Jagdish Bhalla and P. K. Chatterji, JJ.
1. By an interim order dated 9.7.2002, learned single Judge while recording certain findings directed the Registrar to hold the fresh election of Committee of Management within two months from that date in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Societies Registration Act and Rules framed thereunder.
2. Aggrieved by the above order, the appellants have preferred this special appeal inter alia on the ground that the Registrar has no power under Section 25 (2) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 [hereinafter, referred to as the Act] but the learned single Judge has passed the impugned order upholding the order of the Registrar for the reason that the case appeared to be of strange type, who without recording any finding declared the order of the Registrar to be perfectly legal and justified. Learned single Judge, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, has committed an error in not adverting to the submission that the order of the Registrar is void ab initio for the reason that respondent No. 3 was not at all competent to approach the Registrar on account of the fact that respondent No. 3 himself was not only the member but President of the Committee who has taken the decision, which respondent No. 3 had sought to challenge and thus the action of the Registrar taking cognizance on the representations of respondent No. 3 was not proper and legally justified.
3. Sri N.K. Seth, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 3 raised objection to the maintainability of the special appeal and placing reliance on the decisions in Fakirelal v. State of V. P. and Ors., 1999 (2) AWC 926 : 1999 (17) LCD 606, Pratapur Sugar and Industries Ltd. v. Deputy Labour Commissioner, 2001 (19) LCD 247, Smt. Rama Devi v. Smt. Madhuri Verma and Ors., 1998 (16) LCD 115 and Sita Ram Lal v. District Inspector of Schools, 1994 (1) VPLBEC 24, learned counsel for the respondent contended that in view of the principles laid down in the above cases, this special appeal is not maintainable.
4. Sri Seth in support of his contention that the special appeal is not maintainable in the present case further relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Sudarshan Singh Bedi v. Additional District Magistrate/Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Varanasi, 1993 (1) AWC 916. In this case, their Lordships held that the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer shall be treated as an order of the Tribunal as the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has to determine the objections as provided under Rule 8 (2) of the rules. The provisions of determination casts duty upon the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to act judicially after considering the pleadings of the parties and after affording them opportunity to lead evidence and further to pass a reasoned order. Learned counsel, however, failed to satisfy that the Registrar also performs such functions while passing order in exercise of powers under Section 25 (2) of the Act. In these circumstances, the case relied upon by him is not applicable in this case.
5. According to learned counsel for the respondent No. 3, Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the High Court Rules is based on a logic that the prescribed authority or the revisional authority which acts as Tribunal or Court having already appreciated the matter from judicial angle and in order to get finality, the decision of the single Judge should be taken as final and no appeal should further be maintainable. Elaborating further, he submitted that while deciding whether the appeal is maintainable or not. what is to be seen is whether the order which is subject-matter of challenge in the writ petition filed under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution had been given by a body or authority which had been constituted by the State and had been clothed with the State's inherent judicial power to deal with disputes between the parties and to determine them on merits, fairly and objectively.
6. Sri Anupam Mehrotra, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the order passed by the Registrar is purely an administrative order and this order cannot be termed to be an order of a body or authority having the status of a Tribunal. Relying upon the decisions in Committee of Management v. Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari, 1987 UPLBEC 989, Abhay GGJS Kusmikhalan v. Assistant Registrar, 1990 UPLBEC 480, Urwa Bazar Educational Society v. Assistant Registrar, 1988 (2) AWC 1148 : 1988 UPLBEC 515, Khapraha Educational Society v. Assistant Registrar, 1993 (1) AWC 332 : 1993 UPLBEC 89O, Committee of Management v. Assistant Registrar, 1993 (1) UPLBEC 690 and Muslim Welfare Society v. Assistant Registrar, 1991 (2) AWC 1311 : 1991 UPLBEC 1046 learned counsel for the appellant contended that the order dated 5.7.2002, passed by the Registrar is purely an administrative order by which it has been directed that election will be held by the Registrar. Further, by this order, the Registrar has nullified elections that have 'already held on 1.7.2002 in pursuance of notification dated 20.6.2002 and giving complete go-bye to Section 25 (1) of the Societies Registration Act, has passed the impugned order allegedly under Section 25 (2) of the Act on the representation of the Respondent No. 3.
