J.C. Gupta and S.K. Agarwal, JJ.
1. This is the second writ petition filed by the petitioner, Kailash Nath God. His earlier writ petition, bearing No. 39460 of 1999, was dismissed by us on 24.4.2000 on the ground that the order of detention does not suffer from any infirmity, inasmuch as the acts of the petitioner were not only prejudicial to the maintenance of public order but also to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. However, the reasons for dismissing the aforesaid Writ Petition No. 39460 of 1999 were given by us later on. The present writ petition has been filed on the ground that in similar set of circumstances, a Division Bench of this Court has subsequently held the application of provisions of Section 3 of the National Security Act (hereinafter called as 'NSA') inapplicable. The finding by the other Division Bench returned in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 42309 of 1999. Dilip Kumar v. Union of India and others, is as under :
'It is not disputed that the drugs as defined, has been included as one of the essential commodities under Section 2(a)(iv-a) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. As drugs are essential commodities and their production, supply anddistribution and trade and commerce is controlled by the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the Rules framed thereunder, there remains no doubt that the Explanation appended to subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Act is attracted to the present case and the order of detention could not be legally passed. From a close reading of the Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 3 of Prevention of Black marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, it is clear that the nature of the drugs whether spurious, misbranded, or adulterated is not the basis for passing the order but the requirement is that the trade and commerce or indulgence in the production, supply and distribution of the alleged drugs should be with a view to making gain in any manner which may directly or indirectly defeat or tend to defeat the provisions of that Act or other law, which in the present case, may be Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Allegation against petitioner is that he stored the spurious medicines for making gain which, if permitted, would defeat provisions of aforesaid Acts. In view of the aforesaid legal position, in our opinion, the detaining authority was not competent to pass an order of detention against petitioner in view of the clear prohibition contained in the Explanation to Section 3(2) of the Act.'
2. It is pertinent to mention here that the aforesaid Judgment has been delivered on 15.5.2000. However, both these petitions arise out of the same F.I.R. but the grounds of detentions were different, may be the contents are similar. In the circumstances, we desired the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri G.C. Chaturvedi, to satisfy us about the maintainability of the present writ petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner has very candidly accepted that this writ petition, though is notmaintainable, yet the question raised before the Bench now is of general importance and, therefore, it must be given a proper consideration by us. Since, admittedly, it was not raised before us in the previous petition and a contrary decision has come in a subsequent Judgment of this Court barring the applicability of the provisions of N.S.A., it shall be expedient in the interest of justice that this Court should go into the question without bothering much about the maintainability of the petition.
3. We see no merits in the submission of the learned counsel. As already stated earlier, we had held in our judgment dated 24.4.2000 that the detention order is perfectly valid because the activity of the petitioner is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as well as to the maintenance of supply and services essential to the community. It is not open to us to enter into the merits of the argument now advanced before us especially when this question was not raised at all before us during the course of arguments by the petitioner. In the result, we dismiss this writ petition as not maintainable.
