ORDER
D.P. Singh, J.
1. Heard Shri Krishnaji Khare counsel for the applicant and Shri C. B. Yadav, learned Chief Standing Counsel-II for the opposite party No. 1.
2. At the first blush, this case appeared to be an exercise in futility and I was about to discharge the notices because the executor of the judgment, Smt. Maya Niranjan, had already been transferred from the post and the order and judgment of the Court had been complied by her successor, though after more than four years when it was to be complied within two months. It appeared to be yet another case of stagnant officialdom relying upon the procedural delays, which mars the working of nearly every department of the Government. But the counsel for the applicant, a reasonable man, begged couple of minutes, otherwise, he said, he would be falling in his duty to the Courts and the society. With some reluctance, I agreed.
3. He started with some brief facts and took me to certain paragraphs of the writ judgment and couple of paragraphs of counter-affidavit and its annexures. And he stopped. I could not. We together read the judgment, the petition and the counter with its annexures. He was right. Though it was agonizing reading, but it brought forth the defiant and 'care two hoots' attitude of Smt. Maya Niranjan. A sense of helplessness slowly crept in, but soon gave way to the duty that I owe to the institution and the society.
4. Smt. Maya Niranjan is a veterant of contempt matters. She has about 60 matters pending against her before this Court. It spans her entire career.
5. The applicant was appointed as a Farrash, on a fixed salary, in a duly recognized and aided Intermediate College on 27-10-1959. He was given permanent appointment as a peon with effect from 1-8-1973. The date of birth of the applicant was recorded in the Service Book as 13-7-1944 and it remained unchallenged for more than two decades. However, he was restrained from functioning as such by the College Authorities with effect from 13-7-1994, treating his date of birth as 13-7-1934. Aggrieved, he represented his cause before the District Inspector of Schools II, who, after due enquiry and opportunity to the Management, held by his order dated 29-11-1994, after examining the school leaving certificate, Managers Returns etc., that his date of birth was 13-7-1944, therefore, the applicant was to retire in July, 2004. This order was never set aside by any Superior Officer of the Education Department. Nevertheless, the Management preferred a Writ Petition No. 2022 of 1995 against the aforesaid order wherein an interim order, staying the operation of the order dated 29-11-1994, was passed. Both the parties exchanged their pleadings. During pendency of the writ petition, the opposite party No. 1 directed the Associate District Inspector of Schools, vide her order dated 22-1-2000, to enquire into the correctness of the date of birth of the applicant recorded in the Service Book. The Associate District Inspector of Schools, without any opportunity to the applicant, finalized the enquiry and submitted a report dated 4-2-2000 to the opposite party No. 1, holding that the date of birth of the applicant was 1934. The aforesaid enquiry report was filed in the pending writ petition through a supplementary affidavit on 11-2-2000. A learned single Judge of this Court, after hearing the parties and after considering the enquiry report in detail, rejected the enquiry report and dismissed the writ petition vide order and judgment dated 21-2-2000 with the following directions :--
'For the reasons given above, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. The applicant and opposite party No. 3 are directed to reinstate the opposite party No. 4 in service and pay his entire arrears of salary within a period of two months from the date of a certified copy of this order is produced before the opposite party No. 3.'
6. In the writ petition the opposite party No. 1, was impleaded as opposite party No. 3 whilst the applicant was impleaded as opposite party No. 4.
7. The certified copy of the judgment of this Court was served on Smt. Maya Niranjan through a covering letter dated 28-3-2000 which was admittedly received by her on 30-3-2000. The order of the learned single Judge was never challenged by any of the Educational Authorities, including Smt. Maya Niranjan, before any competent Court of law. However, the Management filed a Special Appeal No. 295 of 2000, but no interim order was granted in the Special Appeal, which was subsequently also dismissed vide order dated 9-4-2000 by a Division Bench of this Court by a reasoned order.
