such as total vagueness in respect to the property to be acquired and in regard to the public purpose. The judgment and order of this Court was modified to the extent that the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act remained intact and the Land Acquisition Collector (hereinafter called the 'Collector') was directed to decide the objections under Section 5A of the Act by giving opportunity of hearing to the persons interested and to issue a declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act in accordance with law. The Collector, instead of restricting the case only to those persons whose petitions had been allowed, issued notices under Section 5A of the Act by publication in the newspaper on 18.05.2005 and asked the persons interested to file objections under Section 5A of the Act within 30 days thereof. Large number of persons filed objections and they were heard village-wise and a fresh declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act was made on 3rd October, 2005 in respect of the entire land measuring 468.2963 hectares situate in said seven villages, as notified under Section 4(1) of the Act. Hence these writ petitions.
3. S/Shri Vijai Bahadur Singh, S.P. Gupta, Ravi Kant, Ravi Kiran Jain, Murlidhar, R.N. Singh, learned Senior Counsel, S/Shri B.N. Rai, Satish Chaturvedi, Tej Pal, Prabodh Gaur, H.N. Singh, Vishnu Behari Tiwari, M.K. Gupta, S.D. Dube, A.K. Sachan, K.K. Tripathi, Neeraj Tewari and Pradeep Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners have contended that some of the present petitioners had earlier filed Writ Petition No. 624 of 1998, which was allowed by this Court. The declaration made under Section 6 of the Act, impugned herein, was issued after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation prescribed under the Act and as no award was made within a period of two years from the date of publication of the previous declaration under Section 6 of the Act, the proceedings under the Act lapsed.
4. It is also contended that an area of 468 Hectares was notified under Section 4 of the Act and only 134 Hectares land was involved in litigation. There was no hindrance regarding the balance 334 Hectares land and at least in respect of the said land, as no Award had been made within the prescribed period, proceedings lapsed automatically by virtue of the provisions of Section 11A of the Act. Therefore, a declaration be made to that effect and the respondents be restrained to proceed further with acquisition proceedings. The limitation for issuing declaration under Section 6 of the Act had expired much before the first interim order was passed on 08.01.1998. There has been hostile discrimination as in some similar cases, lands have been exempted, while objections of some of the petitioners have been rejected. No opportunity of effective hearing was afforded to the petitioners as required in law.
5. In view of the above, it was contended that the petitions deserve to be allowed.
6. On the other hand, Shri S.M.A. Kazmi, learned Advocate General, with Shri S.N. Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State; Shri Ajit Kumar Singh and Shri M.C. Tripathi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Authority have submitted that as there are interim orders continuing, even today in some of the cases, to the effect that petitioners therein would-not be dispossessed, which amounts to staying the further proceedings and in view thereof, the period of limitation has not yet expired, therefore, the proceedings have not lapsed. In most of the cases, petitioners had purchased the land subsequent to notification under Section 4 of the Act, who cannot be heard at all. The judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be re-examined by this Court on any ground whatsoever and once the Apex Court has sustained Section 4 notification, it impliedly extended the period of limitation provided in the Act for issuing Section 6 declaration. Once the petitioners had submitted to the jurisdiction of the acquisition authorities by filing fresh objections under Section 5A of the Act, it is not open to them to challenge the proceedings on any ground whatsoever. More so, the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed the order in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the limitation got extended. The petitions are, thus, liable to be dismissed.
7. We have considered the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties and perused the record.
8. The notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is a condition precedent to exercise any further powers under the Act. Therefore, a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is a sine qua non for initiating the acquisition proceedings. In the absence of such a notification, the machinery provided by the Act for further action obviously cannot be proceeded. Vide Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay and Ors. : [1961]1SCR128 ; Narendrajit Singh and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. : [1978]2SCR254 ; and Aflatoon and Ors.v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors. : [1975]1SCR802 .
9. The declaration under Section 6 of the Act is conclusive proof for acquisition of land as it envisages that the Authority has decided to acquire the land. As the persons interested are being deprived of their properties and livelihood, the provisions of the Statute are required to be construed strictly. This is required for the reason that the Authority cannot be permitted to initiate the acquisition proceedings and go into deep slumber, as it would amount to freezing the price of the land notified as on the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and for the reason that persons interested become entitled to have compensation only with reference to the market value prevailing on the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. Vide Khub Chand and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. : [1967]1SCR120 ; Narendrajit Singh (supra); Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of U.P. and Ors. : AIR1963SC1019 ; and Collector (District Magistrate), Allahabad v. Raja Ram Jaiswal : [1985]3SCR995 .
10. In Narain Das Jain v. Agra Nagar Mahapalika, Agra : [1991]1SCR389 , the Hon'ble Apex Court made reference to the Law Commission Report, submitted in 1957 on the need for reform in the Act, wherein it had been observed as under:
The community has no right to enrich itself by deliberately taking away the property of any of its members in such circumstances without providing adequate compensation for it.
11. In Hansraj H. Jain v. State of Maharastra and Ors. : (1993)3SCC634 , the Hon'ble Apex Court reiterated a similar view observing that the acquisition proceedings have to be concluded within the prescribed limitation under the Act, as notification under Section 4 of the Act cannot be issued with the sole intention to peg down the prices for acquisition in remote future, therefore, causing loss and injury to the affected land owners.
12. It is also a matter of common knowledge that money loses its value everyday. When market value is to be determined with reference to the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act, issued much earlier, the dispossessed persons may not be able to purchase anything with the amount of compensation paid at a much belated stage.
