A.P. Misra, J.
1. We have already passed the operative portion of the order in open court on 25th October, 1989, and are giving reasons for the same by means of the present judgment.
2. Abhishekh Malviya alias Munnu has filed the present Habeas Corpus petition for a direction for setting the petitioner at liberty forthwith and for quashing his detention order dated 30th November, 1988.
3. According to the petitioner, police of police station Attarsuiya, Allahabad, due to pre-existing enmity got a false Case Crime No. 197 of 1988 under Section 297, I.P.C. registered on 22nd September, 1988. While the petitioner was in jail after his arrest in the aforesaid crime the local police obtained orders for his preventive detention from the District Magistrate, Allahabad under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The aforesaid order of detention was served on the petitioner in jail on 1st December, 1988, Grounds of detention of the petitioner are as follows :--
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4. According to the petitioner, the order detention was passed by the detaining authority without applying his mind. The petitioner challenged the said detention order on a number of grounds.
5. Against the aforesaid detention order of the petitioner sent his representations to the District Magistrate, Allahabad the State Government and also the Union of India. He was informed on the 5th January, 1989, from the Governor of U.P. that his representation had been rejected by the State Government. Similarly he received information on 25th January, 1989, from the Union of India that the Central Government has also rejected his representation. According to the petitioner he was not given proper hearing by the Advisory Board. On behalf of the State Government a very eminent legally equipped Government official appeared along with all the relevant documents relating to the detention of the petitioner but petitioner was not given assistance of a legal expert.
6. A counter-affidavit has been filed by the Joint Secretary to the State Government, Home (Confidential) Department, Lucknow, on behalf of the detaining authority Sri K.N. Bhatnagar, the then District Magistrate, Allahabad (since deceased on 27th June, 1989) as the petitioner's matter was dealt with by the aforesaid officer at the level of the State Government and he had perused the record of the detaining authority. In the said counter-affidavit he has stated that the detention order was passed on the 20th November, 1988, on the basis of the material on the record and it was valid order under the aforesaid Act and was served on the detenu on the 1st December, 1988, in Jail
7. The petitioner has challenged the detention order inter alia, on the following grounds :
1. Inordinate delay was caused by the authorities in considering his representation and that is sufficient for ordering release of the petitioner.
2. The detention order is discriminatory in nature as no such order has been passed against the other two-accused, who had the same role in the same incident and thus the order is liable to be quashed.
3. Even though on behalf of the State Government legal experts were permitted to argue before the Advisory Board, but the same facility was not made available to the detenu and thus the order of detention is liable to be quashed.
4. Relevant materials were not placed before the detaining authority and as such there was no proper application of mind of the detaining authority.
5. Admittedly, the petitioner was in judicial custody and there was no material that there was likelihood of his conning out of jail or that he is either a habitual offender or he would repeat the offence in future.
6. That the grounds of detention since based one incident could not constitute the case of public order but at the most law and order.
8. The first ground of challenge to the detention order that inordinate delay was caused by the authority in considering his representation had been stated in paragraph 6 of the writ petition. According to the petitioner on the 9th December, 1988 and 14th December, 1988, he made the representations, but only he got the information on the 5th January, 1989, from the Governor of U. P. that his representation had been rejected by the Governor of U.P. and on 25th January, 1989, he received information that his representation has been rejected by the Central Government. In the counter-affidavit, it has been asserted that the petitioner made a representation on the 14th December, 1988 and since his representation contained few assertions against administration and various officials, it was sent for the comments to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad, and the comment dated 21st December, 1988, from the Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad, was received in the office of the detaining authority on 23rd December, 1988. Thereafter, the detaining authority along with his own comment sent the same to the State Government on 24th December, 1988. It has been asserted that the aforesaid few days taken by the police authorities (S.S.P.'s office) was on account of they being lawfully pre-occupied with the arrangements of Mahakumbh. In the counter-affidavit filed by Sri Chandpal Singh on. behalf of State of U. P. it has been averred that the aforesaid papers were received in the concerned section in the State Government on the 26th December, 1988, which was examined and was put up with detailed notes on the 28th December, 1988, on which date the Joint Secretary (Home) and Special Secretary (Home) examined the said representation. The Home Secretary put up a note on 29th December, 1988 and finally the representation of the petitioner was rejected by the State Government on 4th January, 1989, which was communicated to the petitioner though the district authorities on 5th January, 1989. From these facts it is revealed that it cannot, be said that any inordinate delay was caused by the respondents in disposing of the representation of the petitioner.
9. In Babul Mitra v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1973 SC 197 : (1974 Cri LJ 395) it was held:
'When the State of West, Bengal at the relevant time of the detention of the detenu was pre-occupied with the colossal refugee problem and there was also a spurt of extremists activities engaging attention of the State Government, one month's delay by the State Government in considering detenu's representation did not constitute inordinate delay.'
