S.P. Mehrotra, J.
1. The petitioners have filed this writ petition, inter-alia praying for issuance of a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the Government Orders dated 28.3.1998 and 22.2.1999 issued by respondent No. 1 (Annexure Nos. 1 and 2 to the writ petition) and further for issuance of a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 not to withdraw or transfer any amount from the Zila Nidhi Fund of the Zila Panchayat, Banda towards payment of salaries of teaching and non-teaching staff and to meet other expenses of the Zila Parishad Krishi Mahavidyalaya, Banda, and further for issuance of a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to pay back amount of Rs. 36,03,000/- withdrawn from the Zila Nidhi Fund of Zila Panchayat, Banda under the Government Order dated 28.3.1998 and 22.2.1999 to the Zila Nidhi Fund of Zila Panchayat, Banda with interest at the rate of 18% per annum.
2. In the aforesaid writ petition an impleadment application supported by an affidavit was filed on behalf of Dr. Ram Bharat Singh Tomar, Principal of the aforementioned institution and another along with a stay vacation application and a counter-affidavit sworn on 18.1.2001 in reply to the aforesaid writ petition. The said impleadment application has been allowed today by a separate order and the applicants of the said application have been directed to be impleaded as the party respondent Nos. 4 and 5 in the aforesaid writ petition.
3. The petitioners have filed a rejoinder-affidavit sworn on 11.4.2001 in reply to the aforesaid counter-affidavit filed on behalf of Dr. Ram Bharat Singh Tomar and another (respondent Nos. 4 and 5 in the Writ petition).
4. A supplementary counter-affidavit sworn on 23.12.2001 has also been filed on behalf of the respondent Nos.'4' and 5 (Dr. Ram Bharat Singh Tomar and another).
5. Another impleadment application has been filed in the writ petition on behalf of Non-teaching Employees Association, Zila Parishad, Krishi-Mahavidyalaya, Banda through its Secretary along with a stay vacation application and a counter-affidavit sworn on 27.12.2001 in reply to the aforesaid writ petition The said impleadment application has been allowed today by a separate order, and the applicant has been directed to be, impleaded as party respondent No. 6 in the aforesaid writ petition.
6. A stay vacation application No. 27292 of 2002 along with a counter-affidavit sworn on 22.1.2002 by Smt. Krishna Devi Patel, Adhyaksh, Zila Panchayat. Banda (Respondent No. 2) has been filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3.
7. The petitioners have filed a rejoinder-affidavit sworn on 27.1.2002 in reply to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the party respondent No. 6.
8. Supplementary affidavit sworn on 6.1.2002 has also been filed on behalf of the petitioners.
9. The petitioners have also filed a rejoinder-affidavit sworn on 24.2.2002 in reply to the aforesaid counter-affidavit of Smt, Krishna Devi Patel filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3.
10. The relevant facts which emerged from the writ petition and various affidavits exchanged between the parties are as follows : A resolution dated 12.11.1991 (Annexure No. A-I to the counter-affidavit of Dr. Ram Bharat Singh Tomar) was passed by Zila Parishad, Banda proposing to establish Mahavidyalaya for Agricultural Education and Research, for which it was proposed that Zila Parishad would provide land and a sum of Rupees Ten Lacs.
11. It appears that the Adhyaksh, Zila Parishad, Banda sent a communication in this regard to the State Government whereupon a communication dated 3.11.1992 was sent by UP Sachiv, Uttar Pradesh Government to the Adhyaksh, Zila Parishad, Banda inter-alia, stating that if Bundelkhand University would grant permission to Zila Parishad, Banda for establishing Krishi Mahavidyalaya then the Government would have no objection in accepting the proposal of the Zila Parishad. The said communication dated 3.11.1992 is annexed as Annexure No. CA-2 to the said counter-affidavit of Dr. Ram Bharat Singh Tomar.
12. A communication dated 30.9.1993 (Annexure No. 4 to the writ petition) was sent by the UP Sachiv, Uttar Pradesh Government to the Registrar, Bundelkhand University, Jhansi, inter-alia, giving clearance for temporary affiliation of the aforesaid Zila Parishad Krishi Mahavidyalaya, Banda subject to the condition mentioned in the said communication.
13. Various letters annexed as Annexure Nos. CA-4 to CA-12 to the counter-affidavit of Dr. Ram Bharat Singh Tomar were thereafter exchanged between Zila Parishad. Banda/Zila Panchayat, Banda and the Uttar Pradesh Government. In its communications, Zila Parishad, Banda/Zila Panchayat. Banda, inter-alia, sought permission of the Government for making payment of salary to the teaching and non-teaching staff of the aforesaid Mahavidyalaya from Zila Nidhi Fund of Zila Panchayat, Banda.
14. Ultimately, Up-Sachiv, Uttar Pradesh Government sent a communication No. 1295 dated 28.3.1998 to Upper Mukhyadhikari, Zila Panchayat, Banda, inter-alia, directing for immediate, payment of six months, salary to the Teachers and employees of the aforesaid Mahavidyalaya in accordance with Rules .s and further directing for making detailed enquiry on various points mentioned in the said communication. The said communication is annexed as Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition. Thereafter, the District Magistrate, Banda sent a communication dated 26.11.1998 to Up-Sachiv, Panchayat Raj Anubhag, Uttar Pradesh Government along with an enquiry report dated 17.10.1998. The said communication dated 26.11.1998 is annexed as Annexure No. CA-14 to the counter-affidavit of Dr. Ram Bharat Singh Tomar.
