N.S. Gupta, J.
1. By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the pettioner Manoj alias Ghantoori has challenged the validity of detention order dated 19-6-1997, passed by the then District Magistrate, Udham Singh Nagar (Rudrapur), under Section 3/1 of the National Security Act.
2. The grounds of detention upon which the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority viz the District Magistrate was based were as follows-
1) That the petitioner had actively participated along with his other associates in Case Crime No. 376 of 1997, under Sections 147/148/149/307/452/323/506, I.P.C. and 7 of Criminal Law Amendment on 2-6-97 at about 8.30 A.M. and was responsible for committing heinous offence of gang rape as also attempting to commit murder by forming an unlawful assembly in the intervening night of 1/2, 6-97 at 9.00 P.M. in Kasba Kashipur.
2) That on the next day viz. 2-6-97, at about 8.30 P.M. in the night the petitioner again visited the house of the complainant Ashok Kumar and threatened him and the members of his family with dire consequences if he deposed against him in the Court. The people of the Mohalla were terrorised. They closed their doors and fell frightened so much so that some of the Mohallawalas took shelter in the police station during night. The terror of the petitioner was so grave that none could dare to open his mouth to narrate the details of the incident.
3) That on 2-6-97, information was lodged at the police station that the petitioner had pressurised the police officials to hush-up Case Crime No. 376 of 1997 registered against the petitioner.
4) That the petitioner had terrorised the doctors of the Government Hospital to this extent that even they did not properly conduct the medical examination of the victim Smt. Sampatti and her daughters Geeta and Kaushalya.
5) That on 20-10-90 at about 2.30 P.M. the petitioner along with his associates attempted to commit murder of one Jadu by stabbing him in his abdomen within the jurisdiction of police Station Kashipur.
6) That he terrorised the victims Jadu and his mother Sundari Devi to vacate the house in which they were living as tenents by accepting a sum of Rs. 20,000/- from the landlord Kunj Behari for that purpose. This incident created based to this extent that the entire population of Kasba Kashipur started feeling insecure, giving rise to the disturbance of public order. The impact of the terror created by the petitioner was so grave that nobody could dare to give evidence against him. With the result that the petitioner was acquitted in the said case being Case Crime No. 762 of 1990.
7) That on 8-7-91 at about 1.15 p.m. the petitioner along with his associates was responsible for committing murders of Rajesh and Nasim s/o Abdul Aziz and further attempted to commit murder of Mukhtar Husain by opening fire by means of country made pistols. This incident also created terror amongst the people and the people of the locaility started feeling insecure. This incident was registered as Case Crime No. 695/91, under Section 302, I.P.C.
8) On 20-10-91 at about 9.45 P.M. the petitioner along with his other associates committed the murder of one Shivraj Singh son of Maharaj Singh in Mohalla Katoratal, when the deceased Rajesh along with his friends and others was going to see the Ramlila. This incident also created terror in the locality and was registered as Case Crime No. 1025 of 1991, under Section 302, I.P.C. After proper investigation into the matter the police had submitted proper chargesheet, but because of the terror of the petitioner the witnesses did not depose against the petitioner and his associates, with the result that the case had ended in acquittal.
9) That on 10-3-93 at about 8.00 A.M. the petitioner was arrested by Head Constable Lekhpal Singh and constables Sukhbir Singh and Ram Pal Singh in Girital Colony near the house of Kalwa and on his personal search a country made pistol of 315 bore containing live cartridge there in was recovered, about which incident the police has submitted chargesheet and the matter was pending trial before the Court.
10) That on 21-5-93 at about 10.00 A.M. the petitioner along with his brother Rajendra and Banti Jat went to the hotel of Rakesh Kumar for taking meals. When the hotel manager demanded the charges, the petitioner threatened him saying that his name was Manoj alias Ghantoori and that no hotelwala dares to demand money from him. Thereafter a scuffle had followed in between the petitioner and his associates on the one hand and Rajnish the hotel owner on the other. The petitioner threatened Rajnish, the brother of the hotel owner to kill and thereafter on 23-5-93 at about 9.00 p.m. the petitioner again went to the said hotel where Rajnish was sitting on the counter and assaulted Rajnish by means of a knife. When the servant of Rajnish came to his rescue he too was pushed back. Rajnish was immediately taken to the hospital but was declared dead. This incident was registered as Case Crime No. 624 of 93, under Section 302, I.P.C. and after proper investigation into the matter the police and submitted chargesheet.
