R.R.K. Trivedi, J.
1. Petitioner, Sushil Kumar Singh, by means of this petition, has challenged the order dated 11-11-1999, passed by District Magistrate, Varanasi under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, hereinafter referred to 'Act' under which petitioner has been detained. Along with order of detention, petitioner was also served grounds of detention on which basis District Magistrate, respondent No. 1, formed his subjective satisfaction to detain petitioner. The grounds of detention, as stated in Annexure 2 to the writ petition, are being mentioned hereunder :-
(1) That on 20th Oct. 1999, at 4.30 p.m. Chandra Bhushan Singh alias Chhallu Singh, resident of village Dharaurha, Police Station Chaubepur, district Varanasi along wih Shiv Shanker Singh was going to his village on scooter. When they crossed Munari Bazar and were on way to their village, petitioner along with his companions Kamlesh Singh and Rajesh Singh came from behind on a Maruti car No. U.P. No. 65M8998, overtook the scooter and with intention to kill, fired at Chandra Bhushan, Singh and Shiv Shanker Singh from automatic cirearms. In this firing, Shiv Shanker Singh was hit and he fell down and died but Chandra Bhushan Singh escaped and ran towards nearby heap of bricks. He was chased by petitioner and his companions and was fired at in the same manner and was seriously injured. Thereafter petitioner and his companiess left the scene of occurrence, asuming him to be dead, by same Maruti car. By this firing, fear and terror prevailed over the entire market including the town and among residents and shopkeeprs on the highway and the public order was badly distubred., Shopkeepers of the main road closed their shops. People ran helter skelter and hid themselves at safer places. A First Information Report of this incident was lodged at Police Station Chaubepur which was registered as Case Crime No. 185 of 1999, under Sections 302/307, I.P.C.
(2) It is further stated that since 1995, petitioner is indulging in criminal activities. On 5-7-1995, he along with several persons had beaten Indra Raman Yadav and had also stolen his articles, With regard to this incident, a First Information Report was lodged which was registered as Case Crime No. 85 of 1995 under Sections 147, 341, 323, 504, 506 and 379, I.P.C. but the case was ultimately closed for want of evidence as no body came forward on account of the pressure of petitioner.
(3) That on 17-7-1997, petitioner threatened and terrorised Kamlesh Nath Singh of village Makharia, Police Station Tarwa, district Azamgarh at ANDHURA PUL in respect of which case was registered at Police Station Chetganj, District Varanasi as Case Crime No. 144 of 1997 under Sections 504, 506, I.P.C. and 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act. After investigation, charge sheet was filed and case is still pending consideration in the Court.
(4) That on 2-12-1997, with intention to kill Sri Pancham Shukla, resident of village Dejepur, Police Station Jansa fires at him and abused and gave him threat of life. Case was registered at Police Station Jansa as Case Crime No. 293 of 1997 under Sections 307, 504, 506, I.P.C. and 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act. As no body came forward to give evidence on account of fear and pressure of petitioner, a final report was submitted.
(5) That on 17-2-1998, petitioner beat Kamla Shankar Yadav, abused and terriorise him in respect of which a case was registered as Case Crime No. 50A of 1998,under Sections 147, 323, 504 and 506, I.P.C. and 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act. After investigation, charge sheet has been filed in Court and case is pending.
(6) That on 6-8-1999, petitioner and his companions forcibly abducted Prem Chandra Gupa in respect of which case was registered at Police Station Surlyawa, district Sant Ravidas Nagar as Case Crime No. 163 of 1998, under Section 364, I.P.C. However, on account of the fear and pressure of petitioner and his companions no body dare are to give evidence and ultimately a final report was submitted.
(7) That on 19-1-1999, petitioner along with his companions committed crime in district Ghazipur in respect of which case was registered at Police Station Nandganj as Case Crime No. 82 of 1999, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, I.P.C. and Case Crime No. 83 of 1999 under Sections 25/27, Arms Act. After investigation charge sheet has been submitted in Court and case is pending.
(8) That on 19th Jan. 1999, as Arun Kumar Singh refused to pay GoondaTax petitioner and your companions threatened him to be killed by pistol and terrorised him. In respect of this incident, a First Information Report was lodged at Police Station Kotwali, district Ghazipur registered as Case Crime No. 24 of 1999, under Sections 147, 149, 506, I.P.C. and 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act. After investigation, charge sheet has been filed and case is pending in Court.
2. It has been further stated that the petitioner is a habitual and notorious criminal. He has close friendship with criminals. Petitioner and his father Udai Nath Singh aliws Chulbul are history sheeters, his uncle and father are members of inter State mafia gangs. On account of the criminal activities of petitioner, a terror is prevailing in district Varanasi and adjoining district Ghazipur and Sant Ravi Das Nagar and at several other places. He is frequently indulging in heinious offences like murder, attempt to murder rioting etc.
3. That on account of incident dated 20th Oct. 1999 committed by petitioner and his companions in which one person died and another was seriously injured, terror prevailed in the locality and in surrounding areas, public order has been badly disturbed. The effect of the heinous murder is till lomming large in the minds of the persons of the locality and they are under fear and terror. In connection with this incident, petitioner was arrested on 21st Oct. 1990 and presently he is lodged in District Jail, Varanasi and he is trying seriously for his release on bail. There is strong possibility of petitioner being released on bail and if he comes out from jail, there is serious apprehension that he shall again indulge himself in similar activities, which shall be highly prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order in the area. On basis of the aforesaid grounds respondent No. 1 recorded his satisfaction that in order to prevent petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary to make an order directing detention of the petitioner.
4. Petitioner was also informed that against the order of detention, he has right to make representation to the State Government, Advisory Board and also to the Central Government. If he desires to make representations, they may be submitted through Superintendent of District Jail. He was also informed that he has a right to be personally heard by Advisory Board, for which also he may communicate through all authorities within three weeks within which period case shall be referred to the Advisory Board.
5. In this writ petition, counter affidavit and supplementary counter affidavit have been filed by the (hen District Magistrate, Varanasi as respondent No. 1 Sri R.S. Agarwal, Joint Secretary on behalf of respondent No. 2, Sri A.K. Mishra, Superintendent, District Jail as respondent No. 5 and by Smt. Bina Prasad, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, for respondent No. 3. Petitioner has filed rejoinder affidavit.
6. We have heard Sri Jagdish Singh Sengar, learned counsel appearing for petitioner, Sri A.K. Tripathi, learned A.G.A. appearing for respondents No. 1,2 and 5 and also learned Additional Standing Counsel appearing for Union of India.
7. Learned counsel for petitioner has questioned the legality of the impugned order of detention dated 11-11-1999 on following two grounds. :-
8. Firstly, it has been submitted that the alleged incident dated 20th Oct. 1999, even if accepted to be true, at the most could effect the law and order and had no potentiality to disturb the public order. Learned counsel has submitted that the incident took place outside the market area. There is material on reocd which indicate, that there was long standing enmity between the family of petitioner on the one hand and family of Chandra Bhushan Singh on the other and several murders took place even before the incident in question. Such occurrence in which murder has been caused on account of previous enmity between two factions, there could not be any possibility of disturbance of public order. Learned counsel has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment, in case of Jeevan Singh v. State of U.P. 1999 CrLJ 1889.
9. The second submission of the learned counsel for petitioner is that the petitioner has been tried and acquitted in Sessions Trial No. 832 of 1999 in respect of the incident dated 20th Oct. 1999 by learned Sessions Judge, Varanasi and thus the ground on which basis the impugned order of detention was passed, has become non existent. In this connection, it has been further submitted that so far as the other incidents mentioned in the grounds are concerned, they are very old and stale incidents and could not have rational nexus with the, impugned order of detention. It is submitted that the solitary ground, on which basis the impugned order of detention could be passed, has become non existent. The impugned order of detention stands vitiated and is liable to be quashed. The continued detention of petitioner has been rendered illegal. In support of his submission, learned counsel has placed before us thew mudgment andorer dated 17-1-2000 passed in S.T. No. 832 of 1999 State v. Sushil Singh and others which has been filed las Annexure 1 to the rejoinder affidavit. He has also placed reliance on Division Bench judgment of this Court in case of Punnet v. State of U.P. 1999 (38) All Cri C 338 : (1999 All LJ 444).
10. Learned A.G.A., on the other hand, has submitted that if the entire material on record is taken into consideration, there remains no doubt that the subjective satisfaction of the respondent No. 1, District Magistrate was justifed and detention of the petitioner under the Act was necessary. Learned counsel has submitted that after the incident dated 20th Oct. 1999, reports were received from various police personnel indicating that on account of the incident the public order has been badly affected and terror and commotion prevailed all around. The residents of that locality and surrounding areas were under fear and were not prepared to come out openly and narrate the incident due to fear of their life. The reports and other material on record placed before us by learned A.G.A. in support of his submissions shall be discussed in subsequent paragraphs. Learned counsel has further submitted that enmity alone can not be made basis to discard the grounds. The Court has to assess the impact of the incident on the society and then only it can be determined whether satisfaction of the detaining authority was reasonable and based on credible material. Learned counsel has placed reliance on following judgments :-
(1) Sri Shiv Ratan Makim v. Union of India AIR 1986 SC 610;
(2) Kamal Kishore Saini v. State of U.P. AIR 1998 SC 208 (sic);
(3) State of Punjab v. Sukhpal Singh AIR 1990 SC 231 and
(4) Om Prakash Singh v.'State of U.P. All India JIC 872.
11. In respect of the impact of the judgment of acquittal of petitioner in Sessions Trial No. 832 of 1999, learned A.G.A. has submitted that the order of acquittal passed subsequently will not affect the detention of petitioner as it was not in existence on the date when the order dated 11-11-1999 was passed by the detaining authority, there was no question of consideration of this order at that time. Learned counsel has further submitted that the object and considerations for passing order of detention are altogether different. The action under the Act is not punitive. It is preventive. The order of detention under the provisions of the Act may be passed even in a case where no criminal case has been registered and is pending against detenu. Learned A.G.A. has placed reliance on following judgments :-
(1) Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal AIR 1974 SC 2154;
(2) Suru Malick v. State of West Bengal AIR 1974 SC 2305;
(3) Israil Sk. v. The District Magistrate West Dinajpur AIR 1975 SC 168;
(4) Kamarunnisa y. Union of India AIR 1991 SC 1640; and
(5) Manoj alias Ghantoori v. Union of India 1998 All JIC 577 : (1998 All LJ 1869).
12. We have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. The first submission of the learned counsel for petitioner is that there was no ground for passing impugned order of detention against petitioner as the incident of 20th Oct. 1999 could, at the most, be a problem of law and order and could not disturb the public order. For the other grounds, it has been submitted that they are old and stale incidents and could not be made basis for passing the order of preventive detention. Along with grounds of detention other materials were also served on petitioner, which have been filed as Annexures 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. Annexure 5 is copy of the First Information Report relating to incident dated 20th Oct. 1999. In this report, it has been mentioned that on account of the firing by the accused persons, people ran helter skelter, the commotion prevailed there are nobody could have courage to come out near the victim. Annexure 8 is the report of the Station House Officer, Police Station Chaubepur in which it has been stated that in the house situated in front of the place of occurrence and in the Munari market, there was atmosphere of fear and all the doors were closed. The residents of village Dharaurha used to come running from the village to the place of occurrence and were saying that it will be now better for them to leave the village. During this period, the additional police force was summoned and deployed. The Station House Officers of Police Stations Cholapur, Phulpur, Maruadih, Shivpur and Rohania reached at the spot. Seeing presence of large number of police force, some people mustered courage and came to the place of occurrence and they prayed for the security. During this period, the District Magistrate, Senior Superintendent of Police, Additional District Magistrate (Supplies), Superintendent of Police (Rural Area), Circle Officers of Cholapur and Sadar and Sub Divisional Magistrate (N) also reached. P.A.C. was directed to move on patrolling. Annexure 11 consists of eight reports regarding the circumstances prevailing at various places after the incident dated 20-10-1999.This information was collected by the different patrolling parties from different places which indicated that even tempo of life of the people in that area was badly disturbed, life was not normal. They used to close their doors even before sunset and the movement after sunset was totally stopped. Reports also show that the people were afraid of petitioner and his gang so much so that they were not prepared to speak anything. In present proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court does not sit in appeal against the order of detention. The Court has limited role to see whether the credible material was before the detaining authority on which basis he could reasonably form a subjective satisfaction for passsing the order of preventive detention. After going through materials filed along with writ petition, we are of the opinion that before the detaining authority, there was credible material on which basis the order of preventive detention could be passed. Learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of Jeevan Singh (supra). However, the facts of the case relied on are distinguishable from the facts of the case in hand. From narration of facts given in the judgment of Jeevan Singh, this difference is apparent. The judgment in Jeevan Singh's case does not help petitioner in any manner. In the present case authorities had to deploy large contingents of police for patrolling in order ot restore public order. The seriousness of the incident and its impact is well reflected from the fact that even tempo of life of society was badly disturbed and fear and commotion prevailed all around. It is difficult to say that there was no credible material before the respondent No. 1 for passing the impugned order of detention.
13. In this connection, learned counsel has also submitted that the other cases mentioned in the grounds were old and stale and could not be used for passing the impugned order of detention. From perusal of the grounds, it appears that the petitioner started indulging himself in various kinds of criminal activities. Cases mentioned are of 1995, 1997, 1998 and 1999. These cases indicated background of the petitioner to the detaining authority for satisfying him that a preventive action is necessary so that he may not indulge in similar activities in future. Earlier cases reported against the petitioner may not independently be used for passing the order of preventive detention but certainly they could be used for ascertaining the repetitive tendency of detenu and necessity for passing the order of preventive detention. Further the cases shown in grounds Nos. 6, 7 and 8 were of 1999. The last case in ground No. 6 was of 6th August, 1999 in which it has been alleged that the petitioner abducted one Prem Chandra Gupta and the case was registered against him under Section 364, I.P.C. Thus it cannot be said that nexus of this incident snapped with the object sought to be achieved by passing the order on 11-11-1999, that is, after about three months. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Haradhan Saha (AIR 1974 SC 2154) (supra) in paragraph No. 19 of the judgment held as under :-
The essential concept of preventive de tention is that the detention of a person is not to punish him for somthing he has done but to prevent him from doing it. The basis of detention is the satisfaction of the executive of a reasonable probability of the likelihood of the detenu acting in a manner similar to the past acts and preventing him by detention from doing the same. A criminal conviction on the other hand is for an act already done which can only be possible by a trial and legal evidence. There is no parallel between prosecution in a Court of law and a detention order under the Act. One is a punitive action and the other is a preventive act. In one case a person is punished whereas in preventive detention a man is prevented from doing something which it is necessary for reasons mentioned in Section 3 of the Act to prevent.
14. In our opinion, looking to the material on record, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. There was sufficient and credible material before the detaining authority for passing the impugned order.
15. The second submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is based on the order dated 17-1 -2000 under which the petitioner has been acquitted in case crime No. 185 of 1999 relating to the incident dated 20th October, 1999. The judgment is merely one and half pages. The trial with regard to the incident dated 20th October, 1999 has been concluded on 17th January, 2000 i.e. within three months while in this State the average time taken in concluding the trial is more than five years. The appeals are being heard in High Court after twenty years. The judgment shows that even the injured witness who lodged First Information Report turned hostile and refused to support the prosecution case. Order of acquittal has been passed in absence of evidence. The important question for consideration is, whether the impugned order of detention shall vitiate on account of such order of acquittal. Learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in case of Puneet (1999 All LJ 444) (supra). The case of Puneet is, however, distinguishable for the reason that there was only one ground on which basis order of detention was passed i.e. the incident of 1 lth January, 1998 in which he was acquitted. However, in the present case, there are other grounds also for passing the order of detention. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Shri Shiv Ratan Makim (AIR 1986 SC 610) (supra) held in paragraph No. 6 as under:-
This argument completely overlooks the fact that the object of making an order of detention is preventive while the object of a criminal prosecution is punitive. Even if a criminal prosecution fails and an order of detention is then made, it would not invalidate the order of detention, because, as pointed out by this Court in Mohd. Subrati v. State of West Bengal (1973) 3 SCC 250 : AIR 1973 Supreme Court 207 'the purpose of preventive detention being different from conviction and punishment and subjective satisfaction being necessary in the former while proof beyond reasonable doubt being necessary in the latter', the order of detention would not be bad merely because the criminal prosecution has failed. It was pointed out by this Court in that case that 'the Act creates in the authority concerned a new jurisdiction to make orders for preventive detention on their subjective satisfaction on grounds of suspicion of commission in future of acts prejudicial to the community in general. This jurisdiction is different from that of judicial trial in Courts for offences and of judicial orders for prevention of offences. Even unsuccessful judicial trial or proceeding would therefore not operate as a bar to a detention order or render it mala fide.
16. In case of Suru Mallick (AIR 1974 SC 2305) (supra) Apex Court took the same view that even in case prosecution fails, it shall not effect the order of detention. A Division Bench of this Court in case of Manoj alias Ghantoori (supra) after referring judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under :-
Judging the present case in the backdrop of the two cases relied upon by he learned counsel for the State, we are of the opinion that criminal activities of the petitioner which were of heinous nature, though in some of which the petitioner was ultimately acquitted and the fact of acquittal were not brought to the notice of the detaining authority and the detaining authority was only apprised that the said cases were pending, we are of the opinion that no prejudice was caused to the detenu for the simple reason that the very involvement of the petitioner in the number of cases complained against the petitioner afforded sufficient grounds for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to exercise his powers under Section 3/1 of the National Security Act.
17. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench in the above-mentioned case.
18. For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in this petition. The order of detention is justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. Writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.