15. Thereupon, Up-Sachiv, Uttar Pradesh Government sent a communication No. 885, dated 22.2.1999 to Upper Mukhyadhikari, Zila Panchayat, Banda, inter-alia, stating that having considered the enquiry report of the District Magistrate, Banda, the Government had decided that the balance salary of the Teachers and employees of Zila Parishad Krishi Mahavidyalaya, Banda be paid immediately in accordance with Rules. It was, inter-alia, further stated that the expenditure incurred in this regard was declared as proper expenditure charge on Zila Nidhi Fund. The said communication dated 22.2.1999 annexed as Annexure No. 2 the writ petition.
16. A perusal of Annexure No. 6 to the writ petition shows that pursuant to the said communications dated 28.3.1998 and 22.2.1999, the following amounts were paid from Zila Panchayat Nidhi, Banda :
Rs. 6,53,718-30 in respect of salary for the period September, 1996 to February, 1997.
Rs. 29,49,734-30 in respect of salary for the period March, 1997 to January, 1999.
Total --Rs. 36,03,452-60.
17. As stated earlier, the petitioners have, inter-alia, challenged the said Communications/Government Orders dated 28.3.1998 and 22.2.1999 and have also sought direction for refund of the said amount of Rs. 36,03,000/- withdrawn from the Zila Ndhi Fund.
18. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties.
19. The petitioners have challenged the said communications/Government Orders dated 28.3.1998 and dated 22.2.1999 and the payment of salary to the staff of the aforesaid Zila Parishad Krishi Mahavidyalaya, Banda mainly on two grounds:--
1. Zila Panchayat has no jurisdiction or power to establish a post Graduate College under the Uttar Pradesh Kshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats Adhiniyam, 1961 (In short 'U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961')
2. The appointments of the Principal, Teachers and non-teaching staff in the said Mahavidyalaya have been made without following the norm or procedure prescribed by law.
20. Before going into the merits of the writ petition, it is necessary to deal with a preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents challenging locus standi of the petitioners to file the present writ petition. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that as per the allegations made in Paragraph 2 of the writ petition, the petitioner No. 1 is an Association of the employees and pensioners of Zila Panchayat, Banda who are mentioned in a list annexed as Annexure No. 3 to the writ petition. It is further contended that these employees and pensioners of Zila Panchayat, Banda are concerned with the payment of their respective salaries, allowances, pension etc. and they have no concern with the validity of establishment of the Post Graduate College by Zila Panchayat, Banda or with the appointments made in the said College or with the payments of salary etc. made to the staff of the said College. If the petitioners have any grievance in regard to the payment of their salaries, allowances, pension etc. they can seek appropriate relief in this regard in appropriate proceeding, but the petitioners have no locus standi to question the said activities of Zila Panchayat, Banda regarding establishment of the Post Graduate College, appointment of staff in the said College and payment of salary etc. to such staff.
21. In reply, the learned Counsel for the petitioners refers to Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the writ petition and Annexure 3 to the writ petition and submits that in view of Section 102 (3) (b) of the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961, the payment of salaries, allowances, pension etc. is to be made to the petitioners from the Zila Nidhi Fund of Zila Panchayat, Banda, and inasmuch as, there are arrears in regard to certain employees, the petitioners have locus standi to file the aforesaid writ petition.
22. Having considered the rival contentions made in regard to the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents, we find that there is force in the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents. The petitioner No. 1, as is apparent from Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the writ petition, is an Association of the employees and pensioners of Zila Panchayat, Banda, while the petitioner' No. 2 is Adhyaksh of the said Association. The concern of these employees and pensioners can only be in regard to the payment of their respective salaries, allowances, pension etc. for their respective services. If these employees and pensioners have any grievance in regard to the payment of their respective salaries, allowances, pension etc., it is open to them to raise their grievance in appropriate proceeding and seek appropriate reliefs. However, these employees and pensioners have no locus standi to question the activities of Zila Panchayat, Banda in regard to the establishment of Post Graduate College or in regard to appointments of staff in the Post Graduate College or in regard to payment of salary etc. to such staff from Zila Nidhi Fund.
23. The question of locus standi may be examined from another angle also. The establishment of the aforesaid Mahavidyalaya has been undertaken by Zila Panchayat, Banda in exercise of its powers and functions mentioned in Item (xvii) of Part-A of Schedule II U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961 read with Section 33(1)(V) of the said Adhiniyam. As such, the expenditure in regard to the aforesaid Mahavidyalaya falls under Section 102(3)(f) of the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961.
24. Payment of salaries, allowances, pension etc. of the employees and pensioners of Zila Panchayat, Banda falls under Section 102(3)(b) of the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961.
25. A reading of Sub-section (3) of Section 102 of the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961 shows that the expenditure falling under clause (b) of the said Sub-section would get priority over the expenditure felling under clause (f) of the said Sub-section. In view of this also, the petitioners cannot have any grievance in regard to the expenditure incurred with regard to the aforesaid Mahavidyalaya.
26. There is yet another aspect of the matter. A Government Order dated 4th September, 2001 has been filed as Annexure No. SCA-1 to the supplementary counter-affidavit of Dr. Ram Bharat Singh Tomar sworn on 23.12.2001. This Government Order shows that salary etc. and retrial benefits will be paid to the officers and employees of Zila Panchayat from the funds transferred by the State Government to Zila Panchayat. In view of this provision in the Government Order, the petitioners can no longer have any grievance/concern in respect of expenditure from the Zila Nidhi Fund.
27. It is also note-worthy that even the allegations made in the aforesaid writ petition do not give locus standi to the petitioners to file the same even though the list annexed as Annexure 3 to the writ petition mentioned arrears with regard to certain employees, but no details of the said arrears have been mentioned in the writ petition. It is also not mentioned in the writ petition as to whether any and if so what remedies or proceedings have been taken so far by the said employees in regard to their alleged arrears. It is thus evident that the petitioners have made only vague and general allegations in order to claim locus standi for filing the aforesaid writ petition. Such vague and general allegations, in our opinion cannot give any locus standi to the petitioners for filing the aforesaid writ petition.
