D.P. Mohapatra, J.
1. On a difference of opinion between the two learned Judges of a Division Bench, this case has been referred to the Full Bench.
2. The factual matrix of the case leading to the present proceeding may be stated thus : Chandra Shekhar Azad Agriculture and Technology University, Kanpur (hereinafter referred to as the University) by the advertisement dated 15-6-1991 invited applications for appointment to two permanent posts of Assistant Professors (Agriculture Engineering) along with some other posts. The last date for submitting application was 10-7-1991. Fifty six candidates, including the petitioner Pranveer Singh Satwat, submitted their applications for the said post; of them thirty candidates, including the petitioner, were called for interview. The interview was held on 10-10-1991. On being selected by the Selection Committee the appointment letter dated 10-11-1991 was issued in favour of the Petitioner in pursuance of which he joined as Assistant Professor on 11-11-1991.
3. The respondent No. 3, Sri R. K. Singh, challenged the appointment of the petitioner before the Chancellor of the University, i.e. the Governor of Uttar Pradesh, under Section 23 of the Uttar Pradesh (Krishi Evam Prodyogik Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1958 (U.P. Act XLV of 1958) hereinafrer referred to as the Act) mainly on the ground, inter alia, that the petitioner did not possess the eligibility qualification on the last date fixed in the advertisement for receipt of applications, therefore, his appointment is invalid and should be set aside. He also made an allegation that the petitioner has been appointed in the University, even though he did not possess the requisit qualifications, due to certain extraneous considerations like being a caste-man of the vice-Chancellor The Chancellor issued notice to the petitioner and the University and after considering their representations/explanations/replies cancelled the appointment of the petitioner on the ground that he was not eligible to be appointed to the post of Assistant Professor since he did not possess the minimum qualification prescribed on the last date fixed for receipt of applications, vide order dated 27-9-1994 (Annexure XII to the writ petition). The Chancellor further directed that the post be readvertised and appointment be made in accordance with law.
4. Being aggrieved by the said order the petitioner filed the writ petition registered as Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 34147 of 1994 citing the Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor and Sri R.K. Singh as respondents. He prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Chancellor dated 27-9-1994 (Annexure XII to the writ petition) and for issue of a writ of mandamus res-training the respondents from interfering in his working as Assistant Professor (Agriculture Engineering) in the University.
5. The case was listed before the Division Bench consisting of Mr. Justice R. A. Sharma and Mr. Justice M. Katju, Mr. Justice R. A. Sharma by judgment dated 18th November, 1994 held that the case lacks merit and dismissed the writ petition. Mr. Justice M. Katju by a separate order passed on the same day, was of the prima facie view that the impugned order dated 27-9-1994 is illegal and is liable to be quashed. He ordered stay of operation of the impugned order and directed that until further order the petitioner will be permitted to continue to work as Assistant Professor (Agriculture Engineering) in the University. The then Chief Justice by order dated 2-1-1995 directed the case to be listed before a Bench of three Judges. That is how the case has been listed before us.
6. The facts which were not disputed before us are that in the advertisement no date was specified by which the applicant was to possess the prescribed qualifications and that the petitioner had not completed his M. Tech. course by 10-7-1991, which was the last date for submission of applications for the post. Indeed, he was awarded the degree of M. Tech in Agriculture Engineering on 31-8-1991 vide Annexure VI to the writ petition Sri R.K. Singh the respondent no. 3 who was not a candidate for the post, filed the application before the Chancellor challenging the validity of the petitioner's appointment in 1993 about more than two years after the appointment. Almost three years had elapsed since the appointment of the petitioner when the Chancellor passed the order dated 27-9-1994 cancelling the appaintment of the petitioner.
7. The main thrust of the submissions of Sri S.P. Gupta, Senior Advocate, appearing for the petitioner, was (1) that the Chancellor under Section 23 of the Act has no power to interfere with the order of appointment of the Board of the University and, therefore, the Chancellor's order is liable to be quashed ; (2) that the Chancellor should not have entertained the application filed after long lapse of time (more than two years) since petitioner's appointment; (3) that respondent No. 3, who was neither a candidate for the post nor in any way concerned with the appointment, had no locus standi to file the application under Section 23 of the Act; and (4) that the petitioner, who has been continuing in the post for several years, should not be discontinued from service on equitable grounds.
