1. The company petition (C.P. No. 7/2001) filed on 19.12.2000 by Swapna Ghosh, ("the petitioner") under Section 111A of the Companies Act, 1956 ("the Act") seeking directions against M/s. Infosys Technologies Limited ("the Company") for rectification of the register of members in respect of 100 shares covered by share certificate No. 40737 by deleting the name of Shri T.R. Sreenivasa Reddy ("the third respondent") and substituting the name of the petitioner came up for hearing from time to time, but the respondent Nos. 3 to 7 and 11 remained absent, in spite of the notices of hearing sent to them by ordinary post and once by speed post. This Bench ultimately by an order dated 24.11.2003, after setting ex-parte the respondent Nos. 3 to 7 and 11, directed the Company to rectify its register of members by incorporating the name of the petitioner in the place of the third respondent, upon which the latter has come out with the present company applications (C.A. Nos. 21,22&23/2005) on the ground that he did not receive any notice from the Company Law Board with regard to the company petition and claimed the following reliefs: a) to set aside the ex-parte order dated 24.11.2003 passed against the applicant in C.P. No. 7/111A/SRB/2001; b) to condone the delay in filing the application to set aside the ex-parte order dated 24.11.2003; c) to restrain the first respondent from transferring, alienating or in any way disposing 100 equity shares- bearing Certificate No. 40737 together with 700 Bonus shares issued thereon; and d) to restrain the Company or their share transfer agent or depository from entertaining any transfer of the impugned shares pending disposal of the application.
2. Shri V. Venkadasalam, learned counsel appearing for the applicant submitted that the applicant is a shareholder of the Company holding 100 shares, impugned in the company petition. The Company allotted 700 bonus shares in the name of the applicant. When the applicant misplaced the share certificates, he applied for the duplicate share certificates from the Company. In the meanwhile, the first respondent herein filed the present company petition under Section 111A alleging that she had purchased the impugned shares from the fourth respondent and sought appropriate directions for rectification of the register of members of the Company. However, the applicant, though arrayed as the third respondent never received any notice from the CLB with regard to filing of the company petition (C.P.No.7/2001), which came to be allowed on 24.11.2003, with consequential directions for rectification of the register of members of the Company, by removing the name of the applicant in respect of the impugned shares. By virtue of Regulation 21(3) of Company Law Board Regulations, 1991 ("the Regulations") any notice which is required to be served on any person other than a company, shall be served by delivering or tendering a copy thereof to such person or his authorised representative or by prepaid registered post, acknowledgement due addressed to the last known address of such person. This being a special provision will over ride the general one and, therefore, any service of notice and process issued by ordinary post are not in consonance with the Regulations. In this connection, Shri Venkadasalam, learned counsel, relied on Ramchandra Keshav Adke v.Govind Joti Chavare , wherein it has been held that "Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. This rule squarely applies where the whole aim and object of the legislature would be plainly defeated if the command to do the thing in a particular manner did not imply a prohibition to do it in any other". The applicant came to know during the second week of January 2004 about the order passed by this Bench and thereafter immediately obtained copies of the proceedings of this bench and filed an appeal (company appeal No. 17/2005) before the High Court of Karnataka, upon which the High Court was pleased to pass on 15.03.2005 the following order: If for any reason, third respondent before the Company Law Board and the appellant before us is aggrieved by the exparte order passed by the Company Law Board, in our opinion, he can make an appropriate application requesting the Company Law Board to recall their earlier order. Therefore, for the present in our opinion, the appeal filed by the appellant need not be entertained. In view of the above, we decline to entertain the appeal and accordingly, it is rejected.
However, liberty is reserved to the appellant, if he so desires, to make an appropriate application before the Company Law Board, subject to the objection that may be taken up by the respondents herein, to recall the earlier order dated 24.11.2003, ordered accordingly.
The applicant after obtaining certified copy of the order of the High Court of Karnataka on 20.03.2005 filed on 22.03.2005 the present applications without any further delay for recalling the order dated 24.11.2003 of the CLB and other reliefs. Regulation 26 empowers the Bench to set aside the ex-parte order passed against the applicant on such terms as it thinks fit. There is no malafide or deliberate delay as a dilatory tactic on the part of the applicant and, therefore, the'Bench in exercise of its discretion may condone the delay, in tune with the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCS 123. If the delay is not condoned and the company petition is not heard on merits, the applicant will be put into irreparable loss and hardship. Shri V.Venkadasalam, learned counsel, therefore, sought for the reliefs as claimed in the applications.