28. In Paragraph 19 of the writ petition, the petitioners have alleged in regard to an employee namely Awadhesh Kumar Sachan that salary has not been paid for the last 17 months due to paucity of funds.
29. These allegation made in Paragraph 19 of the writ petition have been replied to in Paragraph 27 of the counter-affidavit sworn on 22.1.2002 filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. It is denied in the said Paragraph of the counter-affidavit that Awadhesh Kumar Sachan has been paid his salary for last 17 months due to paucity of funds. In fact, it is pointed out that Awadhesh Kumar Sachan, by order dated 26.12.1998, was deputed to perform his duties on the post of Tax Collector and to collect Tahbazari does at Tehsil Naraini but he was not performing his duties honestly, not achieving his target, nor was he visiting his area for collecting tahbazari dues, hence payment was withheld. It is further stated in the said Paragraph of the counter-affidavit that Awadhesh Kumar Sachan has filed Writ Petition No. 1408 of 1999 before this Court but in the said writ petition he has not said that the salary was not being paid to him due to paucity of funds. The said assertion made in the said counter-affidavit show that the allegation made in the writ, petition regarding non-payment of salary to Awadhesh Kumar Sachan on account of paucity of funds are not correct, and such allegations. Cannot give locus standi to the petitioners for filing the aforesaid writ petition.
30. Hence, we are of the opinion that the petitioners have no locus standi to file the aforesaid writ petition, and the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents is correct.
31. In this connection, it is pertinent to refer to a decision of the Apex Court in Rajnit Prasad v. Union of India and Ors., JT 2000 (2) SC 31. The Apex Court laid down as follows (Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the said Judgment Today.)
'8. It is, no doubt, true that the scope of locus standi has been widened by this Court through its various decisions and, that too in the field of. Public Interest Litigation where it has been said that Public Interest Litigation can be initiated not only by filing petitions in the High Court or in this Court in a regular manner but also by means of letter and telegrams addressed to the Court, (see People's Union for Democratic Rights and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.. AIR 1982 SC 1473 : (1982) 2 SSC 494; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1984 SC 802; State of Himachal Pradesh v. A. Parent of a Student of Medical College, Shimla and Ors., AIR 1985 SC 910 ; (19850 3 SCC 169 and Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa and Ors., AIR 1991 SC 1902.
9. But a mere busy-body who has no interest cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Court. In respect of departmental proceedings which are initiated or sought to be initiated by the Government against its employees a person who is not even remotely connected with those proceedings cannot; challenge any aspect of the departmental proceedings or action by filing a writ petition in the High Court or in this Court. Disciplinary action against an employee is taken by the Government for various reasons principally for 'mis-conduct' on the part of the employee. This action is taken after a 'domestic' enquiry in which the employee is provided an opportunity of hearing as required by the constitutional mandate. It is essentially a matter between the employer and a stranger, much less a practising advocate, cannot be said to have any interest in those proceedings. Public Interest of general importance is not involved in disciplinary proceedings. In fact, if such petitions are entertained at the instance of persons who are not connected with those proceedings. It would amount to an abuse of the process of Court.'
32. In view of our decision on the preliminary objection, it is not necessary to examine the case on merits. However, since submissions have been made by both the sides on merits of the case also, we are proceeding to deal with the same.
33. The first contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the Zila Panchayat, Banda had no jurisdiction or power to establish the aforesaid Zila Parishad Krishi Mahavidyalaya, Banda under the provisions of the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961. It is contended that in view of Article 243G of the Constitution of India, the powers and the authority are to be conferred on the Panchayat by the State Legislature by law, and the Panchayats are entitled to only such powers and authority as are conferred on them by any such law enacted by the State Legislature. If the law made by the State Legislature has not conferred power or authority to the Panchayat in respect of certain matter, the contention proceeds, then the Panchayat cannot exercise any power or authority in respect of such matter.
34. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that Entry (xvii) of Part-A of Schedule II to the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961, which gives power to Zila Panchayat in respect of education including primary and secondary schools cannot be interpreted to include power to establish a Post Graduate College. It is contended that the word 'including' should be interpreted in the sense of the word 'means' and, therefore, the said Entry (xvii) of Part-A of Schedule II to the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961 should be confined only to primary and secondary education, and the said Entry cannot be extended to include higher education also reliance is placed on the following decisions :
1. The South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufactures Association and Anr. v. The State of Gujarat and Anr., AIR 1977 SC 90.
2. M/s. Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Limited v. The State of U.P. and Anr., AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1649.
3. Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Company Limited and Ors., (1987) 1 SCC 424 ; AIR 1987 SC 1023.
35. In reply, it is contended on behalf of the respondents that the Entry (xvii) of Part-A of Schedule II to the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961 cannot be interpreted to mean only primary and secondary education, word 'including' occurring in the said Entry has been used in extensive sense, and the word 'education' should, therefore, be given its natural and full meaning. The word 'education', the contention proceeds, includes not only primary and secondary education but also higher education. It is also pointed out on behalf of the respondents that various entries occurring in Part A of Schedule II to the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961 show that the various powers and functions have been conferred on Zila Panchayat for the over all development of the area of Zila Panchayat and therefore, the said Entry (xvii) should be widely interpreted in order to include within its fold various facets of education including higher education. The respondents, therefore, contend that Zila Panchayat, Banda had full power and authority to establish the aforesaid Zila Parishad Krishi Mahavidyalaya.
36. Having considered the rival contentions, we are of the view that the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is not correct Article 243G of the Constitution of India which deals with the powers, authority and responsibilities of Panchayats, provides as follows :
'243-G. Powers, authority and responsibilities of Panchayats.--Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by law, endow the Panchayats with such powers and authority and may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self-Government and such law may contain provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities upon Panchayats at the appropriate level, subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, with respect to-
(a) the preparation of plans for economic development and social justice,
(b) the implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice as may be entrusted to them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule.'
