Prakash Krishna, J.
1. The present revision arises out of proceedings under Section 4-B of the U.P. Sales Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the assessment year 1986-87. The dealer opp. party deals in the manufacture of automobiles toughened safety glass parts including wind screen, doors screen, side screen and back screen etc. The application for grant of recognition certificate under Section 4-B (_) -(_} was filed in respect of notified goods mentioned in annexure-3 of the notification No. 7551 dated 31st of December, 1976. The Assessing Authority by the order dated 22.12.1987 granted recognition certificate with respect of 'Automobile Safety Toughened Glass' whereby the dealer opp. party was authorized to purchase raw material and packing material at the concessional rate of tax at 4 per cent.
2. The dealer opp. party felt aggrieved by this order as total exemption of sales tax on the purchases of raw material and packing material was not granted. An appeal under Section 9 of the Act was filed which was allowed by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) by the order dated 11th of January, 1989. As a result of the appellate order, the recognition certificate was directed to be amended to the effect that the dealer opp. party would be entitled to purchase raw material and packing material without payment of any sales tax on such purchases. This order has been confirmed in second appeal by the Tribunal in second appeal No. 55 of 1989, which is subject matter of the present revision.
3. Heard the counsel for the parties and perused the record.
4. The short question which involves in the present revision is whether manufacture of toughened glass amounts to the manufacturing of 'glass and glasswares including optical glass in all its forms' as mentioned in the aforesaid notification. If that is so, the dealer would be entitled to purchase raw material and packing material for the manufacture of notified goods namely toughened glass without payment of any tax on the purchase of such raw material and the packing material.
5. To resolve the controversy it is appropriate to refer the various notifications relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective submissions. The argument of the learned standing counsel is that the automobile toughened glass is not covered under the category of 'glass and glasswares including an optical glass in all forms'. The said contention is being disputed by the learned , senior counsel for the dealer opp.party. Reference can be made to Notification No. ST-II-7551/X-91 dated 31st December, 1976, issued under Section 4-B of the Act. Clause -2 of the said notification provides that no tax shall be payable on the sale to or, as the case may be, purchase by any unit in respect of raw materials required by it for use in the manufacture of goods mentioned in Annexure-III or for the packing material of the said goods manufactured by it. Entry No. 2 of Annexure-III, relied upon by the counsel for the parties reads as follows:-
2. 'Glass and glasswares including optical glass in all forms.'
6. By a subsequent notification the State Government superseded all the previous notifications issued under Section 4-B of the Act by Notification No. ST-II-4519 dated 29th August, 1987, Entry No. 2 of Annexure-I to the said notification which is presently involved, reads as follows:-
'Glass and glasswares including optical glass in all its forms but excluding ornamented and cut glass bangles'.
7. In view of clause (b) (2) of the notification no tax shall be payable in respect of sale to or, as the case may be, purchase by a dealer holding a recognition certificate under Section 4-B (2) of the Act of any raw material, accessories and component parts required for use in manufacture by him of the notified goods mentioned in column-2 of Annexure-I or of any goods required for use in the packing of such notified goods manufactured by him.
8. The learned standing counsel in support of the revision has placed reliance upon the following three judgments:-
1. Indo International Industries v. CST 1981 UPTC 481 (S.C.).
2. 1999 UPTC 681 CST Lucknow v. S/S.Paliwal Glass Works.
3. 1999 UPTC 853, CST v. Swastik Glass Enterprises.
9. On the other hand the learned senior counsel for the dealer opp.party has placed reliance upon the following two judgments: -
1. Atul Glass Industries Pvt. Ltd, v. Commissioner of Central Excise 1986 UPTC 1345 (SC).
2. Hindustan Safety Glass Works v. CST 1998 UPTC 1012.
10. The moot question involved, therefore, is whether the toughened glass is included in the entry namely 'Glass and glasswares in all forms', in the Notification issued under Section 4-B of the Act.
11. While interpreting the notification issued under Section 4-B of the Act, the aims and object of Section 4-B is to be kept in mind. The said section provides special relief to certain manufacturers, to manufacture notified goods. The relief is given in the form of concessional rate of tax/exemption from tax on the purchases of raw materials and packing materials for use in the manufacture of notified goods. Sub Section (1) of Section 4-B of the Act gives an overriding effect upon other sections namely sections 3, 3-A, 3-AAAA and* 3-D. The department on the application of such manufacturers of the notified goods grants them a certificate known as recognition certificate which authorizes them to purchase raw material and the packing material at concessional rate of tax/ without payment of tax to manufacture the specified goods. Rule 25-A is the relevant rule framed under Section 4-B of the Act.