3. Shri Sibaji Sen, learned senior counsel, while vehemently opposing the applications submitted: This Bench, pursuant to registration of the company petition, by an order dated 26.03.2001, directed the respondents, including the applicant herein, to file their counter within four weeks and rejoinder to be filed by the petitioner within one week thereafter. A certified copy of the order dated 26.03.2001 was forwarded by the Bench Officer, an officer notified by the CLB, to the applicant and other respondents on 27.03.2001 by ordinary post. The company petition came up for hearing from time to time before this Bench. Regulation 21(1) provides that any notice or process to be issued by the Bench may be served by any of the following modes:- (ii) by hand delivery (dasti) through a messenger of the Office of the Bench; (iv) by registered post with acknowledgement due if so required by an order of the Bench; (v) where the Central Government is a party, through the Secretary of the concerned Ministry or Department or through Branch Secretariat of the Ministry of Law or through Standing Counsel of the Central Government; (vi) where the State Government is a party, through the Chief Secretary or the Standing Counsel of the State Government.
Regulation 21(1) prescribing the mode of service of notice and process issued by the Bench overrides Regulation 21(3), by which notices shall be served by delivering a copy thereof to the person concerned or his authorised representative or by prepaid registered post, acknowledgement due to the last known address of such person. By virtue of Regulation 32(viii) the Bench Officer is empowered to dispose of the matters relating to service of notices. Accordingly, the Bench Officer effected service of notices, on the respondents including the applicant for the various hearings, by ordinary post, as borne out by the extract from the despatch register for postal dak maintained by the Bench Office and the report dated 10.09.2004 of the Bench Officer, submitted under the directions of the High Court of Karnataka. Rule 32 of Indian Postal Guide lays down that the object in granting certificates of posting is to afford the public an assurance that the letters and other articles entrusted to messengers for posting have actually been posted; that the articles in respect of which such certificates are issued are not registered and that they are treated exactly in the same manner as if they had been posted in a letter box. This rule indicates that any dispatch of letters or articles by certificate of posting is an ordinary dispatch and not in any way guaranteed by the postal department, as held in Union of India v. Neha Chandrakant Shukla (2003) CPJ 401. Thus, the dispatch of hearing notices to the applicant by ordinary post satisfies the requirement of Regulation 21(1)(iii). All notices were sent to the applicant at "Thippasandra Village, Gunjur Post, Varthur, Anekal Taluk, Bangalore-560 087". . This identical address appears in the present applications before this Bench. It is, therefore, far from doubt that the notices reached its destination at the proper time according to the regular course of business of the post office, and were received by the person to whom it was addressed, as held in Harihar Banerjee v. Ram Shashi Ray AIR (1918)PC Privy Council 102. Similar presumption would apply in the case of a letter containing a notice is proved to have been sent by ordinary post, as held in Union of India v. Kalinga Textiles . A certified copy of the order dated 09.04.2003 fixing the hearing on 06.06.2003 was sent to the applicant on 12.04.2003 by speed post, which tantamounts to registered post, as borne out by the receipt issued by the postal authorities. The notices and certified copy of the order dated 09.04.2003 sent by ordinary post/speed post to the applicant were never returned by the postal department. Hence, it has to be presumed that the notices duly reached the applicant and were received by him as held in Ayisabeevi v.Aboobacker . Moreover, by virtue of illustration (e) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, official acts are presumed to be rightly and duly performed until the contrary is shown.