37. Thus, the powers and authority are to be conferred on the Panchayats by the State Legislature by enacting law. Such law may, inter-alia, provide for devolution of powers and responsibilities upon Panchayats in relation to the matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule to the Constitution of India.
38. Entry No. 17 of the Eleventh Schedule to the Constitution of India provides as follows :
'17. Education including primary and secondary schools.'
39. Article 243H of the Constitution of India which deals with the powers to impose taxes by, and funds of, the Panchayats, lays down as under :
'243-H. Power to impose taxes by, and Funds of the Panchayats :--The Legislature of a State may, by law :--
(a) authorize a Panchayat to levy collect and appropriate such taxes duties, tools and fees in accordance with such procedure and subject to such limits;
(b) assign to a Panchayat such taxes, duties, tolls and fees levied and collected by the State Government for such purposes and subject to such conditions and limits;
(c) provide for making such grants-in-aid to the Panchayats from the Consolidated Fund of life State; and
(d) provide for constitution of such funds for crediting all moneys . received, respectively, by or on behalf of the Panchayats and also for the withdrawal of such moneys therefrom,
as may be specified in the law.'
40. Hence, the law made by the' State Legislature may, inter-alia, provide for Constitution of Funds of the panchayat.
41. Article 243N provides for continuance of existing laws and Panchayats, and reads as under :
'243-N. Continuance of existing laws and Panchayats.--Notwithstanding anything in this part, any provision of any law relating to Panchayats in force in a State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992, which is inconsistent with the provisions of this part, shall continue to be in force until amended or repealed by a competent legislature or other competent authority or until the expiration of one year from such commencement, whichever is earlier:
Provided that all the Panchayats existing immediately before such commencement shall continue till the expiration of their duration, unless sooner dissolved by a resolution passed to that effect by the Legislative Assembly of that State or, in the case of a State having a Legislative Council, by each House of the Legislature of that State.'
42. In view of this Article, it is evident that the existing laws relating to Panchayats enforced in a State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992 will continue to remain in operation. Only those provisions of such existing laws as are inconsistent with Part IX of the Constitution of India will cease to remain in operation on the expiry of the period mentioned in Article 243N.
43. Hence, the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961 has continued to remain in operation even after the commencement of Seventy-third Constitutional Amendment. Section 99 of the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961 which provides, inter-alia, for establishment of Zila Nidhi Fund is evidently referable to Article 243H(d) of the Constitution of India which provides for the Constitution of Fund of the Panchayat. Section 99 of the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961 is quoted below :
'99. Zila Nidhi and Kshettra Nidhi.--(1) There shall be established for each 1(Zila Panchayat) a Fund called Zila Nidhi and for each 1(Kshetra Panchayat) a fund called Kshettra Nidhi, to the credit whereof shall be placed all sums received 2(including the grant-in-aid from the Consolidated Fund of the State) and all loans raised by or on behalf to the 1(Zila Panchayat) or the 1(Kshettra Panchayat) as the case may be:
Provided that a 1(Zila Panchayat) or a 1(Kshettra Panchayat) shall earmark parts of the fund received by it for a particular purpose and shall expend the same in carrying out that purpose.
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect any obligations of a 1(Zila Panchayat) or 1 (Kshettra Panchayat) arising from a trust legally imposed upon or accepted by it.
(3) A 1(Zila Panchayat) or a 1 (Kshettra Panchayat) may receive such contributions in cash or in kind as may be made by any person for any work of public utility and 1(Zila Panchayat) or the 1 (Kshettra Panchayat) shall, thereupon, utilize the same together with its contributions, wherever necessary in execution of such work.
44. Section 102 of the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961 which deals with the application of Fund of Panchayat lays down asunder :
'102. Application of Fund.--(1) The Zila Nidhi and all property vested in a 1(Zila Panchayat) and the Kshettra Nidhi and all property vested in a 1(Kshettra Panchayat) shall be applied for the purposes express or implied, for which, by or under this or any other enactment, powers are conferred or duties or obligations are imposed upon the 1(Zila Panchayat) or the 1(Kshettra Panchayat), as the case may be.
(2) A 1(Zila Panchayat) or a 1(Kshettra Panchayat) shall not incur any expenditure for acquiring or renting land beyond the limits of the district of the Khand, as the case may be, or for constructing any work beyond such limits except --
(a) wigh the sanction of the State Government; and
(b) on such term and conditions as the State Government may impose.
(3) Subject to the provisions of Section 99 the fund and property of a 1(Zila Panchayat) or a 1(Kshettra Panchayat) shall be applied in the following order of priority --
(a) Liabilities and obligations arising from a trust legally imposed upon, or accepted by the 1(Zila Panchayat) or the 1 (Kshettra Panchayat);
(b) the payment of establishment charges including contributions to pension, provident fund and leave allowances;
(c) all sums due to the Government;
(d) the re-payment of, and the payment of interest on any loan incurred under the provisions of the Local Authorities Loans Act, 1914;
(e) any sums ordered to be paid from the Zila Nidhi, or the Kshettra Nidhi, as the case may be, under Sub-section (2) of Section 109, Sub-section (3) of Section 137, Sub-section (2) of Section 229, subsection (3) of Section 230 and Sub-section (3) of Section 252;
(f) the carrying on of the duties and obligations imposed upon it under Section 31, 32, 33 and 34 of this Act or under any other enactment.'1
45. Chapter III of the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961 which deals with the powers and functions of Kshettra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat is evidently referable to Article 243G of the Constitution of India. Sections 31 and 33 occurring in Chapter III of the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961 are relevant for our purposes, and the same are reproduced below :
'31. Exercise of powers and performance of functions under the Act--(1) Every 1(Kshettra Panchayat) and 1(Zila Panchayat) shall exercise, the posers and perform the functions conferred and entrusted or delegated to it by or under this Act.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this or any law for the time being in force, the State Government may at any time entrust to any 1(Kshettra Panchayat) or all 1(Kshettra Panchayat) or to any 1(Zila Panchayat) or all 1(Zila Panchayats) any of the functions for the time being performed by any of its departments below or at the district level and to withdraw the function so entrusted.
