Judgment:
1. At the outset, this Court may place on the record that it has very carefully read and re-read the order dated February 25, 1994 by which while granting ad interim orders, the Bench made observations for the subsequent Bench to consider whether this may be a matter fit for admission. The Bench was kind enough to leave the matter open for the subsequent Bench considering this writ petition for admission whether there may be a possibility of this matter being referred to a larger Bench. It was left open for this Court to come to its conclusion that the matterneeds an examination by a larger Bench notwithstanding the recommendation of the earlier Bench in its order of February 25, 1994.
2. This Court has also seen the record of the writ petition very carefully and has also seen the decision of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court of their Lordships the Hon'ble S.D. Agarwala and Hon'ble Dr. R.R. Misra, JJ. in Messrs Bhatia Metal Containers Pvt. Ltd v. State of U.P. and Ors. (1990-II-LLJ- 534) (All). This Court has also perused the relevantprovisions of the Factories Act, 1948 as amended in December 1987 by Act No. 20 of 1987.
3. Even if the decision of the Allahabad High Court was not available for the guidance of this Court, which it is otherwise, difficult for this Court to ignore that the issue plainly is whether the plain meaning of an Act of Parliament is to be taken on its face value or the High Court should impliedly legislate to read more meaning than is necessary. There is no occasion for this Court to add more meaning, in reference to the context, to the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948.
4. In fact, there is no issue in the context of the present writ petition which has been made an issue for the recommended consideration of this Court. Therefore, while the Court appreciates: that the matter has been left open whether this Court ought to consider afresh whether the matter needs consideration for a larger Bench, this Court after carefully examining every considerable aspect of the record, is of the opinion that it would be appropriate that the wordings of the relevant Section i.e., 2(n) of the Act, aforesaid, alongwith a decision of a collateral Division is clear. The interpretation as rendered in Messrs Bhatia Metal Containers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is binding on this Court and there are no good or sufficient reasons to disturb it.
5. The State-respondents upon receiving a list of the persons who have ultimate control over the affairs of a factory under the control of the petitioner company drew its attention to the law that the occupier must be a Director. Section 2(n) defines that the expression 'occupier' of a factory means that the person has an ultimate control over the affairs of the factory. The occupier of the factory has been clarified as in the case of the firm or other association of individuals, any one of the individual partners or members thereof, in the case of a factory owned by the Government the person appointed to manage the affairs of the factory by the concerned Government.
6. In the case before the Court, the context is the occupier of a factory of a company. In refer-ence to Clause (n) of Section 2 i.e. to say an occupier in reference to a factory owned or controlled by a company, beyond a reasonable doubt means any one of its Directors so named. Such is also the view of this Court in the matter of Messrs. Bhatia Metal Containers Pvt. Ltd. (supra).
7. As a new economic order sets in to regulate trade, commerce and industry and liberalisation is the theme the economy is eluding State control. But from State control to stricter self control is the logical paradox of a free economy. As industry of other nations moves into ours, to have any one of the named Directors to be the occupier of a factory it is a legislative intent which calls for obligations from the industry from responsible persons. To submit and for the Court to accept that a person other than a Director must continue to be accepted as an occupier of a factory would amount to interpreting a legislation beyond its intent. The Court cannot legislate.
8. By a prerogative writ, the petitioner seeks a relief to appoint a person as an occupier of the factory, other than a Director, who would be an occupier of a factory has been provided in Section 2(n) of the Act. In the case of a company, he would be any one of the Directors. The High Court cannot, in the circumstances of this case, give a relief beyond the law.
9. This writ petition is, thus, not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed. The interim order dated February 25, 1994 is discharged.
10. As this order closed learned counsel for the petitioner made an oral application under Article 134A of the Constitution of India for a Certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court. As this Court has held that the law, in reference to the context, is plain and clear and relief against the law cannot be granted, this is not a matter which involves a substantial question of law which in the opinion of the High Court needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. The Certificate sought is denied.