13. In K. Krishna Reddy and Ors. v. The Special Deputy Collector Land Acquisition : AIR1988SC2123 , the Hon'ble Apex Court considered the same issue and made the observations as under:
After all money is what many buys. What the claimants could have bought with the compensation in 1977, cannot do in 1988. Perhaps, not even one half of it. It is a common experience that the purchasing power of rupee is dwindling. With rising inflation, the delayed payment may lose all charm and utility of the compensation. In some cases, the delay may be detrimental to the interest of claimants. The Indian agriculturists generally have no avocation. They totally depend upon land. If uprooted, they will find themselves nowhere. They are left high and dry. They have no savings to draw. They have nothing to fall back upon. They know no other work. They may even face starvation unless rehabilitated. In all such cases, it is of utmost importance that the award should be made without delay.
14. Thus, in view of the above, it is the legal obligation of the Authority concerned to ensure that the acquisition proceedings are concluded at the earliest.
15. There is no dispute to the settled legal proposition that in case the acquisition proceedings are quashed by the Court, it will cover the land of only those persons who had approached the Court by filing the petitions and it would not annul the proceedings in respect of those persons who had not approached the Court.
16. In Abhey Ram v. Union of India and Ors. : [1997]3SCR931 , the Hon'ble Apex Court, after considering its earlier judgments, held as under:
In view of the fact that notification under Section 4(1) is a composite one and equally the declaration under Section 6 is also a composite one, unless the declaration under Section 6 is quashed in toto, it does not operate as if that the entire declaration requires to be quashed. It is seen that the appellants had not filed any objections to the said notice under Section 5A.
17. In the aforesaid case, relief was not granted to the tenure holders as they had not filed objections under Section 5A of the Act.
18. Similar view has been reiterated in Delhi Administration v. Gurdeep Singh Uban and Ors. : AIR1999SC3822 , observing that quashing the notification in all cases of individual writ petitions cannot be treated as quashing the whole of it.
19. The controversy as to whether once the notification is quashed by the Court, the period of limitation prescribed under the Statute can be extended, also stood decided authoritatively by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Padmasundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. : [2002]255ITR147(SC) , answering in negative, as it would amount to re-writing the Statute. The Court observed that the Court can only interpret the law and it cannot legislate. The Court categorically held that prescription of time limit in that background is, therefore, peremptory in nature. The matter was referred to the larger Bench to resolve the conflicting views of different Benches on the issue in N. Narasimhaiah v. State of Karnataka : [1996]1SCR698 ; and Oxford English School v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu AIR 1995 SC 2398. The view expressed in the latter case stood approved.
20. The question of limitation for making the declaration under Section 6 of the Act is also no more res integra. In Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat and Anr. : AIR1991SC2153 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Award must be made within a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration, excluding the period of stay of proceedings by the Court, if any, failing which the acquisition proceedings would lapse. The Court further observed as under:
In order to get the benefit of the said provision, what is required is that the landholder, who seeks the benefit, must not have obtained any order from the Court restraining any action or proceedings in pursuance to the declaration under Section 6 of the Act so that the explanation covers only the cases of those landholders who do not obtain any order from the Court which would delay or prevent the making of Award or taking possession of the land acquired.
21. Therefore, it is evident that in case only one person obtains the interim relief from the Court, it would not cover the land of other persons.
22. However, in Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka and Ors. : (1994)4SCC145 , Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:
Explanation 1 thereto provides the method or mode of computation of the period referred to in the first proviso, namely, the period during which 'any action or proceeding' be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 being 'stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded'. In other words, the period occupied by the order of stay made by a court shall be excluded. Admittedly, pending writ petition on both the occasions the High Court granted 'stay of dispossession'. Admittedly, the validity or tenability of the notification issued and published under Section 4(1) is subject of adjudication before the High Court. Till the writ petition s are disposed of or the appeals following its heels, the stay of dispossession was in operation. Though there is no specific direction prohibiting the publication of the declaration under Section 6, no useful purpose would be served by publishing Section 6(1) declaration pending adjudication of the legality of Section 4(1) notification. If any action is taken to pre-empt the proceedings, it would be stigmatized either as 'undue haste' or action to 'overreach the court's judicial process'. Therefore, the period during which the order of dispossession granted by the High Court operated, should be excluded in computation of the period of three years covered by Clause (1) of the first proviso to the Land Acquisition Act.
23. This view stands reiterated with approval in the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Govt. of Tamil Nadu v. Vasanta Bai : [1995]3SCR258 ; and M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of Tamil Nadu : (2000)4SCC322 .
24. In Bailamma v. Poornaprajna House Building Coop. Society : AIR2006SC1132 , the Apex Court reiterated the same view while interpreting the explanation to Section 11A of the Act for exclusion of period from limitation where interim order remained operative. The Court held that a period during which the interim order remains effective is to be excluded from the period of limitation prescribed under the Act. The Court held that once an order of stay is obtained and the statutory authorities are restrained from taking any further action pursuant to the declaration, the authorities cannot be faulted for the delay, and therefore, the period during which the order of stay operated had to be excluded. Such a course is necessary and justified for the reason that because of the stay order the proceedings were delayed and the authorities cannot be blamed for it, and had such a provision not been made by the legislature, the acquisition proceedings could easily be frustrated by obtaining interim orders and prolonging the litigation thereafter. The explanation furnished in this regard was held to be of widest amplitude and applicable where an order of stay is obtained even by a person who is not the land owner for the reason that others may also be interested in frustrating the land acquisition proceedings, as it may be that on account of development of that area some persons in the vicinity may be adversely affected, or it may be for any other reason that persons in locality are adversely affected by the project, for which acquisition is being made. Therefore, the exclusion of the period during which the order of stay operated is not dependant upon the party obtaining such an order.
25. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Lichho Devi : AIR1997SC3474 , the Hon'ble Apex Court approving the law laid down in Vasantha Bai (supra) further held that stay of dispossession of the persons by the Court tantamounts to stay all further proceedings. A similar view has been reiterated in State of Kerala v. Antony Fernandez : [1998]1SCR865 , approving and following the judgments in Sangappa Garunlingappa Sajjan (supra) and Vasantha Bai (supra).
26. Sri S.P. Gupta has urged that the decision in the case of Oxford English School (supra), to the effect that the stay granted in a case would apply to the same case and not to other cases, stood approved by the Constitution Bench in Padmasundara Rao's case (supra). The said argument cannot be accepted in as much as the issue which was under consideration before the Constitution Bench was of extending the limitation regarding Section 6 publication and not with regard to the question of applicability of a stay order in other cases. The Constitution Bench in Rao's case did not deal with this issue and the judgment has to be read in context thereto. We, therefore, do not find any force in the submissions of Sri Gupta.
27. Most of the judgments, referred to hereinabove, lay down clearly that an order obtained by some of the persons challenging the acquisition proceedings can be made applicable in respect to the entire land covered by the said notification/declaration. It may be so necessary as the authority may not be able to implement an integrated scheme for which the land is sought to be acquired unless the entire chunk of land is made available to it. In the case of Bailamma (supra), it has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in certain circumstances, it may be totally immaterial as to who challenges the acquisition proceedings. In such a situation, the stay will operate in respect of all the persons interested. If the argument of Mr. Gupta is accepted that the interim order obtained by one person is not applicable to other tenure holders/persons interested, the authority would not be able to take possession of the land in contravention of the interim order of the Court and the persons interested would agitate that stay cannot operate against them, therefore, the acquisition proceedings would lapse. This would create a chaotic situation, therefore, the submissions made by Shri Gupta is not worth acceptance.
28. In Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur v. Bheru Lal and Ors. : [2002]SUPP2SCR512 , it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act provides that if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any particular land is needed for public purpose, a declaration is to be made to that effect within a period of one year from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. Section 6(1), therefore, does not require that such declaration should also be published in the official gazette within a period of one year from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1). Time limit of one year is prescribed for the declaration to be made that land is needed for a public purpose under the signature of a Secretary or authorized officer to such Government It does not mean the publication in the gazette or newspaper.
29. Similar view has been reiterated in Sriniwas Ramnath Khatod v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. : AIR2002SC187 , observing that the decision to make a declaration is to be taken within a period of one year, and publication can be made subsequently as it is a merely a ministerial act.
30. Shri S.P. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has placed a very heavy reliance upon the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Supdt. of Taxes, Dhubri and Ors. v. M/s. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust : AIR1975SC2065 , wherein while considering the provisions of the Assam Taxation (On Goods Carried by Road or on Inland Waterways) Act, 1961, which fixes the limitation for making re-assessment, the Apex Court held that in case an interim order is passed by the Court, the State Authorities must get it vacated. The Court observed as under:
The first contention on behalf of the State that it became impossible for the State to issue notice under Section 7(2) of the New Act within two years of the expiry of the period of return is unsound on principle and facts....The State did not endeavour to obtain appropriate orders to surmount the difficulties by reason of the injunction against taking steps within the time contemplated in Section 7(2) of the New Act. The State is guilty of default. The State had remedies open to take steps asking for modification of the order. The State had to assert the right that the State was entitled to demand taxes and the respondent was liable to pay the same. The State followed the policy of inactivity. Inactivity is not impossibility. The order of injunction is not to be equated with an act of God or an action of the enemy of the State or a general strike.
31. However, Shri Gupta is not in a position to state as to whether there was an exclusion clause under the Act applicable therein, as contained under the provisions of Sections 6 and 11A of the Act. More so, there are authoritative pronouncements by the Hon'ble Apex Court dealing with the specific provisions involved herein. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the facts of the case relied upon by Shri Gupta are quite distinguishable and the said judgment has no application in these cases.
32. In view of the above, we do not find any force in the submissions made by learned Counsel for the petitioners that respondent authorities should have proceeded with the proceedings and Award could have been made in respect of the balance land.
33. In the instant cases, the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made on 17.12.1997 and the fresh declaration was made on 03.10.2005. Only in few cases, the earlier notification under Section 6 of the Act was quashed by the Court, and the order did not apply to the declaration made in entirety. Therefore, the declaration under Section 6 of the Act made on 3rd October, 2005 superceded the earlier declaration dated 17.12.1997. (Vide Narendrajit Singh (supra); Raghunath and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. : [1988]3SCR441 ; Hindustatn Oil Mills Ltd. and Anr. v. Special Deputy Collector Land Acquisition : AIR1990SC731 ; and Raipur Development Authority v. Anupam Sahkari Griha Nirman Samiti and Ors. : [2000]2SCR781 .
34. It has consistently been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that where successive notifications under Section 4 or the declaration under Section 6 of the Act have been made, either for the reason of quashing the notification/declaration by the Court or for the reason of withdrawal of the notification/declaration by the State Authorities, the last notification/declaration shall be treated to be valid for all purposes, whatsoever.
