Judgment:
G.P. Mathur, J.
1. This petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed at pre-execution stage praying that the order dated 30-5-94 passed under Section 3(1) of Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (for short COFEPOSA) for detaining the petitioner be quashed and a writ of mandmus be issued directing the respondents not to arrest the petitioner or to take any coercive measure against him in pursuance of the aforesaid order. Though the petition was prepared and was got reported from the office on 23-8-95 but the same was actually filed on 19-2-96. By the order dated 26-2-96, a Division Bench restrained the respondents from arresting the petitioner.
2. The material facts which are borne out from the affidavits filed by the parties are that on 21 -1 -98 the Customs Authorities checked three persons in Rupedeha in the district of Bahraich while they were coming on three different vehicles from Nepalganj side and found 6.90 grams, 700.5 grams and 700.5 grams gold pieces bearing foreign markings in rubber balloons which had been tied to theirelbows by adhesive tape. In their statements under Section 107 of Customs Act, they admitted that they had purchased the gold from Kathmandu (Nepal) and were going to sell it to the petitioner-Rajendra Kumar who is resident of Sarrafa-Bazar, Kanpur. They further stated that earlier also they had brought foreign gold from Kathmandu and had sold the same to the petitioner. The statement of petitioner was also recorded under Section 108 of Customs Act on 8-2-93. Thereafter, the State Government passed the impugned order under Section 3(1) of COFEPOSA for detaining the petitioner with a view to prevent him from dealing in smuggled goods, copy of which has been filed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. Two counter affidavits have been filed on behalf of the State of U.P. wherein it is averred that after consideration of all the relevant materials and documents, the State Govt., on being satisfied that with a view to preventing the petitioner from dealing in smuggled goods, passed the detention order under Section 3(1) of the Act. Regarding delay in passing of the order, it is stated that after receiving all relevant papers pertaining to the case from Seizing-Officer and Follow-up action report from the Collector, Customs (Patna) on 13-10-93 and after their due and proper scrutiny, the Custom Department forwarded the proposal for detention of the petitioner to the State Govt. on 21-1-94. The proposal was considered by the Screening Committee of the State Govt. in its meeting held on 31-1-94 but as it. was felt that some more information was required, the case was fixed for consideration at the next meeting which took place on 22-2-94. It was in this meeting of the Screening Committee that a recommendation was made for detaininig the petitioner. The necessary formalities and legal vetting of the proposed detention order and ground was completed on 19-2-94 and the same was placed before the higher authorities of the State Govt. on 23-2-94. The order approving the detention of the petitioner was passed on 28-4-94 and thereafter the impugned order of detention was actually issued on 30-5-94. It is further averred that the order could not be served as the petitioner was absconding and he had not surrendered despite publication of Notification dated 14-3-95 which was published in the U.P. Gazette on 29-4-95. It may be noticed that in the counter affidavit the correctness of the detention order and the grounds of detention have not been challenged. What is pleaded is that as the detention order and the grounds of detention have not been served upon the petitioner he has got no legal or authoritative source of obtaining the copies of the aforesaid orders. Since the respondents have not challenged the correctness of the detention order and the grounds, we are proceeding on the footing that the same are genuine. We are not going into the question as to how the petitioner was able to secure the copies of the aforesaid documents as the same does not appear to be necessary for the decision of the petition.
3. Shri A.D. Giri, learned senior counsel has submitted that the gold was seized by the Customs Authorities from the possession of three persons in district Bahraich on 21-1-93 and the statement of the petitioner was also recorded on 8-2-93 but the detention order was passed almost after sixteen months on 30-5-94 and in view of this long period which has elapsed the vital link with the offending activity had snapped and therefore, there was no justification for passing the impugned detention order. It is urged that the order has been passed for a wrong purpose. Learned counsel has placed reliance on Ravindra Kumar Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, 1974 (4) SCC 111 (sic), Sirajul v. State of West Bengal, 1975 (2) . SCC 78 : (AIR 1975 SC 1517), Anand Prakash v. State of U.P., 1990 (1) SCC 291 : (AIR 1990 SC 516), K.P.M. Bashir v. State of Karanataka, 1992 (2) SCC 295 : (AIR 1992 SC 1352), P.U. Iqbal v. Union of India, 1992 (1) SCC 434: (AIR 1992 SC 1900), Mustakamia Jabar Miyan Sheikh v. M.N. Mehta, 1995 (3) SCC 237 and P.M. Hari Kumar v. Union of India, 1995 (5) SCC 691 :(1995 AIR SCW 3726), in support of the proposition that on account of long delay which has elapsed the detention order is vitiated and the same is liable to be set aside.