7. Sri Mehrotra also invited our attention to Section 25 of the Act which relates to disputes regarding election of office bearers and provides that the prescribed authority may hear and decide in a summary manner any doubt or dispute in respect of the election or continuance in office of an office-bearer of such society. Prescribed authority is competent to set aside the election of an office bearer on the grounds detailed in the section itself. He further submitted that the expression 'prescribed authority' has been defined in the Explanation attached to Section 25 which means that an officer or Court authorised in this behalf by the State Government by notification published in the Official Gazette. Section 25 is reproduced herein under :
'25. Dispute regarding election of office-bearers.--(1) The prescribed authority may, on a reference made to it by the Registrar or by at least one fourth of the members of a society registered in Uttar Pradesh, hear and decide in a summary manner any doubt or dispute in respect of the election or continuance in office of an office-bearer of such society, and may pass such orders in respect thereof as it deems fit :
Provided that the election of an office-bearer shall be set aside where the prescribed authority is satisfied :
(a) that any corrupt practice has been committed by such office-bearer ; or
(b) that the nomination of any candidate has been improperly rejected ; or
(c) that the result of the election insofar it concerns such officebearer has been materially affected by the improper acceptance of any nomination or by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void or by any non-compliance with the provisions of any rules of the society.
Explanation I.--A person shall be deemed to have committed a corrupt practice who, directly or indirectly, by himself or by any other person :
(i) induces, or attempts toinduce, by fraud,intentional mis-representation, coercionor threat or injury, anyelector to give or to refrainfrom giving a vote infavour of any candidate, orany person to stand or notto stand as, or to withdrawor not to withdraw frombeing a candidate at theelection.
(ii) with a view to inducing any elector to give or to refrain from giving a vote in favour of any candidate, or to inducing any person to stand or not stand as, or to withdraw or not to withdraw from being a candidate at the election, offers or gives any money or valuable consideration, or any place or employment, or holds out any promise of individual advantage or profit to any person ;
(iii) abets (within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code) ,the doing of any of the acts specified in clauses (i) and (ii) ;
(iv) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or elector to believe that he, or any person in whom he is interested, will become or will be rendered an object of divine displeasure or spiritual censure ;
(v) canvasses on grounds of casts, community, sect or religion ;
(vi) commits such otherpractice as the StateGovernment mayprescribe to be a corruptpractice.
Explanation II.--A promise of individual advantage or profit to a person includes a promise for the benefit of the person himself, or of any one in whom he is interested.
Explanation III.--The State Government may prescribe the procedure for hearing and decision of doubts or disputes in respect of such elections and make provisions in respect of any other matter relating to such elections for which insufficient provision exists in this Act or in the rules of society. Inserted by Uttar Pradesh Act 13 of 1978, Section 4 (w.e.f. 27.2.1978).
(2) Where by an order made under Sub-section (1), an election is set aside or an office-bearer is held no longer entitled to continue in office or where the Registrar is satisfied that any election of office-bearers of a society has not been held within the time specified in the rules of that society, he may call a meeting of the general body of such society for electing such office-bearer or office-bearers, and such meeting shall be presided over and be conducted by the Registrar or by an officer authorised by him in this behalf, and the provisions in the rules of the society relating to meetings and elections shall apply to such meeting and election with necessary modifications.
(3) Where a meeting is called by the Registrar under subsection (2), no other meeting shall be called for the purpose of election by any other authority or by any person claiming to be an office-bearer of the society.
Explanation--For the purposes of this section, the expression 'prescribed authority' means an officer or Court authorised in this behalf by the State Government by notification published in the Official Gazette. '
8. Relying upon the meaning of 'prescribed authority' as defined in the Explanation attached to Section 25 of the Act and the decision of this Court in the case of Sri Ram Laxmi Narain Marvadi Hindu Hospital v. Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Ors., 2OOO (3) AWC 1955 : (2000) 3 UPLBEC 2063, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the prescribed authority under Section 25 of the Act decides the dispute judicially and in exercise of the inherent judicial powers of the State. By substituting Section 25 in the Act in present form. Legislature has constituted an Election Tribunal for resolving the election disputes of societies registered under the Act. In these circumstances, the order passed by the Registrar under Section 25 (2) of the Act cannot be termed to be an order passed by the Tribunal anddoes not possess the trappings of the Court.