8. Sri S.N. Upadhya and Sri R. Upadhya appearing for the Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor of the University respectively raised the contention that in view of the well settled position that a person, who does not possess the requisite eligibility qualification by the last date for submission of application, in the absence of any other specified date is to be taken as not eligible and, therefore, appointment of such a person to the post is per se invalid. Under the circumstances, the Chancellor has rightly cancelled the appointment of the petitioner to the post.
9. Before proceeding to consider the merit of the points raised, it will be convenient to notice a few provisions of the statute relevant for the purpose of the case. Section 2 (c) of the Act defines 'Board' to mean 'the Board of Management of the University' Section 2 (k) defines 'Teacher' to mean 'a person appointed or recognised by the University for the purpose of imparting instruction or conducting and guiding research or extension programmes and includes a person who may be declared by the Statutes to be a teacher'. In Section 3 (1) it is laid down that the Kuladhipati, the Kulpati and the members of the Board and the Acedemic Council for the time being holding office as such in each University shall constitute a body corporated by the name of that University. Sub-section (2) of the said Section provides that the University shall have perpetual succession and a common seal, and shall sue and be sued by the said name. Section 6 of the Act enumerates the powers of the University. Under Sub-section (3) of the said Section the University is vested with the power to create administrative, ministerial and other necessary posts and to make appointments thereto and under Sub-section (14) power is vested in the University to do all such acts and things, whether incidental to the powers aforesaid or not, as may be requisite in order to further the objects of the University. Under Section 8 (B) of the Act the following are prescribed as authorities :
(i) The Board of Management,
(ii) The Academic Council,
(iii) The Board of Faculties, and
(iv) Such other authorities as may be declared by the Statutes to be authorities of the University.
Section 9 of the Act provides that the Governor of Uttar Pradesh shall be the Kuladhipati of the University ; he shall by virtue of his office, be the head of the University, and shall, when present, preside at any Convocation of the University and that the Kuladhipati shall have other power as may be conferred on him by this Act or the Statutes. Section 10 of the Act makes provisions relating to constitution, power and duties of the Board. Sub-section (7) of the said Section which enumerates the powers and duties of the Board provides in clause (b) that the Board shall have to appoint members of the academic and administrative staff of the University in the manner prescribed Section 23 of the Act, which is very relevant for the purpose of the present proceeding is quoted hereunder:-
'Membership and Proceedings.-If any question arises whether any person had been duly elected or appointed as, or is entitled to be, a member of any authority of the University subordinate to the Board or whether any decision of the University or any authority subordinate to the Board is in conformity with this Act and the Statutes, the matter shall be referred to the Kuladhipati whose decision thereon shall be final.'
Section 26, which makes provision regarding appointment of salaried officers and teachers, lays down in Sub-section (1) that subject to the conditions of the Act, the members of the staff of the University shall be appointed by the Board on the recommendation of the Kulpati. Sub-section (2) of the section lays down that every salaried officer and teacher of the University shall be appointed under a written contract, the contract shall be lodged with the Kulpati and a copy thereof shall be furnished to the officer or teacher concerned, the contract shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and the Statutes for the time being in force in relation to the conditions of service. Section 27 of the Act provides, inter alia, that any dispute arising out of contract between the University and any officer or teacher of the University shall on, the request of the officer or teacher concerned be referred to a Tribunal of Arbitration consisting of one member nominated by the Board, one member nominated by the officer or teacher concerned and an umpire appointed by the Kuladhipati, and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final and no suit shall lie in any civil court in respect of the matters decided by the Tribunal. It is further provided therein that every such request shall be deemed to be a submission to arbitration upon the terms of this Section within the meaning of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and all the provisions of that Act with the exception of Section 2 thereof, shall apply accordingly.
10. In view of catena of decisions of the Supreme Court the position is to be taken as well settled that in the absence of any specific date stated in the advertisement, the last date of submission of the application is to be taken as the date for possession of eligibility qualifications of an applicant. This is also in keeping with general proposition that only a candidate possessing the eligibility qualification can submit application for the post. However, the matter will stand on a different footing if a date is specifically mentioned in the advertisement for the post. We may notice some of the decisions In this regard.