Section 114, illustration (f) of the Indian Evidence Act enables the Court to presume that the common course of business has been followed in particular case unless it is rebutted. The conduct of men in official and commercial matters is to a very great extent uniform. In such cases there is a strong presumption that the general regularity will not, in any particular instance be departed from, as held in Bhaironprasad v. Lakshmi Narayan Das AIR 1924 Nagpur 385. Under the common law, where acts are of an official nature, or require the concurrence of official persons, a presumption arises in favor of their due execution as held in Harpal Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh AIR 1978 P&H 68. The Bench Officer who is vested with the power to deal with the matter relating to service of notices is presumed to have rightly performed his official acts. In spite of service of the notices and despite the fact that the applicant had full knowledge of the orders made by this Bench from time to time, the applicant deliberately failed to participate in the proceedings, thereby, the Presiding Officer was constrained to dispose of the company petition by an order dated 24.11.2003 recording his statement that "The respondent Nos. 3 to 7 and 11 neither appeared nor filed counter to the company petition, in spite of notices of hearing sent to them from time to time". This statement recorded in the order dated 24.11.2003 cannot be contradicted by an affidavit and other evidence, in support of which the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak "Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. Judgements cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation (Per Lord Atkinson in Somasundaran v. Subramanian AIR 1926 PC136). We are bound to accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgement, as to what transpired in court. We cannot allow the statement of the Judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgement that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well-settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgement of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit and other evidence." and Bank of Bihar v.Mahabir Lal : to show that "where a statement appears in the judgement of a court that a particular thing happened or did not happen before it, it ought not ordinarily to be permitted to be challenged by a party unless of course both the parties to the litigation agree that the statement is wrong, or the court itself admits that the statement is erroneous." Similarly, when there is a dispute as to what happend before a court or tribunal, the statement of the Presiding Officer is generally taken to be correct, as held in Union of India v. T.R. Varma AIR 1957 SC 884. The High Court of Karnataka, on the strength of these principles enunciated by the Supreme Court, did not entertain the appeal preferred by the applicant against the order dated 24.11.2003 of the CLB, but granted liberty to make an appropriate application before the CLB, subject to the objections of the respondent for recalling the impugned order. The applicant failed to file any rejoinder to the counter-affidavit of the first respondent for the instant applications, in which case the averments made in the counter-affidavit stand admitted. There can be admissions by non-traverse as held by the Supreme Court in Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram . Any allegation of fact must either be denied specifically or by a necessary implication or there should be at least a statement that the fact is not admitted. If the plea is not taken in that manner, then the allegation shall be taken to be admitted as held in Lohia Properties (P) Limited v. Atmaram Kumar . It cannot, therefore, be said that the applicant did not receive any notice from the CLB with regard to its proceedings or the ultimate order passed on 24.11.2003. The applicant acted recklessly and the application to recall the order dated 24.11.2003 should not be entertained. The plea of the applicant that he was not aware of the order passed by the CLB and consequently did not file the application within 30 days of passing of the order is absolutely false. The applicant failed to serve on the respondent copy of the application (CA 23/05) seeking the restraint order against the Company and the application is deserved to be dismissed on this ground alone. The learned Senior Counsel pointed out that his client was forced to sell 400 shares out of the total 800 shares held by her pursuant to issue of bonus shares, to meet the litigation expenses and pressed for dismissal of the applications.
4. The respondents 1 & 2 have furnished a statement of affairs regarding the 100 shares of Rs. 10/- each impugned in the company petition. These shares earned bonus shares from time to time aggregating 400 shares and there was stock split, thereby 400 shares became 800 shares of each Rs. 5/-. These shares are held in demat form earned further bonus shares. As per the beneficial holders list provided by the depository as at 22.04.2005, the petitioner's name (in CP 7/2001) is shown in the register as holder of 1000 shares of each Rs. 5/-. These respondents do not have control over these shares, as they are in demat form. However, these respondents will abide by any order which may be passed by this Bench.
5. I have considered the extensive arguments advanced by the learned counsel. The issue that arises for my consideration is whether the applicant has made out sufficient grounds to recall the ex-parte order dated 24.11.2003 and to condone the delay in approaching this Bench, in this behalf? A careful scrutiny of records available before me reveals that the first respondent in these applications filed the company petition on 19.12.2000 seeking directions against the Company and others including the applicant being the third respondent in the company petition for rectification of the register of members of the Company in respect of the impugned shares by deleting the name of the applicant and substituting the name of the first respondent herein.