9. We find force in the arguments advanced by Sri Anupam Mehrotra regarding maintainability of the special appeal.
10. Section 25 of the Act was amended by the Societies' Registration (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, A perusal of the objects and reasons of the section makes the legislative intent clear that it was to provide a forum for deciding the dispute in respect of election or continuance in office of office-bearers of a society. This section provides grounds on which the election of office-bearers can be set aside by the prescribed authority. Explanation to Section 25 further provides that for the purpose of this section, the expression 'prescribed authority' means an officer or Court authorised in this behalf by the State Government by notification published in the Official Gazette. The State Government by notification has authorized the Sub-Divisional Magistrate a prescribed authority within their respective jurisdiction. Sub-Divisional Magistrate is an executive Magistrate and his functions relate to matters, which are administrative or executive in nature and acts as an administrative, or executive officer under various laws. He functions as Court as provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus he is an executive officer as well as a Court.
11. Prescribed authority under Section 25 of the Act is empowered to decide the dispute judicially and in exercise of the inherent judicial powers of the State. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal can be invoked either under a reference made by Registrar or by 1/4 members of general body of society, as provided under Section 25 (1) of the Act. A member of the society has been intentionally excluded to invoke the jurisdiction of Tribunal with the intention to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and frivolous litigation. Prescribed authority passes the order after hearing parties and giving them opportunity to adduce evidence.
12. In Sri Ram Laxmi Narain Marvadi Hindu Hospital v. Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Ors. (supra), the Court held as under :
'........The law as it stands isthat the Registrar has to take a workable administrative decision to recognize the newly constituted Committee of Management or its office-bearers so that smooth functioning of the society is not hampered. This determination is, of course, subject to the ultimate decision by the civil court. Nevertheless, if a bona fide dispute or doubt with regard to the election of the rival Committee of Management of the officebearers is raised, in that event the Registrar would keep his hands off and relieve himself by performing statutory duty of making a reference under Section 25 of the Act.'
13. In view of the above discussions, we are of the considered opinion that the decisions relied upon by Sri N. K. Seth referred to above, in fact relate to different authorities such as prescribed authority under the Panchayat Raj Act, Additional/Deputy Labour Commissioner under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and the District Inspector of Schools under the Intermediate Education Act, function as a Tribunal or quasi-judicial authority. If a person being aggrieved by the order passed by the above authorities prefers a writ petition, then that writ petition is cognizable by learned single Judge and the pronouncement made therein is not amenable to special appeal. We further find that the order under challenge is an administrative order passed by the Registrar and thereafter the order passed by the learned single Judge in the writ petition has the trappings of the final order.
14. Sri N.K. Seth next contended that under Rule 5 of Chapter VIII the special appeal is not maintainable as it has been filed against the interim order as would be evident from the order dated 9.7.2002 and the writ petition is still pending. According to him, the order dated 9.7.2002 passed by the learned single Judge is not a judgment and, therefore, the specialappeal is not entertainable. It will remain as an interlocutory order and further it does not bring about the termination of the proceeding in which the adjudication has been made.
15. In Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben, AIR 1981 SC 1786, the Supreme Court observed that every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be judgments which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned.
16. In Sandeep Agarawal and Anr. v. Adarsh Chaddha and Ors. Special Appeal No. 122 (M/S) of 2002, this Court after considering the principles laid down by the Apex Court and this Court held that if the interlocutory order amounts to disposal of a vital issue and in fact is affecting vital and valuable rights having trappings of the final orders, in that case, the special appeal is maintainable.
17. On the facts and circumstances of the case, as already indicated above, we find force in the arguments advanced by Sri Mehrotra that the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge has the trappings of the final order and as such this special appeal is maintainable. Accordingly, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge has the trappings of the final order.
18. Accordingly, special appeal is maintainable.