8. The applicant filed a Contempt Petition No. 522 of 2001 impleading the immediate successor in office of Smt. Maya Niranjan when his current salary and so also the arrears were not paid within time, Notices were issued on that contempt petition on 26-2-2001 when a counter-affidavit was filed by Smt. Shantwana Tiwari in that contempt petition on 15-5-2001, whereafter the applicant came to know that his salary has not been paid in view of the fact that the matter has been referred to the State Government.
9. The present, contempt petition, was thereafter filed on 22-5-2001 and notices were issued to Smt. Maya Niranjan on 23-5-2001. Subsequently, vide order dated 31-1-2003, both the contempt petitions were connected.
10. The allegation in the present contempt petition is that in spite of service of the order of the learned single Judge and the Division Bench, the order of the Courts were being defined by Smt. Maya Niranjan and instead of complying with the same she was questioning the very correctness and legality of the judgment in her letter dated 9-5-2000 before the Director of Education (Secondary) wherein she had reiterated the enquiry report submitted on her direction and had sought directions for further action. It is further alleged that this exercise was once again repeated in her letter dated 26-9-2000 stating that complying with the orders and judgments of this Court would unnecessarily burden the State Exchequer with the salary of ten years on forged date of birth of the applicant.
11. Upon being noticed, Smt. Maya Niranjan filed her counter-affidavit along with a discharge application dated 6-8-2001. In the counter-affidavit, she has stated that she relinquished charge of the Office of District Inspector of Schools II on 3-10-2000 but she admitted that the enquiry report was submitted on her orders and had been considered by the Court in its judgment. She has further admitted that she had written the letter dated 9-5-2000 but she explains that it was only to bring the entire facts and controversy in the notice of the Government and had sought directions for complying with the order of this Court. She has also admitted authorising the letter dated 26-9-2000 stating that it was only a reminder seeking direction for compliance of the Courts order and since no directions and instructions were received, she could not make the payment before she relinquished charge on 3-10-2000. In paragraph 14 she admits that District Inspector of Schools II alone is the Competent Authority to pay salary to the applicant in compliance of this Courts order.
12. After hearing the counsel for the applicant and Smt. Maya Niranjan, this Court found a triable case against Smt. Maya Niranjan, and as such, in the presence of her counsel, framed the following charge on 11-8-2004 :
'You, Smt. Maya Niranjan, the then District Inspector of Schools II, show cause why you should not be tried and punished under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act for willful and deliberate violation and defiance of the order and judgment dated 21-2-2000 as affirmed in the Special Appeal.'
13. In pursuance of the said show cause, Smt. Maya Niranjan has filed her reply to the charges along with a discharge application dated 18-8-2004. In her reply she has reiterated the contents of the earlier counter-affidavit, the contents of which have already been noted above. Apart from it, she has stated that the letter dated 9-5-2000 was only a paper transaction between her and the Director of Education and there was no intention of deliberate disobedience and it was only to seek permission for filing Special Leave Petition and for the release of fund. She has further stated that she was not competent to release the current or arrears of salary to the applicant and, therefore, she had sought permission from the appropriate Authority for the release of fund. Further, she says that the Government finally granted sanction on 22-5-2001 for compliance of the Courts order but as she had already demitted office on 3-10-2000 she could not release the salary and arrears. She has again reiterated that the date of birth of the applicant was 13-7-1934 because if it was 13-7-1944, his age on the date of appointment of the applicant could only be fifteen years and three months and as such the applicant was disqualified to get a Government job. She has stated that as the dispute related to salary of ten years, which was to be paid from the State Exchequer, she was unable to take appropriate decision without seeking prior approval and sanction of the Government. She has also stated that in view of Government Orders dated 19-12-2000 and 19-1-1984 and also a circular of the Director of Education dated 21-4-1993 as the financial burden was much beyond her powers, she had to refer it to the Director of Education. After the arguments had been heard and the Court invited the counsel for the opposite party to address it on the question of sentence, the matter was got adjourned whereafter Sri Sudhir Agarwal, learned Additional Advocate-General raised an absolutely new argument that the District Inspector of Schools II was not competent to release the salary as this power vested only with District Inspector of Schools. Finally, she has stated that now the order of the writ Court has been complied and this Court should show its judicial grace and end the matter.