4. Despite this, we had preferred to deal with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The submission is that the manufacture or storage of spurious drugs by the petitioner is part of trade and commerce and was with a view to make gain in any manner, which may directly or indirectly defeat or tend to defeat the provisions of Essential Commodities Act or Drugs Act. This personal gain is the guiding factor behind any activity to be covered by the provisions of Blackmarketing Act. Another ingredient necessary for its applicability is that it must be an item which is covered by Essential Commodities Act. Drugs are included under essential commodities with a view to control and regulate its supply and not essentially for punishment. An action is punishable under the said Act if it contravenes provisions regulating supply of this essential commodity. For adulterated.misbranded or spurious drugs, various punitive provisions including imprisonment for life are provided in Drugs Act. If it is purely a matter contravening or affecting adversely the supply of drugs, declared as essential commodity, the detention for any such contravention under N.S.A. is prohibited by the Explanation to Section 3 of N.S.A. If the purpose behind storing and selling of spurious drugs by the petitioner and his son was to make monetary gain, it is squarely covered under Section 3 of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (hereinafter called as the 'Blackmarketing Act'). So far as this contention is concerned, we are wholly in disagreement. Section 3(b) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (hereinafter called as the 'Drugs Act') deals with the definition of 'drug'. The definition is in four different segments. Clause (b) of Section 3 of the Drugs Act is quoted below for ready reference :
'(b) 'drug' includes,--
(i) all medicines for internalor external use of humanbeings or animals and allsubstances intended to beused for or in thediagnosis, treatment,mitigation or preventionof any disease or disorderin human beings oranimals, includingpreparations applied onhuman body forthe purpose of repellinginsects like mosquitoes ;
(ii) such substances (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the human body or intended to be used for the destruction of vermin or insects which cause disease in human beings or animals, as may be specified from time to time by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette ;
(iii) all substances intended for use as components of a drug including empty gelatine capsules ; and
(iv) such devices intended for internal or external use in the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of disease or disorder in human beings or animals, as may be specified from time to time by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette, after consultation with the Board ; '
A perusal of all these four sub-clauses of Section 3(b) of the Drugs Act clearly indicate that this refers only about the genuine drugs and not to any spurious drugs.
5. Chapter ill of the Drugs Act deals with import of drugs and cosmetics. Section 8 of this Act deals with the standards of quality. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) to Section 8 speaks that 'in relation to a drug, that the drug complies with the standard set out in the second Schedule'. Now Section 9 of this Act deals with misbranded drugs. We are not concerned with this branded drug. Section 9A of this Act deals with adulterated drugs. Section 9B deals with spurious drugs. The definition is quoted as under :
'9B. Spurious drugs.--For the purposes of this Chapter, a drug shall be deemed to be spurious.-
(a) if it is imported under a name which belongs to another drug ; or
(b) if it is an imitation of, or is a substitute for, another drug or resembles another drug in a manner likely to deceive or bears upon it or upon its label or container the name of another drug unless it is plainly and conspicuously marked so as to reveal its true character and its lack of identity with such other drug ; or
(c) if the label or container bears the name of anindividual or company purporting to be the manufacturer of the drug, which individual or company is fictitious or does not exist ; or
(d) if it has been substituted wholly or in part by another drug or substance ; or
(e) if it purports to be the product of a manufacturer of whom it is not truly a product.
Clause (d) is most relevant. If it has been substituted wholly or in part by another drug or substance. Section 12 of the Drugs Act deals with the power of Central Government to make Rules. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 deals with various matters on which these Rules can be framed. Section 13 of this Act defines offences.
6. Chapter IV of this Act deals with manufacture, sale and distribution of drugs and cosmetics indigenously. Section 16 of the Act speaks of standards of quality. For ready reference, Section 16 is quoted as under :
' 16. Standards of quality.--(1) For the purposes of this Chapter, the expression 'standard quality' means,--
(a) in relation to a drug, that the drug complies with the standard set out in the second Schedule, and
(b) in relation to a cosmetic, that the cosmetic complies with such standard as may be prescribed.
(2) The Central Government, after consultation with the Board and after giving by notification in the Official Gazette not less than three months' notice of its intention so to do, may by a like notification add to or otherwise amend the second Schedule for the purposes of this Chapter, and thereupon the second Schedule shall be deemed to be amended accordingly.'
This section, thus, clearly deals with drugs that conform to thestandard prescribed in Schedule II. It not only envisages but also permits sale of such drugs alone to the society.
