Judgment:
ORDER
Amar Saran, J.
1. Heard Shri B. N. Tewari, learned counsel for the applicants and Shri Dhirendra Bahadur Singh for opposite party No. 3 and learned Additional Government Advocate representing the State.
2. This application has been filed for quashing the criminal proceedings in Criminal Case No. 558 of 2001, under Sections 498A, IPC and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, police station Nigara, district Ballia, pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ballia and the order dated 22-3-2001 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ballia taking cognizance of the case and the charge-sheet dated 22-1-2001 submitted by the police.
3. In brief, the facts of this case are that an FIR was lodged in this case on 12-12-2000 by Smt. Kanchan Bala, opposite party No. 3 alleging that she was married to Gopal Krishna Pandey, applicant No. 1. She came to her sasural on 8-3-2000. Her father had given sufficient dowry at the time of marriage, but after marriage her husband Gopal Krishna Pandey, mother-in-law Smt. Vijai Laxmi and father-in-law Suman Pandey began to demand colour T.V., freezer and cooler and on non-fulfillment of their demand, they began to torture the informant Smt. Kanchan Bala. The complainant came back to her father's house on 23-3-2000 to take her M.A. Part-1 examination, where she disclosed about the torture practised on her. On 15-8-2000 the applicants are said to have gone to her father's house and tried to force her to sign a plain stamped paper and began to demand the aforementioned dowry items as a pre-condition for taking her back. On her refusal, her husband, Gopal Krishna Pandey, applicant No. 1 slapped her. On arrival of the witnesses, the applicants left the place issuing threats. After this incident, the complainant's father made great efforts to resolve the matter, but the matter was not resolved and hence the aforesaid FIR was lodged on 12-12-2000.
4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the applicants that as a matter of fact this FIR was lodged by way of counterblast to the divorce petition which the applicant No. 1 has filed against the complainant on 4-7-2000. In that divorce petition, it was mentioned that the complainant was not willing to cohabit with the applicant No. 1 and she told the applicant No. 1 on the first night itself that she had been forced to marry to applicant No. 1 although she loved someone else and she practised cruelty on the applicant No. 1. The person with whom, she is said to have relations prior to marriage, however, has not been named in the divorce petition.
5. These allegations in the divorce petition are at best a defence evidence and can only be considered at the trial of the case and it could be premature to quash the proceedings in an application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. Moreover, unsubstantiated allegations of infidelity without nominating the person with whom a woman is said to be having relations prior to her marriage, may be a kind of cruelty on the woman and such an allegation could easily be made for the purpose of creating grounds in the divorce petition filed by the husband.
6. In this case the learned counsel for the applicants has cited several decisions. The first decision cited by the learned counsel for the applicants is Sunil Kumar v. Escorts Yamaha Motors Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 27, for the proposition that in a case where the FIR does not disclose the necessary ingredients of the offence of cheating or criminal breach of trust and the circumstances manifestly suggest that the FIR was lodged to pre-empt the filing of the criminal complaint against the informant under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, criminal proceedings therein may be quashed.
7. In the present case, the FIR prima facie discloses an offence under Section 498, IPC and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and the same has not been filed to pre-empt the initiation of any proceedings against the complainant.
8. The second case cited by the learned counsel for the applicants Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill, AIR 1996 SC 309, was a case in which a senior Police Officer has slapped her senior lady officer on the posterior in the presence of a gathering of senior officers and offence was not allowed to be quashed and it was not even considered a trivial offence, within the meaning of Section 95 of the Penal Code. Also reference was made in paragraph 8 of the case to one of the propositions in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 (Sup) 1 SCC 335 : (AIR 1992 SC 604) (1992 Cri LJ 527), that criminal proceedings may be quashed if they are manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudges. This proposition was not accepted as a sufficient ground for quashing and criminal proceedings against K.P.S. Gill and on facts it was held that the offence alleged had been disclosed.
9. In the third case, G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., AIR 2000 SC 754 : (2000 All LJ 496) : (2000 Cri LJ 824) the accused had been prosecuted both under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act and were also being sought to be prosecuted under Section 406/420, IPC. The prosecution under the latter provision was held to be an abuse of the process of Court. Therefore, that case also is not of much help to the applicants.