14. Before I deal with the arguments, it appears appropriate to examine the attending facts and circumstances.
15. Though the applicant was appointed on a fixed salary as Farrash in 1959, he was given a regular appointment as a Peon in 1973 when his Service Book was prepared and the date of birth was recorded therein as 13-7-1944. This date of birth remained unchallenged for two decades. However, the management, while granting selection grade to the applicant, changed the date of birth to 13th July, 1934 and it held that the applicant would retire on 31-7-1994. The applicant represented his case before the District Inspector of Schools II and also to the Regional Deputy Director of Education, who vide order dated 17-8-1994 directed the District. Inspector of Schools II to enquire into the cause and take a decision. The District Inspector of Schools II, after giving opportunity to the Management and after relying upon the Government Order dated 2-5-1974 held that the date of birth of the applicant was 13-7-1944 and set aside the order of the Management and asked it to continue the applicant in service vide its order dated 29-11-1994. This order was challenged by the Management in the writ petition, wherein the aforesaid order and judgment was passed. Before the learned single Judge, specific argument was raised that if the date of birth of the applicant was taken to be as 13-7-1994, he would have been only 15 years of age when appointed in 1959, but the same was turned down by the learned single Judge. The specific allegation with regard to mention of the date of birth in the Manager's Return of 1969-70 was also considered and rejected. Report of the enquiry conducted during pendency of the writ petition was also considered and rejected. These are the main facts which have to be considered while considering the defence set up by the opposite party.
16. It would also be necessary to note the findings and strictures recorded by the learned Judge while dismissing the writ petition.
17. The learned writ Judge, while considering the inquiry report and the conduct of Smt. Maya Niranjan during pendency of the writ petition had recorded the following indicating strictures against her :--
'I am not issuing any notice to the petitioner and the District Inspector of Schools as the learned counsel for the respondent is more anxious for early disposal of the writ petition. He is not interested in any action against the petitioner or the District Inspector of Schools. But I consider it necessary, after closely examining the material, to record my strong disapproval of the crude and undesirable manner in which the petitioner and the present District Inspector of School/Deputy Director of Education have attempted to over reach this Court.'
Further, while considering the holding of enquiry and reaching a different result, the Court held:--
'The petitioner or the District Inspector of Schools could not render the proceedings infructuous by this impermissible method. To that extent the learned counsel for the respondent is fully justified in urging that they deliberately have attempted to interference with course of justice.'
Further, it went on to hold :--
'In any case, it was must unsatisfactory manner of attempting to nullify the effect of earlier order passed by the District Inspector of Schools.'
18. On the basis of the reply filed by Smt. Maya Niranjan, it is urged that since Smt. Maya Niranjan did not have the power to sanction the release of salary and arrears of the applicant, she had no other option but to refer it to the Director of Education.
19. From a perusal of the two affidavits filed by Smt. Maya Niranjan, it is apparent that she has taken a conflicting stand as to the authority which is competent to pay the salary and arrears in compliance of this Court's order. In the counter-affidavit filed along with the discharge application 6-8-2001, in paragraph 14 Smt. Maya Niranjan has stated as follows :--
'In this regard it is further relevant to state that Smt. Santevna Tiwari (who has now been promoted) has also handed over the charge of office of District Inspector of Schools II. Alld and at present Smt. Ferhana Siddiqui is posted as District Inspector of Schools II, Alld who alone is competent authority to pay the salary and arrears to the applicant in compliance of the orders of this Hon'ble Court.'
20. In pursuance of this statement, Smt. Maya Niranjan cannot be heard saying that she did not have the authority or power to comply with the Courts order. In effect she says that when she was holding the post of District Inspector of Schools II, she was not competent, but when Smt. Ferhana Siddiqui was holding it, she was competent. It would be worthwhile to examine the statute on this point.