11) That on 27-5-93 at about 4.00 p.m. the petitioner along with his associates went to the main Bazar of Kasba Kashipur and threatened Dharmpal Singh who was doing pairvi in Rajnish case to kill him by taking out a pistol. The petitioner opened fire in air and went away. This incident also created terror; the shop keepers shuttered down their shops and started running away. Case Crime No. 636 of 1993, under Section 504/506, I.P.C. about this incident was registered against him and was pending trial.
12) That on 29-5-93 the then sub-Inspector of Kashipur submitted a report against the petitioner and his associates under Section 2/3 of U.P. Gangsters and Antisocial Activities Act against the petitioner and his associates which case was registered as Case Crime No. 64 of 1993 and was pending before the Court.
13) That on 13-1-95 at about 7.30 p.m. the petitioner along with his associates formed an unlawful assembly and in prosecution of the common object of the said unlawful assembly the petitioner and his associate assaulted Sanjai Kumar by means of knife, Danda and country made pistols, caused injuries to him which case was registered as Case Crime No. 33 of 1995, under Section 147/307, I.P.C. in which case too the police after proper investigation submitted chargesheet and which case was pending trial.
14) That on 10-5-95 at 11.30 p.m. in front of a Tea Shop of Ram Pal near the Court campus Kashipur the petitioner was apprehended by the Inspector P.N. Singh and other police personnel and country made pistol of 12 bore and 12 live cartridges were recovered from his possession, about which case Crime No. 467 of 1995, under Section 25 Arms Act was registered against the petitioner and was pending trial before the Court.
15) That on 14-7-95, the then Inspector Kotwali D.C. Rawat got Case Crime No. 690 of 1995 under Section 3/4 of U.P. Goonda Act registered against the petitioner, because the petitioner was involved in antisocial activities in Kasba Kashipur and was branded as a Goonda. After proper investigation of the case the police submitted chargesheet and the case was pending trial.
16) That on 17-2-96 at about 10.00 p.m. the petitioner along with his associates Balvinder Singh, Mahendra Singh, Jassa Singh, Gurusewak Singh, Umesh Pahalwan and two others armed himself and his associates with guns and country made pistols, Lathis and swords and went on four motorcycles to the house of Nahar Singh, Nirmal Singh, Karnal Singh and threated to kill them about which Case Crime No. 234 of 1996, under Sections 147/148/149/452/307/506, I.P.C. was registered against the petitioner and his associates. After proper investigation into the matter, the police submitted chargesheet in this case and the case was pending trial.
17) That on 31-8-96 at about 9.15 p.m. the petitioner and his associates opened fire upon police party but was apprehended on Manpur Road and on his personal search a country made pistol of 12 bore, containing an empty cartridge and one live cartridge of 12 bore were recovered. The petitioner was found carrying 3 Kg. doda of opium in a plastic bag about which Cases under Section 307, I.P.C. 25 Arms Act and 18/20 of D.P.S. Act were registered against the petitioner and were pending trial.
18) That in the intervening night of 31-8-96/1 -9-96 when the petitioner was lodged in police lock-up of police station Kashipur along with his brother Satish alias Mintoo, the petitioner started causing injuries to his person by means of a water glass, with an intention to falsely rope in the police officials about which Case Crime No. 800/96, under Section 309/306, I.P.C. was registered against the petitioner and was pending trial.
19) That another case No. 308/97, under Section 3/4 of Gangsters Act was registered against the petitioner.
The petitioner had challenged the aforesaid detention order on the following grounds :-
i) That the detention order was vitiated for lack of application of mind by the detaining authority.
ii) That the sponsoring authority suppressed the relevant materials from the detaining authority and gave incorrect facts.
iii) That the police was feeling enmical towards the petitioner and at the instance of the petitioner a Magisterial enquiry was also instituted against the police officials.
iv) That proper compliance of provisions of Section 10 of the National Security Act was not made. There was delay in the consideration and disposal of the representation of the petitioner which caused prejudice to him.
v) That at the time of passing impugned detention order the petitioner was in jail and no satisfaction was recorded by the detaining authority about the urgency of his detention.