Applying the principle in this case coupled with the explanation of the respondents that few days delay was caused on account of the police administration being busy with Mahakumbh and thus delay in this case for less than one month, cannot be said that there was any inordinate delay indisposing of the representation of the petitioner.
10. The second ground of attack is that the authorities have discriminated between the petitioner other co-accused of the same activity when the preventive detention order was passed only as against the petitioner and not against the other co-accused. According to the petitioner, the case set up by the respondents against the petitioner is identical to the case of other two co-accused. The argument is unsustainable. In view, even if there may be more than one accused of the same incident but passing of the order under preventive detention law is entirely on different criteria. It be in a given case the activity may constitute only law and order but if there be other circumstances of the case which in law is permissible to the detaining authority to take into account the background, the history of a particular accused, his tendency to commit a crime or other permissible circumstances, then even if there be more than one accused of an incident it, is open for the detaining authority to pass the order of preventive detention only as against one on its subjective satisfaction. It may be there is likelihood of only such an accused to commit crime in future also. In the present case, according to the learned counsel for the respondents the background of the petitioner was taken into consideration which was not present in other accused and, therefore, it cannot be said the action of the respondents in passing the order of preventive detention as against the petitioner was discriminatory. We would not like to express any opinion whether the material relied as background was available to the detaining authority for its subjective satisfaction or if available was permissible for his subjective satisfaction or not since it is a matter which we shall be dealing under another head. Apart from this we feel that the petitioner, in this case, cannot say that there was any discrimination between the petitioner and other co-accused as according to the case set up on behalf of the respondents the case of the petitioner stands entirely on different footing which was not with the other co-accused.
11. The third ground of challenge is that before the Advisory Board hearing was given to the State Government though a very eminent legally equipped Government official, while the petitioner was deprived of the same and thus in effect he could not truly represent his case before the advisory Board and thus the order of detention is liable to be set aside on this ground alone. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of U.P. Advisory Board it has been asserted that the petitioner made oral submissions before the Board and they were duly considered by the Board while submitting its report. It has been denied that any legal practitioner including S.P.O. was allowed to appear before the Board on behalf of the State or the district administration and only official/officials of the State Government and officers of the district administration are allowed to appear before the Board for the purpose of producing the records and answering the querries made by the Board which was done in this case also. The Board gave patient hearing to the detenu who appeared in person. The aforesaid version belies the case of the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied in the case A.K. Roy v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 710 at p. 747 : (1982 Cri LJ 340 at p. 376), in which it was held:--
'We must, therefore, hold regretfully though, that the detenu has no right to appear through a legal practitioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board. It is, however, necessary to add an important caveat...permitting the detaining authority or the Govt. to appear before the Advisory Board with the aid of a legal practitioner or a legal advisor would be in breach of Article 14, if a similar facility is denied to the detenu. We must, therefore, make it clear if the detaining authority or the Govt. takes the aid of a legal Advisory Board, the detenu must be allowed the facility of appearing before the Board through a legal practitioner....'
The aforesaid principle is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the counter-affidavit, as aforesaid, it has been denied that any legal expert or legal advisory appeared before the Advisory Board. Only officer brought the records on behalf of district administration of the State Government and they merely answered certain querries put by the Advisory Board. In view of this it cannot be said that any denial of right as envisaged in the aforesaid decision was made in the present case. Thus, even this ground as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not sustainable.
12. So far as grounds Nos. 4, 5 and 6 are concerned they could be conveniently dealt with under one head thus we are accordingly deciding it together.
13. Under ground No. 5 it was contended that since the petitioner was already under judicial custody and the date- the detention order was passed, viz. 30th November, 1988, the petitioner had not even moved an application. Thus, the recital in the detention order that there was likelihood of the detenu being released was a consideration which is not borne out from the record and thus consideration was based on non-existent material and that his satisfaction vitiates. It is not in dispute in the present case that the detention order was passed on 30th November, 1988, and the petitioner moved for bail on the 1st December, 1988. In paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit filed by the aforesaid Sri Harish Chandra Chaudhary it has been asserted that the detaining authority was informed about the fact and the grounds of detention itself recite that the effort was being made for getting the petitioner released on bail. It was contended on behalf of the respondent-State that the detaining authority was well aware that on the facts of this case the petitioner was likely to be granted bail and thus even if in fact no bail application is moved by the detenu can invalidate the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority on the facts and circumstances of this case looking to the crime and the injury caused that there is likelihood of the detenu being granted bail. The argument on behalf of the State has substance. While exercising powers under preventive detention law the satisfaction of the detaining authority that there is likelihood of any detenu being enlarged on bail need not base only after an application for bail is moved by the detenu, even if otherwise on the facts and circumstances of the case the detaining authority is satisfied that there is likelihood of the detenu being enlarged on bail looking to the said facts and circumstances of the case could pass an order of preventive detention and thus the argument on behalf of the petitioner that the said satisfaction was based on non-existent material cannot be accepted. The detaining authority was aware of the crime, the incident, injuries and if on the said basis a subjective satisfaction was recorded that there was likelihood of his being enlarged on bail cannot be said to be illegal.