35. The issue of maintainability of the writ petitions by the persons, who have purchased the land subsequent notifica6tion under Section 4 of the Act, is also no more res integra.
36. In Pandit Leela Ram v. Union of India : [1976]1SCR341 , the Apex Court has held that any one who deals with the land subsequent to Section. 4. notification, would do so at his own peril. In Sneh Prabha v. State of Uttar Pradesh : AIR1996SC540 , the Apex Court held that Section 4 notification gives a notice to the public that the land is needed for public purpose and it further points out 'an impediment to any one to encumber the land acquired thereunder.' The alienation thereafter does not bind the State or beneficiary under the acquisition. The purchaser is entitled only to receive compensation. While deciding the said case, reliance had been placed on the earlier judgment in Union of India v. Shri Shiv Kumar Bhargava and Ors. : [1995]1SCR354 .
37. Similarly, in U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties Pvt. Ltd. : [1996]1SCR683 , the Supreme Court held that purchase after publication of Section 4 notification is void against the State and at the most the purchaser may be a 'person' interested in compensation since he steps into the shoes of the erstwhile owner and may merely claim compensation.
38. However, in subsequent judgment in Jaipur Development Authority v. Mahavir Housing Coop. Society, Jaipur and Ors. : (1996)11SCC229 , the Apex. Court, though did not decide the issue finally, expressed doubts on the maintainability of reference under Section 18 by the subsequent purchaser. He can get only compensation as what he has paid.
39. In Ajay Kishan Singhal v. Union of India : AIR1996SC2677 ; Mahavir and Anr. v. Rural Institute, Amravati and Anr. : (1995)5SCC335 ; and Gian Chand v. Gopala and Ors. : [1995]1SCR412 , the Apex Court has categorically held that a person who purchases the land after publication of Section 4 notification, is not entitled to challenge the proceedings for the reason that his title is void and he can at best claim compensation on the basis of vendor's title. In view of this, the sale of land after issuance of Section 4 notification is void and purchaser cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings. However, it has been further observed that if a large number of cases are pending challenging the acquisition proceedings, it would not be appropriate to eliminate the claim of subsequent purchasers as they would stand to gain if the acquisition is invalidated. The issue in view of these observations therefore becomes insignificant.
40. Undoubtedly, declaration under Section 6 of the Act has to be made within one year, excluding the period covered by interim order of the Court, if any, from the date of publication of the substance of Section 4 notification and in case such a declaration is not made, the proceedings will lapse. Same remains the position if the Award is not made within two years from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, excluding the period of interim stay, if any, by the Court. Vide State of Haryana v. Sukhdev and Ors. : AIR1994SC1255 ; and General Manager, Department of Telecommunications v. Jacob AIR 2003 SC 1308.
41. The issue as to whether the Hon'ble Apex Court in exercise of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution, can pass an order contrary to the statutory provisions, is also no more res integra.
42. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Court cannot extend the period of limitation. Article 142 empowers the Hon'ble Supreme Court to pass an order to do complete justice between the parties. While issuing such an order, the Apex Court does not generally ignore the substantive statutory provisions.
43. In State of Punjab and Anr. v. Rajesh Soyal : 2003CriLJ60 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:
This Court has ample jurisdiction to pass orders under Article 142(1) of the Constitution, it may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter but even in exercising this power, it is more doubtful that an order can be passed contrary to law.
44. Similar view has been reiterated in Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy and Ors. : (2004)ILLJ421SC , wherein it has been held that the Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142. of the Constitution would not ordinarily grant such a relief which would be in violation of a statutory provision. While deciding the said case, reliance had been placed in Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India : [1999]3SCR1279 , wherein it has been held as under:
Even under Article 142 of the Constitution, such a direction cannot be issued. While passing an order under Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court cannot ignore the substantive provision of law much less the constitutional rights available to a person.
45. Similar view has been reiterated in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India : [1998]2SCR795 ; M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath : (2000)6SCC213 ; and Textile Labour Association v. Official Liquidator : (2004)IILLJ760SC
46. Thus, in view of the above, it cannot be held that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had issued any direction and asked the Authorities to proceed in contravention of the statutory provisions as the said residuary power is supplementary and complementary to powers specially conferred upon the Apex Court by Statutes.
47. The question of estoppel by the conduct of a party has also been considered time and again by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
48. It is settled proposition of law that estoppel does not operate against the Statute. Vide Bengal Iron Corporation v. Commercial Taxes Officers and Ors. : 1993(66)ELT13(SC) ; Delhi Development Authority v. Ravindra Mohan Aggarwal and Ors. : AIR1999SC1256 ; and M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu and Ors. : [1999]3SCR1066 .
49. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. H.S. Rikhy etc. v. the New Delhi Municipal Committee : [1962]3SCR604 , has categorically held that question of estoppel does not arise against statute, and the Court placed reliance upon paragraph 427 of Volume XV, 3rd Edition of the Halsbury's Law of England, wherein it has been observed as under:
Results must not be ultra vires- A party cannot, by representation, any more than by other means, raise against himself an estoppel so as to create a state of things which he is legally disabled from creating. Thus, a corporate or statutory body cannot be estopped from denying that it has entered into a contract which it was ultra vires for it to make. No corporate body can be bound by estooppel to do something beyond its powers, or to refrain from doing what it is its duty to do....
50. The Apex Court in the said case rejected a similar contention observing as under:
In this connection, it is also convenient here to notice the argument that the Committee is estopped by its conduct from challenging the enforceability of the contract. The answer to the argument is that where a Statute makes a specific provision that a body corporate has to act in a particular manner and no other, that provision of law being mandatory and not directory, has to be strictly followed.
