Judgment:
S. P. Mehrotra, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, praying for quashing the judgment and order dated 8.11.2002 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 2, Saharanpur, and the judgment and order dated 17.10.1997 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) passed by the learned Prescribed Authority/Judge Small Cause Court, Saharanpur.
2. The dispute relates to an accommodation bearing Municipal Corporation No. 4/493, Mohalla Jaffer Nawab Khan, Saharanpur. The said accommodation has hereinafter been referred to as the 'disputed accommodation'.
3. From the allegations made in the writ petition, it appears that the respondent filed a release application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (in short 'the Act') against the petitioner in respect of the disputed accommodation. A copy of the said release application filed by the respondent has been filed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition.
4. It was, inter alia, alleged in the said release application that the petitioner was a tenant of the respondent in the disputed accommodation at the monthly rent of Rs. 40 per month along with 12% water tax, total Rs. 44.80 per month ; and that the disputed accommodation was bona fide required for the respondent and her large family members ; and that on comparison of hardships, the petitioner would not suffer any hardship as compared to that of the respondent. The said release application was registered as P.A. Case No, 1 of 1995.
5. The petitioner contested the said release application, and filed his written statement, copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-2 to the writ petition.
6. Both the sides filed affidavits and documentary evidence in support of their respective cases. The Prescribed Authority/Judge Small Cause Court, Saharanpur, by his Judgment and order dated 17,10.1997 allowed the said release application and released the disputed accommodation in favour of the respondent. It was, inter alia, held that there were 45 members in the family of the respondent, and only 4 rooms were available for their residence, as such, the need of the respondent was real and bona fide.
7. On the question of comparative hardships, the learned Prescribed Authority held that in case of rejection of the said release application, the respondent would suffer much greater hardship than would be suffered by the petitioner in a case the said release application was allowed.
8. Against the said judgment and order dated 17.10.1997 passed by the learned Prescribed Authority/ Judge Small Cause Court, Saharanpur, the petitioner filed an appeal under Section 22 of the Act which was registered as Rent Appeal No. 37 of 1997.
9. By the judgment and order dated 8.11.2002, the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 2, Saharanpur (Appellate Authority) dismissed the said appeal filed by the petitioner. The learned appellate authority again considered the entire evidence on record and drew various conclusions on the questions of facts involved in the case, and confirmed the said judgment and order dated 17.10.1997, passed by the learned Prescribed Authority/Judge Small Cause Court, Saharanpur.
10. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the present writ petition.
11. I have heard Sri Syed Wajid Ali, learned counsel for the petitioner at length.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that during the pendency of the said release application, an accommodation under the tenancy of one Abdul Kareem in the house in question was vacated as was pointed out in paragraph 26 of the written statement (Annexure-2 to the writ petition) filed on behalf of the petitioner. It is submitted that the authorities below have not considered the said aspect of the case.
13. Having considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I find myself unable to accept the same. The appellate authority in its judgment and order dated 8.11.2000 has considered in detail the affidavit of Riaz Ahmad filed by the respondent in regard to the allegations made by the petitioner regarding the accommodation vacated by Abdul Kareem. It was pointed out that the vacation of one room would not solve the problem for the respondent looking to the number of the family members of the respondent because it was impossible for 45 persons to reside in 5 or 6 rooms. Thus, the submission made on behalf of the petitioner regarding the vacation of accommodation in the tenancy of Abdul Kareem in the house in question has been considered by the learned appellate authority and finding of fact have been recorded.
14. Learned counsel for the petitioner then tries to assail the findings on the question of bona fide need and comparative hardships.
15. I am of the opinion that the findings of facts on the questions of bona fide need and comparative hardship have been recorded on detailed consideration of the material on record. The findings of facts are normally not interfered with by this Court in the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India unless such findings are shown to be patently illegal or perverse. No illegality or perversity has been shown in the findings recorded by the authorities below. Therefore, no interference is called for with the findings of facts recorded by the authorities below on the questions of bona fide need and comparative hardships.
16. Reference in this regard may be made to certain decisions of the Apex Court.
17. In India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin M. A. Baker and Anr., AIR 1978 SC 45, it was laid down by the Apex Court that the conclusions of fact cannot be interfered with by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The findings on the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord recorded by the courts below by appreciating the entire evidence cannot be interfered with by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
18. In Munni Lal and Ors. v. Prescribed Authority and Ors., AIR 1978 SC 29, it was laid down by the Supreme Court that the finding on the question of comparative hardship of the landlord was finding of fact, and the same cannot be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
19. In Ashok Kumar and Ors. v. Sita Ram, 2001 (3) AWC 1997 (SC) : 2001 (2) ARC 1 : 2001 (43) ALR 783 (SC), the Apex Court held as follows (paragraphs 9 and 15 of the said ARC) :
'9. The position is too well-settled to admit of any controversy that the finding of fact recorded by the final court of fact should not ordinarily be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction, unless the Court is satisfied that the finding is vitiated by manifest error of law or is patently perverse. The High Court should not interfere with a finding of fact simply because it feels persuaded to take a different view on the material on record.
25. The question that remains to be considered is whether the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction was justified in setting aside the order of the appellate authority. The order passed by the appellate authority did not suffer from any serious illegality, nor can it be said to have taken a view of the matter, which no reasonable person was likely to take. In that view of the matter there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the order in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. In a matter like the present case where orders passed by the Statutory Authority vested with power to act quasi-judicially is challenged before the High Court, the role of the Court is supervisory and corrective. In exercise of such jurisdiction the High Court is not expected to interfere with the final order passed by the Statutory Authority unless the order suffers from manifest error and if it is allowed to stand it would amount to perpetuation of grave injustice. The Court should bear in mind that it is not acting as yet another appellate court in the matter. We are constrained to observe that in the present case the High Court has failed to keep the salutary principles in mind while deciding the case.'
20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that this writ petition lacks merit and the same is liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is dismissed accordingly.
21. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submits that some time be granted to the petitioner for vacating the disputed accommodation.
22. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner is granted time upto 31st March, 2003, provided the petitioner gives undertaking before the Prescribed Authority on his personal affidavit within one month from today incorporating the following conditions :
(1) The petitioner will vacate the disputed accommodation on or before 31st March, 2003 and will handover peaceful vacant possession of the same to the respondent.
(2) The petitioner will continue to pay rent of the disputed accommodation to the respondent till the date of vacating the disputed accommodation.
23. In case, the requisite undertaking is not given within the time granted or any of the conditions incorporated in the undertaking is not complied with, this order granting time to the petitioner will stand automatically vacated and it will become open to the respondent to execute the release order forthwith.