12. The Supreme Court in the case of Indo International Industries v. CST 1981 UPTC 481 has interpreted the expression 'glassware' used in a notification issued in the First Schedule to the U.P. Sales Tax Act. It was faced with the question as to whether hypo clinical syringes, thermometers and lactometers were liable to be taxed as 'glasswares' or as hospital equipments.' It has relied upon its earlier judgment in the case of Ramavtar Budhai Prasad etc. v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer Akola (1961) 1 SCR 279 and held that it is well settled that in interpreting the item in Statutes like the Excise Act or the Sales Tax Act, whose primary object to raise revenue and for which purposes they classify divert products, articles and substances, resort should be had not to the scientific and technical meaning of the terms or expressions used but to their popular meaning, that is to say, the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. In para - 5 of the judgment it is noted that it is true that the dictionary meaning of the expression 'glassware' is an article made of glass, however, in commercial sense 'glassware' could never comprise articles like clinical syringes, thermometer and lactometer which have specialized significance and utility. The relevant portion is quoted below:-
'Having regard to the aforesaid well-settled test the question is whether clinical syringes could be regarded as 'glass ware'falling within Entry 39 of the First Schedule to the Act? It is true that the dictionary meaning of expression 'glass ware' is article made of glass. (See Websters new World Dictionary). However, in commercial sense glass ware could never comprise article like clinical syringes, thermometers, lactometers, and the like which have specialized significance and utility. In popular or commercial parlance a general merchant dealing in 'glass ware' does not ordinarily deal in articles like clinical syringes, thermometers, lactometers, etc. which article though made of glass, are normally available in medical stores or with the manufacturers thereof like the assessee. It is equally unlikely that consumer would ask for such articles form a glass ware shop. In popular sense when one talks of glassware such specialized articles like clinical syringes, thermometers, lactometers and the like do not come up to one's mind. Applying the aforesaid test, therefore, we are clearly of the view that the clinical syringes which the assessee manufactures and sells cannot be considered as 'glass-ware' falling within Entry 39 of the First Schedule of the Act.'
13. In the light of the above judgment of the Supreme Court, to answer as to whether the particular item is a ' glass and glassware' or not, resort should be had to the common arid popular meaning of the item in question.
14. In Ram Avatar Buddhi Prasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer : [1962]1SCR279 the Supreme Court was concerned, with the word Vegetables' occurring in C.P and Bearer Sales Tax Act, 1947 and it was held as follows:-
'But this word must be construed not in any technical sense nor from the botanical point of view but as understood in common parlance. It has not been defined in the Act and being a word of everyday use it must be construed in its popular sense, meaning and with sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the Statute is dealing would attribute to it It is to be construed as understood in common language.'
15. The same principle was reiterated in Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh : [1967]2SCR720 . In this case it was held that the charcoal would be included in coal, with the following observations: -
'Now, there can be no dispute that while coal is technically understood as a mineral product, charcoal is manufactured by human agency from products like wheat and other things. But now it is well established that while interpreting the items in Statute like Sales Tax Act, resources should be had not to be scientific or technical meaning of such terms but to their popular meaning, meaning attached by those dealing in them, that is to say, to their commercial sense. The same view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of South Bihar Sugar Mills Limited v. Union of India : 1973ECR9(SC) and Dunlop India Ltd. v. Union of India 1977 S.C. 597.
16. The Supreme Court in the case of Atul Glass Industries (P) Ltd. (Supra) has held that glass mirror can not be classified as 'other glass and glassware'. In this case the Supreme Court has also observed that for determining as to whether new commodity is substantially different from the original it has to be found as to how the product identified by the class or sections of people dealing or using the product. That is a test which is attracted whenever the Statute does not contain any definition. It is generally by its functional character that the product is so identified. It is a matter of common experience that the identity of an article is associated with its primary function. It is only logical when a consumer buys an article, he buys it because it performs a specific function for him. There is a mental association in the mind of the consumer between the article and the need is supplied in his life. In the case of glass mirror, the consumer recalls primarily the reflective function of article more than any thing else. It is a mirror, an article which reflects images. It is referred to as a glass mirror only because the word 'glass' is descriptive of mirror. In that glass has been used as a medium for manufacturing the mirror. In this judgment, the Supreme Court has noticed the manufacturing process of glass mirror, in para - 3 of the judgment. It has also held thereafter that the wind screens, rear screens and door screens used in motor vehicles cannot be described as 'glass' or 'glasswares'. In para 17 of the judgment of the Supreme Court has made the following observations:-
'Upon the tests and having regard to the foregoing considerations which have appealed to us when considering the proper classification of glass mirrors, we have no hesitation in holding that the screens cannot be described as 'glass or glasswares' under Tariff Item No. 23-A(4). No, one dealing in or using the screens would consider them as 'glass or glasswares'. They can only be considered as motor vehicle parts. Even if we assume that they could fall under Tariff Item No, 23-A(4) relating to 'glass and glasswares' also, inasmuch as Tariff Item No. 34-A is a special entry and Tariff Item No. 23-A (4) is a general entry, the special must exclude the general and, therefore, also it is Tariff Item No. 34-A which prevails and is attracted'.
