R.P. Yadav, J.
1. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned standing counsel.
2. None appears for opposite party No. 3.
3. By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner prays for quashing of the order dated 7.8.1980, passed by Consolidation Officer, Patti, district Pratapgarh and the order dated 28.8.1984, passed by Deputy Director (Consolidation), Patti, Pratapgarh, rejecting the application under Section 5 of the Limitation for Condonation of Delay In filing of the objection under Section 9A(2) of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter called the Act).
4. Dispute relates to plot No. 124 measuring 3 bigha, 16 biswa 5 dhur situated In village Kashipur, pargana and tehsil Patti, district Pratapgarh. Opposite party No. 3, Smt. Dhanraji (since deceased) was the recorded tenure holder of the said plot. When the village came under consolidation sometime before 1971 and the relevant forms were issued to the chak-holders asking for the objections sometime in the 1971, Shri Bisesar, father of the petitioner, filed an objection, claiming sirdari right over the said plot, His objection under Section 9A(2) of the Act was dismissed by the Consolidation Officer and the order of dismissal of his objection was upheld by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in appeal and by Deputy Director (Consolidation) in revision. The village was denotified under Section 52 of the Act on 14.3.1978.
5. The petitioner filed an objection under Section 9A(2) of the Act alongwith an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. There is a dispute with regard to the date of filing of this objection. According to the petitioner, it was filed on 6.11.1977, whereas the learned Consolidation Officer has held that it was actually filed sometime in November, 1978, after the de-notification of the village under Section 52 of the Act. However, the opposite party No. 3 opposed the prayer of the petitioner. The Consolidation Officer held that there was no sufficient cause for condonation of delay as the petitioner has himself received the notice on 28.9.1971 on behalf of his father, Bisesar, which was issued from the Court of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and, therefore, there was no sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Some other grounds were also mentioned. The order passed by the Consolidation Officer was confirmed by the Deputy Director (Consolidation) in revision under Section 48 of the Act.
6. It is this order passed by the Consolidation Officer and the Deputy Director (Consolidation) declining to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in filing the objection under Section 9A(2) of the Act, which have been challenged through this petition.
7. It is submitted by the learned Counsel that the petitioner was the sirdar of the disputed plot and in the year 1956, he had filed a suit in the revenue court under Section 209 of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, wherein a compromise was filed on 2.8.1956. The owner, Shri Ramdhir Singh had acknowledged his possession over the plot in question and that he continued in possession thereof and has acquired the sirdari rights. It was further submitted that on account of strained relations with his father, he had gone to Bombay, where he lived for a long period and was unaware of the consolidation operation. It is also submitted that immediately after coming to village, when he came to know of the consolidation proceedings, he filed the said objection alongwith the application for condonation of delay. Learned Counsel has submitted that there was sufficient ground disclosed and the Consolidation Authorities have erred in not condoning the delay in filing the objection and also in declining to dispose of the case on merits. The learned Counsel has urged that the Courts have been very liberal in condoning the delay in such matters in order to afford an opportunity to the parties to get their rights adjudicated upon by the competent courts on merits. In support of his this contention, the learned Counsel has referred to the case of Smt. Premo Devi v. Joint Director (C), Muzaffar Nagar and Anr. 2003 (21) LCD 793, wherein it was held that the Courts should take lenient view in condoning delay.
8. I have considered over the aforesaid submissions and perused the record as well. There is no dispute that the Courts generally display leniency in allowing the condonation of delay if sufficient cause for the same is disclosed but this is not an universal rule that any one Tom, Dick and Harry, whosoever comes to the Court with some application for condonation, his prayer will be allowed without considering the worth of allegations made by him and the applicant, who seeks condonation must establish that there was sufficient cause, which prevented him from filing the application or petition earlier and within prescribed time limit. The expanses of the word 'sufficient cause' engulfs In its fold good, just, bona fide or honest. Any such cause, which prevents a person approaching the Court within time is sufficient. In doing so, it is the test of reasonableness in normal circumstances, which has to be applied. Keeping in view this test of reasonableness, the legality and correctness of the two orders are to be examined on the touchstone of judicial anvil.