11. The Supreme Court in the case of District Collector and Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential Schools Society, Vizianagaram and Ors. v. Mr. Tripura Sundari Devi, (1990) 3 UPLBEC 2032, ruled that it must be remembered by all concerned that when an advertisement mentions a particular qualification and an appointment is made in disregard of the same, it is not a matter only between the appointing authority and the appointee concerned, the aggrieved are all those who had a similar or even better qualifications than the appointee or appointees but who had not applied for the post because they did not possess the qualifications mentioned in the advertisement, it amounts to a fraud on public to appoint persons with inferior qualifications in such circumstances unless it is clearly stated that the qualifications are relaxable ; no court should be a party to the perpetuation of the fraudulent practice.
12. The Supreme Court in the case of A.P. Public Service Commission, Hyderabad and Anr. v. B. Sarat Chandra and Ors., 1990 (4) SLR 235 ruled that in a case where there are different steps in the process of selection, the minimum or maximum age for suitability of a candidate for appointment can not be allowed to depend upon a fluctuating or uncertain date, the date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific, and determine as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for recruiting agency to scrutinise applications.
13. In the case of Dr. Prit Singh v. Mr. S.K. Nangal and Ors., JT 1992 (5) SC 381, a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court held :-
'In the present case there is no dispute that in the Master of Arts Examination, the appellant secured only 47,1% marks which is not even the second division......The irresistible conclusion is that on the relevant date the appellant did not possess the requisite qualifications.
We fail to understand as to how the Vice-Chancellor who himself was of the opinion that the appellant did not possess the requisite qualifications for the post of Principal and who had refused to approve the said appointment, later approved the same appointment on 13th November, 1987 with effect from 16th October, 1987. It has rightly been submitted on behalf of the respondents that the Vice-Chancellor approved the appointment after 15th October, 1987 when the amendment was made in the prescribed qualifications for the post of Principal of a recognised College of Education. If he was not eligible for appointment in terms of the prescribed qualifications on the date he was appointed by the Managing Committee subject to the approval of the Vice-Chancellor, then later he cannot become eligible after the qualifications for the post were amended. As such we are in agreement with the view expressed by the High Court, that on the date of the appointment the appellant did not possess the requisite qualifications and as such his appointment had to be quashed.'
14. Another three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Dr. M.V. Nair v. Union of India and Ors. 1993 LIC 1111, ruled that it is well settled that suitability and eligibility has to be considered with reference to the last date for receiving the applications, unless, of course the notification calling for applications itself specifies such a date.
15. In another case reported in the same volume at page 1250 Mrs. Rekha Chaturvedi v. University of Rajasthan and Ors. a Bench of the Apex Court held as follows :-
'The required qualifications of the candidates should not be examined with reference to the date of selection as the date of selection is invariably uncertain. In the absence of knowledge of such date the candidates who apply for the posts would be unable to state whether they are qualified for the posts in question or not, if they are yet to acquire the qualification. Unless the advertisement mentions a fixed date with reference to which the qualifications are to be judged, whether the said date is of selection or otherwise it would not be possible for the candidates who do not possess the requisite qualifications In praesenti even to make applications for the posts The uncertainty of the date may also lead to a contrary consequence, viz., even those candidates who do not have the qualifications in praesenti and are likely to acquire them et an uncertain future date may apply for the posts thus swelling the number of applications But a still worse consequence may follow, in that it may leave open a scope for mal-practices. The date of selection may be so fixed or manipulated as to entertain some applicants and reject others arbitrarily. Hence, in the absence of a fixed date indicated in the advertisement/notification inviting applications with reference to which the requisite qualifications should be judged, the only certain date for the scrutiny of the qualifications will be the last date for making the applications. Therefore, where the Selection Committee in the present case took into consideration the requisite qualifications as on the date of selection rather than on the last date of preferring applications, it acted with patent illegality, and on this ground itself the selections made by it are liable to be quashed.'
However, in the facts of that case the Court declined to set aside the selections in spite of the illegality and observed that the guidelines given in the judgment are to be observed in other future selections.
16. In the case of Ashok Kumar Sharma and Anr. v. Chandra Shekhar and Anr., 1993 (1) SLR 379, the Supreme Court considering the facts of that case, held that the appellants did pass the examination and were fully qualified for being selected prior to the date of interview that by allowing the appellants to sit for the interview and by their selection on the basis of their comparative merits, the recruiting authority was able to get the best talents available, and that it was certainly in the public interest that the interview was made as broad based as was possible on the basis of qualification. Mr. Justice R.M. Sahai, who was a member of the Bench, took the view that the appellants are entitled to reliefs not as a matter of law but due to equitable considerations arising in peculiar facts of case. The case is, therefore, clearly distinguishable on facts from the case in hand.