This Bench by an order dated 26.3.2001 directed the respondents in the company petition including the applicant to file their counter within four weeks and posted the matter for hearing on 11.05.2001. A copy of the order dated 26.03.2001 was sent to among others the applicant on 27.03.2001 by the Bench Officer. None of the parties to the company petition appeared on 11.05.2001 nor filed counter in terms of the order dated 26.03.2001. When the matter came up for hearing on 13.07.2001 the respondents 1 & 2 in the company petition entered appearance, while none of the other respondents including the applicant either appeared or filed the counter. Thereafter, the company petition came up for hearing on several occasions, but the applicant never chose to enter appearance but remained absent, in spite of the notices of hearing sent to them. It may be observed that the eighth respondent entered appearance belatedly on 09.04.2003 who was permitted to file counter after imposing cost of Rs. 7500/- each to the petitioner and the respondents 1 & 2 together. Though the seventh respondent in the company petition failed to appear despite the notice of hearing sent to him, yet on the request of his counsel, he was afforded yet another opportunity to file counter even at the belated stage. However, when the matter came up for hearing on 24.11.2003, the respondent Nos. 3-7 and 11 neither appeared nor filed counter in the company petition notwithstanding the opportunity afforded to them. Consequently, this Bench was constrained to pass the impugned order on 24.11.2003, which is reproduced here below: Heard Shri Sibaji Sen, Senior Advocate for the petitioner and Shri M. Ravi Kumar, Advocate for the eighth respondent. The respondent Nos. 3 to 7 and 11 neither appeared nor filed counter to the Company Petition, in spite of notices of hearing sent to them from time to time. The learned Senior Counsel has filed an application in CA No. 118 of 2003 for amendment of the Company Petition. While the respondents 1 & 2 have not filed counter to this application, the eighth respondent has no objection for allowing this application.
Accordingly, the application in C.A.No. 118 of 2003 is allowed in the facts and circumstances of the case and on the strength of the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel.
It is submitted that the dispute in relation to the impugned shares inclusive of bonus shares amounting to 800 equity shares after sub division has been settled between the petitioner and the eighth respondent who have filed before this Bench the terms of settlement executed between them. The said terms of settlement have been taken on record and form part of this order. Both the petitioner and the eighth respondent are bound by the said terms of settlement. In view of this, the Company will rectify its register of members in respect of the impugned shares by deleting name the third respondent and substituting name of the petitioner therein. As the shares are in dematerialised form, the Company and the petitioners will take appropriate steps ensuring the transfer of the impugned shares in dematerialised form in favor of the petitioner by taking up with the 11^th respondent and any other appropriate authority. In case of any difficulty in implementation of this order, the parties are at liberty to approach this Bench for further directions.
The Bench Officer will forward a copy of the order to all the respondents.
With the above directions, the petition stands disposed of. No order as to costs.
The Bench Officer in terms of the directions of this Bench forwarded on 27.11.2003 a certified copy of the order dated 24.11.2003 to all the respondents to the company petition including the applicant. It is on record that the applicant preferred an appeal against the said order before the High Court of Karnataka in the company appeal No. 17/2005.
The High Court while declining by an order dated 15.03.2005 to entertain the appeal, granted liberty to the applicant to make an application before the CLB subject to the objections that may be taken up by the respondents. The applicant, pursuant to the order of the High Court has come out with the present applications for recalling the exparte order dated 24.11.2003 and for condonation for the delay in not approaching this bench within time. The main grievance of the applicant is that he did not receive any notice from the CLB with regard to the filing of the company petition and ultimately the impugned order dated 24.11.2003 came to be passed without hearing him in the matter. In this connection, the report dated 10.09.2004 submitted by the Bench Officer in terms of the directions of the High Court on service of notices on the third respondent assumes relevance, which is reproduced here below: With reference to your memo dated 27.08.2004, requesting the Company Law Board to furnish the particulars of notices sent to third respondent in C.P. No. 7/111A/SRB/2001, I am directed to state that after registration of the petition, chamber order was made on 26.03.2001 directing the respondents to file their counter within four weeks and petitioner to file rejoinder within the one week.
Thereafter, in the said order the matter was posted for hearing on 11.05.2001. A certified copy of the order dated 26.03.2001 was sent to all the parties (including third respondent) by ordinary post on 27.03.2001 (copy of proof of dispatch is enclosed and marked as Annexure -A) The matter came up for hearing on 11.05.2001 and the Bench adjourned the matter to 13.07.2001 as none appeared for the petitioner and respondents. A certified copy of the order dated 11.05.2001 was sent to nil the parties (including the third respondent) by ordinary post on 17.05.2001 (copy of proof of dispatch is enclosed and marked as Annexure-B) When the matter came up for hearing on 13.07.2001, only counsel of the petitioner and first respondent were present at hearing. The matter was adjourned to 19.10.2001. A certified copy of the order dated 13.07.2001 was sent to all the parties (including third respondent) by ordinary post on 18.07.2001 (copy of proof of dispatch is enclosed and marked as Annexure-C).
Due to administrative reasons, the hearing posted on 19.10.2001 was postponed to 08.11.2001. However, the hearing notice was sent only to the petitioner's counsel and counsel for the first respondent company and not to other parties.