2[7. (3) Where the State Government entrusts any function to the Zila Panchayat or Kshettra Panchayat under Sub-section (2), it may direct that any scheme, plan or project of the concerned department shall also be transferred to, and implemented by or under the control the Zila Panchayat or the Kshettra Panchayat, as the case may be].
33. General posers and functions of 1(Zila Panchayats).--(1) Every 1(Zila Panchayat) shall exercise and perform the following powers and functions-
(i) to classify fairs and festivals, other than those that are or may hereafter be managed by the State Government as 1(Gram Panchayat) fairs and festivals, 1(Kshettra Panchayat) fairs and festivals, and 1(Zila Panchayat) fairs and festivals for purposes of management and control by 1(Gram Panchayats), 1(Kshettra Panchayats) and 1(Zila Panchayat) respectively and to reverse such classification when so deemed necessary or desirable;
(ii) to classify roads as village roads, inter-village roads and district roads for the purpose of management by 1(Gram Panchayats), 1(Kshettra Panchayat) and the 1(Zila Panchayat) respectively;
(iii) to supervise generally in accordance with rules made in this behalf the activities of 1(Gram Panchayats) and 1 (Kshettra Panchayats) of the district;
(iv) to act, subject to the rules made in this behalf, as the main channel of correspondence between the State Government on the one hand and the 1(Kshettra Panchayat) and 1(Gram Panchayats) on the other;
(v) the powers and functions specified in Part-A of Schedule II;
(vi) Performance of such other functions as may be prescribed.
(vii) A 1(Zila Panchayat) may make reasonable provision within the district in respect of matters specified in Part-B of Schedule II.'
46. In view of these provisions, it is evidence that Zila Panchayat shall exercise such powers and perform such function as are conferred and entrusted or delegated to it by or under the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961. Section 33(1)(v) shows that besides other powers and functions mentioned in Section 3(1), the Zila Panchayat has also been conferred powers and functions specified in Part A of Schedule II to the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961.
47. Entry No. (xvii) of Part A of Schedule II to the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961 reads as under:
'(xvii) Education including primary and secondary Schools :
(a) Construction, maintenance and supervision of primary and secondary schools.
(b) Providing education for all in district.
(c) Survey and Evaluation of Primary and Secondary Education in district.'
48. The controversy involved in regarding interpretation of this Entry (xvii). This Entry (xvii) of the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961 is evidently referable to Entry No. 17 of the Eleventh Schedule to the Constitution of India.
49. A reading of Entry No. 17 of the Eleventh Schedule to the Constitution of India in the light of other Entries occurring in the said Schedule, particularly Entry Nos. 1, 8, 14, 23 and 26, clearly show that the word 'education' occurring in the said Entry No. 17 is to be given its normal and full meaning. The words 'including primary and secondary schools' occurring in the said Entry No. 17 have been mentioned by way of abundant caution and the said words cannot be interpreted to restrict the meaning of the word 'education' so as to confine the same to primary and secondary education only. The word 'education' is to be given its normal, natural and full meaning so as to include all facets of education including higher education.
50. There is one more aspect of the matter. Article 243G contemplates that the Panchayat should be conferred such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institution of self-Government. Various Entries in the Eleventh Schedule to the Constitution of India show that the Panchayat, are to be conferred powers and responsibilities for the purpose of over all development of all aspects of rural life in their respective areas. In view of this also, the word 'education' occurring in Entry No. 17 of the Eleventh Schedule to the Constitution of India should be given its normal, natural and full meaning as noted above. The words 'including primary and secondary schools' have been mentioned only by way of abundant caution.
51. Coming now to Part-A of Schedule II to the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961, it is evident that most of the Entries in the said Part-A of Schedule II to the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961 are parallel to various Entries occurring in the Eleventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. Entry No. (xvii) of Part-A. of Schedule II to the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961 is parallel to Entry No. 17 of the Eleventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. Therefore, just as the word 'education' occurring in Entry No. 17 of the Eleventh Schedule to the Constitution of India is to be given its normal natural and full meaning, the word 'education' occurring in Entry (xvii) of Part A of Schedule II to the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961 should also be given its normal, natural and full meaning. Just as in Entry No. 17 of the Eleventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, the words 'including primary and secondary schools' have been mentioned by way of abundant caution, similarly the words 'including primary and secondary schools' occurring in Entry (xvii) of Part-A of Schedule II to the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961 have also been mentioned by way of abundant caution hence, Entry (xvii) of Part-A of Schedule II to the UP. Adhiniyam, 1961 takes within its fold all facets of education including higher education, and the said Entry cannot be confined only to primary and secondary education.
52. It is further note-worthy that Entry (xvii) of Part-A of Schedule II to the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961 as also Entry No. 17 of the Eleventh Schedule to the Constitution of India use the word 'including'. The word 'including' is generally used as term of extension.
53. In Reynolds v. The Commissioner of Income Tax for Trinidad and Tobago, (1965) 3 All England Reports 901 (P.C.), the Privy Council interpreted the word 'including' broadly relying upon the following dictum of Lord Watsongiven in Dilworth v. Stamps Comrs; Dilworth V. Land & Income Tax Comrs., (1899) A.C. 99 at pp. 105, 106:
'the word 'include' is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and, when it is so used, these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include.'
