Satish Chandra, J.
1. Heard Sri Prabhakar Tewari, learned Counsel for the U.P. S. R. T. C. and Sri M. E. Khan, learned Counsel for the respondents.
2. This 'first appeal from order' has been filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act against the judgment and award dated 13.12.2004, passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Sultanpur in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 101 of 1995, wherein an award of Rs. 1,09,900 was awarded.
3. The brief facts of the case are that on 9.5.1995 deceased Sri Ram Sundar was travelling in Jeep No. U.P. 44-A/0787. When the jeep reached near to village Bedupara, the driver got down for toilet by parking the jeep. In the meantime, a U.P.S.R.T.C. Bus No. 42A/6692 of Faizabad Depot was coming and hit the jeep from the backside. Deceased Sri Ram Sunder and another person namely Safat Ahmad had died on the spot. Other passengers also suffered injuries. Separate claim petitions were filed on behalf of both the deceased persons. The present claim petition is pertaining to the claim for the death of deceased Sri Ram Sunder. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has awarded the total compensation of Rs. 1,57,000 by observing that both vehicles were involved in the accident, so the liability was divided at the ratio of 70:30 per cent. Thus, the appellant has liability to pay Rs. 1,09,900. Not being satisfied, the appellants have preferred this appeal.
4. With this background, learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the bus was not involved in the accident as no report was mentioned in the Faizabad Depot. Without prejudice, he further submitted that the accident was a contributory accident where both the bus and jeep were involved, so the compensation will have to be divided at the ratio of 50:50 per cent and certainly not at the ratio 70:30, as held by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Lastly, he submitted that the compensation is on higher side, so he made a request to modify/set aside the impugned order of the Tribunal.
5. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents has justified the order of the Tribunal.
6. We have heard the learned Counsels for both the parties and gone through the material available on record from which it appears that in the claim petition pertaining to deceased Sri Safat Ahmad, the bus was held liable for the accident, which was occurred on 9.5.1995 at 9.45 a.m. on Sultanpur-Varanasi road near village Bedupara. Present appeal is pertaining to the same incident. So, the preliminary objection taken by the appellants' counsel is not sustainable, especially when the criminal case was also launched against the driver of the bus late Sri Khan (Crime Case No. 121/1995).
7. From the record, it appears that the jeep was parked on the roadside, which was hit by U.P.S.R.T.C. Bus No. 42A/6692 on 9.5.1995. Two persons sitting in the jeep had died, so there was the greater involvement of the bus in the said accident and the compensation was rightly distributed at the ratio of 70:30 per cent. Regarding quantum, it appears that the deceased Sri Ram Sunder was aged about 42-45 years and he was a labourer, whose income was about Rs. 15,000 per annum. By deducting 1/3 for self expenditure, Rs. 10,000 per annum was taken for the purpose of compensation by the Tribunal. By looking the age, the Tribunal has applied the multiplier '15'. Thus, the compensation was computated to Rs. 1,50,000. In addition to that, Rs. 5,000 was awarded for consortium charges and Rs. 2,000 for funeral charges. Thus, total compensation amounting to Rs. 1.57,000 appears to be reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the case.
8. Needless to mention that India is one of the countries with the highest number of road accidents. Motor accidents are everyday affairs. A larger number of claims for compensation for injury caused by road accidents are pending in various Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. In a fatal accident, the dependents of the deceased are entitled to compensation for the loss suffered by them on account of the death. The most commonly practiced method of assessing the loss suffered is to calculate the loss for a year and then to capitalize the amount by a suitable multiplier. To that is added the loss suffered on account of loss of expectation of life and the like. The Tribunals and High Courts have adopted divergent methods to determine the suitable multiplier. Even this Court has not been uniform; may be because the principle on which this method came to be evolved has been forgotten. It has, therefore, become necessary to examine the law and to state the correct principles to be adopted.
9. It is true that perfect compensation is hardly possible and money cannot review a physique frame that has been battered and shattered, as stated by Lord Merris in West v. Shepard 1964 AC 326. Justice requires that it should be equal in value, although not alike in kind. Object of providing compensation is to place claimant as far as possible in the same position financially as he was before accident. Broadly speaking, in the case of death basis of compensation is loss of pecuniary benefits to the dependents of the deceased which includes pecuniary loss, expenses etc. and loss to the estate. Object is to mitigate hardship that has been caused to the legal representatives due to sudden demise of the deceased in the accident. Compensation awarded should not be inadequate and should neither be unreasonable, excessive, nor deficient. There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring value of human life and measure of damage cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation; but amount recoverable depends on broad facts and circumstances of each case. It should neither be punitive against whom claim is decreed nor it should be a source of profit of the person in whose favour it is awarded. Upjohm L.J. in Charter House Credit v. Jolly (1993) 2 CB 683. Remarked, 'the assessment of damages has never been an exact science; it is essentially practical'.
10. The damages for vehicular accidents are in the nature of compensation in money for loss of any kind caused to any person. In case of personal injury the position is different from loss of property. In the later case there is possibility of repair or restoration. But, in the case of personal injury, the possibility of repair or restoration is practically non-existent. In Parry v. Cleaver (1969) 1 All ER 555, Lord Morris stated as follows:
To compensate in money for paid and for physical consequences is invariably difficult, but...no other process can be devised than that of making monetary assessment.
11. The main principles of law on compensation for injuries were worked out in 19th Century, where railways accidents were becoming common and all actions were tried by Jury. Though the cases have antiquated air it is still useful to refer to them. The necessity that damages should be 'full' and 'adequate' was stressed by the Court by Queen's Bench in Fair v. London and North-Western Railway Co. (1869) 21 LT 326. The word 'compensation' is derived from Latin word 'compensare' meaning 'weigh together' or 'balance'. In Rushton v. National Coal Board (1953) 1 All ER 314, it was observed:
Every member of this Court is anxious to do all he can do to ensure that the damages are adequate for the injuries suffered, so far as they can be compensated for an injury, and to help the parties and others to arrive at a fair and just figure.
It has to be kept in view that the Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is required to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to be 'just'. It has to be borne in mind that compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighted in golden scales. Bodily injury is nothing but a deprivation which entitled the claimant to damages. The quantum of damages fixed should be in accordance to the injury. An injury may bring about many consequences like loss of earning capacity, loss of mental pleasure and many such consequential losses. A person becomes entitled to damages for the mental and physical loss, his or her life may have been shortened or that he or she cannot enjoy life which has been curtailed because of physical handicap. The normal expectation of life is impaired. But at the same time, it has to be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be wind fall for the victim.
12. Statutory provisions clearly indicate the compensation must be 'just' and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of profit but the same should not be a pittance. The Courts and Tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation, which should be just. What would be 'just' compensation is a vexed question. There can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb. Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar or special features, if any. Every method of mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of 'just' compensation which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of the expression 'which appears to it to be just' a wide discretion is vested on the Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses and arbitrariness. The expression 'just' denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness, and non-arbitrary. If it is not so it cannot be just. (See Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation : AIR 1998 SC 3191 : 1999 (1) AWC 164 (SC).
13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R. D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. : AIR 1995 SC 755 : 1995 (1) AWC 39 (SC), laying the principles posited:
Broadly speaking, while fixing the amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are capable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant : (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far as non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters, i.e., on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit: (Hi) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life.
14. In the light of above discussions, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order of the Tribunal and the F.A.F.O. is devoid of merits.
In the result, the F.A.F.O. is hereby dismissed.