7. Section 17 of the Drugs Act deals with misbranded drugs. Section 17A deals with adulterated drugs, and Section 17B deals with 'spurious drugs'. Section 17B of this Act is quoted as under :
' 17B. Spurious drugs.--For the purposes of this Chapter a drug shall be deemed to be spurious :
(a) if it is manufactured under a name which belongs to another drug ; or
(b) if it is an imitation of, or is a substitute for, another drug or resembles another drug in a manner likely to deceive or bears upon it or upon its label or contained the name of another drug unless it is plainly and conspicuously marked so as to reveal its true character and its lack of identity with such other drug : or
(c) if the label or container bears the name of an individual or company purporting to be the manufacturer of the drug, which individual or company is fictitious or does not exist ; or
(d) if it has substituted wholly or in part by another drug or substance ; or
(e) if it purports to be the product of a manufacturer of whom it is not truly a produce.'
Clauses (b) and (d) of this Section is of relevance. It is of importance why two separate chapters were created in the Drugs Act, as amended upto date. Chapter III deals with import of drugs and cosmetics. Chapter IV deals with indigenous manufacture, sale and distribution of drugs and cosmetics. From a perusal of entire Section 17B, all its five clauses what emerges out is that anypreparation that is manufactured, stored or sold falling within any of these mischief enumerated in Section 17B is called spurious perforce in order to deal with the same effectively under the punitive provisions of the Drugs Act. For no other purposes such a preparation is termed a drug. It is otherwise not a drug. No one shall like to call a spurious medicinal preparation a drug. The Drugs Act also defines a drug to be one that conforms strictly to the standards set out in second Schedule. By implication any other medicinal preparation shall be either adulterated, misbranded or spurious. Punitive provisions for any of these categories further indicate that sale of all such medicinal preparations are strictly prohibited by the Drugs Act. What is included as essential commodities is a 'drug', as defined in the Drugs Act and not any of these three classes of medicinal preparations. Such an activity is per se playing deception and fraud upon society.
8. We have examined in the light of the Explanation to Section 3(2) of N.S.A. the submission made before us. We find that it talks of definition contained in Explanation to subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Blackmarketing Act (Act No. 7 of 1980). Any detention under N.S.A. is barred if the activity of the petitioner is prejudicial in any manner to the maintenance of supply of drugs to the community. It further says that 'for the purposes of this sub-section, the expression acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community' does not indicate acting in any manner prejudicial to maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community as defined in sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Blackmarketing Act. Thus, it is apparent that it connotes an altogether different meaning to the term 'acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community'. From this Explanation, it is apparent that only a case of disruption of supplies is covered bythe Explanation appended to Section 3 of the Blackmarketing Act. So far as N.S.A. is concerned, it takes into its score the supplies and services, maintenance of which is essential to the community. Only in that situation, an order under N.S.A. can be- passed. If it is purely a case of maintenance of supplies and its prejudice by the act of the petitioner, then application of Section 3 of N.S.A. is wholly-barred. But where it not only concerns the 'supplies' but also the 'services' essential to the community, such an order or detention can be passed under the said Act. Dealing with Explanation to Section 3 of the Blackmarketing Act, we find that the Explanation defines the expression 'acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community' means (a) committing or instigating any person to commit any offence punishable under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), or under any other law for the time being in force relating to the control of the production, supply or distribution of, or trade and commerce in any commodity essential to the community : or (b) dealing in any commodity : (i) which is an essential commodity as defined in the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), or (ii) with respect to which provisions has been made in any such other law as is referred to in clause (a), with a view to making gain in any manner which may directly or indirectly defeat or tend to defeat the provisions of that Act or other law aforesaid'. The last two lines of the Explanation are of great importance and magnitude in interpreting the two explanations. So far as an order of detention under Section 3 of the Blackmarketing Act is concerned, it can be passed if a person is indulging into any activity covered by the definition given in clauses (a) and (b) of the Explanation to Section 3 with a view to make a personal gain in any manner, which may directly or indirectly defeat or tend to defeat the provision of the Act or other law aforesaid. Clause (a) to the Explanation talks of Essential Commodities Act or any other law forthe time being in force. Thus, it also takes within its purview the Drugs Act, as amended from time to time and even the Indian Penal Code. Sections 273 and 274. Apart from it, it also takes within its periphery an act of dealing in any commodity, which is essential commodity, as defined by the Essential Commodities Act or with respect to which provision has been made in any such other law, as referred to in clause (a) which means various other acts dealing with such activities, apart from Essential Commodities Act. This leaves no room for any doubt in our mind that an act, which is squarely covered by the instinct of gain in any manner to the businessmen or manufacturer, distributor, etc. it shall be simply covered by the provisions of Section 3 of the Blackmarketing Act.