14. It is contended that there was no material before the detaining authority that there is a likelihood of the petitioner repeating the offence even in future except the sole incident and on the contrary the material placed before the authority were not relevant material, viz., the past history of the petitioner and further the materials in the crime reports as against the petitioner were all these in which either the petitioner was not an accused or was acquitted or discharged and thus fact of acquittal or discharge having not been placed, the authorities thus deliberately withheld the relevant material and thus the satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority suffers from patent illegality and is liable to be set aside. It was further contended in the present case, the order of detention was passed only on the basis of one incident dated 22nd September, 1988, by looking to the said incident it cannot be said, it is a case of public order. At the most, it could be said to be a case of law and order and thus order of detention in liable to be set aside.
15. As we have said above all the aforesaid being interlinked material, we first propose to proceed to decide whether the aforesaid incident constitutes public order or only law and order. Catena of decisions were placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner to support his case. Preventive detention is an exception to the normal procedure. In fact, it is a sanction and authorised to be exercised for a very limited purpose under Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution of India with many safeguards. It is on this ground repeatedly that various Courts while pronouncing judgment whether a particular fact constitutes a 'public order' or 'law and order' have made it clear that each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances of that case. The object for passing the preventive detention law has been to maintain tranquillity and well being of the society. It is in this background that the preventive detention law being hard law the Courts have always considered (sic) taken into consideration that the liberty of a person not jeopardised unless the circumstances squarely fall within the four corners of the laws authorising preventive detention.
16. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the activity in this case is confined to one incident dt. 22nd September, 1988 in which there is no allegation that the petitioner was doing any illegal act and in spite of challenge by the patrolling police party undaunted they continued to do the said illegal act, resisting the authority of the police and thus creating a panic or terror in the society. In this case even the grounds of detention reveal that on seeing the patrol police party the petitioner along with other two co-accused merely tried to escape and further feeling that they are surrounded, to facilitate the escape they hurled bombs and used fire-arm on the police party. He was not terrorising public at large, which may have any impact on the tempo of the community. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondents, learned Government Advocate urged that mere attack on the police party causing injury itself constitutes a case of 'public order' and this by itself is sufficient for passing the order of preventive detention.
17. For the petitioner reliance was placed on the cases: Ajay Dixit v. State of U.P., AIR 1985 SC 18 : (1985 Cri LJ 487) relevant grounds of detention in that case, are quoted below:--
'2. That on date 27-9-82 at 3.10 a.m., you collected goondas in your house in the town of Ferozabad and when the police party reached in order to arrest the goondas you fired at the police party on which a case against you under Section 307/34 of Indian Penal Code is pending the trial in the Court.
3. That on date 27-9-82 you were arrested by the police in the town of Ferozabad and a country made Tamancha and two live cartridges without licence were recovered from your possession in respect of which a case against you under Section 25/27 of Arms Act is pending the trial in the Court.'
Held...in certain criminal charges mentioned in grounds numbers 2, 3, 4 and 5, there is no difficulty in arresting the detenu. The grounds mentioned therein are not of such magnitude as to amount to apprehend disturbance of public order, nor was there any evidence that for any conduct of the detenu public order was endangered, or, there could be reasonable apprehension about it....'
Gulab Mehra v. State of U.P., AIR 1987 SC 2332 : (1988 Cri LJ 168), relevant ground No. 2 of detention in that case is quoted below:--
'On 3-10-1986, the appellant armed with illegal bombs went towards Uttam Talkies, Kydganj, Allahabad with the intention of committing serious offence. On information being received, the police went to arrest the appellant. That the appellant with the intention to kill lobbed a bomb but the police party escaped it by a hair's breadth and the bomb exploded. As a result of this there was a stampede in the public, the doors and windows of the houses and shops closed down, the traffic stopped and the people were terror-striken. The police arrested appellant on the spot and recovered 3 illegal bombs from the appellant.'
Held...'on considering these decisions, we are constrained to hold that the clamping of the order of detention is not in accordance with the provisions of the Act.'
Apart from this in this case it was held that the detaining authority has not filed any affidavit but was filed only by a police officer. The Court held that the detention order was invalid.