21. Payment of salary to Teachers and Employees of aided and recognised Intermediate Colleges is governed by U.P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). Section 3 of the Act has fixed the time within which salary of Teachers and Employees of aided institutions has to be paid and that too without any deduction. Under Section 5 of the Act the responsibility for payment of salary to employees is laid upon the Inspector. The liability for payment of salary, under Section 10, is with the State Government. The Government has framed Rules under Section 16 of the Act namely U.P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Rules, 1993. Under Rule 6 the salary bill is to be submitted by the 20th of the month to the Inspector, which has to be verified by the Account Officer. The over all responsibility for payment of salary has been placed upon the Inspector under Rule 18 of the Rules.
22. Thus, under the Act and the Rules, the liability for payment of salary, including arrears of salary, as mentioned in Rule 8, lies with the Inspector. In my opinion, this argument of the learned counsel for opposite party No. 1 has no merit as under the Act and the Rules, she was obliged to pay the current and arrears of salary.
23. It has then been urged that without the release of grant by the State Government or the Director, she could not have released the arrears or the current salary.
24. The Institution was an aided Institution as mentioned in Section 2 (b) of the Act and the maintenance grant, as mentioned in Clause (c) of Section 2 had already been approved for payment of salary to the employees of the institution. It is not denied that the Institution was receiving maintenance grant from the State. It is also not disputed that the applicant was a permanent employee in the Institution and prior to 13-7-1994 his salary was being paid by the District Inspector of Schools II from the grant already released by the State Government. It is nobody's case that the grant from which the salary of the applicant was being paid was at any point of time withdrawn by the State Government or the Director. Thus, there was no occasion for Smt. Maya Niranjan to have asked the Director or the State Government for releasae of grant.
25. The learned counsel has further urged that in view of the Government orders, as already noted above, Smt. Maya Niranjan could not have released the salary without approval of the Director and that is why she had to write letters to the Director seeking approval for release of salary to the applicant. Assuming the argument to be correct, let us examine whether she sought approval of the Director.
26. In the letter dated 9-5-2000 addressed to the Director, there is no prayer for release of grant or for seeking approval for payment. In fact, in the said letter she has stated that :--
'Special appeal kharij ho jane se Shri Puleshwar paricharak ko Bina Kaam ke dinak 1 -8-1994 se Shasan/Vibhag ko vetan dena padega jisese shaskiya dhan ka durupyog hoga.'
and then she goes on to request as follows :--
'Chunki Prakaran dus varsh tak fargi janam tithi badha lane se sambandhit hai jisese shasan par unaavashyak vyay bhar badhegal Aisi istithi mein prakaran ke sambandh main aavashyak nirnaya lekar savashyak karyawahi ke liye is karyalaya ko nirdesh dene ka kasht karein taki aap ke nirdesh ke anupalan mein aavashyak karyawahi ki ja sake!'
Again she wrote a letter dated 26-9-2000 where she reiterates that :--
'Ukt ke sambandh mein aapke avgat karaya ja chuka hai kiprakaran dus varsh tak fargi janam tithi badhakar lene se unaavashyak. shaskiya vyay bhar badhne se sambandhit and the prayer part she states :--
'atteh aapse anurodh hai ki ukte prakaran mein yathasighra aavashyak karyawahi/nirdesh dene ki kripa karein, jisese prakaran ke sambandh min agrattar karyawahi ke ja sake!'
27. It is apparent from a perusal of the said two letters and the prayer quoted here-inabove, that there is absolutely no demand for release of grant or approval for release of salary of the applicant. It could not be, because, as noted above, under the Act and the Rules the entire responsibility for payment of salary, including arrears, lay with Smt. Maya Niranjan. In fact, by the said two letters the applicant was goading the Director to defy and violate the order and judgment of this Court. Even the two Government orders and the Circular, on which she has strenuously placed reliance, cannot be a valid defence. The Government order dated 19th January, 1984 relates to certain sanctions of 1982 to 1983. Its perusal shows that it relates to new claims made for the first time and does not relate to release of arrears or current salary in the facts of this case. The Government order dated 19th December, 2000 cannot be passed into service on the facts of this case, as the writ judgment in this case was delivered on 21-2-2000 and its directions were to be carried out within two months. The circular dated 21-4-1993 basically relates to ex parte orders, however, it stipulates that where the order has to be complied forthwith, the grant may be sought after following the due procedure of law. It is admitted to Smt. Niranjan that the procedure is to get the salary bills from the management and after getting it verified from the Accounts Officer, the superior authority may be approached for release of grant. But she did not follow this procedure or in fact did not make any effort to obtain the bills from the management. Nevertheless, the circular basically deals with those cases where a new demand is raised for the first time. In any view, none of the Government orders or the circular can override the powers of the statute. None of the aforesaid three documents prohibited Smt. Niranjan from exercising her powers under the statute on the directions of the Court.