3. Counter-affidavits in the case have been filed by Sri Mahesh Kumar Gupta, the then District Magistrate Udham Singh Nagar, the detaining authority at the relevant time who passed the impugned order of detention as also by Sri R.S. Agarwal, Deputy Secretary Home and Sri Ram Bilas Jailor. Affidavit was also filed by Sri Jitendra Kumar, Present District Magistrate of Udham Singh Nagar.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the affidavits and counter-affidavits which were exchanged in between the parties.
5. The detaining authority has reiterated in his counter-affidavit that heinous offences one after the other were being committed by the petitioner and his associates which created panic and terror in the mind of the public and the impact of the criminal activities of the petitioner was so grave that the public order was disturbed and the public of Kasba Kashipur had started feeling insecures. The number of incidents given above regarding criminal history of the petitioner fully prove prima facie the involvement of the petitioner in heinous offences like rape, murder and attempt to murder etc.
6. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that since the petitioner was acquitted in the various cases of murder and attempt to murder instituted against him, this Court should believe that the petitioner was innocent and was falsely roped in into a number of criminal cases maliciously by the police. It is not possible for us to appreciate the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner for the simple reason that the copies of judgments of the Courts which were filed by the petitioner himself relating to incident dated 12-10-91, regarding the murder of Shiv Raj Singh go to show that all the three witnesses of fact had turned hostile. In other incident dated 20-5-92, relating to the murder of Rajnish, the case ended in acquittal because of the fact that the witnesses of fact failed to suport the prosecution theory. The third case relating to the incident of 13-1-95 under Setions 147/148/307/149, I.P.C. in which Hemant Kumar Sharma was injured had also ended in `cquittal because the prosecution witnesses including the injured did not support the prosecution story.
7. The circumstances that the witnesses of heinous cases like that of murder and attempt to murder turned hostile before the trial Court by itself go to show that the terror of the petitioner was so much that no witness was prepared to state anything before the trial Court against the petitioner; that by itself goes to suggest that the people were feeling frightened and scared by the criminal activities of the petitioner. It is clear from the affidavit filed by the detaining authority that after perusing all the relevant materials which were duly placed before him, he had passed the imugned order of detention. Thus the ground that the detaining authority did not apply its mind to the materials relating to the activities of the petitioner before arriving at subjective satisfaction is absolutely unfounded.
8. Sri Manoj Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that no reference about the report of the Local Intelligence Unit was made by the detaining authority in the impugned order that the impugned order was based upon extraneous considerations; but we are unable to agree with the submissions for the reason that there is nothing in the report of the L.I.U. which may go to suggest that the petitioner did not indulge into various criminal activities Rather the said report also goes to suggest that because of the terror created by the petitioner the people of the locality were not going to open their mouths against the petitioner. The mere fact that at the time of passing impugned order the petitioner was in jail is no ground to vitiate the impugned order of detention. Application for bail can be given at any time as a matter of right.
9. Sri Manoj Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner, relying upon the proposition of law laid down in AIR 1989 SC 491, has argued that since the petitioner was inside jail the possibility of his coining out of jail was non-existent. The detaining authority while passing the impugned order of detention failed to consider that important aspect of the matter and, therefore, the detention order was liable to be quashed.
10. Another ruling relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner was A.K. Roy v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1982 SC 710. On the basis of this ruling too the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the report of L.I.U. was an extraneous matter which was not referred to in the ground of detention order and it may have influenced the mind of detaining authority and hence the order was vitiated.
11. On the other hand Sri Mahendra Pratap A.G.A. relied upon the ruling of Kamariinnissa v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1991 SC 1640 in which their lordships of the Supreme Court laid down the following guidelines which arc reproduced as under (para 13):-
From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to us that even in the case of a person in custody the detention order can validly be passed (I) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reasons to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition to question it before a higher Court. What this Court stated in the case of Ramesh Yadav AIR 1986 SC 315 (supra) was that ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely to pre-empt or circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law. It seems to us well settled that even, in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law of preventive detention. This seems to be quite clear from the case law discussed above and there is no need to refer to the High Court decisions to which our attention was drawn since they do not hold otherwise. We, therefore, find if difficult to accept the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that there was no valid and compelling reason for passing the impugned orders of detention because the detenus were in custody.
