ORDER
U.S. Tripathi, J.
1. This application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the charge sheet and summoning order dated 9-6-1995 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hamirpur and the entire proceeding of Case No. 1150 of 1995 (Crime No. 168 of 1994), State of U.P. v. Udai Pal Singh under Section 498A I.P.C. and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act., P.S. Binwar, district Hamirpur.
2. It appears that Smt. Poonam Singh opposite party No. 2 lodged a report on 26-7-1994 at P.S. Binwar, district Hamirpur against the applicants under Section 498A, I.P.C. and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act with the allegation that she was married with Balwant Singh applicant No. 3 according to Hindu Rites in the year 1991. When she started residing with the applicants they started demanding dowry and treating her with cruelty. Ultimately she was rescued by the police from the confinement of the applicants on 27-6-1994. On the above report the police registered a case a crime No. 68 of 1994 and after investigation submitted charge sheet against the applicants under Section 498A, I.P.C. and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act.
3. On the basis of charge sheet learned Chief Judicial Magistrate summoned the applicants vide order dated 9-8-1995. The above summoning order, the charge sheet and the proceeding arising out of it has been sought to be quashed in this proceeding.
4. Heard Sri V.S. Singh, learned counsel for the applicants and Sri U.C. Mishra, learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2 and the learned A.G.A.
5. The first contention of learned counsel for the applicants was that the summoning order is not a speaking order and it is liable to be quashed. In this regard he also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Criminal Misc. Application No. 1518 of 1999. Hari Dayal v. State of U.P. decided by Hon'ble Bhagwan Din, J. on 24-5-1999 and Hazi Shall v. State of U.P., 1999 (1) JIC 163, Allahabad.
6. In the above case laws it was held by learned single Judge of this Court that Criminal Court is required to make speaking order while summoning the accused persons for trial. Speaking order does not. mean the critical order, touching all the aspects of the case and also the defence version, if set out at that very stage, but to examine the material made available by the Investigating Officer along with the chargesheet and satisfy himself, if the material evidence as such unchallenged is sufficient to prima facie make out the case against the accused persons.
7. It was further pointed out by learned counsel for the applicants that learned Magistrate while passing summoning order has simply mentioned that the case be registered and accused be summoned and he has not taken proper cognizance by a speaking order.
8. Section 204, Cr.P.C. which deals with issue of process says that if in the opinion of Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding, he may issue summons or warrant as the case may be.
9. However, for arriving on opinion for taking cognizance it is necessary that there should be sufficient ground for proceeding. The above section does not require that reason should be briefly recorded as it is required for rejecting a complaint under Section 203, Cr.P.C. If the Magistrate had ordered issuance of summons it means that he was of the opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding with. Moreover, the cognizance in this case was taken on police report and the material on the basis of which the accused were challaned was before the Magistrate. It was not shown before this Court that there were not sufficient material for the Magistrate to proceed with the case. Therefore, there appears no illegality in the summoning order.
10. Analogous to the provision of Section 204, there is provision of Section 204 Cr.P.C. which deals with the procedure and requirement of framing charge against the accused person and says that if, upon such consideration, examiantion, if any, and hearing, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this chapter (Chapter XIX), which such Magistrate is competent to try and which, in his opinion, could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. The above provision of Section 240, Cr.P.C. was considered by the Apex Court in recent decision in the case of Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of West Bengal, 2000 (1) JT Supreme Court 13 : AIR 2000 SC 522 and held that if the trial Court decides to frame a charge there is no legal requirement that he should pass an order specifying the reasons as to why he opts to do so. Framing of charge itself is prima facie order that the trial Judge has formed the opinion, upon considering the police report and other documents and after hearing both sides, that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence concerned. If he forms the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence which he is competent to try, he is only required to frame a charge in writing against the accused. If there is no legal requirement that the trial Court should write an order showing the reasons for framing a charge, why should the already burdened trial Courts be further burdened with such an extra work.... If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the smail paced progress of proceedings in trial Courts would further be slowed down.
11. Therefore, the Magistrate was not required to write a detailed reasoned order while summoning the accused, which is not required to Section 204, Cr.P.C., unlike requirements of Section 203, Cr.P.C. which requires that if the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is no sufficient ground for presuming, he shall dismiss the complaint and in every such case he shall briefly record his reasons for so doing.
12. Assuming that there was some irregularity, that irregularity is not sufficient to quash the proceeding itself. Furthermore, in this case cognizance was taken on 9-8-1995. As held by Apex Court in the case of Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh, 1996 JIC 709 : AIR 1996 SC 1592) (Supreme Court) in settled law that once cognizance is taken, two courses are open to the Magistrate, namely, either to discharge the accused if the evidence does not disclose the offence or to acquit after the full trial. Unless either of the two courses is taken and orders passed, the cognizance duly taken cannot be set at naught. Therefore, the quashing of the summoning order at this stage when the cognizance was already taken will not be justified.
13. The next ground contended by learned counsel for the applicants was that the applicant No. 3 had filed a divorce petition against opposite party No. 2 in the Court of District Judge, Hamirpur. The opposite party No. 2 filed written statement in the said petition and in her above written statement she categorically admitted that she had love affair with one Brij Gopal Singh with whom she had married and had also conceived. Her parents forcibly married her with the applicant No. 3 and she was not ready to perform marital obligation with the applicant No. 3 and her statement was also recorded under Order 10, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code in which she consented for divorce and also admitted her relationship with Brij Gopal. The FIR in this case was lodged under the pressure of the brother of opposite party No. 2 and in view of her above admission in divorce suit there was no force in the case.
14. In her counter affidavit Smt. Poonam Singh denied the allegation of applicants and deposed that she was forced to make signature on certain papers which were used for preparing false written statement and she was also forced to give statement in favour of applicant No. 3 while she was in confinement of applicants. The above question are questions of facts and are to be decided by the trial Court on the basis of evidence of the parties. The truthfulness of the allegations and the establishment of the guilt can only take place when the trial proceeds. There is no justification for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. for quashing the proceeding on the allegation of above factual aspects which have been controverted and its correctness is to be decided by the Trial Court. An enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegation made in the FIR are beyond the scope of Section 482, Cr.P.C. as per guidelines laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Ishwar Piraji Kalpattri, 1996 SCC (Crl) 150 : AIR 1996 SC 722.
15. Moreover, on the direction of this Court the statement of opposite party No. 2 was recorded by Chief Judicial Magistrate. Hamirpur. The Chief Judicial Magistrate has sent certified photostat copy of the statement. Perusal of the above statement shows that the opposite party No. 2 had vehemently denied the allegation made against her in the petition and she also stated that her written statement in divorce suit was forged and her signature was obtained by force and she was also forced to give statement before Court. It is also clear from the record that when opposite No. 2 went to her parent's house she moved an application before the Court in which divorce petition was pending resiling from the written statement and also sought permission to contest the suit.
16. Therefore, on the above allegation the charge sheet and proceeding arising out of it are not liable to be quashed. The application having no merit is liable to be rejected.
17. The application is rejected. Stay order dated 27-10-1995 passed by this Court is vacated. Trial Court is directed to expedite the disposal of the case.