54. In the State of Bombay and Ors. v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabhba, AIR 1960 Supreme Court 610, the Supreme Court while dealing with the interpretation of the word 'industry' occurring in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, laid down as follows (Paragraph 10 of the said AIR):
'10..............It is obvious that the words used in an inclusive definition denote extension and cannot be treated as restricted in any sense. (Vide : Stroud's 'Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 2, P. 1415). Where we are dealing with an inclusive definition it would be in appropriate to put a restrictive interpretation upon terms of wider denotation.'
55. In Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tees Hazari Court, Delhi v. State of Gujarat and Ors., AIR 1991 Supreme Court 2176, the Supreme Court while interpreting Article 129 of the Constitution of India, laid down as (follows Paragraph 29 of the said AIR):
'29. Article 129 declares the Supreme Court a Court of record and it further provides that the Supreme Court shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. The expression used in Article 129 is not restrictive instead it is extensive in nature. It the framers of the Constitution intended that the Supreme Court shall have power to punish for contempt of itself only, there was no necessity for inserting the expression 'including the power to punish for contempt of itself. The article confers power on the Supreme Court to punish for contempt of itself and in addition, it confers some additional power relating to contempt as would appear from the expression 'including'. The expression 'including' has been interpreted by Courts to extend and widen the scope of power. The plain language of article clearly indicates that this Court as a Court of record has power to punish for contempt of itself and also something else which could fall within the inherent jurisdiction of a Court of record. In interpreting the Constitution, it is not permissible to adopt a construction which would render any expression superfluous or redundant. The Courts ought not to accept any such construction. While construing Article 129, it is not permissible to ignore the significance and impact of the inclusive power conferred on the Supreme Court. Since, the Supreme Court is designed by the Constitution as a Court of record and as she founding fathers were aware that a Superior Court of record had inherent power to indict a person for the contempt of itself as well as of Courts inferior to it, the expression 'including' was deliberately inserted in the Article. Article 129 recognized the existing inherent power of a Court of record in its full plenitude including the power to punish for the contempt of inferior Courts. If Article 129 is susceptible of two interpretations, we would prefer to accept the interpretation which would preserve the inherent jurisdiction of this Court being the Superior Court of record, to safeguard and protect the subordinate judiciary, which forms the very backbone of administration of justice. The Subordinate Courts administer justice at the grass root level their protection is necessary to preserve the confidence of people in the efficacy of Courts and to ensure unsullied flow of justice at its base level.'
56. In Regional Direction, Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. M/s. High Land Coffee Works of P.F.X. Saldanha and Sons and Anr., AIR 1992 Supreme Court 129, the Supreme Court while considering the interpretation of the words 'seasonal factory' occurring in the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 as amended by the Amending Act 44 of 1966, laid down as follows (Paragraph 7 of the said AIR):
'7........................The amendment, therefore, was clearly in favour of the widening the definition of 'seasonal factory'. The amendment is in the nature of expansion of the original definition as it is clear from the use of the words 'include a factory.' The amendment does not restrict the original definition of 'Seasonal Factory' but makes addition thereto by inclusion. The word 'include' in the statutory definition is generally used to enlarge the meaning of the preceding words and it is by way of extension, and not with restriction. The word 'include' is very generally Used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include.' (See (i) Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th Edn., Vol. 3, p. 1263 and (ii) C.I. T. Andhra Pradesh v. M/s. Taj Mahal Hotel Secunderabad, (1971) 3 SCC 550 : AIR 1972 SC 168, (iii) State of Bombay v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, (1960) 2 SCR 866 at p. 875 : AIR 1960 SC 610 at p. 624.'
57. In the Forest Range Officer and Ors. v. P. Mohammad AH and Ors., AIR 1994 Supreme Court 120, the Supreme Court was considering the definition of the words 'Forest Produce' occurring in the Kerala Forest Act, 1961. The Supreme Court laid down as follows (Paragraph 6 of the said AIR) :
'6..........................It is settled law that the word 'include' is generally used as a word of extension. When used in an interpretation clause, it seeks to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute. Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition at p. 64 stated the construction to be adopted to the meanings of the words and phrases that 'The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the law giver'. At P. 214 it is stated that an interpretation clause which extends the meaning of a word does not take away its ordinary meaning. An interpretation clause to the inclusive definition is not meant to prevent the word receiving its ordinary, popular and natural sense whenever that word that would be properly applicable, but to enable the word as used in the Act, when there is nothing in the context or the subject matter to the contrary, to be applied to some things to which it would be ordinarily be applicable. An interpretation clause should be used for the purpose of interpreting words which are ambiguous or equivocal, and not so as to disturb the meaning of such as are plain. At P. 216 it is stated that another important rule with regard to the effect of an interpretation clause is, that an interpretation clause is not to be taken as substituting one set of words for another, or as strictly defining what the meaning of the term must be under all circumstances, but rather as declaring what may be comprehended within the term where the circumstances require that it should be so construed.'
58. From these decisions, it is evident that the word 'including' is normally used as a term of extension. However, sometimes the word 'including' is also used by way of abundant caution. In this regard, the reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Reserve Bank of India and Ors. v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Company Ltd. and Anr., AIR 1996 Supreme Court 646. In this case, the Supreme Court was dealing with the interpretation of Section 45K of the Reserve Bank of India Act (2 of 1934). The Supreme Court laid down as follows (Paragraph 25 of the said AIR):
'25. It is thus evident that the words 'in respect of any matters relating to or connected with the receipt of deposits' in Section 45K(3) confer a wide power on the Bank to issue directions and the said power is not restricted or limited to receipt of deposits only. The amplitude of this power cannot be curtailed by the words 'including the rates of interest payable on such deposits and the periods for which deposits may be received' In Section 45K(3). It is no doubt true that the word 'including' is generally used in extensive sense to bring within the ambit of the provision matters referred to in the inclusive clause which normally would not have been covered by the provision. But that is not always so. Many times the legislature uses an inclusive phrase to specifically include a matter by way of abundant caution. Having regard to the object and purpose underlying the enactment of Section 45K, we are unable to construe the words 'including the rate of interest payable on such deposits and the periods for which deposits may be received' as restricting the ambit of the words 'in respect of any matters relating to or connected with the receipt of deposits', which, in our opinion, must be given their natural meaning as construed by this Court in Peerless II. This means that the Bank has been given the power to issue directions in respect of any matter relating to or connected with the receipt of deposits.'
