Judgment:
Krishna Murari, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned standing counsel.
2. The facts of the case in brief as stated in the writ petition are that respondent Nos. 5 and 6 and certain other persons were allotted land by the Gaon Sabha in 1964. The petitioner No. 1 and others initiated proceedings for cancellation of the said allotment which was dismissed by the Sub-Divisional Officer as barred by time. However, the Sub-Divisional Officer continued the proceedings suo motu. The proceedings went up to the Board of Revenue and were abated on 26.3.1970, due to consolidation operation in the village. In the consolidation proceedings petitioners again filed objection seeking cancellation of the allotment made in favour of respondent Nos. 5 and 6 and to expunge their name from the disputed plots. The Consolidation Officer vide order dated 31.12.1968 dismissed the objection. The petitioners filed an appeal which was dismissed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation on the ground that the Consolidation Authorities have no jurisdiction to consider the validity of the lease granted by the Gaon Sabha. The revision filed by the petitioners was also dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 31.12.1970. Thereafter, a review petition was filed before Board of Revenue for review/recall of the order dated 26.3.1970. The Board of Revenue dismissed the review on 20.11.1974 on the ground that the Consolidation Authorities have jurisdiction to consider the validity of the lease and as such the review was not maintainable. The petitioners again approached the Deputy Director of Consolidation for reviewing the order dated 13.12.1970. The said review application was also dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 18.1.1975 on the ground that Consolidation Authorities are not vested with any power of review. In these sets of facts, the present writ petition has been filed seeking followed reliefs:
(i) to issue an order, direction or writ in the nature of certiorari calling for the record of the case and to quash the orders dated 18.10.1975, 31.12.1970, 26.3.1970 and 31.12.1968, passed by the opposite party Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
(ii) to issue an order, direction or writ in the nature of certiorari calling for the record of the case and to quash the order passed by the Board of Revenue dated 20.11.1974 in case, it is found that the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to consider the case of the petitioners.
(iii) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the consolidation authorities or the revenue authorities to adjudicate the rights of the petitioners and to go into the validity of the patta granted in favour.
(iv) to issue any other writ, order or direction which this Hon'ble Court deems fit, proper in the circumstances of the case and to which the petitioners may be found entitled to under law.
(v) to issue an order or direction awarding costs of this petition to the petitioners.
3. It is no doubt correct that when the proceedings were pending before the Consolidation Authorities, there were conflicting views on the Jurisdiction of the Consolidation Authorities to consider the validity of lease granted by Gaon Sabha. However, this controversy was decided by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Similesh Kumar v. Gaon Sabha, 1977 ALJ 310. The Full Bench opined that the Consolidation Authorities cannot adjudicate upon the validity of the lease nor the same can be cancelled or ignored by them.
4. However the Full Bench of Similesh Kumar (supra) came for consideration by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of U. P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2000 (2) AWC 933 (SC) : AIR 2000 SC 878. Relying upon the earlier decision in the case of Gorakh Nath Dubey v. Hari Narain Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2451, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that in case the lease is void the same can be ignored by the consolidation authorities, and they would be within their jurisdiction in adjudicating upon that document so as to finally decide the rights of the parties. Thus, the ratio of the Full Bench decision of this Court that consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction either to adjudicate upon the validity of the lease or ignore the same came to be much diluted by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
5. However, before proceeding to consider the question of granting reliefs claimed by the petitioners in the writ petition, to direct either the consolidation authorities or the revenue authorities to consider the case of the petitioners, it has to be considered whether the petitioners who are three in number, two private individual and the Gaon Sabha have any right to maintain the proceedings for cancellation of the lease made in favour of respondent Nos. 5 and 6 and the writ petition filed by them is maintainable.
6. Section 198 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act prescribes the procedure for cancellation of the allotment made by Gaon Sabha. The said section also provides that order of preference to be followed while making allotment of land. Section 198 (2} as it originally stood provided for an appeal by any 'person aggrieved' against the order of allotment or lease made by Gaon Sabha before the Sub-Divisional Officer. The section has undergone frequent changes. By Section 36 of the U. P. Amendment Act XX of 1954 Sub-section (2) was substituted by a new section and the Sub-Divisional Officer came to be vested with the power to inquire into the allotment made under Sub-section (1) either on his own motion or on the application of any 'person aggrieved'. By Section 23 of the U. P. Act XXXVII of 1958 the said power came to be vested in Assistant Collector in-charge of Sub-Division instead of Sub-Divisional Officer. Again by Section 14 of U. P. Act (IV) of 1969 the power came to be vested in the Collector which could be exercised by him either on his own motion or on the application of any 'person aggrieved' by the allotment. The section as it stands now, the power of cancellation is vested with Collector which can be exercised by him either on his own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved. Whatever the amendments, the position that cancellation proceedings can be initiated by a 'person aggrieved' has remained unaltered throughout. Thus, in order to maintain the cancellation proceedings the petitioners have to demonstrate that they are persons aggrieved.
