ORDER
D.P.S. Chauhan, J.
1. The petitioner, who was a Naib Tehsildar, was posted, in the year 1964, in Tehsil Pooranpur, District Pilibhit, where he continued to remain uptill 1967. In connection with, and in respect of, lease of the land of the Gaon Sabha Seema, the State Government set up a vigilance enquiry against the petitioner as well as against the then Supervisor Kanungo, Teg Bahadur and Lekhpals, Chandra Kumar Dixit and Ram Singh. Sanction for prosecuting the petitioner for offences punishable Under Sections 420/468/ 120B, IPC and Under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for brevity hereinafter referred to as 'the 1947 Act') was accorded by the Governor on 18-11-1982. The vigilance Cell after a lapse of about eight years submitted a charge-sheet on 21-8-1983 in the Court of Special Judge, Pilibhit, against the petitioner as well as against Tej Bahadur. Chandra Kumar Dixit and Ram Singh, for prosecuting them Under Sections 420/468/ 120B, IPC and Under Section 5(2) of the 1947 Act whereupon case was registered as ST No. 2 of 1983 (State v. Virendra Pratap Singh) and the charges, against the petitioner, were framed on 17-11-1984.
2. Out of twenty two witnesses, who were to be examined in the case by the prosecution, nine were the witnesses of fact and rest were of formal nature. Out of these nine witnesses, Teja Singh and Swaran Singh died and Chheda Lal, Kallu, Bechan Singh and Bal-winder Singh were declared hostile by the prosecution. Phool Chand did not support the prosecution case as against the petitioner and the remaining two witnesses Bhagwan Deen and Chandra Bhan on having not been produced was discharged. Thus, none of the witnesses of fact supported the case of the prosecution as against the petitioner and according to the petitioner, there exists no evidence or material or document so to incriminate or connect him with the alleged offences.
3. In the background of these facts, petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by means of the present petition Under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity hereinafter referred to as Cr. P.C.) seeking relief for quashing of the proceedings pending against him in Sessions Trial No. 2 of 1983, State v. Virendra Pratap Singh, before the Special Judge, Pilibhit. This Court, on 5-1-1986, while admitting the petition instead of staying the proceedings in the trial directed for keeping in abeyance the delivery of judgment.
4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor.'
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner made following three fold submissions:--
(i) that the trial is barred Under Section 6 of the 1947 Act as there exists no valid sanction for prosecuting the petitioner for the offences charged with and the proceedings in trial are liable to be quashed.
(ii) that on the basis of the charge-sheet submitted by the prosecution and the evidence available on record, no offence against the petitioner is made out;
(iii) that, in the background of the facts and the peculiar circumstances of the case, no useful purpose would be served in continuing the proceedings in the trial any further as the same, initiated on the basis of charge-sheet submitted after a lapse of about eight years, have not been completed despite the order of this Court and, in such circumstances, continuation of proceedings in the trial would be abuse of the process of the Court violating the guarantee of speedy trial.
6. The submissions as advanced by the petitioner are mainly questions of law and the facts only have peripheral relevance in the course of consideration of the same.
7. The State Government, under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1952 Act) was conferred the power for appointing Special Judge, as may be necessary, for such area or areas, as may be specified, for trying the offences punishable Under Sections 161, 162, 163, 164, 165A, IPC and Under Section 5 of the 1947 Act, and any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or any abetment of any of the offences, as mentioned above. The special Judge, appointed Under Section 6 of the 1952 Act, is conferred with exclusive powers in respect of the offences mentioned above and also for trying any offences other than the offences mentioned above with which the accused may, under the Cr. P. C. be charged at the same trial. Thus, in view of the 1952 Act, a charge-sheet against the petitioner was filed in the Court of the Special Judge Pilibhit.
8. There is no dispute or doubt regarding the legal position that the trial without a valid sanction, where one is necessary Under Section 6 of the 1947 Act, is without jurisdiction. Thus, it is to be seen, in the present case, whether the sanction in question was valid one.
9. Before considering the submissions, it is apt to have the relevant facts and the rules.
10. The petitioner after having been selected by the U. P. Public Service Commission was appointed as Naib Tehsildar who having completed the period of probation, was duly confirmed. He was appointed by the Board of Revenue (hereinafter referred to as 'the Board') against a permanent vacancy by direct recruitment and the conditions of service were governed by the rules known as the 'The Subordinate Revenue Executive (Naib Tehsildars) Rules, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as the 1944 Rules). Under Rule 36 of 1944 Rules, which is quoted hereunder, the punishment is dealt with.
'36 : Punishment and appeals -- Subject to the modifications noted below, the provisions of the rule regulating punishments and appeals promulgated in the 'Punishment and Appeal Rules for the Subordinate Services' shall apply to persons appointed to the Service :
(1) The District Officer may censure a Naib Tehsildar.
(2) The District Officer may suspend a Naib Tehsildar pending inquiry into any instance of official misconduct or pending the receipt of orders upon any report made as to such misconduct.
(3) Any order for the punishment of a Naib Tehsildar excepting dismissal or removal may be passed by the Commissioner, who shall send a copy thereof to the Board, (4) Any order for the punishment of a Naib Tehsildar who was not appointed by the Governor may be passed by the Board.
(5) The Board may pass any order of punishment except removal or dismissal of a Naib Tehsildar appointed by the Governor.