At the hearing held on 08.11.2001 counsel for first respondent Company entered appearance for second respondent (M/s. Karvy Consultants Limited) also. Besides counsel for first and second respondents, counsel for the petitioner and counsel for the eleventh respondent (Vysya Bank Limited) were also present. The petition was adjourned to a date to be notified in due course.
The matter was posted for hearing on 13.02.2002 and the hearing notice was sent to all the parties (including third respondent) on 17.01.2002 by ordinary post (copy of proof of dispatch is enclosed and marked as Annexure -D). However, due to administrative reasons the hearing posted on 13.02.2002 was postponed to 26.02.2002 and the hearing notice was sent to all parties (including third respondent) on 31.01.2002 by ordinary post (copy of proof of dispatch is enclosed and marked as Annexure-E).
At the hearing held on 26.02.2002 counsel for petitioner, respondents 1 & 2, respondent 7 and eleventh respondent were present. The matter was adjourned to a date to be notified later.
The matter was posted for hearing on 09.10.2002 and hearing notice was sent to all the parties (including third respondent) on 18.09.2002 by ordinary post, (copy of proof of dispatch is enclosed and marked as Annexure-F). On 09.10.2002 the matter was adjourned to a date to be notified in due course.
The matter was posted for hearing on 09.04.2003 and the hearing notice was sent to all the parties (including third respondent) on 17.03.2003 by ordinary post. (copy of proof of dispatch is enclosed and marked as Annexure-G).
At the hearing held on 09.04.2003 counsel for petitioner, respondents 1 & 2 and the director of seventh respondent were present. The matter was adjourned to 06.06.2003. A certified copy of the order dated 09.04.2003 was sent to all the parties (including third respondent) by speed post on 12.04.2003 (copy of proof of dispatch is enclosed and postal department receipt for speed post are enclosed and marked as Annexure-H).
Due to administrative reasons the hearing on 06.06.2003 was postponed to 27.06.2003 and the notice was sent to all the parties (including third respondent) by ordinary post on 12.05.2003 (copy of proof of dispatch is enclosed and marked as Annexure-I).
At hearing held on 27.06.2003 counsel for petitioner and representative of eighth respondent were present. The matter was adjourned to a date to be notified later.
The matter was posted on 05.09.2003 and the notice was sent to all the parties (including third respondent) by ordinary post on 13.08.2003 (copy of proof of dispatch is enclosed and marked as Annexure-J).
At hearing held on 05.09.2003 counsel for petitioner, respondents 1 & 2 and eighth respondent were present. The matter was adjourned to 24.11.2003. A certified copy of order dated 05.09.2003 was sent to all the parties (including third respondent) by ordinary post on 18.09.2003 (copy of proof of dispatch is enclosed and marked as Annexure-K).
On 24.11.2003 the matter was disposed of, in terms of settlement entered into between petitioner and eighth respondent. A certified copy of the order dated 24.11.2003 was sent to all the parties (including third respondent) by ordinary post on 27.11.2003 (copy of proof of dispatch is enclosed and marked as Annexure-L) except counsel for the petitioner and respondents 1 & 2 who have been furnished with said order copy along with certified copy of the settlement memo in person.
It is to be noted that the notices sent by ordinary post as well as certified copy of the order dated 09.04.2003 sent by speed post to the third respondent (Shri T.R. Srinivasa Reddy) were never returned by the postal department.