17. In the case of Dr. M.S. Mudhol and Anr. v. Shri S.D. Halegkar and Ors., JT 1993(4) SC 143 validity of appointment of Principal of a private school was in issue. Due to default of second respondent, in 1981 the first respondent was appointed as Principal although he did not have the requisite qualifications. There was nothing on the record to show that he projected qualifications other than he possessed. It was held that the Selection Committee committed the illegality and not the first respondent. In these circumstances the Court took the view that it would be inadvisable to make him suffer after a period of 12 years. The Court declined to issue a writ of quo warranto against the appointment of Principal of a private aided school after 9 years holding that the post of the Principal in a private school though aided, is not of such sensitive public importance that the Court should find itself impelled to interfere with the appointment by a writ of quo warranto even assuming that such a writ is maintainable. The petition was dismissed. This case is also distinguishable from the case in hand and further, it cannot be said that post of Assistant Professor is not a sensitive post the validity of which the Court should not consider merely on the ground of lapse of time.
18. In the case of U.P. Public Service Commission Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad and Anr. v. Alpana, JT 1994 (1) (SC) 94 : (1994) 1 UPLBEC 242 (SC) the Supreme Court held :
''In the facts of the present case we fail to appreciate how the ratio of the said decision of this Court can be attracted. The facts of this case reveal that the respondent was not qualified to apply since the last date fixed for receipt of application was August 20, 1988. No rule or practice is shown to have existed which permitted entertainment of her application. The Public Service Commission was, therefore, right in refusing to call her for interview. The High Court in Writ Petition No. 1898/91 mandated the Public Service Commission to interview her but directed to withhold the result until further orders. In obedience to the directive of the High Court the Public Service Commission interviewed her but her result was kept in abeyance. Thereafter, the High Court while disposing of the matter, finally directed the Public Service Commission to declare her result and, if successful to forward her name for appointment. The High Court even went to the length of ordering the creation of a supernumerary post to accommodate her. This approach of the High Court cannot be supported an any rule or prevalent practice nor can it be supported on equitable considerations. In fact there was no occasion for the High Court to interfere with the refusal of the Public Service Commission to interview her in the absence of any specific rule in that behalf. We find it difficult to give recognition to such an approach of the High Court as that would open up a flood of litigation. Many candidates superior to the respondent in merit may not have applied as the result of the examination was not declared before the last date for receipt of applications If once such an approach is recognised there would be several applications received from such candidates not eligible to apply and that would not only increase avoidable work of the selecting authorities but would also increase the pressure on such authorities to withold interviews till the results are declared, thereby causing avoidable administrative difficulties This would also leave vacancies difficulties. This would also leave vacancies unfilled for long spells of time. We therefore, find it difficult to uphold the view of the High Court impugned in this appeal.'
19. In the case of Smt. Ravinder Sharma and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors., JT 1994 (6) SC 531, the Supreme Court, rejecting the prayer of the appellant about not having concealed her qualifications made the following observations :-
'We are of the view that no exception could be taken with the impugned judgment. The appellant is not found fault with for concealment of qualifications On the contrary, what is complained against her is lack of qualification...The appellant was directly appointed. In such a case, the qualification must be either (i) a Graduate/intermediate Second Class or (ii) Matric first class.
Admittedly, the appellant did not possess this qualification. That being so, the appointment is bad. The Commission recommended to the Government for relaxation of the qualification under Regulation 17 of the Regulations The Government rejected that recommendation Where, therefore, the appointment was already against Regulation 7, it was liable to be set aside That being so, no question of estoppel would ever arise. We respectfully agree with the view taken by the High Court.'