4. The question whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable for quashing of an order under section 3(1) of COFEPOS A at pre-execution stage has been considered by the Supreme Court in Additional Secretary to the Govt. of India v. Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia, 1991 (1) JT 549 and after dealing with the matter exhaustively, the Court ruled as follows :.The Courts have the necessary power and they have used it in proper cases as has been pointed out above, although such cases have been few and the grounds on which the Courts have interfered with them at the pre-execution stage are necessarily very limited in scope and number, viz., where the Courts are prima facie satisfied (i) that the impugned order is not passed under the Act under which it is purported to have been passed, (ii) that it is sought to be executed against a wrong person, (iii) that it is passed for a wrong purpose,,(iv) that it is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds or (v) that the authority which passed it had no authority to do so. The refusal by the Courts to use their extraordinary powers of judicial review to interfere with the detention order prior to their execution on any other ground does not amount to the abandonment of the said power or to their denial to the proposed detenu, but prevents their abuse and the perversion of the law in question.
This decision has been subsequently followed in M.K. Bapna v. Union of India, 1992 (4) JT 49, State of Tamil Nadu v. P.K. Shamsuddin, 1992 (4) JT 179 : (AIR 1992 SC 1937) and Subhash Muljimal Gandhi v. L. Himingliana, 1994 (6) SCC 14:(1994 AIR SCW 4975). Thus the power under Article 226 of the Constitution can be exercised at the pre-execution stage on very limited grounds enumerated by the Apex Court and not on all grounds which are available after the detention order has been served (sic) has been taken into custody.
5. It is not the case of the petitioner that the impugned detention order is not passed under COFEPOS A or that the State Govt. which passed it has no authority to do so or that the impugned order had not been passed against him and it is sought to be executed against a wrong person. It is also not the case of the petitioner that the impugned order is based on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds. The only ground urged is that the order is passed for a wrong purpose. In elaborating his submissions, Shri Giri has urged that if after passing of the order there is delay in execution thereof, it would not be a case where detention order can be branded as having been passed for a wrong purpose and this ground would be available only after the person concerned has been detained and not at the pre-execution stage but where there is delay in passing of the order, as a result whereof vital link with the offending activity has snapped, the order has to be necessarily held to have been passed for a wrong purpose and therefore, such a plea can be raised at the pre-execution stage and in such circumstance this Court can exercise power under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the detention order.
6. The main question which requires consideration is that if there is delay in passing a detention order, can it be held that the order has been passed for a wrong purpose. The dictionary meaning of the word 'purpose' is - a result which it is desired to obtain and is kept in mind in performing an action. Section 3(1) of COFEPOS A provides that the Central Government or the State Govt. or any Officer of the aforesaid governments specially empowered may, if satisfied, with respect to any person with a view to preventing him from smuggling goods or abetting the smuggling of goods or concealing or keeping smuggled goods or dealing in smuggled goods make an order directing that such person be detained. It has been held in the case of N.K. Bapna (supra) that as 'smuggling' has been defined in the Act, the said definition has to be taken into consideration for the purpose of the Act and not the dictionary meaning of the word. Section 2(e) of the Act lays down that 'smuggling' has the same meaning as in Section 2(39) of the Customs Act 1962 and all its grammatical variations and cognate expression shall be construed accordingly. Section 2(39) defines 'smuggling' in the following words;
Smuggling', in relation to any goods, means any act or omission which will render such goods liable to confiscation under Section 111 or Section 113.