18. Sharad Kumar Tyagi v. State of U.P., AIR 1989 SC 764 : (1989 Cri LJ 830). This was a case where the detenu threatened to shoot shopkeepers of locality if they failed to give him money and terror striken shopkeepers closed their shops. The activities of the accused in such circumstances was held to be a case of public order. However, reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on this case since reference was made in this case of the case of Gulab Mehra (1988 Cri LJ 168) (supra). The relevant portion is quoted hereunder:--
'Thus from these observations it is evident that an act whether amounts to a breach of law and order or a breach of public order solely depends on its extent and reach to the society. If the act is restricted to particular individuals or a group of individuals it breaches the law and order problem but if the effect and reach and potentiality of the act is so deep as to affect the community at large and/or the even tempo of the community then it becomes a breach of the public order.'
Gulab Mehra's case (supra) upon which reliance was placed in Sharad Kumar Tyagi's case (supra), we find, the facts mentioned therein were quite different. The ground of detention in that case pertained to the detenu demanding money from shopkeepers of Khallasi Line, but no shop keeper had come forward to complain about the detenu and only the picket employed at the police station had made a report. The second ground related to the detenu hurling bomb at the police party in order to evade his arrest. It was in these circumstances this Court deemed it appropriate to quash the order of detention. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the facts in the case of Gulab Mehra (supra) are similar to the facts of the present case as in this case no witness has come forward regarding the closure of the shop, and further even in that case bombs were thrown at the police party as in the present case.
19. Subhash Bhandari v. District Magistrate, 1988 All Cri C p. 48 : (1988 Cri LJ 190) (SC). This was relied upon that even in this case commotion, closure of shops etc, was mentioned in the activity found in the ground of detention. The Court held that it was a case of law and order and not public order.
20. Zaki Ahmad v. State of U.P., 1988 All Cri C 172 : (1988 All LJ 453). According to the petitioner this is also a case of firing on a police party and panic created in the people, yet it was held that it was a case of law and order and not public order, and it was further held:--
'The learned counsel for the petitioner has also urged before us that acts attributed to the petitioner related to law and order problem and not to a public order. Whereas we are satisfied that the incident which took place on 26-6-87 and in which the petitioner had fired a shot at the police party did not relate to a public order but was purely a matter of law and order because it was confined to police only and could have no impact upon a large section of the community....'
21. On the other hand, on behalf of the State, the Deputy Government Advocate relied on the following decision. In S.C. Bose v. District Magistrate, Burdwan, AIR 1972 SC 2481 : (1973 Cri LJ 764). Relevant ground No. 2 in that case is quoted hereunder.
'2. Following a series of interparty clashes on 8-10-71 curfew orders were promulgated under Section 144, Cr.P.C. in D.S.P. Township between 6 p.m. and 5 a.m. with effect from 8-10-71. On 12-10-71 during the curfew hours at about 20-15 hours you along with your associates Pulal Chandra Das and others belonging to CPI (M) being armed with lethal weapons like bombs, knives etc., attacked lorry No. WGP 535 in which police party under the leadership of H.C./1209 Anil Kumar Samata of B. Zone O.P. was on patrol duty. You hurled bomb aiming the police party with a view to kill them near street No. 1 of Tilak Road. The bomb missed them and it exploded on the road. The police party after the explosion chased you and your, associates and could arrest you and 2 others, while others fled away. On search one knife and a cycle chain was recovered from possession of Samaresh Bose. Your act was intended to cow down the police and your political opponents by terror for promoting the objectives of the party to which you belong. By attempting to murder police personnel engaged in maintenance of public order in the residential township area within curfew period, you created a sense of panic and insecurity in the minds of local people to such an extent that they were hesitant to pursue their normal avocations for a considerable period after the incident.'
It was held in this case that the petitioner and his associates had indulged in acts prima facie designed to terrorise people, to over-awe their political opponents and to cow down the police force and bring a halt to the machinery of law and order, and thus the Court justified the order of detention. This was a case where the detenu following the series of inter-parties clashes during curfew period attacked the lorry of the police party which was on the patrol duty. This was a case where the detenu undeterred and in spite of curfew attacked on the police party.
22. In Ramesh Roy v. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1972 SC 1678 : (1972 Cri LJ 1024), the detenu was committing the theft of rice from railway wagon at the Railway Station Yard, hurled bombs upon the Railway Protection Force party who was on duty with a view to do away their lives when challenged by them, and thus created panic in the said area and the adjoining locality. It was again a case where the detenu has attacked the Railway Protection Force while committing theft in the Railway wagon.