20. In a recent decision, Ashok Kumar Sharma and Ors. v. Chander Shekhar and Anr., JT 1997 (4) SC 99, the Apex Court has categorically ruled that eligibility of candidates will be judged with reference to the dale by which application is to be filed and any person who acquires prescribed qualification subsequent to such prescribed date cannot be considered at all and that delay due to late publication of results of examination is outside the purview of writ. The relevant portion of the judgment reads :-
'The proposition that where applications are called for prescribing a particular date as the last date of filing the applications, the eligibility of the candidates shall have to be judged with reference to that date and that date alone, is a well-established one. A person who acquires the prescribed qualification subsequent to such prescribed date cannot be considered at all. An advertisement or notification issued/published calling for applications constitutes a representation to the public and the authority issuing it is bound by such representation. It cannot act contrary to it. One reason behind this proposition is that if it were known that persons who obtained the qualifications after the prescribed date but before the date of interview would be allowed to appear for the interview, other similarly placed person could also have applied. Just because some of the persons had applied notwithstanding that they had not acquired the prescribed qualifications by the prescribed date, they could not have been treated on a preferential basis Their applications ought to have been rejected at the inception itself This proposition is indisputable and in fact was not doubted or disputed in the majority Judgment This is also the proposition affirmed in Smt. Rekha Chaturvedi v. University of Rajasthan and Ors., JT 1993 (1) SC 220 : 1993 Suppl. (3) SCC 168. The reasoning in the majority opinion that by allowing the 33 respondents to appear for the interview, the Recruiting Authority was able to get the best talent available and that such course was in furtherance of public interest is, with respect an impermissible justification. It is, in our considered opinion' a clear error of law and an error apparent on the face of the record.
In our opinion, R.M. Sahai, J. (and the Division Bench of the High Court) was right in holding that the 33 respondents could not have been allowed to appear for the interview.
In our opinion, the said contention is beside the point In these proceedings, we cannot examine the reasons for delay-assuming that there was delay in publishing the results That issue is outside the purview of the writ petition Whatever may be the reason, the 33 persons were not qualified as on the prescribed date and, therefore, could not have been allowed to appear for the interview. On the first issue (mentioned in the order dated 1st September, 1995), therefore, we held in favour of the review petitioners, affirming the opinion of Sahai, J.'
21. From the conspectus of views taken in the decision of the Apex Court noted above, the position that emerges is that in the absence of any specified date by which a candidate is to fulfil the eligibility qualifications, he or she has to fulfil such qualifications by the last date for submission of applications. In the absence of any provision in the advertisement or the Act and the Statute empowering the authority to relax/extend the date for fulfilment of qualifications, no authority can exercise such power. If a candidate, who did not possess the prescribed qualifications by the last date of submission of applications, has been selected and appointed in the post, his appointment is invalid and liable to be set aside. In such a case the order of the authority cancelling/setting aside the appointment cannot be interfered with by the High Court. In such a case the question whether the candidate did or did not suppress the real fact relating to his qualifications is not relevant because the appointment is cancelled/set aside on the ground or its invalidity and not on the ground of suppression of relevant facts by the candidate concerned.
22. The question that remains to be considered relates to the scope of Section 23 of the Act. As noted earlier, one of the contentions raised by Sri S.P. Gupta learned senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner, was that the Chancellor has no power to revise the decision of the Board since no such power is vested in him under Section 23 of the Act. Elucidating the point Sri Gupta submitted that since the appointment of the petitioner was made by the Board and the Board is neither the University nor it is a subordinate authority its decision cannot be revised by the Chancellor (Kuladhipati) under Section 23 of the Act. The further argument advanced by Sri S.P. Gupta was that the Chancellor (Kuladhipati) has no suo motu power to decide the matter: he gets jurisdiction to decide only when a dispute/question is referred to him.
23. Section 23 of the Act reads :
'If any question arises whether any person has been duly elected or appointed as, or is entitled to be, a member of any authority of the University subordinate to the Board or whether any decision of the University or any authority subordinate to the Board is in conformity with this Act and the Statutes, the matter shall be referred to the Kuladhipati whose decision thereon shall be final '
24. From the statutory provision in Sections 2 (C), 3, 6, 8 (B), 9, 10 (7) and 26 noted earlier it is clear that under the scheme prescribed in the Statute different powers are vested in the Board, the authorities and the officers of the University, This is done presumably for more efficient administration of the affairs of the University to carry out the provisions of the Act properly. The Kuladhipati, who is the highest officer of the University, has been vested with the power to decide any question relating to the election or appointment of any person or entitlement of a person to be a member of any authority of the University subordinate to the Board and whether any decision of the University or any authority subordinate to the Board is in conformity with the Act and the Statutes. It is mandated under Section 23 of the Act that the matter shall be referred to the Kuladhipati whose decision thereon shall be final. Section 23, as we read it, is couched in wide and comprehensive language and brings within its fold different types of disputes relating not only to the appointment and election of a person as a member of any authority of the University subordinate to the Board, but also includes any dispute whether any decision of the University or any authority subordinate to the Beard is in conformity with the Act and the Statutes. The words 'any decision of the University, in our considered view, are wide enough to include any decision of the Board, which is an authority of the University. We do not find any good reason to give a restricted meaning to the language of Section 23. We are, therefore, not persuaded to accept the contention of Sri S.P. Gupta, learned senior Advocate, that the orders/decisions of the Board are excluded from the purview of Section 23 of the Act. It follows, therefore that the decision of the Kuladhipati in the present case cannot be assailed on the ground of lack of competence or jurisdiction.