17. In para 13 of the judgment the Supreme Court has noted that wind screens, rear screens and door screens of motor, vehicles are manufactured according to the specific shape and measurement indicated in the orders, for different vehicles require screens of different shapes and measurement and held that the screens manufactured from sheet glass. It is first given shape and size according to the specification contained in the order and thereafter subjected to the process of toughening. It is a fabricated article.
18. The aforesaid judgment has been followed by a learned Single Judge in the case of Hindustan Safety Glass Works v. CST 1998 UPTC 1012. The High Court was called upon to decide as to whether the toughened glass sheets would fall in entry No. 39 of Notification dated 20.5.1976 ( a different notification, issued for rate purposes) which is reproduced below:-
'39 - All goods and wares made of glass, but not including plain glass- panes....'
19. It has been held therein that a new product emerges out of glass sheets when glass mirror is being manufactured. It has been held that glass screen manufactured by the dealer is not included in 'glass and glasswares'. Ultimately, it has been held that toughened glass sheet manufactured by the dealer will be taxed as unclassified item. The High Court while interpreting the aforesaid entry No. 39, held that all items of glass have not been included as part of 'glass and glasswares'. Plain glass panes have been excluded from the scope of Entry No. 39, aforesaid. Glass screen is more akin to glass - panes. The interpretation, thus, made is confined to the particular entry being entry No. 39 of altogether different notification.
20. At this stage another argument of the learned senior counsel for the dealer opp.party is to be considered. He strenuously contended that while interpreting the entry in a notification under Section 4-B of the Act, the notifications issued under Section 3-A of the Act are not relevant. To this proposition, there cannot possibly be any objection. But if a particular entry has been judicially interpreted either by this Court or by the Supreme Court, there is a presumption under law that the interpretation put by the Court is known to the legislature. The Supreme Court in para 16 of the case of F.S. Gandhi v. CRT : [1990]18ITR34(SC) has observed so. The relevant portion of the paragraph is quoted below: -
'It must be assumed that while enacting Finance Act 1969, Parliament was aware of the constructions placed by this Court on these words in CWT v. Smt. MuthuKrishna Ammal (Supra). In repeating the said words in the amended clause (e) of section2, the Parliament must be taken to have used the said words to bear the meaning which has been put upon them by this Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Smt. Muthu Krishna Ammal (Supra).'
21. It was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Atul Glass Industries Limited (Supra) in the year 1986 by the judgment dated 10th of July, 1986 that 'glass and glasswares' do not include the screens and they can only be considered as motor vehicle parts. Automobile' screen thus cannot be held to be included in 'glass or glasswares.'
22. It is true that this Court was considering the Entry No. 39 of Notification dated 20.5.1976 issued under the U.P. Trade Tax Act, in the case of M/s. Hindustan Safety Glass Works (Supra) wherein it has held by following the judgment of the Supreme Court that the toughened glass sheets are not included in the aforesaid entry which relates to all glass and wares made of glass, but not including plain glass panes. The aforesaid entry was contained in a notification under Section 3-A of the Act. The argument of the learned Senior Counsel that the interpretation given to an entry issued under Section 3-A of the Act can be of no assistance to interpret an entry in a notification issued under Section 4-B of the Act, is a wide proposition. It is one thing to say that the ambit and scope of a notification issued under Section 4-B of the Act can not be enlarged or interpreted with reference to a notification issued under other Sections, prescribing the different rate of taxes for different commodities. But it is different thing to say that even if a particular phrase has been interpreted in a particular notification, it is irrelevant to interpret similar or same kind of entry mentioned in a notification issued under Section 4-B of the Act. To my mind if a particular meaning has been assigned to a particular item and the said item finds place in a notification issued under Section 4-B as well, in a notification issued under Section 3-A or the like other sections, I see no difficulty in assigning the same meaning to both the notifications. The view which I am taking is not in any way in conflict or derogation of the view taken by the Division Bench in the case of Fine Straw and Cardboard Factory (P) Limited (supra). The Division Bench has said only this much that for granting of recognition certificate one has to look to the conditions prescribed in the. notification issued 'under Section 4-B of the Act. A close reading of the aforesaid judgment would reveal that it nowhere says that a common expression found in two notifications issued under different sections of the Act has to be necessarily interpreted differently. Therefore, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Atul Glass (supra) and M/s Indo International Industries, it is difficult to agree with the view of the Tribunal that toughened glass is 'glass and* glasswares', the expression used in the relevant notification issued under Section 4-B of the Act.