51. Similarly in A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai : [1984]3SCR74 , a similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court observing as under:
Lastly, it was argued by the counsel for the respondents that the appellant would be estopped from challenging the mechanical process because he did not oppose the introduction of this process, although he was present in the meeting personally or through his agent. This argument is wholly untenable because when we are considering a constitutional or statutory provision, there can be no estoppel against a Statute and whether or not the appellant agreed or participated in the meeting, which was held before introduction of the voting machines. If such a process is not permissible or authorised by law, he cannot be estopped from challenging the same.
52. Thus, in view of the above, the question of application of estoppel against statute/public policy does not arise.
53. It is a settled legal proposition that objections under Section 5A of the Act have to be filed within the period of 30 days from the date of publication of substance of Section 4 notification and opportunity of personal hearing is mandatory in case the persons interested file objections within the time stipulated therein and appear in person or through their representatives and ask for opportunity of hearing. Vide Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad : [1977]1SCR71 ; Shyma Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar : (1993)4SCC255 ; Rambhai Lakhabai Bhakt v. State of Gujarat and Ors. : [1995]3SCR272 ; Tej Kaur v. State of Punjab and Ors. : [2003]2SCR707 ; Pratibha Nema v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. : AIR2003SC3140 ; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai : AIR2005SC3520 ; and Kanpur Development Authority v. Mahavir Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. (2005) 10 SCC 320.
54. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the issue observed as under:
It is not in dispute that Section 5A of the Act confers a valuable right in favour of a person whose lands are sought to be acquired. Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of 'eminent domain' may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefore must be paid.
The conclusiveness contained in Section 6 of the Act indisputably is attached to a need as also to the purpose and in this regard ordinarily, the jurisdiction of the court is limited but it is equally true that when an opportunity of being heard has expressly been conferred by a statute, the same must scrupulously be complied with. For the said purpose, Sections 4, 5A and 6 of the Act must be read conjointly. The court in a case, where there has been total non-compliance or substantial non-compliance with the provisions of Section 5A of the Act, cannot fold its hands and refuse to grant a relief to the writ petitioner. Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act renders a declaration to be a conclusive evidence. But when the decision-making process itself is in question, the power of judicial review can be exercised by the court in the event the order impugned suffers from well-known principles viz. illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. Moreover, when a statutory authority exercises such enormous power it must be done in a fair and reasonable manner.
It is trite that hearing given to a person must be an effective one and not a mere formality. Formation of opinion as regards the public purpose as also suitability thereof must be preceded by application of mind as regards consideration of relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. The State in its decision-making process must not commit any misdirection in law. It is also not in dispute that Section 5A of the Act confers a valuable important right and having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300A of the Constitution it has been held to be akin to a fundamental right.
55. Thus, in view of the above, we reach the inescapable conclusion that objections under Section 5A of the Act have to be dealt with in accordance with law by providing opportunity of effective hearing to every objector, as it cannot be held to be an empty formality and in case such a hearing is not provided, the subsequent proceedings would stand vitiated.
56. Much has been canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that some of the petitioners have been subjected to hostile discrimination, as the land of others have been exempted while considering their objections under Section 5A of the Act, though it is denied by the learned Counsel for the respondents. Discrimination means an unjust, unfair action in favour of one and against another. It involves an element of intentional and purposeful differentiation and further an element of unfavourable bias. Vide Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra : 1952CriLJ805 .
57. In Chandrabanshi Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar : [1985]1SCR579 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court deprecated the practice of release of land owned by a particular family by way of simple favouritism and declared it to be void, being hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. However, inference of discrimination or hostile treatment is to be drawn after considering the full facts and all materials placed before the Court for the purpose, otherwise it will create a chaotic situation. Vide Madhu Kishwar and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. : AIR1996SC1864 .
58. In Sube Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. : AIR2001SC3285 , the Supreme Court did not accept the discrimination of exemption of constructions already made on the ground of classification of constructions. The State had taken a policy decision not to exclude constructions of XB' or VC class whereas constructions of XA' class stood excluded, holding it to be unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory, thus, hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
59. Similar view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in B.E.M.L. Employees' House Building Cooperative Society Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. AIR 2004 SC 505.
60. Therefore, in view of the above, it if. evident that discrimination on unreasonable classification is not permissible.
61. Thus, in view of the above, the law in this regard can broadly be summarised as under:
I. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act has to be made within one year from the date of Section 4 notification.
II. The period of one year limitation gets extended by the period for which the interim order of any nature, either of dispossession or of further proceedings passed by a Court, remains operative in respect of any part of the land covered by Section 4 notification whether it has been obtained by a person interested or any unconnected person.
III. The Court does not have the power to extend the period of limitation provided under the Statute.
IV. Ordinarily, the acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed only in respect of the land belonging to the petitioners and not in toto covering the area for which there Is no challenge to acquisition proceedings.
V. The Award is to be made within the statutory period prescribed under Sections 11 and 11A of the Act, excluding the period of interruption because of the judicial proceedings before a Court, otherwise the proceedings would lapse.
VI. The person, who purchases the land subsequent to notification under Section 4 of the Act, is not entitled to maintain a writ petition as the sale deed in his favour is void, so far the State is concerned, though he may claim compensation in accordance with law.
VII. If there are successive notifications under Section 4 or declarations under Section 6 of the Act, the subsequent notification/declaration would prevail as it supersedes and nullify the earlier notification/declaration.