25. The last submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Chancellor, respondent No. 1, did not exercise jurisdiction within a reasonable time and the order passed by it should be quashed on this point. Respondent No. 1 has exercised its jurisdiction under Section 23 of U.P. Act No. 45 of 1958. The Chancellor can exercise his discretion inter alia regarding any appointment made by the University and no period of limitation is provided either for making reference to it or for exercise of powers under this prevision. The power has to be exercised within a reasonable time if the Statute does not provide any limitation for exercise of any statutory power. In Government of India v. The Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals Madras and Ors., AIR 1989 SC 1771 wherein Rule 12 of Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Exercise Duty) Rules, 1956 was challenged on the ground that it did not provide for any limitation for recovery of duty and it was violative on the ground of Article 14 of the Constitution, the Hon'ble Court repelled the contention. It was held that in absence of any period of limitation, the authority is to exercise the power within a reasonable period. What would be the reasonable period depends upon the fact of each case. The petitioner had not raised this objection before the Chancellor in his reply that there was inordinate delay in making reference to the Chancellor. This plea is being raised by the petitioner for the first time in the petition.
26. The petitioner was not qualified till the last date of submission of the application for appointment. In Smt. Ravinder Sharma and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors. JT 1994 (6) SC 531, wherein the appointment of the appellant therein as a clerk was made in 1967 and thereafter promotion was also made in 1974 but as she did not possess the requisite qualification on the relevant date, the respondents declared her appointment as bad in 1977. The argument was raised before the Supreme Court that as the appellant did not conceal her qualification she could not be blamed if she was appointed and, therefore, principle of estoppel was pleaded. The Supreme Court repelled the contention holding that the appellant was not found guilty for concealment of her qualification and what was complained was lack of qualification and as she did not possess the requisite qualification, her appointment was validly set aside. In such circumstances the question of estoppel did not arise. In Dr. M. S. Mudhol and Anr. v. Sri S.D. Helegkar and Ors., JT 1993(4) SC 143, wherein the appointment of Principal was challenged after 9 years of his appointment by a writ of quo warranto on the ground that at the time of appointment the teacher did not possess the requisite qualification. The High Court had dismissed the writ petition on the ground of laches and other grounds. The Supreme Court did not interfere in the order of the High Court. This case has no application to the facts of the present case.
27. In Ram Swarup v. State of Haryana and Ors., AIR 1978 SC 1536, the appellant therein was appointed as Labour-cum-Consolidation Officer in 1968 but in 1977 the Government reverted him on the ground that he was not qualified for being appointed because he did not possess one of the qualifications prescribed under Clause 1, Rule 4 viz., experience of 5 years in working of Labour Laws. The writ petition was dismissed by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that appointment of the appellant as Labour-cum-Consolidation Officer became valid after he acquired the requisite qualification The question involved in that case was as to what was the effect of the appointment if it was made in breach of Clause 1, Rule 4 which prescribed one of the qualifications, viz., 5 years experience. The Supreme Court held that the experience of 5 years was directory. It was not a case where at the time of appointment the requisite qualification was totally wanting.
28. In the present case, on facts, it cannot be said that the delay is unreasonable. The petitioner was issued appointment letter on 10-11-91 on probation for two years and before expiry of two years he had been issued a notice dated 27-10-1993 to establish the validity of his appointment. The petitioner was given time to submit a reply. Respondent No. 1 passed the impugned order on 27-9-1994. The appointment of the petitioner was found to be invalid and it was set aside. The order, on merit, having been found to be perfectly legal and justified, the Court is not bound to interfere in such order under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
29. On the analysis and discussions made in the foregoing paragraphs, all the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner having failed, the writ petition is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case without any order for costs.