28. Assuming that she could not release the arrears of salary, but there is absolutely no reason given in her reply as to why at-least the current salary was not released within the time specified by the Court, in spite of the fact that the management had reinstated the applicant on 30-7-2000 and the bills for the current salary was served in her office by the Principal through letters dated 26-8-2000 and 30-9-2000. These averments in the counter-affidavit of the Principal has not been denied. A faint submission has been made that there was no direction of the writ Court for payment of current salary. It is preposterous. There was clear direction for reinstatement, which was done by the management. Does it mean that he was to work without salary? The Apex Court, in Lakshman Prasad Agarwal v. Syed Mohammad Kareem, 2002 (47) All LR 378 has aptly said, not only the letter but even the spirit of the order has to be seen. Even Section 3 of the Act says the salary has to be paid by the month even if there was no such direction.
29. Therefore, this argument of learned counsel for the applicant is also without any basis.
30. It is also alleged that she has sought permission to file the Special Leave Petition but that is only an averment and is not supported by any documents at all on the record. During arguments the Court had specifically asked her counsel Sri Yadav, who after consulting Smt. Maya Niranjan, admitted that she never sought permission to file Special Leave Petition.
31. From the aforesaid fact, it would be clear that Smt. Maya Niranjan was holding the charge of District Inspector of Schools II, when the hearing in the aforesaid writ petition was going on and she was the authority who directed holding of the parallel enquiry with regard to the date of birth of the applicant. In the reply to the charges she has reiterated that in case the date of birth of the applicant was taken to be 1944, his initial appointment would have been illegal as the applicant would only have been 15 years old. This very argument was considered by the learned single Judge but was rejected holding that the applicant was given a fresh regular appointment as a Peon in 1973 and which had remained unchallenged for about two decades and there was nothing on record to establish that the applicant was instrumental in alleged altering of his date of birth. The learned Judge found that in the Manager's Return in 1970-71 and onwards his date of birth has remained unchanged as 1944. The learned Judge has also taken into account the School leave certificate which matched the date of birth as entered in the Service Book. However, in spite of these findings, Smt. Maya Niranjan is adamant in questioning the correctness of the judgment without challenging the same. As already noted above, she never approached the Director or the State Government for filing a Special Leave Petition against the judgment. She is also adamant in stating that date of birth which has been upheld by this Court was forged, even though the finding is categorically otherwise.
32. The Apex Court in Lakshman Prasad Agarwal (2002 (47) All LR 378) (supra)has propounded that while considering the question of disobedience or otherwise of an order not only the letter of the order but also its spirit has to be considered by the Court.
33. Further, in Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirakh Ghosh, 2002 (48) All LR 121 : (AIR 2002 SC 1405 : 2002 Cri LJ 1814), the Apex Court, while dealing with a case where there was a clear direction, it held (paras 13 and 20 of AIR, Cri LJ) :
'The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been introduced in the Statute Book for the purpose of securing the feeling of confidence of the people in general and for due and proper administration of justice in the country. .........'
It has further observed :
'............The Government is not a machinery for oppression and ours being a welfare State as a matter of fact be opposed thereto. It is the peoples welfare that the State is primarily concerned with and avoidance of compliance with a specific order of the Court cannot be termed to be a proper working for a State body in terms of the wishes and aspiration of founding father of our Constitution.'
34. The Apex Court in the case of Bank of Baroda v. Sadruddin Hasan Daya, AIR 2004 SC 942, while considering the nature and power of contempt has held to the following effect (paras 3 and 4) :
'Contempt proceedings serve a dual purpose of vindication of the public interest by punishment of a contemptuous conduct and coercion to compel the contemner to do what the law requires of him.'