VIII. Discrimination in acquisition on an unreasonable ground is not permissible.
IX. A person who files objection under Section 5A of the Act, appears before the Authority and demands hearing, has to be granted such an opportunity of hearing, as the objections under Section 5A of the Act cannot be decided mechanically.
X. The Hon'ble Supreme Court ordinarily does not pass an order under Article 142 of the Constitution, which is inconsistent with statutory provisions.
XI. Estoppel does not operate against the statutory provisions.
62. The present cases are required to be examined in the light of the aforesaid legal propositions.
63. Undoubtedly, large number of petitioners in all these petitions are purchasers of properties subsequent to the issuance of Section 4 notification and in some cases even after declaration under Section 6 of the Act and the submission made by learned Counsel appearing for the respondents that they have no right to be heard here is in consonance with law as the sale deeds in their favour are bold so far as the State is concerned and they do not have a right to be heard by the writ Court. However, considering the facts and circumstances of these cases and in view of the fact: that we are considering all the issues together and in case we are satisfied that the proceedings have already lapsed, the subsequent purchasers may be justified in contending that their sale deeds were not void, as the proceedings had automatically lapsed by application of law, prior to execution of sale deeds in their favour.
64. So far as the decision on objections under Section 5A of the Act are concerned, in most of the cases, pleadings have been found far from satisfactory. In one case argued by Shri Ravi Kant, learned Senior Counsel, it has been submitted that objection filed by one of the petitioners therein is annexed with the petition, though the said annexure reveals that the objections had been filed by some other person, who was not even a party in the said case though he is a party in another case. In the case argued by Shri S.D. Dube, it has not been stated that the petitioner therein had appeared before the Authority and demanded a right of hearing. The petitioners have miserably failed to plead their cases and substantiate the pleadings. However, it was not permissible for the respondent authorities to have invited objections under Section 5A of the Act after the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, for the reason that the direction was to hear the earlier objections filed under Section 5A of the Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had not issued any direction to invite fresh 5-A objections. It has been averred in some of the petitions that when the petitioners went to the office after receiving notices from the respondents, instead of giving them opportunity of hearing, they were simply asked to put their signatures/thumb impression on the papers and no opportunity had been afforded to them, In the counter affidavit filed by the State as well as the Development Authority, such averments have not been denied specifically, We find it shocking that reply has been given simply saying that such averments do not need any comment/reply. It is also shocking that the counter affidavit on behalf of the State has been filed by one Shri Shyam Lal Singh Yadav, who had been the deponent in the first round of litigation, wherein, while quashing the acquisition procreations qua the petitioners therein, vide Judgment and order dated 26th March 1999, this Court had made the following observations:
The law raises a presumption that all official acts are done in a regular manner. When instances come to the notice of Court that order-sheets are written in a back date, the confidence of Court in relying on official papers is shaken. The Court has evolved the method of taking evidence on affidavit for the speedy disposal of cases. If false affidavits can be sworn with impunity, the whole edifice will crumble down, We are, therefore, unable to take a lenient view in the case of Sri Shyam Lal Singh Yadav and we direct the Registry to file a complaint under Section 193, 465 I.P.C. against Sri Shyam Lal Singh Yadav.
We regret to note that a Senior Officer like a Collector of the district not only connived at the filing of the false affidavit but also facilitated it by gratuitously stating in his certificate filed on 26.8.1998 that Government offices are opened on Gazetted holidays if the urgency of the matter so requires.
65. No reasoning could be given by the learned Advocate General or any other counsel appearing for the respondents as to why the same officer has been found by the State so indispensable that he could be assigned the role of filing the counter affidavit again and none of them is aware as to whether the directions issued by this Court earlier had been comphed with. The learned Advocate General on 25.09.2006 filed an affidavit of Shri K.L. Meena, Secretary of the department stating what has been stated by Shri Yadav.
66. According to the records produced by Shri Ajit Kumar Singh, altogether 3482 objections were filed, Out of the said objections, 2636 objectors appeared and 846 did not appear for personal hearing. They were heard from 28.06.2005 to 22.07.2005 from 10.00 a.m. to 02.00 p.m. and objectors were heard village-wise on fixed dates. For example, for the village Bairi Akbarpur Kachhar, objections were heard for three days, i.e. 28th 29th and 30th June, 2005 and large number of objectors appeared in person. On the very first date, 156 objectors appeared. Similarly, while hearing objections in respect of village Kheora Kachhar on 20th July, 2005, 170 objectors appeared. Similarly on 14.07.2005 from village Bisayakpur Kachhar, 171 claimants appeared for personal hearing. It is claimed that all of them were heard properly. It is beyond our imagination as how such a large number of objectors could be heard during the period of four hours and as to whether this could be held to be an effective hearing. It is not humanly possible to hear such a large number of persons in such a short span of time. Even the report dated 29.07.2005 submitted by the Land Acquisition Collector to the State, does not give any detail of hearing and only one statement has been made that the objections were heard and considered.
67. We are therefore of the view that the procedure of hearing adopted by the authorities, was almost an empty formality and from the records which have been produced before the Court and examined by us, it is more than evident that the earlier directions of the Apex Court have not been complied with in letter and spirit. The hearing and disposal of objections have been made in a casual and cavalier fashion which does not find our approval as It is Inconsistent with the provisions of Section 5A and the settled principles of natural justice.