There are various clauses namely, clauses (a) to (p) in Section 111 which make the goods brought from a place outside India liable to confiscation and that would, therefore amount to 'smuggling' within the meaning of Section 2(39) read with Section 111 of the Customs Act. If foreign gold is brought from any place outside India to any place inside India without payment of requisite duty, it will amount to smuggling of goods as mentioned in Sub-clause (i) and the gold so brought would be smuggled goods within the meaning of sub-clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. The State Govt. was satisfied that foreign gold had been brought to India from Nepal without payment of duty and the same was sold to the petitioner. The case of the petitioner was thus covered by sub-clause (iv) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. The impugned detention order dated 30-5-94 recites that the State Govt. was satisfied that in order to prevent smuggling of goods, transportation, concealment or dealing in smuggled goods, it was necessary to detain the petitioner under Section 3(1) of the Act. Since the material with the State Govt. showed that the petitioner was involved in transporting, concealing or dealing in smuggled goods, it could very well pass a detention order under Section 3(1) of the Act. The object with which the order was passed was to prevent the petitioner from indulging in the aforesaid activities. The preamble of COFEPOSA is 'an Act to provide for preventive detention in certain cases for the purposes of conservation and augmentation of foreign exchange and prevention of smuggling activities and for matters connected therewith.' There can be no doubt that the State Government having been satisfied that the petitionerwas engaged in transporting, concealing, keeping or dealing in smuggled goods and in order to achieve the object of the Act namely prevention of smuggling activities, passed the impugned detention order. Thus it cannot be held that the order has been passed for a wrong purpose.
7. The contention that if a long period has elapsed between the offending activity and passing of a detention order the same would be for a wrong purpose is, in our opinion, wholly fallacicus. The effect of delay in passing a detention order was considered by Bhagwati, J. (as his Lordship then was) in Sheikh Serajul v. State of West Bengal, 1975(11) SCC78:(AIR1975SC 1517) and itwas held as follows :
There was delay, both at the stage of passing the order of detention and in arresting him, and this delay, unless satisfactorily explained, would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining Magistrate recited in the order of detention. It would be reasonable to assume that if the detaining Magistrate was really and genuinely satisfied after proper application of mind to the materials before him that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner, he would have acted with greater promptitude both in making the order of detention as also in securing the arrest of the petitioner, and the petitioner would not have been allowed to remain at large for such a long period of time to carry on his nefarious activities.
But this must not be understood to mean that whenever there is delay in making an order of detention or in arresting the detenu pursuant to the order of detention, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority must be held to be not genuine or colourable. Each case must depend on its own peculiar facts and circumstances, the detaining authority may have a reasonable explanation for the delay and that might be sufficient to dispel the inference that its satisfaction was not genuine.
Similar view was taken by Krishna Iyer, J. in Ravindra Kumar v. West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 1408:(1975 Cri LJ 1235) and in view of the delay in passing of the order the Habeas Corpus petition filed by detenu was allowed with following obsevation :
In these circumstances, we are not satisfied that there is any justification for claiming subjective satisfaction put forward by the District Magistrate.
In Sheikh Nizamuddin v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 2353 : (1975 Cri LJ 12) there was no satisfactory explanation for delay in arresting the detenu. The habeas corpus petition was allowed with the observation that it could not be held that the District Magistrate applied his mind and arrived at a real and genuine satisfaction that it was necessary to detain the petitioner. Thus where there is delay in passing the detention order it is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority which gets vitiated rendering the detention order invalid. The delay cannot lead to the inference that the detention order has been passed for a wrong purpose.
8. It is important to emphasis that there is no inflexible rule that whenever there is a delay in passing a detention order it must necessarily be held that the satisfaction on the detaining authority was vitiated rendering the detention order invalid. It will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and if there is satisfactory explanation for passing the order, the same cannot be held to be illegal or invalid. In Rajendra Kumar Natwar Lal Shah v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 1255, it was held as follows at page 1260 :
A distinction must be drawn between the delay in making of an order of detention under a law relating to preventive detention like the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 and the delay in complying with the procedural safeguards of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. The rule as to unexplained delay in taking action is not inflexible. In cases of mere delay in making of an order of detention under a law like the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 enacted for the purpose of dealing effectively with persons engaged in smuggling and foreign exchange racketeering who, owing to their large resources and influence have been posing a serious threat to the economy and thereby to the security of the nation, the Courts should not merely on account of delay in making of an order of detention assume that such delay, if not satisfactorily explained, must necessarily give rise to an inference that there was no sufficient material for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority or that such subjective satisfaction was not genuinely reached. Taking of such a view would not be warranted unless the Court finds that the grounds are 'stale' or illusery or that there is no real nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of detention.