9. So far as the case of the petitioner is concerned, it would be significant to mention that he claims that he was living in Bombay but both the Authorities of Consolidation have concurrently held that It was the petitioner, who received the notice in the name of his father on 28.9.1971 and this notice was with regard to appeal pending before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) therefore, this allegation that he was living in Bombay on account of the strained relations with his father, stands totally falsified. It is also worth to mention that Shri Bisesar, the father of the petitioner had contested the case by filing an objection under Section 9A(2) of the Act before the Consolidation Officer and he was unsuccessful in appeal and also in revision upto the Deputy Director (Consolidation). It was only when his father had lost the case that he came with an afterthought and cooked up version. He has absolutely no case for being tried and as held by the Consolidation Officer, the petitioner made forgery in the date in filing his objection and application, which was actually filed sometime in the year 1978 but the year was subsequently changed as 1977 and, thereafter an application was moved that his objection was not available in the office. The Consolidation Officer has given convincing and cogent reasons for his findings. Change of the year in objection and application shows the cunningness and the dexterity of the petitioner and a person, who comes before the Court with such a background does not deserve any leniency or liberal attitude at all.
10. It was also urged by the petitioner that he had acquired sirdari right in the year 1956 itself when his claim was admitted by the real owner of the land in dispute by filing a compromise on 2.8.1956. The copy of the compromise is annexed as Annexure-1 to the petition. It goes to show that when this compromise Is alleged to have been filed on 2.8.1956, the petitioner was a minor. It is said that by being in adverse possession of the disputed land since before the abolition of zamindari, he had acquired the sirdari rights. This compromise was filed by Shri Bishesar (his father) as guardian of the petitioner Bhulai, who was then a minor. Although the actual age of the petitioner is not indicated, yet, it is preposterous to say that a minor was in adverse possession and had acquired sirdari rights during his minority period. It would also be relevant to note that the terms of the compromise are also self-contradictory. In the first sentence it is stated that the petitioner will get possession over the land with effect from the said date, i.e., 2.8.1956, without any process of the Court, whereas in the second sentence it is stated that the petitioner had acquired sirdari rights on account of being in possession for about ten years. Although actual age of the petitioner at that time of compromise is not mentioned yet being a minor, he was definitely below 18 years and it cannot be accepted that a minor of 8 years would have taken the adverse possession of the land belonging to some other persons and continued in peaceful and hostile possession thereon specially when his father was alive with whom the petitioner shows that he had strained relations and on account of the strained relations, he lived at Bombay for a very long time but it was the father, who filed this compromise on 2.8.1956, as his guardian. The circumstances clearly speak that this compromise (Annexure-1 to the petition) is also not a genuine document and it seems to have been manufactured at subsequent stage with a view to give colour to the claim of the petitioner. However, the suit is said to have been ultimately dismissed on 19.2.1957, in default of the parties and no order was passed. This shows that the compromise was not accepted by the Court even if it was really filed in any such case and the petitioner did not acquire any right thereunder.
11. Both the authorities of the consolidation have consistently held that the petitioner has given contradictory statement on the point of having come and stayed in the village during the, proceedings of consolidation. They have disbelieved his version and concluded that no sufficient cause is shown for not filing the objection within due time and there was no sufficient cause for condoning the delay. There seems to be no illegality in the said finding.
12. It would also not be out of place to observe that the Courts are generally lenient in granting condonation of delay for allowing the parties to get their rights decided on merits but in whose favour? A deserving person, who will be victim of injustice if the discretion is not given to him but not in favour of a crooked, knavish, dishonest or perjurer or to encourage frivolous litigation, which has been filed with a view to tormenting and harassing the other party.
13. In view of what has been discussed above, it is beyond any doubt that the petitioner has come with absolutely false allegations before the Court, which is not good, just, honest or bona fide. He had full knowledge of the consolidation proceedings having received notice in the name of his father in the year 1971 and that he filed this objection along with the application for condonation of delay as a second inning after his father had lost the case at all the three levels of the consolidation authorities and that the consolidation authorities have rightly declined to condone the delay in filing the objection by the petitioner under Section 9A(2) of the Act. Not only this, the petitioner's conduct in ante-dating the objection was also such, which disentitles him from getting any condonation of delay.
14. In the result, the petition is devoid of any merit. The order passed by the Consolidation Officer as well as Deputy Director (Consolidation) does not call for any interference at all. The petition is liable to be dismissed.
15. The petition is dismissed.