68. The entire land covered by Section 4 notification has been notified under Section 6 declaration, therefore, the issue of discrimination does not arise and the submissions in this regard are preposterous, More so, as in none of the petitions, factual foundation has been laid, that there was a conscientious discrimination on the part of the parties and in the absence of proper pleadings, the issue does not, require to be examined at all.
69. If the facts of the case are examined in a chronological order for determining limitation, the following situation emerges:
Dates Proceedings of the case09.08.1996 Notification under Section 4of the Act was published inthe Gazette.07.09.1996 & The substance thereof was20.12.1996 published in local newspapers.17.12.1997 Declaration under Section 6 ofthe Act was published in theOfficial Gazette, i.e. priorto only two days of expiry ofthe period of limitation.08.01.1998 Various writ petitions werefiled challenging the acquisitionproceedings and the interim orderswere granted first time stayingdispossession. Thus, it becomesevident that even after expiry ofthe limitation of issuing theSection 6 declaration within oneyear, i.e. up to 19.12.1997,there was no interim order.25.03.2004 This Court allowed only four writpetitions, quashing all theacquisition proceedings qua thepetitioners therein.06.10.2004 The Hon'ble Supreme Court allowedthe appeal filed by the State innine cases upholding the quashingof Section 6 declaration anddirecting the Authorities to hearobjections under Section 5A ofthe Act and then to proceed inaccordance with law17.05.2005 Objections under Section 5A ofthe Act were invited from allconcerned, whether they hadearlier filed writ petitions orobjections etc. or not.03.10.2005 Declaration under Section 6 ofthe Act was published in theGazette.
70. Admittedly, the earlier Section 6 declaration was issued only two days prior to expiry of period of limitation and the interim order was first granted on 08.01.1998. This Court quashed the acquisition proceedings only in respect of the land qua the petitioners in those cases only. However, a large number of writ petitions remained pending and some of them (about five writ petitions) are still pending. In these petitions, the challenge is to the earlier Section 6 declaration and interim orders are continuing. The subsequent declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made on 03.10.2005 which is beyond the period of limitation, as one year had lapsed before passing interim order in any case, by this Court in respect of acquisition proceedings. The Hon'ble Supreme Court issued directions to hear objections under Section 5A of the Act and to proceed in accordance with law. The parties before the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not point out that the order may lead to a futile exercise as the limitation had already expired and it was not permissible to issue another declaration under Section 6 of the Act for want of limitation. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, wherein direction was issued to proceed in accordance with law, cannot be read otherwise, as in view of the Constitution Bench decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P. Sunderarao (supra), it is not permissible for the Court to extend the period of limitation prescribed by the Statute. Undoubtedly, the submissions made by Shri Kazmi, the learned Advocate General that this Court does not have any right to re-examine the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, is full of substance but the Court is not precluded from examining the meaning of the said judgment in letter and spirit. The submissions made by Shri Kazmi stands fully fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. State of U.P. and Ors. : AIR2005SC446 , where a similar issue has been dealt with, observing as under:
The decision rendered by this Court concluded the controversy and it was not permissible to any party or to Authority/Tribunal or Court including the High Court to re-open the issue and to record a contrary finding. We are clearly of the opinion that the High Court committed manifest error of law in re-examining the question and recording a finding, which is totally at variance with the earlier decisions of this Court.
71. Undoubtedly, this Court cannot re-examine the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, but may read it as a whole to find out the meaning in real spirit of the order. The relevant part of the judgment and order reads as under:
Under the circumstances, these appeals are entitled to succeed partly; in other words, the notification issued under Section 6(1) of the Act is quashed while sustaining the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act in all other respects, the impugned orders are not disturbed. We direct that the respondents shall be given opportunity of hearing during the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act, after giving fresh notice of hearing indicating a fixed date. It is open to the respondents-land owners to bring to the notice of the Land Acquisition Officer as regards the subsequent developments. t The land acquisition authorities, after holding enquiry under Section 5A of the Act, as directed shall proceed in accordance with law.
72. It is evident that their Lordships had restricted the case to hearing the objections already filed by the respondents therein and there was no positive direction to invite fresh objections under Section 5A of the Act, from all concerned. More so, authorities were directed to proceed in accordance with law. The law of limitation, as it goes to the root of the cause takes away the competence/jurisdiction to proceed with acquisition proceedings, after expiry of the limitation, the authorities are bound by the law of limitation prescribed under the Statute. The Hon'ble Apex Court was not requested to decide the case also taking into consideration the issue of limitation, and it so happened that this Court also while quashing the acquisition proceedings had not addressed itself to the said relevant issue of limitation.
73. The submissions made by Shri Kazmi, learned Advocate General that once they had filed objections and submitted to the jurisdiction of the authority, the petitioners are estopped from raising the issue of limitation is of no consequence for the reason that persons interested had raised objections on limitation also, meaning thereby, the objections on other issues had been under protest subject to the law of limitation.
74. The issue involved herein had neither been agitated nor been considered by the Apex Court, therefore, the submissions made in this behalf are not worth acceptance.
