G.P. Mathur, J.
1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed praying that the order dated 1.2.2001 of Collector, Allahabad and the award dated 5.2.2001 of Special Land Acquisition Officer be quashed. A further prayerhas been made that a writ of mandamus be Issued commanding the Special Land Acquisition Officer to pay compensation on the basis of award dated 11.10.2000.
2. Some land situate in villages Shaha alias Peepal Gawn. Jhalwa, Harwara, Deoghat, Pargana Chail, district Allahabad, was acquired for a public purpose, namely, for establishment of residential colony under a planned development scheme by the Allahabad Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the Authority). The notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was published in U. P. Gazette on 23.2.1991 and the notification under Section 6 of the Act was published in the Gazette on 31.12.1991. It was recited in both the notifications that the Government was satisfied that the case was one of urgency and accordingly, a direction was issued under Section 17(1) of the Act to the Collector, Allahabad, to take possession of the land mentioned in the schedule appended to the notifications though no award under Section 11 had been made. In view of the fact that Section 17 of the Act was made applicable, the land-holders were paid 80% of the estimated amount of compensation before taking possession as provided in Sub-section (3A) of Section 17 of the Act. It appears that the award was not made promptly and accordingly, a direction was issued on 1.5.2000 in Writ Petition No. 17406 of 1994 to make an award within three months. Thereafter, the Special Land Acquisition Officer made an award on 11.10.2000. The Allahabad Development Authority was thereafter asked to make payment of compensation to the land-holders. Thereafter, the Secretary of the Allahabad Development Authority moved an application before the Collector, Allahabad, on 10.1.2001 for setting aside and cancelling the award dated 11.10.2000 as the same had been made without issuing any notice and without giving any opportunity of hearing to the Development Authority. The Collector, Allahabad, by his order dated 1.2.2001 set aside the award, dated 11.10.2000 on the ground that before making the award the Special Land Acquisition Officer had not given any notice to Allahabad Development Authority and had not afforded any opportunity of hearing to it. Subsequent thereto, the Special Land Acquisition Officer made a fresh award after hearing the parties on 5.2.2001.
3. Sri P.C. Srivastava learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order dated 1.2.2001, was passed by the Collector, Allahabad, without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and, therefore, the same is illegal and is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel has further submitted that the second award made on 5.2.2001 is also liable to be set aside as two awards cannot be made for the same land and the tenure-holders are entitled to be paid compensation in accordance with the earlier award dated 11.10.2000. Learned counsel has also urged that notice had in fact been given to the Allahabad Development Authority before making the award dated 11.10.2000, by the Special Land Acquisition Officer and the Collector has erred in holding that the said award was made without giving any opportunity to it and, therefore, the order dated 1.2.2001 cannot be sustained in law.
4. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of Allahabad Development Authority (sworn by Sri P.K. Pandey on 13.3.2001), it is specifically averred in paras 10 and 11 that the award dated 11.10.2000 was made ex parte against the Allahabad Development Authority arid it was on this ground that an application was moved before the Collector, Allahabad, on 10.1.2001, for setting aside the ex parte award dated 11.10.2000 made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. No material has been placed on record to show that before making the award, any notice was ever issued to the Allahabad Development Authority or any opportunity of hearing was given to it. From the averments made in the affidavits filed by the parties, we are satisfied that the award dated 11.10.2000 was made without giving any opportunityof hearing to the Allahabad Development Authority.
5. Sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Act provides that in any proceeding held before the Collector or Court in such cases, the local authority or company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. Section 3(aa) of the Act defines 'local authority' and it includes a town planning authority (by whatever name called) set up under any law for the time being in force. The Allahabad Development Authority has been constituted in accordance with the provisions of U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act, and, therefore, it is a 'local authority' within the meaning of Section 3(aa) of the Act. The Allahabad Development Authority was consequently entitled to appear and adduce evidence before the Collector before making of the award. The Collector in the impugned order dated 1.2.2001, has held that as the opportunity of hearing was not given to the Allahabad Development Authority before making the award dated 11.10.2000, there was violation of Section 50(2) of the Act and consequently, the award was liable to be set aside. In our opinion, the view taken by the Collector is perfectly correct and cannot be faulted on any ground.
6. The ambit and scope of Sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Act was examined by a Constitution Bench in U. P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi and Anr., AIR 1995 SC 724, and it was held as under :
'1. Section 50(2) of the Land Acquisition Act confers on a local authority for whom land is being acquired a right to appear in the acquisition proceedings before the Collector and the reference court and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation.
2. The said right carries with it the right to be given adequate notice by the Collector as well as the reference court before whom acquisition proceedings are pending of the date on which the matter of determination of compensation will be taken up.
3. That proviso to Section 50(2) only precludes a local authority from seeking a reference but it does not deprive the local authority which feels aggrieved by the determining of the amount of compensation by the Collector or by the reference court to invoke the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution as well as the remedies available under the Land Acquisition Act.