59. The proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in this decision is applicable to the interpretation of Entry No. 17 of the Eleventh Schedule to the Constitution of India as well as Entry (xvii) Part-A of Schedule II to the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961. The words 'including primary and secondary schools' occurring in both the said provisions have been mentioned by way of abundant caution and the said words cannot be interpreted to restrict the meaning of the word 'education' so as to confine the same to primary and secondary education only. The word 'education' in both the said provisions is to be given its normal, natural and full meaning so as to include all facets of education including higher education.
60. Coming now to the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, the Supreme Court in the South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Association case (supra) was dealing with the interpretation of Entry No. 22 added by the Gujarat Government to Part I of the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The Supreme Court laid down as follows (Paragraph 5 of the said AIR):
'5.....................We do not think there could be any inflexible rule that the word 'include' should be read always as a word of extension without reference to the context............................Though 'include' is generally used in interpretation clauses as a word of enlargement in some cases the context might suggest a different intention...................................... The Explanation says that, for the purpose of Entry 22, potteries industry 'includes' manufacture of the nine articles of pottery named therein. It seems to us that the word 'includes' has been used here in the sense of 'means'' this is the only construction that the word can bear in the context. In that sense it is not a word of extension, but limitation; it is exhaustive of the meaning which must be given to potteries industry for the purpose of Entry 22. The use of the word 'includes' in the restrictive sense is not unknown. The observation of Lord Watson in Dil-Worth v. Commr. of Stamps, 1899 AC 99, which is usually referred to on the use of 'include' as a word of extension is followed by these lines : 'But the word 'includes' is susceptible of another construction, which may become imperative, if the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for the purpose of adding to the natural significance of the words or expressions defined. It may be equivalent to 'mean and include and in that case it may afford an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purpose of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions'. It must therefore, be held that the manufacture of Mangalore pattern roofing tiles is outside the purview of Entry 22.'
61. Thus, this decision of the Supreme Court shows that the word 'include' though normally used as the word of enlargement, may depending on the context in which it is used in a statute may be interpreted in the sense of 'means'. Thus, this decision was based on the language and context of Entry No. 22 in question. . Applying the test of language and context of a statute for interpreting the word 'include', we are of the view that the language and context of Entry No. 17 of the Eleventh Schedule to the Constitution of India as well as Entry (xvii) of Part-A of Schedule II to the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961 clearly show that the word 'include' occurring in the said provisions cannot be interpreted in the restricted sense so as to restrict the scope of the word 'education' to only primary and secondary education. The words 'include the primary and secondary schools' as held above, have been mentioned only by way of abundant caution.
62. In M/s. Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Limited case (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, the Supreme Court was dealing with the interpretation of certain notifications issued under the U.P. Sales Tax Act (15 of 1948). After noticing the entries occurring in the said notification, the Supreme Court laid down as follows (Paragraph 10 of the said AIR):
'10.........................But here, the expression 'including' does not enlarge the meaning of the word 'metal' and must be understood in a conjunctive sense, as a substitute for 'and'. Thus is the reasonable and proper construction having regard to the scheme followed in the framing of those notifications.'
63. Thus, this decision interpreted the word 'including' having regard to the language and scheme of the notification in question. This decision, therefore, supports the proposition that the word 'including' is to be interpreted keeping in view the text and context of the particular statute in which the word occurs.
64. Coming to the present case, the text and context of Entry No. 17 of the Eleventh Schedule to the Constitution of India as well as Entry (xvii) of Part-A of Schedule II to the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961 clearly show that the word 'including' occurring in the said provisions cannot be interpreted in the restrictive sense, nor can the said word be interpreted in conjunctive sense.
65. In Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and investment Company Ltd. and Ors., (1987) 1 Supreme Court Cases 424 : AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1023, the Supreme Court was dealing with the meaning of the expression 'Prize Chit' occurring in Prize Chits and Money Circulation Scheme (Banning) Act (43 of 1978). The Supreme Court laid down as follows (Paragraphs 31, 32 and 33 of the said AIR):
'31. .. Much argument was advanced on the significance of the word 'includes' and what an inclusive definition implies. Both sides relied on Dilworth's case, 1899 (79) LT 478. Both sides read out the well known passage in that case where it was stated (at p. 475),
'The word 'include' is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge he meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also these things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. But the word 'include' is susceptible of another construction, which may become imperative, if the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for the purpose of adding to the natural significance of the words or expressions defined. It may be equivalent to 'mean and include', and in that case it may affore an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions.'
Our attention was also invited to Ardeshir Bhiwandiwala v. State of Bombay, (1961) 3 SCR 592 : AIR 1962 SC 29; GIT Andhra Pradesh v. Taj Mahal Hotel, (1972) 1 SCR 168 : AIR 1972 SC 168 and S.K. Gupta v. K.P. Jain, (1979) 3 SCC 54 : AIR 1979 SC 734.