75. In all these cases, under all circumstances, the proceedings had lapsed and inviting objections under Section 5A of the Act and deciding the same, will be nothing but an exercise in futility. The Hon'ble Supreme Court did not ask the Authority/Land Acquisition Collector to invite fresh objections from all concerned, rather directed to issue notices to the objectors for hearing. The Authority, for the reasons best known to it, invited fresh objections within 30 days from the date of publication in the newspapers. That was not the direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and nor such a direction could be issued as it would tantamount to extending the period for inviting the objections under the Act, The argument of the learned Advocate General is that in view of the remand judgment of the Apex Court, the period of limitation stood impliedly extended. The said argument, if accepted, would lead to anomalous results and it would also run counter to the ratio of the decision in Padmasundara Rao's case (supra). If the Constitution Bench in the aforesaid decision has held that the period of limitation cannot be extended then such a conclusion as suggested by the learned Advocate General cannot be drawn and the argument deserves to be rejected. Even otherwise, what is impermissible directly cannot be permitted indirectly. No estoppel can be pleaded against law. In view of this, we are of the opinion that the Apex Court cannot be presumed to have extended the period of limitation more so when the said issue does not find consideration therein. The issue of limitation being a matter of substantive law, can be raised and decided as it touches the basic issue of authority and jurisdiction to proceed with acquisition. The Apex Court cannot be presumed to have authorised the authorities to acquire land even if the Statute prohibits the same.
76. The respondents are entitled to the exclusion of the period covered by the interim order of the Court and not beyond it. The period of limitation expired prior to 08.01.1998, on which date, the first interim order was passed and the Court had no competence to extend the period of limitation nor the Hon'ble Apex Court has extended it. Therefore, a fresh declaration under Section 6 of the Act could not have been issued, as the proceedings stood lapsed.
77. The averments on the issue of limitation on behalf of the petitioners are that the declaration under Section 6(1) dated 03/10/2005 is beyond limitation of one year as first interim order was passed by this Court on 08/1/1998 and remained operative up to the date of declaration on 03/10/2005 in the following circumstances:
The last notification under Section 4(1) was admittedly passed on 20/12/1996 and the present notification under Section 6(1) was published on 03/10/2005, hence the total periods comes as follows:
03/10/2005 - 20/12/1996 = 8 years 9 months 15 days. The period of interim order to be excluded from 08/01/1998 to 03/10/2005 comes:-03/10/2005 - 08/1/1998= 7 years 8 months 27 days. Hence, excluding the stay period from total period consumes in present notification under Section 6(1) comes as follows:8 years 9 months 15 days - 7 years 8 months 22 days = one year 18 days. In this view of the matter the present notification is beyond limitation of 18 days.
78. Mathematically, the aforesaid calculation is correct and no fault can be found with the same. This calculation can be made otherwise also. The first declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made only two days prior to expiry of the statutory limitation on 17.12.1997 and the first interim order was passed on 08.01.1998. The limitation to make a declaration under Section 6 had expired on 19.12.1997. Thus for eighteen days even after expiry of limitation there was no restrain order at all. Therefore, no fresh declaration under Section 6 could have been issued on 03.10.2005 on the basis of Section 4 notification which was last published on 17.12.1996.
79. It has fairly been conceded by the learned Counsel for the respondents that limitation for issuing Section 6 declaration has been taken from the date of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, i.e. 06.10.2004. This is not legally permissible for the reason that the limitation of one year of making the declaration under Section 6 is to be calculated from the last date of publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act. Moreover, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not issue direction to this effect; and secondly the law, as explained above, does not permit to issue such a direction, Therefore, the declaration under Section 6 made on 03.10.2005 is admittedly beyond the limitation prescribed by the Act.
80. We do not find any force in the submissions made by Shri S.N. Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel that the notice dated 17:05.2005 published on 18.05.2005 by the authorities inviting fresh objections under Section 5A of the Act, be treated as the last publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act published in the Official Gazette on 09.08.1996, for the reason that Section 4 provides publication in the Official Gazette and substance thereof in the two local newspapers and then affixation thereof in the locality. The notice dated 17.05.2005 itself reveals that all the aforesaid three modes had already been complied with on 19 12.1996, 20.12.1996 and 20.12.1996 respectively. There is no requirement of making fresh publication subsequent thereto, nor it is permissible for the State to make such a publication after the expiry of nine years from the date of publication in the Official Gazette.
81. When the statute provides for a particular procedure, the authority has to follow the same and cannot be permitted to act in contravention of the same It has been hither to uncontroverted legal position that where a statute requires to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods or mode of performance are impliedly and necessarily forbidden, The aforesaid settled legal proposition is based on a legal maxim ' Expressio unius est exclusio alterius', meaning thereby that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner and following other course is not permissible. This maxim has consistently been followed, as is evident from the judgments in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan : [1962]1SCR662 ; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh and Ors. : [1964]4SCR485 ; Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare and Ors. : [1975]3SCR839 ; Chettiam Veettil Ammad v. Taluk Land Board and Ors. : [1979]3SCR839 ; J.N. Ganatra v. Morvi Municipality Morvi : AIR1996SC2520 ; Babu Verghese and Ors. v. Bar Council of Kerala and Ors. : [1999]1SCR1121 ; Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad and Ors. : AIR1999SC3558 ; Haresh Dayaram Thakur v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. : AIR2000SC2281 ; Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh and Ors. : (2000)7SCC296 ; Dhanajaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka etc. etc. (2001) 4 SCC 9; and Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala and Ors. : [2001]252ITR1(SC) .
82. The submissions made on behalf of the respondents that they had proceeded in pursuance of the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 06.10.2004 issued under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, also remain untenable for the reason explained hereinabove.
83. The result therefore is that the Statutory prescribed period for making the declaration under Section 6 of the Act having lapsed, all actions and consequences subsequent to the notification under Section 4 of the Act stand vitiated. The impugned declaration under Section 6 of the Act dated 03.10.2005 is quashed, so far as the land involved in these petitions are concerned. The writ petitions accordingly succeed and are allowed with no order as to costs.