23. In Kanu Biswas v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1972 SC 1656 : (1972 Cri LJ 1006) the detenu armed with bombs, daggers, knives and iron rods etc. attacked police on the platform at Beligghata railway station with a view to take their lives and to intimidate the public charged two bombs which exploded with terrible sound endangering the on-duty police and this action was so violent that it created panic and confusion among the passengers there. Apart from this, the ground No. 1 contained an allegation that the detenu attacked a passenger and his wife with a open knife in a third class compartment of the railway train. It was in these conditions it was held to be a case of public order. This was a case where bombs were hurled at the Railway platform in order to create panic in public.
24. In Babul Mitra v. State of West Bengal and Ors., AIR 1973 SC 197 : (1974 Cri LJ 395) it was held:--
'The activity of detenu in having a bomb and in attempting to throw it on police personnel at the time of his arrest is bound to affect public order. That would disturb the even tempo of the community life.'
In this case, at the time of arrest of the detenu by the police personnel he had a bomb at his hand. He made an attempt to throw the bomb on the police personnel at the time of his arrest with a view to killing them. It is significant in this case it was held:--
'....The scene of the activity of the petitioner in the first ground is a public school. We have already held that that ground is connected with public order. The victims of the petitioner's activity in the second ground are the police personnel. They are public servants incharge of maintenance of law and order in the community. The scene of action in the second ground is located within the area of the Police Station Moynaguri. The scene of action in the first ground is also Moynaguri. The two grounds read together disclose the petitioner's concerted scheme of making public institutions and public servants the target of his violence. This scheme sheds light on the potentiality of the second ground. The activity specified in the second ground is bound to affect public order.'
Thus, in the facts and circumstances of this case it was held that the aforesaid ground constitutes public order.
25. In Shiv Shanker v. Incharge Police Station Hasanganj, Lucknow, 1985 All LJ 132 the detenu fired at the police party. In this case the Court held that the firing at the police party and on a person who has appeared as a witness disturb public peace and such acts cannot be termed as mere law and order affairs, and detention on those grounds was , held to be valid. It was further held that on the basis of two incidents -- one firing at the police party and. the other firing at the witnesses -- taken cumulatively it would be a case of public order. Relevant portion is quoted hereunder:--
'....We are in the circumstances satisfied that these two incidents at least to have the effect of causing disturbance to public order and cannot be termed as mere 'law and order' affairs.'
26. In Kali Charan v. State of U.P., 1985 All LJ 1151, it was held that the incident of opening fire at police party at public place involves breach of public order. Ground No. 2 in that case is relevant. In this case the detenu and others were trying to raise illegal constructions on the Janam Bhumi near Keshav Dev temple in the city of Mathura and even when the police party arrived at the spot to check the illegal activity they resisted and in order to continue it undeterred in order to kill notice personnel opened fire at the police party.
27. Learned counsel for the State further argued that reliance on behalf of the petitioner in the case of Ajay Dixit (1985 Cri LJ 487) (supra) is not applicable since in that case there was no evidence that any public order was disturbed while in the present case as per report of the police personnel there was closure of shops and commotion in the area.
28. For the State, reliance was placed in the case of State of U.P. v. Kamal Kishore Saini, AIR 1988 SC 208 : (1988 Cri LJ 405). It was a case where firing was made by the detenu on the undertrial prisoner in the Court premises while the said undertrial was being taken to jail by the police men. In this situation, it was held, it would create panic and terror in the minds of persons present there and thus it affects the tempo of the life of the community and thus it was held that, it affects public order and not merely law and order. The facts in that case are different from the facts of our case.
29. From catena of decisions cited by the learned counsel bomb or firing at the police party by itself may or may not constitute to public order and the Court has to examine facts of each case in order to come to the conclusion whether it is a case of public order or law and order. In order to draw an inference whether a particular activity amounts to breach of law and order or breach of public order depends on its extent and reach to the society. So long it is restricted to a particular individual or a group of individuals it breaches the law and order problem but if the effect and reach and potentiality of the act is so deep as to affect the community at large or even tempo of the community then it becomes breach of the public sector. Thus, whether an act is law and order or public order depends upon the impact of the act on the life of the community or in other words the reach and effect and potentiality of the act if so put as to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community.
30. The society today is so interlinked that many of the acts though constituting an offence against individual if committed in the public place it creates panic and terror to the people of that locality. It disturbs not only the harmony of the society, but it affects the tempo of the community. Law of preventive detention deprives of a man of his liberty without formulation of charge and also without trial. It is also based on reasonable probability which may not be warranted by the legal evidence. Thus, it is, in fact, in contradiction to the punitive detention. It is for this reason the object of preventive detention is not to punish a person for having committed any offence but to check him from doing so in future to prevent disorder of the society. The Constitution envisages life, liberty and pursuit of happiness of every individual. However, the same is...subject to the reasonable restrictions. Though the law of punitive detention provides for elaborate investigation, inquiry and trial and punish a person whose offence is proved on the basis of legal evidence, but the legislature still felt there may be classes of cases where trial of such person obtaining conviction therein may take a long and such person could not be kept under detention as there is likelihood of his being enlarged on bail and the activity of such person is such which if not prevented would create disorder in the public thus law were framed for preventive detention. It is in this light Courts have to examine each case on its own facts and circumstances, the effect of the activity in that set up and its impact and its reach on the community and then the Court has to come to the conclusion whether it is a case of law and order or public order.