12. In 1994 SCC (Cri) 1325 : (AIR 1994 SC 2179), Attorney General for India v. Amratlal Prajivandas the provisions of Section 5A of National Security Act came up for consideration before the Bench of Hon'ble Nine Judges of the Apex Court in which their lordships had observed in paragraph 48 (of SCC) : (para 47 of AIR) as follows :-
Now, it is beyond dispute that an order of detention can be based upon one single ground. Several decisions of this Court have held that even one prejudicial act can be treated as sufficient for forming the requisite satisfaction for detaining the person. In Debu Mahato v. State of W.B. AIR 1974 SC 816) it was observed that while ordinarily-speaking one act may not be sufficient to form the requisite satisfaction, there is no such invariable rule and that in a given case one act may suffice. That was a case of wagonbreaking and having regard to the nature of the Act, it was held that one act is sufficient. The same principle was reiterated in Anil Dey v. State of W.B. AIR 1974 SC 832. It was a case of railway signal material. Here too one act was held to be sufficient. Similarly in Lsrail S.K. v. District Magistrate of West Dinajpur AIR 1975 SC 168 and Dharua Kanu v. State of W.B. AIR 1975 SC 571, single act of theft of telegraph copper wires in huge quantity and removal of railway fishplates respectively was held sufficient to sustain the order of detention. In Saraswathi Seshagiri v. State of Kerala AIR 1982 SC 1162), a case arising under COFEPOSA, a single act viz. attempt to export a huge amount of Indian currency was held sufficient. In short, the principle appears to be this, Though ordinarily one act may not be held sufficient to sustain an order of detention, one act may sustain an order of detention if the act is of such a nature as to indicate that it is an organised act or a manifestation of organised activity. The gravity and nature of the act is also relevant. The test is whether the act is such that it gives rise to an inference that the person would continue to indulge in similar prejudicial activity. That is the reason why single acts of wagon breaking, theft of single material, theft of telegraph copper wires in huge quantity and removal of railway fishplates were held sufficient. Similarly, where the person tried to export huge amount of Indian currency to a foreign country in a planned and premeditated manner, it was held that such single act warrants an inferennce that he will repeat his activity in future and, therefore his detention is necessary to prevent him from indulging insuch prejudicial activity. If one looks at the acts the COFEPOSA is designed to prevent, they are all either acts of smuggling or of foreign exchange manipulation. These acts are indulged in by persons, who act in concert with other persons and quite often such activity has international ramifications. These acts are preceded by a good amount of planning the organisation. They are not like ordinary law and order crimes. If, however, in any given case a single act is found to be not sufficient to sustain the order of detention that may well be quashed but it cannot be stated as a principle that one single act cannot constitute the basis for detention. On the contrary, it does. In other words, it is not necessary that there should be multiplicity of grounds for making or sustaining an order of detention.
13. Judging the present case in the back-drop of the two cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the State, we are of the opinion that criminal activities of the petitioner which were of heinous nature, though in some of which the petitioner was ultimiately acquited and the fact of acquittal was not brought to the notice of the detaining authority and the detaining authority was only apprised that the said cases were pending, we are of the opinion that no prejudice was caused to the detenu for the simple reason that the very involvement of the petitioner in the number of cases complained against the petitioner afforded sufficient grounds for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to excercise his powers under Section 3/1 of the National Security Act.
14. It is clear from the affidavit of Sri R.S. Agarwal, Deputy Secretary Home that the petitioner's representation dated 4-7-97 against the impugned order of detention was received by the state on 10-7-97, 12-7-97 and 13-7-97 were holidays on account of second Saturday and Sunday. The State Government placed the said representation along with necessary comments of the detaining authority before the Advisory Board on 14-7-97, which after the report of the Advisory Board was again examined by the State Government and was finally rejected on 17-7-97. The Central Government also rejected the petitioner's representation which fact was duly conveyed to the petitioner vide FAX message D/- 28-8-97. It would thus be seen that there was no undue delay in the consideration and disposal of the petitioner's representation on the part of the State Government or the Central Government.
15. Thus, to sum up, we find that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority regarding the involvement of the petitioner in criminal activities was prowess based and was of such a magnitute as to disturbe public order and hence it was proper one. We accordingly find no force in this petition, which is hereby dismissed.