It is beyond doubt that notices were sent by the Bench Officer to the third respondent for the various hearings from time to time on eleven occasions by ordinary post and once by speed post. It is observed that the hearings of the Bench on 19.10.2001, 13.02.2002 and 06.06.2003 were cancelled due to administrative exigencies, thereby postponing the hearing to 08.11.2001, 26.02.2002 and 27.06.2003 respectively. It is on record that the hearing notices were sent, inter-alia, to the applicant for those postponed hearings also except for the hearing held on 08.11.2001 by ordinary post. The notices were found to be sent to the applicant at "Thippasandra village, Gunjar Post, Varthur, Anekal Taluk, Bangalore-560 087. A certified copy of the order dated 24.11.2003 was sent to the applicant on 27.11.2003 at the same address. The despatch register for postal dak maintained by Bench Office clearly indicates that the hearing notices on the various dates furnished in the report dated 10.09.2004 were sent to the applicant. The dispatch register discloses the amount incurred for sending those notices to the applicant. In the light of illustration (e) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, the official acts of the Bench Officer, in the absence of contrary established by the applicant, are presumed to be duly performed as held in Bhaironprasad v. Lakshmi Narayan Das and Bhairav v. Luxmi (supra). The Bench Officer vested with the power to deal with the matter relating to service of notices is presumed to have rightly performed his official acts as held in Harpal Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh (supra). The first respondent in her counter affidavit while opposing the application set out the entire details of service of notice effected by the Bench Officer in terms of his report submitted before the High Court of Karnataka. The applicant has not chosen to deny any of the averments made categorically in regard to the service of notices by the Bench Officer. The learned counsel appearing for the applicant while advancing his arguments neither denied these averments. It is thus, the specific averments made in the counter-affidavit of the first respondent on the service of notices as borne out by records stand non-traversed either specifically or by a necessary implication, in which case, those allegations shall be taken to be admitted as held in Ramesh Kumar v. Kasho Ram and Lohia Properties (P) Limited v. Atmaram Kumar (supra). Against this background the specific averments of the applicant made in his application deserve to be considered which read thus "The Applicant states that the Applicant did not receive any notice from this Hon'ble Board with regard to the filing of this Company Petition and ultimately, on 24.11.2003 this Company Petition was allowed and consequential directions were issued to rectify the Register of Members. Only during the 2nd week of January, 2004, the Petitioner came to know about the order passed by this Hon'ble Board and immediately, the Applicant had obtained the copies of the proceedings of this Hon'ble Board and filed an appeal, Company Appeal No. 17 of 2005 before the High Court of Karnataka against the order of the Company Law Board, The said appeal came up for hearing on 15.03.2005 and the Hon'ble High Court has passed the following order". The plea taken by the applicant that he did not receive any notice from this Bench is quite bald and nothing but abuse of process of law. The applicant has not indicated as to how he came to know about the impugned order made by this Bench, in the absence of which the theory of non-receipt of hearing notice by the applicant is unconvincing. The applicant never contended that the Bench Office did not send any notice of hearing to him. His only grievance is that he did not receive the notices. By virtue of Regulation 21(1), any notice or process to be issued by the Bench may be served by, inter-alia, certificate of posting, which is "an ordinary dispatch" as laid down in Rule 32 of Indian Postal Guide and affirmed by the Gujarat State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in Union of India v. Neha Chandrakant Shukla. It is on record that the notices were sent by ordinary post to the applicant several times and once by speed post on 12.04.2003 duly stamped at his proper address as borne out by the records on record already elaborated elsewhere. In these circumstances the legal presumption is that those notices reached the destination as held in Harihar Banerjee v. Ram Shashi Ray and Union of India v.Kalinga Textiles (supra). The notices sent to the applicant were never returned by the postal authorities, in which case, the notices were received by him, as held in Ayisabeevi v. Aboobakcer (supra). Against this background, the assertion of the applicant in his counter affidavit dated 16.08.2005 that he was not served with notice of the company petition by the first respondent's advocate is not justified, more so, when the Bench Officer had forwarded by ordinary post a copy of the order dated 26.03.2001 of the Bench directing all respondents, including the applicant to file their counter within four weeks, as borne by the dispatch register maintained by the Bench Office. The Regulations prescribe different modes of service of notice with the sole object of ensuring proper service of notice upon the concerned parties. I find that there is substantial compliance with the Regulations, especially when notices have been sent as many as eleven times by ordinary post and once by speed post to the applicant at proper address. Any letter sent by speed post is deemed to have been sent by registered post. The applicant cannot contend on mere technicality that the notices were not sent by registered post, acknoweldgement due as contemplated in Regulation 21(3). The decisions cited supporting the claim of the applicant do not go in his aid, in the facts of the present case. While disposing the company petition by an order dated 24.11.2003, it is categorically recorded by this Bench that "The respondent Nos. 3 to 7 and 11 neither appeared nor filed counter to the company petition, in spite of notices of hearing sent to them from time to time." These statements, being matters of judicial record, cannot be now challenged as held in State of Maharashtra v.Ramdas Srinivas NayakUnion of India v. T.R.Varma and Bank of Bihar v.Mahabir Lal (supra). I am, therefore, of the considered view that the applicant has not given any sufficient ground for recalling the ex-parte order made by this Bench and for condoning the delay in filing the present application within time. Accordingly these applications are dismissed.