31. One of the broad criteria for judging this is to see whether the activity of the detenu is such which is done with open defiance and the defiance is such that it creates terror in the vicinity and/or creates panic in the mind of the public that he would not desist from committing the offence even in future and fear in the mind of the public should be such that if they tried to resist such an act would be detenu's offensive to the public at large would be unabated.
32. In our opinion, mere closure of the shops or commotion in the absence of any evidence or statement under Section 161 need not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is a case of public order. It would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case whether the act was such as it creates panic and terror in the minds of the public that the detenu would unleash his activity endangering the life of the people of the community or disturb the life of the community if resisted. It is for this reason we have found in the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the parties two sets of cases one where attack on the police party was to constitute as a case of public order while in the other where it did not. Thus, as a general proposition it would not be right to lay down that the mere attack on the police party would constitute a case of public order.
33. One of the instincts of the human being whether he is an offender or not is to try to escape from the unpleasant clutches of the persons who are likely to catch him, even by using some force, and in a given case may be using the weapon which may be in his hand: However, if a person is committing an offence and while being in process is challenged by the police party and he persists with the illegal activity or acts in a manner to openly defy the police and throws challenge to the police and uses the weapon including the bomb, fire-arm at a public place then this would be a case of open definance which would create terror and panic in the minds of the public. Here detenu is not only showing his open definance but asserting his authority that he had no fear even of the State Authority which is the final protective authority of the people at large. Similarly, where a detenu is already in the police custody, uses force either by throwing bomb or using any other lethal weapon on the police at a public place will again be a case where the detenu is showing his authority over the police force openly in a public place, which is bound to create panic and terror in the minds of the public. Similarly, if the detenu hides and waits for a police party in order to attack either to take revenge or remove the hurdle for commtting future offence would again be a case of public order, or where bomb is thrown at an accused in police custody while being taken to the Court either to get his release or to kill him or even throwing bomb at a witness who is going to the court for giving his testimony in a case would all be a case of public order.
34. There may be another class of cases where the detenu without any of the aforesaid intention on seeing that they are surrounded by the police and unless they make good their escape they would be caught and if while attempting to escape uses his weapon including throwing of bomb or fire-arm then such an act by itself unless it is coupled with other circumstances would not constitute a case of public order. Here the detenu has no intention either to openly defy or give defiant threat and this would not create panic or terror in the minds of the public and potentiality of such an act cannot be such as to effect the tempo of the community. Here even if for a short period there may be commotion or closure of shops which would be more on account of precautionary measures, but it does not affect even tempo of the community. A panic may be created even where there is an explosion of fire crackers which may be on account of false fear mistreating fire-works for bomb, unleashd by a criminal at the public place in order to achieve his object by terrorising the people at large. This pseudo fear even if it leads to commotion and closure of shops will not constitute a case of public order. Similarly, when bomb or fire-arm is used as against the patrolling police party only for the purpose of escaping from such police party party, if surrounded, could not, in our considered opinion, constitute a case of public order.
35. In the present case, the ground of detention is that the detenu on 22nd September, 1988, at about 7.45 p.m. while seeing the police patrol party at the Khema Mai Crossing the companions of the detenu Rakesh alias Kallu said that the police has surrounded them and they should escape by throwing bomb and firing with country made pistol at them. At this another companion of the detenu Rajendra Prasad who was having country made pistol in his hand is alleged in order to kill the police party fired, which missed. Thereafter, the detenu and other companion Rakesh alias Kallu threw bomb at the police party to escape on account of which two constables and one S.I. were injured. But on account of this petitioner and Rakesh alias Kallu escaped. Thus, it is abundantly clear that the detenu along with other companin threw bomb and used country made pistol only for the purpose of evading arrest by the police party and, in fact, the detenu along with other companions Rakesh alias Kallu escaped while the other companion Rajendra Prasad was arrested on the spot. This incident by itself without there being anything else does not show any open defiance by the detenu or an act which may create terror or panic in the mind of people in that locality. There is nothing on the record to show that the detenu was either committing any offence at that time and in spite of police party reaching continued the said definance in the presence of public eye, nor they actually attacked the police party to overpower or cow down the authority in to the vision of the people as to create any fear in the mind of the public. Thus, we are of opinion that in the present case grounds of detention reading by itself on the fact and circumstances of this case would not constitute a case of public order, but only a case of law and order.