32. We do not think it necessary to launch into a discussion of either Dilworth's case or any of the other cases cited. All that is necessary for us to say is this : Legislatures resort to inclusive definitions 1) to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases so as to take in the ordinary, Popular and natural sense of the words and also the sense which the statute wishes to attribute to it, 2) to include meanings about which there might be some dispute, or 3) to bring under one nomenclature all transactions possessing certain similar features but going under different names. Depending on the context, in the process of enlarging, the definition may even become exhaustive. We do not think that by using the word 'includes', in the definition in Section 2(a) of the Act, the Parliament intended to so expand the meaning of Prize Chit as to take in every scheme involving subscribing and refunding of money. The word 'includes,' the context shows, was intended not to' expand the meaning of 'Prize Chit' but to cover all transactions or arrangements of the nature of Prize Chits but under different names. The expression 'Prize Chit' had nowhere been statutorily defined before. The Bhabatosh Datta Study Group and the Raj Study Group had identified the schemes popularly called 'Prize Chits. The Study Groups also recognized that 'Prize Chits' were also variously called benefit/saving schemes and lucky draws and that the basic common features of the schemes were the giving of a Prize and the ultimate refund of the amount of subscription (vide Para 6.3 of the report of the Raj Study Group). It was recommended that Prize Chits and the like by whatever name called should be banned. Since Prize Chits were called differently, 'Prize Chits', 'benefits/savings schemes', 'lucky draws', etc. it became necessary for the Parliament to resort to an inclusive definitions so as to bring in all transactions or arrangements containing these two elements. We do not think that in defining the expression 'Prize Chit', the Parliament intended to depart from the meaning which the expression had come to acquire in the world of finance, the meaning which the expression had come to acquire in the world of finance, the meaning which the Datta and the Raj Study Groups had given it. That this is the only permissible interpretation will also be further evident from the text Chit and the context as we shall presently see.
33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A Statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the section, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With those glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. It is by looking at the definition as a whole in the setting of the entire Act and by reference to what preceded the enactment and the reasons for it that the Court construed the expression 'Prize Chit' in Srinivasa and we find no reason to depart from the Court's construction.'
66. Thus, this decision clearly lays down that the interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of the interpretation. The textual interpretation should match the contextual. The word 'including' should, therefore, be interpreted keeping in view the text and context of the particular statute.
67. As held above the text and context of Entry No. 17 of the Eleventh Schedule to the Constitution of India as well as Entry (xvii) of Part-A of Schedule II to the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961, clearly show that the words 'including primary and secondary schools' have been mentioned in the said provisions by way of abundant caution and the said words cannot be interpreted to restrict the meaning of the word 'education' so as to confine the same to primary and secondary education only. The word 'education' occurring in the said provisions is to be given its normal, natural and full meaning so as to include all facets of education including higher education.
68. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that Zila Panchayat had full power and authority to establish the aforesaid Zila Parishad Krishi Mahavidyalaya in view of Entry (xvii) of Part-A of Schedule II to the U.P. Adhiniyam, 1961. The contention to the contrary raised on behalf of the petitioner lacks merit and is liable to be rejected.
69. The second contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the appointments of the Principal, Teachers and non-teaching staff in the said Mahavidyalaya have been made without following the norm or procedure prescribed by law.
70. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the communication dated 30.9.1993 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) giving clearance for temporary affiliation of the aforesaid Zila Parishad Krishi Mahavidyalaya, Banda, inter-alia clearly required that the Principal/Lecturers selected by the Higher Education Service Commission would be appointed in the aforesaid Zila Parishad Krishi Mahavidyalaya, Banda. It is, inter-alia, asseged in Paragraph 8 of the writ petition that the appointments of the Principal, Teachers and non-teaching staff were made without following any norm or procedure prescribed by law. Similar allegations have been made in Paragraph No. 17 of the writ petition.
71. In reply, it is submitted on behalf of the respondents that all the appointments were made in accordance with law and by adopting proper procedure for appointments. It is further submitted that all the Teachers and employees were appointed on ad-hoc basis till the regularly selected candidate by the Higher Education Service Commission joins and the procedure for ad-hoc appointment was fully complied with. Reference is made to Paragraphs 17 and 25 of the counter-affidavit sworn on 22.1.2002 filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. It is further submitted that the assertions made in the said Paragraphs 17 and 25 of the counter-affidavit regarding ad-hoc appointments have not been specifically denied in the corresponding Paragraphs 13 and 21 of the rejoinder-affidavit sworn on 24.2.2002 filed on behalf of the petitioners.
72. Having considered the rival contentions, we are of the view that the second contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is not correct.
73. A perusal of the writ petition filed by the petitioners shows that the petitioners have made only general allegations regarding the appointments not having been made in accordance with law and regarding the Teachers appointed in the said Mahavidyalaya lacking minimum qualifications. The assertions made on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the counter-affidavit regarding ad-hoc appointment of the Teachers and employees in the said institution have not been specifically denied by the petitioners in their rejoinder-affidavit. The petitioners have not given any particulars to substantiate their allegations regarding the appointments not having been made in accordance with law or regarding the Teachers appointed in the said institution lacking minimum qualifications.
74. Even otherwise, it is note-worthy that the District Magistrate sent a communication dated 26.11.1998 to Up-Sachiv, Panchayat Raj Anubhag, Uttar Pradesh along with an enquiry report dated 17.10.78. The said communication dated 26.11.1998 is annexed as Annexure No. CA-14 to the counter-affidavit of Dr. Ram Bharat Singh Tomar.
75. The said communication dated 26.11.1998 clearly states that in view of the enquiry report of the Enquiry Officer, it is evident that the ad-hoc appointments by advertisement/interview were made in the said institution till the regularly selected candidates by the Commission would join the institution, and that the appointed Teachers/employees possessed the prescribed educational qualifications and eligibility for their posts.
76. In view of this communication of the District Magistrate, Banda based on the enquiry report dated 17.10.1998, it is evident that the second contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is not correct, and the same is liable to be rejected.
77. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the opinion that the writ petition filed by the petitioners has no force, and the same is liable to be dismissed, the writ petition is accordingly dismissed. The interim order is discharged. However, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no orders as to costs.