10. The fourth case is Kunstocom Electronics (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. Gilt Pack Ltd. 2002 AIR SCW 374 : (AIR 2002 SC 739) : (2002 Cri LJ 1012). In that case where the complainants firm had suffered a loss because of non-supply of certain chemicals by the appellant, who was an associate of a German company, the High Court had first directed the Magistrate to dispose of the objection on merits after examining the summoning order. However, the Magistrate had rejected the application for quashing of the complaint by a reasoned order. Thereafter in petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. High Court had again disposed of the application remanding the applicant to the Magistrate to raise the point at the time of framing of charges. The Supreme Court set aside the latter order and remanded the matter to the High Court to decide the case on merits. Therefore, this case is also of no assistance to the applicants.
11. The next case, Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 499 : (AIR 1992 SC 1815) : (1992 Cri LJ 2916), where a bank loan had been adjusted by the bank from the security deposited with it, the Court held that the complaint had been filed in a mala fide manner to harass the bank authority. Thus, this case is also distinguishable from the facts of the present case.
12. The last case cited by the learned counsel for the applicants is Dr. V.N. Sharma v. State 1996 Cri LJ 1116, in which learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court had held that where no particulars of any specific role played by any one of them nor any incidents or dates of any incidents are mentioned in the complaint and relatives mentioned in the complaint are neither close relatives nor residing in same premises with complainant, no prima facie case under Section 498A. IPC was made out.
13. Here in this case, as pointed out above, specific allegations of dowry demand etc. and the dates when certain incidents took place have been mentioned in the FIR. Hence the last case cited by the learned counsel for the applicant also does not render any assistance.
14. Another point sought to be raised by the learned counsel for the applicant is that applicant No. 3 Vijai Laxmi was undergoing training in Nagara Ballia in Gorakhpur, where she was Mukya Sevika Prashhikshan from 5-3-2000 to 22-9-2000 and hence, as submitted, she could not take part in the incident dated 15-8-2000. Certain documents and certificates have been filed to show that applicant No. 3 took part in the said training.
15. It is significant that such a plea of alibi cannot be considered in an application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. Moreover, it has been stated in paragraph 9 of the counter affidavit filed by the complainant that 15-8-2000 was holiday and Nagra Ballia is only 115 kms from Gorakhpur, which could easily be covered within 5 hours by any motor transport. Such a plea of alibi could, therefore, not exonerate applicant 3 at this stage.
16. Another point about the delay of FIR has been raised, but about this submission of the learned counsel for the applicants, the FIR itself mentioned that initially efforts were made to bring about a reconciliation, but when all these effects failed, then the present FIR was lodged.
17. This is very natural conduct because position of woman in such cases or that of divorced women in India are very poor. Hence if an effort for re-conciliation has taken place and only as a last resort, the FIR was lodged, the delay in lodging the FIR cannot prove a ground for quashing of the same.
18. Learned counsel for the complainant has drawn my attention to a letter signed by the complainant to her home immediately after marriage where the allegations made in the FIR etc. are reiterated.
19. Learned counsel for the applicant states that this fact was not mentioned in the FIR and it is a concocted piece of evidence.
20. There is no need to consider the contending arguments on this point as what value can be assigned to such a letter will be appreciated at the trial of the case.
21. Some criticism was also sought to be made that the summoning order was not a reasoned one and in a mechanical manner the applicants had been summoned by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. Significantly, that order has not been filed with this application. However, the Apex Court has clearly pronounced in Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports v. Roshanlal Agarwal, (2003) 46 All Cri C 686 : (AIR 2003 SC 1900) : (2003 Cri LJ 1698) (SC) that reasons are not needed in the summoning order and only when an order of discharge is passed, then fuller reasons are required.
22. In this view of this matter, there is no ground for quashing the aforesaid criminal proceedings against the applicants or summoning order or charge sheet in this case, Accordingly this application is dismissed. The stay order dated 14-5-2001 is vacated.
23. However, in view of the long delay that has already taken place, the trial Court is directed to conclude the trial of this case within six months if possible. In case the applicants appear before the Court concerned within one month and apply for bail, the same shall be disposed of by the Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 2154 of 1995, Smt. Amrawati v. State of U.P., decided on 15-10-2004. (reported in 2005 Cri LJ 755).
24. It is made clear that none of the observations made above for the purpose of disposal of this application, shall influence the trial Court while deciding the trial of the case.
25. The application is dismissed as above.