36. Even in cases where the case set up by the State is that there was closure of the Shops following of panic in the public and commotion in that area this must be founded on some evidence and not merely opinion of the police administration Evidence of the case may be the F.I.R. evidence recorded under Section 161, Cr. P.C. or such other evidence which may be on the record. However, in the absence of any evidence on the record merely summary of the incidents by the police in the form of an opinion cannot be foundation for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to pass an order under the preventive detention. Even in the present case we find that the statements regarding closure of the shops, commotion in the public is not even mentioned in the F.I.R. and there is no evidence on the record except the opinion expressed by the Station Officer (Annexure 4) to the writ petition. Thus, on the facts of the present case also, we feel, even on this ground it cannot be said either there was a closure of the shops or commotion in the public at large on the date and time of the alleged occurrence.
37. For the petitioner it was further urged that the mention of the fact in the grounds of detention that there was likelihood of his coming out of jail was either vague or was based on non-existing ground. It was urged that the order of detention was passed on 30th November, 1988, while in fact, till, that date the petitioner did not even move for bail, thus question of his coming out of jail could not be there. The argument is untenable. The learned counsel for the State rightly urged that the detaining authority was well conscious that there was likelihood of bail being granted to him on the facts and circumstances of the case and even if no application for bail was moved on the aforesaid fact if such an inference was drawn by the said authority it could not be said to be either vague or based on nonexistent ground.
38. In N. Meera Rani v. State of Tamil Nadu (1989) 3 JT 478 : (1989 Cri LJ 2190) it was held:--
'(i) We may summarise and reiterate the settled principle. Subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention and the decision must depends on the facts of the particular case; preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order etc. ordinarily it is not needed when the detenu is already in custody, the detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while making the order, but, even so, if the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied on cogent material that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are promixate in point of time he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities the detention order can be validly made even in anticipation to operate on his release. This appears to us, to be correct legal position.'
39. For the purpose of subjective satisfaction it is always open for the detaining authority to take into consideration the totality of the fact in existence to come to the conclusion. In the present case, we do not feel that the aforesaid inference of the detaining authority about his likelihood of coming out of the jail on the fact and circumstances of the case could be said to be either vague or based on non-existent ground.
39A. It was further argued on behalf of the petitioner that there was nothing on the record of the case on the basis of which it could be said that the petitioner had repetivive tendency of committing the offence or there was likelihood of the petitioner committing the offence to breach the public order in case he comes out of jail. It was contended that the aforesaid one incident does not show any scheme or repetitive tendency of the petitioner for committing an offence and thus the detention order under the National Security Act could not have been passed.
40. In Smt. Shashi Aggarwal v. State of U. P., AIR 1988 SC 596 : (1988 Cri LJ 839), it was held:--
'Every citizen in this country has the right to have recourse of law. He has the right to move the court for bail when he is arrested under the ordinary law of the land. If the States think that he does not deserve bail the State could oppose the grant of bail. He cannot, however, be interdicted from moving the court for bail by clamping an order of detention. The possibility of the Court granting bail may not be sufficient. Nor a bald statement that the person would repeat his criminal activities would be enough. There must also be credible information or cogent reasons apparent on the record that the detenu if enlarged on bail, would act prejudicially to the interest of public order. That has been made clear in Binod Singh v. District Magistrate Dhanbad (1986) 4 SCC 416 at p. 421 : AIR 1986 SC 2090 at p. 2094 : (1986 Cri LJ 1959), where it was observed :'A bald statement is merely an ipse dixi of the officer. If there were cogent materials for thinking that the detenu might be released then these should have been made apparent. Eternal vigilance on the part of the authority charged with both law and order and public order is the price which the democracy in this country extract the fundamental freedoms of our citizens'.
41. Thus, there must be some cogent material on the record that if the detenu is released he is likely to act prejudicially to the interest of public order and mere bald statement in the ground is not sufficient.
