Judgment:
Anjani Kumar, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner-tenant challenging the order passed by the appellate authority under Section 22 of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') whereby the appellate authority allowed the appeal filed by the respondent-landlord against the order passed by the prescribed authority and released the disputed shop in favour of the respondent-landlord.
2. The petitioner is the tenant of the disputed shop and contesting respondent is the landlord. The landlord filed an application under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act for release of the disputed shop on the ground that the applicant is carrying on business of cloth merchant in the partnership of his father and now he wants to set up his business independently, therefore, he needs the disputed shop for the purpose and further that the tenant is having three shops in the same market and the disputed shop is in fact vacant and no business is being carried out from the disputed shop.
3. The petitioner-tenant contested the aforesaid release application on the ground that since the father of the landlord is 70 years old, therefore, he is not in a position to conduct the business separately and it is incorrect to say that the landlord is living separately from his father, therefore, in fact the landlord does not require any other accommodation because the son is well established and the shop according to the case of the landlord is now being run by the father. On the comparison of the need also it has been stated that from the statement made in the application filed under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act itself it is clear that the tenant has the disputed shop from where he is carrying on business, the averments made in the application that the father of the landlord is carrying on business separately is not correct, even assuming there was a partition between son and father as stated above, the father is now more than 70 years of age is not in a position of carrying the separate shop, therefore it cannot be said to be the need much less more pressing need than that of tenant.
4. The prescribed authority after considering the respective case of the parties arrived at the conclusion that from the set of facts the landlord has not been able to make out a case the disputed shop is bona fide required by him, therefore, rejected the release application without going into further question as to who will be facing greater hardship. Aggrieved thereby the respondent-landlord filed an appeal under Section 22 of the Act. The appellate authority arrived at the conclusion that the view taken by the prescribed authority that since the father is of 70 years old, therefore, the need cannot be said to be bona fide is wholly perverse and deserves to be set aside. The appellate authority has held that merely because the father is of 70 years old, this alone cannot and should not be a ground for rejecting the application holding that the need is not bona fide particularly when it is not disputed that the father and son have separated and the son definitely requires a shop and there is no other shop available except the shop in question. On the question of comparative hardship, the appellate authority found that the need of the landlord is more pressing than that of the tenant. Thus, the appellate authority allowed the appeal setting aside the order passed by the prescribed authority and directed for release of the shop in favour of the landlord.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the order of the appellate authority mainly on the ground that the view taken by the appellate authority that the need of the landlord is bona fide, is not supported by any evidence and deserves to be set aside. On the question of comparative hardship, it is submitted that applying the guidelines prescribed under Rule 16 (2) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, the appellate authority has committed an error in holding that the need of the landlord is more pressing than that of the tenant, he therefore, submitted that the order of the appellate authority deserves to be quashed and that of the prescribed authority deserves to be upheld. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted by picking one sentence from here and there in order to press that the findings of the appellate authority suffer from error of law.
6. It is settled by the Apex Court in the case in Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash, 2004 (2) AWC 1721 (SC) : (2004) 3 SCC 682, that this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not sit in appeal over the findings arrived at by the appellate authority unless the same are demonstrated to be suffering from manifest error of law. Nothing of the sort has been brought to the notice of the Court by learned counsel for the petitioner.
7. The Apex Court in its recent pronouncement in the case in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and Ors., (2003) 6 SCC 675, has laid down the guidelines for interference by the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Applying these guidelines to the present case, I do not find it to be a fit case for interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
8. In this view of the matter, this writ petition is dismissed. The interim order, if any, stands vacated. However, there will be no order as to costs.