9. Now, the question that arises for our consideration is whether the activity of the petitioner was simply to earn profit for himself by sate of spurious drugs totally oblivious of its consequences. Should the Courts, while dealing with such a situation, must also ignore the consequences that will flow from such activity of the traders or manufacturers? No, Section 3 of N.S.A. covers such cases. The courts cannot be oblivious to the consequences that will follow the sale of spurious drugs. Section 3 of N.S.A. deals with three contingencies : (a) prejudice to the security of the country, (b) prejudice to the maintenance of public order, and (c) prejudice to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.
10. Law enjoins a duty upon every citizen that he should abide by the law of the land honestly and faithfully. A 'businessman' is a citizen first and a 'businessman' next. As a citizen, it is his duty to be honest in his dealings with the society. By selling spurious drugs, he commits fraud upon the society. The drugs are supplied to the hospitals also and to the common man as well. They are used for amelioration, mitigation, cure and containment of a disease and not to buy another disease or death. The act of sellingspurious drug is made punishable by the Drugs Act. The hospitals are rendering services to the society, be they private, Government or public hospitals. They all are rendering services to the community. Any supply of spurious drug to such institutions is covered by the term 'supplies and services essential to the maintenance of services to the community'. As such, the act of manufacture, storage and sale of spurious drugs fully and squarely is covered by the provisions of Section 3 of N.S.A. The Explanation appended to Section 3 of the Blackmarketing Act covers only one part, i.e., 'trade for gain', whereas the National Security Act covers both 'supplies of essential commodity as well as services'. It cannot be denied that the drugs are not only meant for supply, but also necessary for maintaining services, which are rendered to the society by the hospitals and physicians. Spurious drugs result into untold sufferings to the patients who consume them as drugs. We cannot be oblivious of the situation that many lives are lost due to consumption of spurious drugs and many deformities incur too. Such situations are squarely covered by N.S.A. There is reference, so far as the grounds of detention is concerned, with regard to such loss of lives at hospitals, gherao of the doctors and registration of criminal cases against them. These are the consequences that follow from the manufacture, storage and sale of spurious drugs. It cannot be denied. As a matter of fact by including punitive provisions for manufacture, storage and sale of spurious drugs, the Drugs Act has refused to recognise them as drugs. It has not been contended before us that the samples drawn from the seized drugs were not found spurious on analysis. As already dealt earlier, the Blackmarketing Act deals with any activity in essential commodity, that is open to detention under the said Act, if it is motivated by the instinct of personal gains. The provisions are overlapping. It cannot be said with any certainty that a case like the one at hand cannot be covered by theprovisions of N.S.A. and no order of detention under any eventuality can be passed under this Act and only an order under the Blackmarketing Act can be passed against such offenders.
11. In our opinion, in view of the above discussion, the activities of the petitioner are squarely covered by the definition of Section 3 of N.S.A. The argument, therefore, is wholly untenable. We cannot lose sight of the consequences flowing from such an act. We have already discussed the consequences, that follow such an act, above. Such consequences clearly come within the purview of N.S.A. because it also falls within the purview of disruption in the maintenance of public order as well. Therefore, in our opinion, the judgment delivered by us does not call for any review, in view of the subsequent judgment delivered by a Division Bench of this Court in Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 42309 of 1990 (supra). Otherwise also, we are not competent to review our judgment because of any subsequent decision by this Court.
12. In view of foregoing reasons, this second writ petition is accordingly dismissed.