42. The only other fact, learned counsel for the State urged was that the detaining authority has taken into account the past history of the detenu which is a relevant consideration for coming to the conclusion that there was likelihood of the detenu committing the offence in future. It is significant, in the counter-affidavit filed by Sri Harish Chandra Chaudhary on behalf of the detaining authority it has been asserted that the incident mentioned in the criminal history has not formed the basis for formulating the grounds of detention and further the detaining authority has neither referred nor relied upon those incidents in the grounds of detention. However, what has been urged on behalf of the State is that the said incident giving history-sheet were given as prelude or the background of the petitioner's history which shows his mental inclination and notoriety as also the murderous assault being made by a desparate character. It is not in dispute in the present case and also in view of the aforesaid averments in the counter-affidavit that the history-sheet or the background of the petitioner was neither mentioned in the grounds of detention, nor it was relied upon in the grounds of detention. This is the defence to the petitioner's allegation that it is on this account the details of these documents were not required to be furnished to the petitioner. Thus, the question would be, if the background was not taken into account then could it be said that the one incident dated 22nd September, 1988, could be such incident which shows repetitive tendency of the petitioner for committing an offence even in future. The broad principle in this regard is well settled. It is not necessary and in a given case even one incident may be sufficient to show repetitive tendency of the detenu and if such an inference is possible from the said incident it would be well within legitimate power of the detaining authority to pass the order for preventive detention.
43. Now, testing the aforesaid incident on the aforesaid principle it cannot be said that the incident shows any repetitive tendency of the petitioner. As aforesaid, it was an incident where the petitioner along with other companions made effort to escape from the possible arrest by the patrolling police party by hurling bomb and using fire-arms.
44. However, learned counsel for the State urged, even though history-sheet was not a foundation of passing the detention order, but it was used as a prelude or background of the petitioner's history showing his mental inclination and notoriety. This may be tested in two ways, either this was only for confirming his opinion of the repetitive tendency of the detenu or this was foundation which influenced the mind of the detaining authority in passing the order of detention. In the latter case, the detaining authority was bound to bring it within the four corners of the grounds of detention and consequent thereafter the details of these documents were required to be furnished to the detenu and it admittedly in the present case was not done. However, in the prior case even it was said that the detaining authority merely used it as a prelude for the confirmation of his opinion already formed on the basis of one incident then the court has to draw an inference that that one incident was sufficient to show a repetitive tendency of the detenu. We have already held above, looking to one incident in isolation, we are of opinion, it could not be said that the said incident shows any repetitive tendency of the detenu.
45. Learned counsel for the State relied on in Bal Chand Bansal v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1175 : (1988 Cri LJ 1092). This was a case where the grounds indicated that the detaining authority was conscious of fact that the petitioner was in judicial custody and he was likely to be released on bail. The ground itself further revealed that he got illegally siphoned the foreign exchange to the tune of about 2 crores of rupees out of the Country and petitioner's nephew with other associates were working in accordance with the directions of the petitioner and further the petitioner was travelling by air under assumed names and had been dodging the authorities when they attempted to contact him before he was apprehended in a Calcutta hotel. Thus, in this case, the ground of detention itself reveals facts on the basis of which inference was drawn by the detaining authority that there was likelihood of his committing breach of public order, in case he is released on bail and thus his case would not help the respondents.
Next, reliance was placed in Vijay Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 934 : (1988 Cri LJ 1092). This was a case where it was held that it is sufficient if there is awareness of the detaining authority of the fact that the detenu is already in detention, and there must be compelling reasons justifying such detention in spite of the fact that he is already under detention on a charge of criminal offence and this must appear from the grounds of detention that were communicated to the detenu. In this case it was further held :--
'....It was urged that apart from the grounds of detention there must be some other material disclosed to the detaining authority that if the detenu is -- released on bail he would again carry on the prejudicial activities.
I do not think that the contention is sound. There cannot be any other material which can enter into the satisfaction of the detaining authority, apart from the grounds of detention and the connected facts therein. The satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be reached on extraneous matters. The need to put the person' tinder preventive detention depends only upon the grounds of detention.'
46. In the present case, the stand taken on behalf of the State is that the detaining authority has not formed the criminal history of the petitioner basis for formulating the grounds of detention.
47. In fact, even the criminal history referred to for subjective satisfaction according to the petitioner in Crime Case No. 80/86 mentioned at serial No. 1 had already resulted into acquittal, Crime Case No. 287/84 was never initiated against the petitioner and he is not an accused in that case. Similarly, case mentioned at serial No. 7 as Crime No. 197/88 was not against the petitioner and the petitioner is not an accused in that case and further cases mentioned at serial Nos. 2, 4, 5 and 6 were all typical police planted cases just due to prejudice against the petitioner and in none of those cases any public man was made a witness and even after challenging the petitioner the police has not taken any interest in any of those cases and those cases are still lying without any decision. However, we would not like to express any opinion in this matter as we are holding as aforesaid that the detaining authority himself did not make it as foundation for making ground of detention and the sole incident of 22nd September, 1988, does not show any repetitive tendency of the petitioner and further this incident cannot be said to be within the framework of public order but only law and order.
48. In view of the aforesaid findings we are of opinion that the order of detention passed by the detaining authority under National Security Act cannot be sustained. Thus, the detention of the petitioner is illegal.
49. In the result, we allow the petition and order that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith unless wanted in connection with some other case.