4. In the event of denial of the right conferred by Section 50(2) on account of failure of the Collector to serve notice of the acquisition proceedings the local authority can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
5. Even when notice has been served on the local authority the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution would be available to the local authority on grounds on which judicial review is permissible under Article 226.
6. ........................'
7. In Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Neyvely and Ors., AIR 1995 SC 1004, three-Judge Bench held as follows :
'The beneficiary, i.e., local authority or company, a cooperative society registered under the relevant State law, or statutory authority is a person interested to determine just and proper compensation for the acquired land and is an aggrieved person. The beneficiary has the right to be heard by the Collector or the Court. If the compensation is enhanced it is entitled to canvass its correctness by filing an appeal or defend the award of the Collector. If it is not made a party, it is entitled to seek leave of the Court and file the appeal against the enhanced award and decree of the civil court under Section 26 orof the judgment and decree under Section 54 or is entitled to file writ petition under Article 226 and assail its legality or correctness. .....'
8. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, there can be no manner of doubt that the Allahabad Development Authority had a right to appear before the Collector and adduce evidence and in the event of denial of such a right conferred by Section 50(2) on account of failure of the Special Land Acquisition Officer to serve a notice, it could approach the Collector for setting aside the award which was made ex parte against it. The Collector was, therefore, perfectly right in entertaining the application moved by the Allahabad Development Authority on 10.1.2001 and in setting aside the award dated 11.10.2000, as the same had been made ex parte and without giving any opportunity of hearing to it. The challenge of the petitioner to the order dated 1.2.2001 of the Collector has, therefore, absolutely to merit and has to be rejected.
9. By way of an amendment application, the petitioner has also sought quashing of the award dated 5.2.2001 and a direction to the respondents to grant him compensation, as per judicial determination dated 31.5.2002 in L.A.R. No. 10 of 2001, Jagpat v. State of U. P.
10. It is well-settled that the award of the Collector made under Section 11 of the Act is nothing more than an offer of compensation made by the Government to the claimant whose property is acquired. (See Raja Harish Chandra v. Dy. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500, Dr. G.H. Grant v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 237, Pariyar and Paree Kanni Rubbers v. State of Kerala, AIR 1990 SC 2192.) Section 18 of the Act confers right upon a person interested, who has not accepted the award to move an application to the Collector for making a reference to the Court if he feels aggrieved by the amount of compensation awarded to him. Since the Act itself provides a complete machinery to a person interested for enhancement of compensation by asking the Collector to make a reference to the Court, the award made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on 5.2.2001 cannot be quashed at the instance of a person interested in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
11. Sri B.B. Paul, learned counsel for the Allahabad Development Authority has submitted that the writ petition at the instance of the present petitioner Rahman Siddiqui is not maintainable as neither he is owner of the land, which had been acquired nor he is a person interested within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Act. Sri Paul has submitted that after the award was made on 5.2.2001, notices under Section 12 of the Act were given to all those persons whose names were recorded over the acquired land. Learned counsel has submitted the recorded tenure-holders of the acquired land having not challenged the order of the Collector, dated 1.2.2001 and also the award dated 5.2.2001 of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, the writ petition is not maintainable. In Para 3 of the supplementary counter-affidavit, (sworn by Sri D.C. Mishra on 9.9.2002), it is averred that the petitioner Rahman Siddiqui claims that he has got a power-of-attorney from the recorded tenure-holders whose land had been acquired but the said power-of-attorney has not been filed so that the true picture may not be revealed. When confronted with this statement made in the supplementary affidavit, Sri P.C. Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner has asserted that the petitioner has got a power-of-attorney in his favour from the recorded tenure-holders. However, the said power-of-attorney was not produced before us. It certainly appears that the petitioner is not one of the recorded tenure-holders whose land may have been acquired. For the purpose of deciding the present writ petition, we do not want to examine the question whether the petitioner has a valid power-of-attorney in his favour, which may entitle him to contest the matter on behalf of those persons, who wereowners of the land and whose land had been acquired. This question shall be examined when the petitioner Rahman Siddiqui initiates any other legal proceeding either for receiving the balance amount of compensation or takes any other step in accordance with law for enhancement of the compensation.
12. Sri Srivastava has referred to Gram Seva Mandal v. Collector, Wardha and Ors., AIR 1975 SC 73, in support of his submission that writ petition at the instance of the present petitioner Rahman Siddiqui is maintainable. In our opinion, the authority cited is clearly distinguishable on facts. Learned counsel has also referred to a judgment of this Court in Agra Development Authority v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, 2000 (2) AWC 1065. This decision can be of no assistance to the petitioner, as on the material placed before the Court, it was held that the development authority had full knowledge of the pendency of proceedings for determination of compensation.
13. For reasons mentioned above, we find no merit in the writ petition, which is hereby dismissed with cost.