23. The Tribunal has described the manufacturing process of automobile toughened glass sheets. From a big plane glass sheet, the pieces of required dimensions are cut. Thereafter polishing work is carried on. The sheets are put together vertically and heated upto a desired temperature and after compressing air, the sheets are suddenly cooled. To manufacture a bending sheet, the required curvature is given in between heating and cooling operation, to bend. In this process the physical properties of the finished goods are changed and the resistance power of glass is increased and it does not reduce to sharp edged pieces at the time of its break. Thus, in my view the contention of the department is correct that the toughened automobile glass sheets used in automobiles as front, rear and side screens are commercially different and therefore more appropriately they cannot be described as 'glass and glasswares'
24. In view of the well known principles relating to the interpretation of entries, as discussed above, the words 'glass and glasswares' should be interpreted as it is understood by the persons who deal with them. It cannot be described as 'glass or glasswares'.
25. In popular sense a general merchant dealing in glasswares, automobile toughened safety glass parts including wind screen, door screen, side screens and back screens, does not ordinarily deals in the articles like automobile toughened safety glass parts, wind screens, door screens, side screens and back screens. It is equally unlikely that the consumer would ask for the said article from a glassware shop. It may be noted here that in the case of Atul Glass Industries (Supra) the question as to whether automobile screens (front, rear and side screens) cannot be described as 'glass or glasswares' has been answered by the Supreme Court in the following words:-
'...We have no hesitation in holding that the screens cannot be described as 'glass or glasswares '....'
26. The Supreme Court has also noted that the automobile screens can be considered as motor vehicle parts.
27. The dealer opp.party applied for grant of recognition certificate for the manufacture of 'automobile toughened safety glass parts including wind screens, door screens, side screens and back screens.' The raw material for the manufacture of automobile safety glass, as mentioned in the recognition certificate, on the basis of the application of the dealer opp.party is as follows:-
'Glass sheets of various sizes and thickness and tinted and plain.'
28. Indisputably the dealer opp.party is manufacturer of automobile toughened safety glass. It requires glass sheets of various sizes and thickness, tinted and plane, as raw material. Therefore, the automobile toughened safety glass is fabricated or manufactured goods out of glass sheets. Meaning thereby the toughened safety glass is different from glass sheets and it would not be 'glass or glasswares.' Applying the test of common parlance as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Indo International Industries (Supra) and Atul Glass Industries Put. Ltd. (Supra), no one dealing in or using the screens, would consider them as 'glass or glasswares'.
29. The learned Senior Counsel in the written argument has placed reliance upon two circulars dated 25th of January, 1977 and 13th February, 1991 issued by the Department and submitted that in view of judgment of this Court in the case of Eskay Remedies v. State of U.P. 2003 UPTC 254, the circular of Commissioner has binding effect. The circular dated 25.1.1977 is regarding the Entry No. II of Annexure-III of the Notification No. 2058 dated 25.5.1976. A close reading of the said circular would reveal that the bangles made of glass would be included within the words 'glasswares' used in the Notification dated 20.5.1976. The reliance placed upon the said circular is misplaced one as it does not touches the controversy involved in the present case. The another Circular dated 13th February, 1991 is with regard to the question of lamp shades, globe, chimney, Jharfanoos etc. In view of the said circular there is no difficulty in treating lamp shades, globe, chimney and Jharfanoos etc. as 'glasswares' mentioned in the notification dated 29.8.1987. I hardly see any application of this circular to the present controversy. It does not in any manner advance the contention of the learned senior counsel for the dealer opp.party. The reason being that automobile toughened safety glass, including wind screen, door screen, side screen and back screens are themselves finished items and they do not stand at par with the items like lamp shades, globe etc.
30. The upshot of the above discussion is that the order of the Tribunal holding that automobile toughened safety glass, wind screen etc. as 'glasswares', within the meaning of the notification under Section 4-B of the Act cannot be sustained. The order of the Tribunal including the order of the First Appellate Authority is set side. The revision is allowed. No order as to costs.