7. Dictionary meaning of word aggrieved is 'having suffered loss or injury.' According to the Black's Law Dictionary aggrieved party/person is 'one whose legal right is invaded by an act complained of, or whose pecuniary interest is directly affected by a decree or judgment. The word aggrieved refers to a substantial grievance, a denial of some personal or property right, or the imposition upon a party of a burden or obligation.' According to Corpus Juris Secundum Volume IV 356 (1st, edition) a party or a person can be said to be aggrieved by a decision only when it operates directly and injuriously upon his personal, pecuniary or proprietary rights.
8. The word aggrieved party/person has also been subject matter of the judicial interpretation by the Hon'ble Apex Court. In the case of Adi Pheroz Shah Gandhi v. H. M. Seervai, AIR 1971 SC 385, while considering the scope and ambit of the word 'person aggrieved' used in Section 37 of the Advocates Act, 1961. The Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as follows :
'From these cases it is apparent that any person who feels disappointed with the result of the case is not a person aggrieved. He must be disappointed of a benefit which he would have received if the order had gone the other way. The order must cause him a legal grievance by wrongfully depriving him of something.'
9. From the above it is clear that a person can be said to be aggrieved only when his rights are directly affected by the operation of the decision, meaning thereby, the decision wrongly deprives him of something or wrongfully refuses him something to which he is legally entitled or wrongfully affects his title of something.
10. In the present case, the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 are challenging the allotment made by Gaon Sabha in favour of respondent Nos. 5 and 6. However, they can only be covered under the definition of 'aggrieved person' if they are able to demonstrate that the decision of Gaon Sabha to allot land in favour of respondent Nos. 5 and 6 wrongfully deprived them of their right of allotment of the said land or they had any title in the said land. Section 198 of the Act prescribes the order of preference to be observed while making allotment of land. Unless, petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 demonstrate that they were applicants for allotment and higher in order of preference than respondent Nos. 5 and 6 and had better claim for allotment than respondent Nos. 5 and 6 and have been wrongfully and illegally deprived of their such rights, they cannot be said to be aggrieved persons. There is not even a whisper in the pleadings that the petitioners were also applicants for allotment of the land and were higher in preference than respondent Nos. 5 and 6. In the absence of any such pleadings petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 cannot be said to be aggrieved persons so as to maintain the proceedings for cancellation of the allotment made in favour of respondent Nos. 5 and 6 and as such, the writ petition filed by them is not maintainable.
11. In so far as petitioner No. 3, Gaon Sabha is concerned, the present writ petition filed by it is also not maintainable as it has been filed in violation of paragraphs 128 and 131 of U. P. Gaon Sabha Manual. Paragraph 128 of the U. P. Gaon Sabha Manual reads as under :
128. 'The conduct of Gaon Sabha Litigation shall not depend upon the individual discretion of the Chairman of the Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti (Land Management Committee), but shall be a matter of a resolution of the Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti (Land Management Committee) as a whole. In urgent cases, however, the Chairman can take action on his own and seek ratification of the Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti (Land Management Committee) afterwards by including in the agenda of the next ensuing meetings.'
12. The present writ petition has been filed by the Gaon Sabha through its Up-Pradhan. There is no material on record to indicate that the Land Management Committee passed any resolution authorizing Up-Pradhan to file the present writ petition. Paragraph Nos. 128 and 131 of Gaon Sabha Manual have been framed under the rule making power conferred on the State and have the force of law and are mandatory in nature as held by this Court in the case of Gram Panchayat v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1969 AWC 500; Brindavan v. Gram Samaj, 1980 AWC 243 and Gram Panchayat v. Collector, Unnao, 1997 (3) AWC 165.
13. Paragraph 131 of Gaon Sabha Manual places a restriction on the Land Management Committee from engaging any lawyer other than the panel lawyer appointed for the purpose with an exception that in important cases special lawyer can be engaged with the permission of the Collector in writing. This writ petition has not been filed by a panel lawyer appointed to represent Gaon Sabha in this Court but through a private counsel. There is nothing on record to indicate that any permission was granted by the Collector to engage a private counsel to file the writ petition on behalf of Gaon Sabha as such the same is not maintainable. I am fortified in my view by a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Baburam Varma v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Akbarpur District Faizabad, 1996 (Suppl) RD 10.
14. In view of foregoing discussions, the writ petition filed by the petitioners is not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.