In the same case the Court went on to hold that :
'One who played fraud on the Court, he obstructs the course of justice and brings the judicial institution into disrepute.'
35. In this very judgment, the Apex Court has reiterated the ratio laid down by it in re : Vinay Chandra Mishra (1995) 2 SCC 584 : (AIR 1995 SC 2348 : 1995 Cri LJ 3994) has held :
'At the same time, the Court should act with seriousness and severeity where justice is jeopardised by a grossly contemptuous act of a party. If the judiciary is to perform its duties and functions effectively and true to the spirit with which they are sacredly entrusted, the dignity and authority of the Courts have to be respected and protected at all costs. Otherwise the very cornerstone of our constitutional scheme will give way and with it will disappear the rule of law.................'
36. In the midst of the hearing, which has taken place over several dates, the learned Additional Advocate-General appeared and sought time to argue, even though the arguments had nearly finished, in all fairness he was also given an opportunity. He has raised a new argument that the District Inspector of Schools II, did not have any financial powers and thus Smt. Maya Niranjan could not have complied with the order even with regard to current salary bills of August and September, 2000, inasmuch as she had relinquished charge of the post of District Inspector of Schools II in August itself and only exercised administrative powers. It has also submitted by him that the Principal of the Institution had mischievously submitted the salary bills to her, though normally the salary bill has to go to the District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad and has relied upon a letter dated 30th October, 1998. To a pointed question as to by which Government order the post of District Inspector of Schools II was created he could not point to any document on record. As has been noted earlier the case of Smt. Maya Niranjan throughout was that the District Inspector of Schools II, was the competent authority to release the salary and now she has sworn another affidavit denying that. Learned counsel for the Principal has urged that the direction of the learned single Judge and the Division Bench was to the District Inspector of Schools II, Allahabad and thus she had no other option but to send the salary bill to her. He has further submitted that during the pendency of this case Smt. Maya Niranjan has got her payment of salary stopped to pressurize her further. It is not denied by the learned Additional Advocate-General that the salary of the Principal of the institution has been stopped. Either of the two affidavits are false and in that case this Court would pass another order for sending the matter to the concerned competent Court for trying her for filing a false affidavit to her knowledge. In my opinion, the stand taken by the learned Additional Advocate-General is not supported by any documentary evidence on the record. Even assuming that she had only administrative powers, even then as there was direction of the writ Court she should have taken prompt action when the bills were presented to her and in that case there was no necessity for her to have written the two letters mentioned above. Thus, there is no escape from the conclusion that Smt. Maya Niranjan with mala fide attitude and defiance was creating hurdles in the compliance of the writ order.
37. Examining the conduct of Smt. Maya Niranjan from any angle leaves no room of doubt, that she consciously and deliberately embarked upon a course to create hurdles in the execution of the order with reprehensive defiance. The main thrust of the argument has remained that since the order has been complied with now, the Court should drop the proceedings. From the facts examined hereinabove, and also in the connected Contempt Petition No. 522 of 2001 it is apparent that Smt. Maya Niranjan was the officer who set the cat among the pigeons which resulted in willful defiance and non-compliance of the order for four and a half years, though it was to be complied within two months. There is no explanation by Smt. Maya Niranjan why at least the current salary was not released or any effort in that direction was made by her even though she held the office for eight months from the date of the order. In my opinion, on these facts there is no other option for the Court except to hold her guilty.
38. Learned counsel for the applicant has urged that Smt. Maya Niranjan is a habitual offender and in several cases she has taken a defiant stand and large number of contempt petitions are pending against her. The Court requested the counsel for Mrs. Maya Niranjan to file affidavit stating that she remembers about four contempt petitions which are pending the details of which have been given in the affidavit. The Court sent for those files and examined two of them. She has further said that she has sent letters to various officers to enquire about the details of others.
39. However on the insistence of the counsel for the applicant, the Court requested the Registry to supply information as to how many contempt petitions are pending against Smt. Maya Niranjan. The Registry has submitted a list of at least 67 contempt petitions which are pending against Smt. Maya Niranjan. Just to refresh her memory, it was shown to her. It spans her career.
40. During the course of hearing, when confronted with the number of contempt case filed against Smt. Niranjan, Sri Yadav explained to the Court that throughout her career of 14 years; except for a couple of months she has remained posted at Allahabad in one or the other capacity, and since there is easy access for the teachers and employees of recognised institutions to the Allahabad High Court, the number of contempt case are high. This would be casting aspersion on the Judges of this Court. Do Judges of this Court issue notices on contempt petition without application of mind or for mere asking? I am sure, Sri Yadav of his own could not have said it, but was only offering the explanation given by Smt. Niranjan.
41. There is yet another facet which is noticeable. She has remained glued to Allahabad for the 14 years i.e. her entire career except for couple of months. She is quite regularly holding two posts at a time. From the writ proceedings it is clear that she was posted as District Inspector of Schools and also holding charge of Deputy Director Region. Again as Deputy Director of the Region she is holding the charge of Joint Director (Finance). She has to have some magic in her, to have weathered not only the change in so many Governments, but to be landing with two pies in both hands, whoever rules at Lucknow.
42. These facts, though are starting at the Court, but to draw any conclusions may be presumptive, so better lay them where they are.
43. An apology has been given by Smt. Maya Niranjan but the same is conditional and does not appear to be genuine. A apology should be an act of real contrition or repentance. The apology lacks both. The Apex Court in (Dr.) K.L. Sahu v. Harishanker, AIR 1995 SC 2320 has held that there is no rule that the Court is bound to accept even an unconditional apology. It has further went on to hold in K.A. Mohammad v. Parsannan, AIR 1995 SC 454 and Arun Kshettrapal v. High Court, AIR 1976 SC 1967 : (1976 Cri LJ 1539) that the right to punish is not lost by acceptance of apology.
44. On all these facts in my opinion, the apology is neither genuine, nor any repentance is shown. She has been in contempt in several other cases spanning her entire career which reflects at her attitude towards Court's orders. The apology cannot be accepted.
45. It is settled law that fine is the rule and sentence is only in rare cases. The fact that even though Smt. Maya Niranjan was fresh from the indicating strictures passed against her by the writ Court with regard to her conduct during hearing of the writ petition, has had no effect on her and she reiterates before the Director and the State Government that the enquiry ordered by her shows that the date of birth was incorrectly recorded and she spurs them into defying the order. In Jaikwal v. State of U.P., AIR 1984 SC 1374 : (1984 Cri LJ 993). Justice Thakkar very aptly observed :
'We are sorry to say, we cannot subscribe to the 'slap say sorry and forget'; school of thought in the administration of contempt jurisdiction.'
46. Considering her conduct and also taking into account that her career spanning more than a decade is marred with more than sixty contempt cases and considering the fact that the State is the largest litigant and if in such cases the recalcitrant officers are handled with kid gloves it would act as spark to under and the flame may engulf the entire lot. In my opinion, the Court would be failing in its duty by merely imposing fine and if no deterrent punishment is awarded the very faith of the people in efficacy of the Courts order would be shaken and it would send down a wrong message that defiance, even after stricture, costs only apology or fine. The Court is conscious that Smt. Maya Niranjan is a young officer having put in only about more than a decade of service but her conduct is such that books no apathy as the public interest in due administration of justice and upholding the dignity of the Courts, is more sacred than the career of an individual.
47. For the reasons given hereinabove, Smt. Maya Niranjan, opposite party No. 1 is hereby sentenced to two months simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2000/- payable within four weeks from today to the Registrar General of this Court. In case of default, she would further undergo one month's imprisonment.
48. Smt. Maya Niranjan, who is present in Court should be taken in custody by the Court officer of this Court and sent to jail through the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad forthwith to serve out the sentence.
49. With regard to filing of false affidavit, the Court would pass separate order.
50. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Chief Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Secretary, Education (Secondary), U.P. Lucknow with the hope that they would administratively deal with Smt. Maya Niranjan.