In Yogendra Morari v. State of U.P., AIR 1988 SC 1835 : (1988 Cri LJ 1825), it was held as follows at page 1837 (of AIR) :
It is not right to assume that an order of detention has to be mechanically struck down if passed after some delay...It is necessary to consider the circumstances in each individual case to find out whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained or not.
Similar view has been taken in K. Aruna Kumari v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1988 SC 227 : (1988 Cri L J 411). A conspectus of the authorities cited above would show that if there is a delay in passing the detention order and the same has not been satisfactorily explained, it will vitiate the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority rendering the detention order in valid but the delay alone cannot lead to the inference that the order has been passed for a wrong purpose. The submission that the impugned detention order has been passed for a wrong purpose being based solely upon the alleged delay in passing thereof, has thus no merit and is liable to be rejected.
9. In Subhash Mujimal Gandhi (supra) search of the petitioner who had come to Bombay from a flight from Dubai revealed that he had tied gold bars around his waist. The detention order passed against him under Section 3(1) of the Act was challenged at pre-execution stage on the ground that the same had been passed for a wrong purpose. It was held that the order of detention which had been made by the detaining authority on the basis of its! satisfaction that the petitioner was smuggling gold could not be held to be bad nor could it be held that the order of detention is made for a purpose extraneous to the provisions of COFEPOSA. In State of Tamil Nadu v. P.K. Shamsuddin, 1992 (4) JT 179 : (AIR 1992 SC 1937) the detention order dated 8-3-88 was challenged by filing a writ petition in Calcutta High Court after nearly 13 months on 5-4-89 wherein an order was passed staying the arrest of the petitioner. The stay order was vacated on 12-4-91 and after nearly three months, another writ petition was filed in Madras High Court which was allowed and the detention order was quashed. In appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and held that the case did not fall within the parameters outlined in the case of Alka Subhash Gadia (supra) justifying interference with the detention order at the pre-execution stage, though the detention order had not been given effect to for among period even when there was no stay order by any Court. It may also be pointed out here that none of the authorities cited by Shri Giri relate to a case where challenge to the detention order may have been made at the pre-execution stage.
10. The material on record shows that the petitioner's wife gave an application to the Chief Minister on 25-8-84 getting an enquiry made by the CID regarding the impugned detention order. It appears that the Forest Minister also sent a letter on 23-12-94 and thereafter, an Under Secretary to U.P. government wrote a letter to Addl. Director General of Police (CID) on 6-1-95 to get the matter enquired into by the CID. TS..: circle officer, Crime Branch of CID, Kanpur then wrote a letter to the District Magistrate, Kanpur that as the matter waj being enquired into by the CID, further proceedings in pursuance of the detention order passed against the petitioner may be stayed. The Circle Officer of CB. CID Kanpur also wrote a letter to the C.M.M. Kanpur on 17-8-95 that as the CID was making enquiry, under the orders of the State Govt, the proceedings under Sections 82/83, Cr. P.C. initiated against the petitioner in pursuance of the detention order passed against him under COFEPOSA may be suspended (Annexures-VI, VII, VIII and XI to the writ petition). These facts show that the petitioner is a fairly resourceful person who succeeded in forestalling the proceedings for a considerable period of time by obtaining orders from the State government for holding a CID enquiry though CB. CID has no role to play in the matters relating to smuggling or passing of detention order under COFEPOSA. However, as the learned counsel has not raised any arguments regarding the effect of delay in affecting the arrest subsequent to the passing of detention order, we are not expressing any opinion on the same.
11. No other point was urged.
12. Having given our careful consideration to the submissions made at the bar and to the material on record, we are clearly of the opinion that the petitioner has not been able to make out any ground which may justify interference with the impugned detention order at the pre-execution stage.
13. The writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. The stay order is vacated.