Ashok Bhushan, J.
1. Heard Sri Y.K. Sinha counsel for the petitioners.
2. By this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for quashing of the order dated 24.8.2002 and entire proceedings of Motor Accident Claim Case No. 71 of 2001 pending before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/F.T.C., 2nd, Saharanpur.
3. The facts of the case as given in the writ petition are :
'Pawan Kumar, son of respondent No. 2 died on 2.5.1992. An application for compensation in accordance with the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, was filed on 19.4.2001. Written statement was filed by the petitioner in which plea was taken that application having been filed after nine years of the alleged accident, is not maintainable as being barred by limitation. Issues were framed by the Tribunal including Issue No. 4 as to whether the application is time barred. The Tribunal vide order dated 24.8.2002 held that the application is not barred by time. The order dated 24.8.2002 has been challenged in this writ petition.
4. Counsel for the petitioners in support of the writ petition has submitted that the question of limitation for filing application under Motor Vehicles Act has to be considered with reference to the date of death. The counsel submitted that at the time when death took place, i.e., 2.5.1992 Section 166(3) provided :
'166(3) No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident ;
Provided that the claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time.'
5. The counsel for the petitioners has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., AIR 1991 SC 2156 and Kerala State Electricity Board and Anr. v. Valsala K. and Anr. etc. etc., AIR 1999 SC 3502. Counsel contended that although the provision of Section 166(3) has been deleted by Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 54 of 1994 with effect from 14.11.1994 but said deletion has no effect on the present case.
6. I have heard counsel for the petitioners and perused the record. The only issue which has arisen for determination in the writ petition is as to whether the application for compensation under Motor Vehicles Act filed by the respondent No. 2 is barred by time or not. There is no dispute that the death occurred on 2.5.1992 and the application has been filed on 19.4.2001. On 19.4.2001 the provision of Section 166(3) as quoted above stood deleted by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 54 of 1994. On the date when the application was filed, there was no limitation prescribed under Section 166. This question is fully covered by the judgment of the Apex Court in Dhannalal v. D. P. Vijayvargiya and Ors. AIR 1996 SC 2155. Facts in the case before the Apex Court were that the appellant met with an accident on 4.12.1990 and the application was filed for compensation on 7.12.1991. The Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment noted the effect of omission of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act with effect from 14.11.1994. The Apex Court held that the effect of the amendment with effect from 14.11.1994 that there is no limitation for filing claim before the Tribunal in respect of an accident. In paragraphs 6 and 7, the Apex Court laid down :
'6. Before the scope of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act is examined, it may be pointed out that the aforesaid Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act has been omitted by Section 53 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994, which came in force w.e.f. 14.11.1994. The effect of the Amending Act is that w.e.f. 14.11.1994, there is no limitation for filing claims before the Tribunal in respect of any accident. It can be said that Parliament realised the grave injustice and injury which was being caused to the heirs and legal representatives of the victims who died in accident by rejecting their claim petitions only on ground of limitation. It is a matter of common knowledge that majority of the claimants for such compensation are ignorant about the period during which such claims should be preferred. After the death due to the accident of the bread earner for the family, in many cases such claimants are virtually on the streets. Even in cases where the victims escape death some of such victims are hospitalised for months if not for years. In the present case itself the applicant claims that he met with the accident on 4.12.1990 and he was being treated as an indoor patient till 27.9.1991. According to us, in its wisdom the Parliament rightly thought that prescribing as period of limitation and restricting the power of Tribunal to entertain any claim petition beyond the period of twelve months from the date of the accident was harsh, inequitable and in many cases was likely to cause injustice to the claimants. The present case is a glaring example where the appellant has been deprived by the order of the High Court from claiming the compensation because of delay of only four days in preferring the claim petition.
7. In this background, now it has to be examined as to what is the effect of omission of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act. From the Amending Act it does not appear that the said Sub-section (3) has been deleted retrospectively. But at the same time there is nothing in the Amending Act to show that benefit of deletion of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 is not to be extended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation has been raised. The effect of deletion of Sub-section (3) from Section 166 of the Act can be tested by an illustration. Suppose an accident had taken place two years before 14.11.1994 when Sub-section (3) was omitted from Section 166. For one reason or the other no claim petition had been filed by the victim or the heirs of the victim till 14.11.1994. Can a claim petition be not filed after 14.11.1994 in respect of such accident? Where a claim petition filed after 14.11.1994, can be rejected by the Tribunal on the ground of limitation saying that the period of twelve months which had been prescribed when Sub-section (3) of Section 166 was in force having expired the right to prefer the claim petition had been extinguished and shall not be revived after deletion of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 w.e.f. 14.11.1994? According to us the answer should be in negative. When Sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been omitted then the Tribunal has to entertain a claim petition without taking note of the date on which such accident had taken place. The claim petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground that such claim petitions were barred by time when Sub-section (3) of Section 166 was in force.'
7. From the above pronouncement of the Apex Court, it isclear that in view of the amendmentmade by the Amendment Act 54 of1994, there was no limitation for filingan application in respect of anyaccident. The Apex Court also heldthat when Sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been omitted, then theTribunal has to entertain a claimpetition without taking note of the dateon which such accident had takenplace. The Motor Accident ClaimsTribunal has rightly relied on the saidjudgment on the Apex Court whilerejecting the objection raised by thewrit petitioner.
8. Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the Apex Court's judgments in the case of Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. (supra) in AIR 1991 SC 2156. In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court considered the question as to what will be the effect on limitation after repeal of the old Act, i.e., 1939 Act. The Apex Court in the aforesaid Judgment considered the provisions of Section 6 of General Clauses Act for considering the effect of repeal. The Apex Court in the aforesaid case has held that the question of condonation of delay must, therefore, be governed by the new law. The aforesaid case is not attracted in the facts of present case since in the aforesaid case, the Apex Court considered the effect of repeal of old Act and further in paragraph 11, it was laid down that the question of condonation of delay be governed by new law. The aforesaid judgment does not help the petitioner in any manner.
9. The next judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board and Anr. v. Valsala K. and Anr. etc. etc. (supra) in AIR 1999 SC 3502. was with regard to Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, as amended with effect from 1995. The question before the Apex Court was as to what is the relevant date for determination of amount of compensation. The Apex Court held that the relevant date for determination is the dale of accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim. The aforesaid case relates to determination of question of compensation payable. It was held that the workman immediately after the accident became entitled for compensation, hence the relevant date is the date of accident. The amendment made in 1995 regarding enhancing the amount of compensation and rate of interest was held not to be attracted in the above case. The aforesaid case is clearly distinguishable and is not applicable in the present case. The question in the present case is not the question regarding determination of amount of compensation rather the question of limitation for filing the application. When an application is filed for compensation, the question as to whether the said application is barred by time or not, has to be considered with regard to date on which the said application has been filed and the law governing the limitation on the said date.
10. In view of what has been said above, the facts of the present case are fully covered by the Apex Court judgment in Dhannalal v. D.P. Vijayuargiya and Ors. (supra). The application filed by respondent No. 2 was not barred by time and the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has rightly decided issue No. 4. None of the submissions raised by the counsel for the petitioner has any merit.
11. The writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed.