Vinod Prasad, J.
1. The revisionists Vishnu aged about 60 years and his two nephews Pancham Ram and Ram Kesh were assaulted by jawahar Lal, Som Raj, Ori Lal, Girdhari, Bhagwan Das Raju and Magala Prasad with bricks on 27.1.2007 and the malefactors also damaged the drain which was got constructed by the applicant When the revisionist entered into his house to save his life, assailants also entered into his house and bet him with lathi and dandas. Satya Narain, Ram Jay and co villagers witnessed this assault who saved the life of the revisionist. Accused persons left the spot hurling filthy, abuses and threatening. Revisionist got him self medically examined in the district hospital Basti where as his nephews got themselves medically examined in PHC Rudhauli. Police did not register FIR of victim inspite of application to the higher police officials and the police on the contrary arrested the nephews of the revisionist. Since the FIR of the revisionists was not registered he wielded the power of judicial Magistrate 1st, Basti under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. who finding prima facie cognizable offence being disclosed ordered for registration of FIR and investigation of the offence vide his order dated 27.2.2007
2. The said cider for registration of FIR and investigation dated 27.2.2007 was challenged by the accused persons before the Session's Judge, Basti in criminal Revision No. 722 of 2007 who vide his impugned order dated 14.5.2007 set aside the said order of registration of FIR and investigation hence this revision by the victim to set aside the order dated 14.5.2007 passed by Session's judge Basti in the aforesaid revision
3. I have heard Sri R.K. Srivastava, Learned Counsel fur the revisionists and the learned AGA in opposition.
4. Learned Counsel for the revisionist contended the impugned order passed by Session's Judge Basti is wholly illegal, totally unjustified and arbitrary. He contended that the application of the revisionist under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. did disclosed commission of cognizable offence and therefore Judicial Magistrate 1st Basti was justified in directing the police to register the FIR and investigate the offence. He contended that since it was a case of injury the FIR of the injured must be registered and his version must be investigated. He contended that the Session's Judge Basti did not examine at all that those victims who suffered injuries are entitle to get their FIR registered, if cognizable offence is disclosed, and to get the offence investigated. He contended that the order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was a pre cognizance order as has been held by the Apex Court and hence Session's had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision filed by the accused. He further contended that the accused had no right to be heard before he is summoned and no prosecution can be thwarted before the FIR is registered. He further contended the accused had no right to take part in the proceeding at a pre cognizance stage and hence he can not challenge any such order. He contended that no revision was maintainable at the behest of accused of cognizable offences to stall the registration of FIR of cognizable offences. He relied upon a decision of this Court rendered in Rakesh Puri and Anr. v. State of U.P And Anr. 2007 ALJ (1) 169. He contended that the decision of this Court rendered in Sabir v. Jaswant 2002 ALJ 2264; Ajai Malviya v. State of U.P. 2001 Cr. L.J. 313 are per-incurium being contrary to the statutory provision of Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. which prohibits maintainability of revision against an interlocutory order. He further contended that the order for registration of FIR is an administrative power provided under CHAPTER Xli relating to the power of police to conduct an investigation into a cognizable offence. He further contended that in view of latest pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Kumari v. State (NCT Delhi) : 2006CriLJ1622 lower revisional court had no power to go into the merits of the allegations once cognizable offence were disclosed. He further contended Session's Judge ignored the law of the Supreme Court rendered in Superintendent Of Police C.B.I. and Ors. v. Tapan Kumar Singh 2003 SCC (Cr.) 1305 which provides that if cognizable offence is disclosed then there can not be any roving inquiry to find to whether the allegations are true or false. He further contended that the decision in Pepsi Food Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate 1998 (36) ACC 20 was wholly irrelevant on the facts of the present case as that was a complaint case under Chapter XV and not under Chapter XII. He further contended that the Judgment of the Apex Court in M. Narayandas v. State of Karnataka 2003 (4) Crimes 159 was wholly mis quoted and in fact that judgment is against the view taken by the session's Judge in the impugned order and more over in that case FIR was registered and in this case the Session's Judge has quashed the order for registration of FIR and therefore that case was wrongly referred to by the Session's Judge. He further contended that in Prakash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab : AIR2007SC1274 it has not been held by the Apex Court that even if the cognizable offence is disclosed Magistrate should not order for registration of FIR or he can refuse the prayer for registration of FIR because it is his discretionary power. On the contrary he contended that once cognizable offence is disclosed Magistrate must direct registration of FIR as crime detection and crime prevention is the duty of police and not of Magistrate and he can not refuse to direct the police to follow the mandate of law laid down by Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal 1992 (Suppl) SCC 335; Ramesh Kumari v. State (NCT Delhi) : 2006CriLJ1622 and Tapan Kumar Singh (Supra). He further contended that in view of law laid down by apex Court in Union Of India v. W.N. Chadha 1993 SCC (Cr.) 1171; Nagawwa v. V.S. Konjalgi 1996 (13) ACC 225; Chandra Deo Singh versus Prakash Chandra Bose : [1964]1SCR639 and of this Court in Rakesh Puri and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Anr. 2007 ALJ (1) 169; and Karan Singh v. State 1997 (34) ACC 163 accused had no right to maintain revision before the Session's Judge Basti who illegally usurped the power of revisonal court to thwart the registration of FIR of an incident of cognizable offence in which victim has even received injuries. He contended that it is a flagrant misuse of revisional power. He also submitted that the lower revisional court has pre judged the facts without giving opportunity to the victim to substantiate the allegations levelled which is wholly illegal and purely conjectural and the impugned order is based of hypothetical reasoning and nonce is totally perverse. He contended that how an injury can be perverse is not understandable. He therefore concluded by haranguing that the order of lower revisional court be quashed and that of the Magistrate be restored.
5. Learned AGA contrarily contended that in the opinion of the lower revisional court allegations were absurd and therefore it interfeted.
6. I have considered the submissions of both the sides in this case the application of the revisionist disclosed commission of cognizable offence. He prayed for registration of his FIR which was allowed by the Magistrate. The said order was passed under Chapter XII Cr.P.C. at a pro cognizance stage. Magistrate had not applied his mind to take cognizance of the offence. His order for registration of FIR was therefore an administrative order at a pre cognizance stage. How such an order can be challenged by an accused. Can an aroused stop registration of FIR of cognizable offence? The answer is No. No accused can stop registration of FIR against him It has been held by the apex court in the case of Suresh Chand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh : 2001CriLJ954 as follows:
But the significant point to be noticed is when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter XII he does so before he takes cognizance.
(Emphasis laid)
7. Recently the Apex Court has re-iterated the said law in the case of Mohd. Yusuf v. Smt. Afaq Jahan And Anr. : 2006CriLJ788 wherein it has been laid down by the Apex Court as follows:
8 The various stops to be ADOPTED FOR investigation under Section 156 of the Code have been elaborated in Chapter XII of the Code. Such investigation would start with making the entry in a book to be kept by the officer in charge of a police station, of the substance of the information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. The investigation started thereafter can end up only with the report filed by the police as indicated in Section 173 of the Code. The investigation contemplated in that chapter can be commenced by the police even without the order of a Magistrate. But that does not mean that when a Magistrate orders an investigation under Section 156(3) it would be a different kind of investigation. Such investigation must also end up only with the report contemplated in Section 173 of the Code. But the significant point to be noticed is, when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter XII he does so before he takes cognizance of the offence.
8. Further it has been held in Superintendent and Remembrance of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerjee : AIR1950Cal437 as follows:
When the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for the taking action of some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence.
9. At this stage accused does not come into picture at all nor can he be heard. He has no locus to participate in the proceedings He can at the most stand and watch the proceedings. It must be remembered that it is pre cognizance stage. In this respect the Apex Court has held in the case of Union Of India v. W.N. Chadha 1993 SCC (Cr) 1171 (Supra) as follows:
The rule of audi alteram partem is not attracted unless the impugned order is shown to have deprived a person of his liberty or his property. The rule of audi alteram partem is a rule of justice and its application is excluded where the rule will itself lead to injustice. There is exclusion of the application of audi alteram partem rule to cases where nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording an opportunity to present and meet a case. This rule cannot be applied to defeat the ends of justice or to make the law 'lifeless, absurd, stultifying and self-defeating or plainly contrary to the common sense of the situation' and this rule may be jettisoned in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. There are certain exceptional circumstances and situations where under the application of the rule of audi alteram partem is not attracted.
10. It has further been held by the apex court in the same judgment (W.N. Chadha) as follows:
89. Applying the above principle, it may be held that when the investigating officer is not deciding any matter except collecting the materials for ascertaining whether a prima facie case is made out or not and a full enquiry in case of filing a report under Section 173(2) follows in a trial before the Court or Tribunal pursuant to the filing of the report, it cannot be said that at that stage, rule of audi alteram partem superimposes an obligation to issue a prior notice and hear the accused which the statute does not expressly recognise. The question is not whether audi alteram partem is implicit, but where the occasion for its attraction exists at all.
90. Under the scheme of Chap. XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there are various provisions under which no prior notice or opportunity of being heard is conferred as a matter of course to an accused person while the proceeding is in the stage of an investigation by a police officer
91. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCO 335 at 359 : 1992CriLJ527 , this Court to which both of us (Ratnavel Pandian and K. Jayachandra Reddy, JJ.) were parties after making reference to the decision of the Privy Council in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad and the decision of this Court in State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha : 1968CriLJ97 has pointed out that the field of investigation of any cognizable offence is exclusively within the domain of the investigating agencies over which the Courts cannot have control and have no power to stifle of impinge upon the proceedings in the investigation so long as the investigation proceeds in compliance with the provisions relating to investigation....
92. More so, the accused has no right to have any asy as regards the manner and method of investigation Save under certain exceptions under the entire scheme of the Code, the accused has no participation as a matter of right during the course of the investigation of a case instituted on a police report till the investigation culminates in filing of a final report under Section 173(2) of the Code or in a proceeding instituted otherwise than on a police report till the process is issued under Section 204 of the Code, as the case may be. Even in cases where cognizance of an offence is taken on a complaint not withstanding the said offence is triable by a Magistrate or triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the accused has no night to have participation till the process is issued. In case the issue of process is postponed as contemplated under Section 202 of the, Code, the accused may attend the subsequent inquiry but cannot participate. There are various judicial pronouncements to this effect but we feel that it is not necessary to recapitulate those decisions.
(Emphasis Supplied)
11. Earlier it has been held by the apex court in the decision of Chandra Deo Singn v. Prakash Chandra Bose : [1964]1SCR639 (Supra) as follows:
7. Taking' the first ground, it seems to us clear from the entire scheme of Ch. XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure that an accused person does not come into the picture at all till process is issued. This does not mean that he is precluded from being present when an enquiry is held by a Magistrate. He may remain present either in person or through a counsel or agent with a view to be informed of what is going on. But since the very question for consideration being whether he should be called upon to face an accusation nor he has no right to take part in the proceedings no has the Magistrate any jurisdiction to permit him to do so it would follow from this, therefore, that it would not be open to Magistrate to put any question to witnesses at the instance of the person named as accused but against whom process has not been issued; nor can he examine any witnesses at the instance of such a person. ...Whatever defence the accessed may have can only be enquired into at the trial: An enquiry under Section 202 can in no sense be characterised as a trial for the simple reason, that in law there can be but one trial for an offence. Permitting an accused person to intervene during the enquiry would frustrate its very object and that is why the legislature has made no specific provision permitting an accused person to take part in an enquiry.... In this connection, the observations of this Court in Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya Dulaji (1961) 1 SCR at p.9 : AIR 1961 SC 1113 at p 1116 may usefully be quoted:
The enquiry is for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint; that is, for acertaining whether there is evidence in support of the complaint so as to justify the issue of process and commencement of proceedings against the person concerned. The section does not say that a regular trial for adjuding the guilt or otherwise of the person complained against should take place at that stage, for the person complained against can be legally called upon to answer the accusation made against him only when a process has issued and he is put on trial.
(Emphasis Supplied)
12. It has been held by this Court in the case of Karan Singh v. State 1997 (34) ACC 163 as follows:
Where an order is made under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. directing the police to register FIR and investigate the same the Code no where provides that the magistrate shall hear the accused before issuing such a direction nor any person can be supposed to he having a right asking the court of law for issuing a direction that a FIR should not be registered against him.
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Further it is to be noted that an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is a pre cognizance order. Magistrate has not applied his mind against any body. He has simply directed the police to register the FIR and investigate the offence. Since no FIR has yet been registered there does not arise any question of quashing of the same. Hence the observations by the Session's Judge, Basti in respect of observations by the Apex Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (Supra) is wholly misplaced. Session's Judge was dealing with a pre FIR stage and not a post FIR stage and this makes a uncoalscenced difference. The nature of the order passed by the Magistrate in the present case was only a 'Peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary power of investigation under Section 156(1) Cr.P.C.' as has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Devarappalli Lakshaminarayana Reddy and Ors. v. V. Narayana Reddv and Ors. 1976 ACC 230.
14. How such a reminder is subject to revisional power of the court is some thing which goes beyond comprehension. From the nature of the order itself it is clear mat it is an interlocutory order not amenable to revisional power of the court. Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. specifically bars revisions filed against interlocutory orders.
15. In this respect I may make it clear that the two judgments of this Court referred to by the Session's Judge in his impugned order completely ignored Section 397 Cr.P.C. ins full and observed that revision is maintainable against an order under Section 156(3). Neither in the two decisions of Ajai Malviya and Sabir (Both Supra) Section 397 Cr.P.C was taken note of specially Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. which puts a complete bar for exercise of revisional power against interlocutory orders. This aspect of the matter has been dealt exhaustively in the case of Rakesh Puri and Anr. v. State of U.P. And Anr. 2007 (1) ALJ 169 After going through various decisions by the Apex Court and looking into the decision of Ajai Malviya it was held in that decision that Ajai Malviya's case is per-incurium as it ignored statutory provision of 397 (2) Cr.P.C. which prohibits revision against interlocutory orders, and which deals with revisional power of this Court as well as lower revisional court. It was further noted in the said decision Rakesh Puri (Supra) as to what is the scope of power of Magistrates under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and relying upon the decision of Apex Court in the case of Central Bureau Of Investigation Through It's S.P. Jaipur v. State of Rajasthan 2001 SCC (Cr) 524 it was held in the said decision as follows:
It is preposterous even to cogitate that o. person has a right to appear before the Magistrate to oppose an application seeking a direction from him for...registration and investigation of the offence when he has no right to participate in the said ex-parte proceeding. If permitted this will amount to killing of foetus of investigation in the womb when it was not there at all. Such a power has not been confened under the law on the prospective accused.
16. when the accused does not have any right to participate in a proceeding how can he be permitted to challenge an interlocutory order passed in such a proceeding. If an accused can not stop registration of a complaint under Section 190(1)(a) Cr.P.C. howsoever fanciful malafide or absurd the allegations may be he certainly does not possess the power to stall registration of FIR of cognizable offence against him.
17. Let me now advert to the reasoning of the Session's Judge that the incident is malafide and impossible. In the impugned order he has observed thus:
The contents of the application shows that some injuries were caused by throwing brick pieces and some were caused by beating but the number of injuries are so small that the incident as shown in the application is not justified and it could not have been taken place as alleged by the applicant.
18. To say the least the reasoning of the Session's Judge is wholly absurd, totally unwarranted and without jurisdiction. Firstly he illegally usurped the revisional power and secondly he judgmented the case without evidence being led and affording opportunity to the victim to prove his case. He has quashed the order of registration of FIR which means that nothing was done in the offence against the accused. The victim who had sustained injuries has been rebuffed by him. This act of Session's Judge is wholly illegal. He seems to be averse to orders under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Where was the need for him to go into the exercise referred to above against the law laid down by the Apex Court. From where Session's Judge got the power to examine the merits and demerits of the allegations when the Apex Court denounces such practices. He himself admitted that it was case of injury. Should the FIR of the victim who had sustained injuries at the hands of the accused inside his house be not registered? Should the injured be directed to go back home and keep silent and his FIR be not registered? The type of order as the impugned one is the worst kind of injustice to be meted to the injured victim by the lower revisonnl court. Let me remind that the apex court has laid down the law that truthfulness, malafide or absurdity are all matters to be investigated and they are not relevant for directing the FIR to be registered. It has been held in Bhajan Lal's case (Supra) as follows:
30. At the stage of registration of a crime, or a case on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable offence in compliance with the mandate of a Section 154(1) of the Code the concerned police officer cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the in formation laid by the informant is reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a case on the ground that the informal/on is not reliable or credible. On the other hand, the officer in charge of a police station is statutorily obliged to register a case and then to proceed with the investigation if he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate, subject to the proviso to Section 157.
(Emphasis Supplied)
19. The sane law been re-iterated in the case of Tapan Kumar Singh (Supra) as follows:
20. It is well settled that a First information Report is not an encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. An informant may lodge a report about the commission of an offence though he may not know the name of the victim or his assailant. He may not even know how the occurrence took place. A first informant need not necessarily be an eye-witness so as to be able to disclose in great details all aspects of the offence committed. What is of significance is that the information given must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the information so lodged must provide a basis for the police officer to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. At this stage it is enough if the police officer on the basis of the information given suspects the commission of a cognizable offence, and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a cognizable offence has been committed if he has reasons to suspect on the basis of information received, that a cognizable offence may have been committed, he is bound to record the information and conduct an investigation. At this stage it is also not necessary for him to satisfy himself about the truthfulness of the information. It is only after a complete investigation that he may be able to report on the truthfulness or otherwise of the information. Similarly, even if the information does not furnish all the details, he must find out those details in the course of investigation and collect all the necessary evidence. The information given disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence only sets in motion the investigative machinery, with a view to collect all necessary evidence, and thereafter to take action in accordance with law. The true test is whether the information furnished provides a reason to suspect the commission of an offence, which the concerned police officer is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate. If it does, he has no option but to record the information and proceed to investigate the case either himself or depute any other competent officer to conduct the investigation. The question as to whether the report is true when there it discloses full details regarding the manner of occurrence, whether the accused is named, and whether...there is sufficient evidence to support the allegations are all matters which are alien to the consideration of the question whether the report discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. Even if the information does not give full details regarding these matters, the investigating officer is not absolved of his duty to investigate the case and discover the true facts, if he can'
(Emphasis Supplied)
20. Recently the said matter again came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Kumari v. State (NCT Delhi) : 2006CriLJ1622 wherein the Apex Court has approved its view rendered id the case of Bahajn Lal (Supra) and has held thus:
That the Police Officer mandatorily registers a case on a complaint of a cognizable offence by the citizen under Section 154 of the Code are no more res integra. The point of law has been set at rest by this Court in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335..
5. The views expressed by this Court in paragraphs 31, 32 and 33 as quoted above leave no manners of doubt that the provision of Section 154 of the Code is mandatory and the concerned officer is duty bound to register the case on the basis of such an information disclosing cognizable offence.
21. In Suresh Chand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh : 2001CriLJ954 it has been observed by the Apex Court as follows:
10. The position is thus clear. Any judicial Magistrate, before, taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer-in-charge of the police station as indicated in Section 154 of the Code. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer-in-charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complaint because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter.
22. Thus with such law laid down by the Apex Court the impugned order passed by the Session's Judge can not be sustained.
23. Another aspect of the matter, dealing with procedure needs determination and that is that the accused be heard in this revision. Principle of natural justice no doubt requires that no body should be condemned without hearing. Here in this case hearing of the accused will mean perpetuating illegality committed by lower revisional court of hearing an accused even before FIR is registered against him when the Apex Court has held that accused can not be heard at all before he is summoned. Law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of W.N. Chadha (Supra) is the law which is binding on all courts in India under Article 142 of The Constitution. Giving Opportunity to the accused in this revision will amount to affording opportunity to the accused to object the order of registration of FIR against him which can not be permitted. It is for this Court to observe law and not to disobey it. Giving opportunity of hearing to the accused in this case was also not required because the order of registration of FIR was quashed and therefore they are not the aggrieved person as of now. It may be that the revision was filed by them in the lower revisional court but that wee an illegal exercise under taken by the lower revisional court which can not be allowed to be repeated. Once the accused can not be heard on the question of registration of FIR of cognizable offence against him he can not be heard on that question in any forum. An illegality can, not be rectified by committing same illegality again
24. With the aforesaid discussions, this revision is allowed. Impugned order of Session's Judge Basti passed in Criminal Revision No. 222 of 2007 Jawahar Lal and Ors. v. State of U.P. And Anr. dated 14.5.2007 is hereby set aside and the order dated 27.2.2007 passed by Judicial magistrate I Basti in Misc. Case No. 46/12/07 Vanshu v. Jawahar and Ors. under Section 156(c) Cr.P.C. is hereby restored.
25. Let a copy of this order be sent to Sessions Judge. Basti for his guidence.