(6) If the Board consider that an order of punishment of removal or dismissal is required in the case of a Naib Tehsildar appointed by the Governor, the Board shall submit the complete proceedings including formal charges, the explanation of the officer and the evidence for and against him together with their own findings and recommendations to Government for orders.'
11. The parties are not at variance regarding the status of the petitioner as a public servant and the position, as per rules, is that the petitioner is a person not appointed by the Governor and is removable from the office by the Board.
12. Section 6 of the 1947 Act provides for a valid sanction as a precondition for a valid prosecution for the specified offences and the policy underlying in the section and other similar section is that there should not be any unnecessary harassment of the public servant. Section 6 of the 1947 Act is as quoted hereunder:--
'6. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution:
(1) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 161, or Section 164, or Section 165 of the Indian Penal Code, or under Sub-section (2) or Subsection (3-A) of Section 5 of the Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction.
(a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of the Central Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of the State Government;
(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from office.
(2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises whether the previous sanction as required under Sub-section (1) should be given by the Central or State Government or any other authority such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed.'
13. The learned counsel for the petitioner made two fold submissions regarding the validity of the sanction--
(i) that the sanction accorded by the Governor dated 18-11-1982 is null and void as the authority of the Governor was incompetent to accord sanction as the petitioner was neither appointed by the Governor nor he was removable from the office save by or with the sanction of the State Government; and
(ii) that, in the alternative, the other limb of submission made is that even if the sanction is held as having been validly accorded by the competent authority, the same is invalid for the reason of non-consideration of the material before according sanction for the offence of misconduct Under Section 5(2) of the 1947 Act and without looking about and making mind regarding the particular misconduct as specified under Clause (1), thereof.
14. It is clear that the petitioner, appointed by the Board under the 1944 Rules, was removable from the service by the Board. In Section 6 of the 1947 Act, the relevant words for consideration of the question involved are 'not removable from office save by or with the sanction of the Central State Government.' The phraseology indicates that the public servant must be a person only removable by the concerned Government or with the sanction of the concerned Government and not otherwise. In the present case, it is to be seen whether the petitioner is only removable by the State Government or with the sanction of the State Government so as to attract Clause (b) of Section 6 of the 1947 Act whereon hinges the question of considering the validity of the sanction accorded for the prosecution of the petitioner.
15. The services of the petitioner are regulated by the statutory rules with provide for punishment. The word 'punishment' includes dismissal as well as removal of person from service. The petitioner was appointed by the Board and not by the Governor and Rule 36(4) of the 1944 Rules provides that any order for punishment of a Naib-Tehsildar, who was not appointed by the Governor, may be passed by the Board. He is removable from service by the Board. He is not removable by the State Government or with the sanction of the State Government. The authority competent to remove the petitioner is the Board. Thus, the provisions of clause (b) of Section 6 of the 1947 Act would not be attracted in this case but it would be covered under Clause (c) which provides sanction by the authority competent to remove the person from the office.
16. The objection of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that the sanction for prosecution accorded by the State Government, which is higher authority than the Board, is valid, has no substance. The words 'not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government are of great relevance. The question is not whether the State Government which is higher authority can remove a public servant or not but it is just the other way, i.e. as to whether the public servant is only removable by the State Government or with the sanction of the State Government and not otherwise. In the present case, the petitioner is removable otherwise than by the State Government or with the sanction of the State Government.
17. The other submission of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor is that it is the point of time of granting the sanction which is relevant and not the time when the offences, in fact, committed or alleged to have been committed. The petitioner, at the time of the commission of the alleged offence or misconduct, was holding the post of Naib Tehsildar, but, at the time of granting the sanction, was officiating as Deputy Collector. This argument is also liable to fail. Firstly, there is no foundation of fact in the counter affidavit and, secondly, the proposition remains no more res Integra in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of R. S. Nayak v. A. R. Antulay, AIR 1984 SC 684 : (1984 Cri LJ 613) where the Supreme Court, in paragraph 23, held --
'The expression 'Office' in the three sub-clauses of Section 6 would clearly denote that the office which the public servant mis-used or abused for corrupt motive for which he is to be prosecuted and in respect of which a sanction to prosecute him is necessary by the competent authority entitling to remove him from that office which he has abused. This inter-relation between the office and its abuse, if severed would render Section 6 devoid of any meaning and this inter relation clearly provides a clue to the understanding of the provision of Section 6 providing for sanction by a competent authority, which would be able to judge the action of the public servant before removing the Bar, by granting sanction to taking of cognizance of the offence by the Court against the public servant. Therefore, it unquestionably follows that the sanction to prosecute can be given by the authority competent to remove the public servant from the office which he has mis-used or abused because that authority alone would be able to know whether there has been a mis-use or abuse of the office by the public servant and not some rank outside.'
18. In para 26 of the said decision, the Supreme Court has taken the following view:--
'Therefore, upon a true construction of Section 6 it is implicit therein that the sanction of that competent authority alone would be necessary which is competent to remove the public servant from the office which he is alleged to have mis-used for corrupt motive or for which a prosecution is to be launched against him.'
19. For the reasons, as stated above, the sanction in question for the prosecution of the petitioner, not having been given by the competent authority, i.e. the Board, is invalid and null and void, and, as a consequence whereof, the entire proceedings launched before the Special Judge, Pilibhit, and pending before him, are without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed so far as the same relate to the petitioner.
20. In view of the finding regarding the invalidity of the sanction, there is no point in dilating the other submissions of the petitioner. There is no material before this court as to whether the trial was concluded or not and as to whether, as directed by this Court, the judgment is lying in abeyance for pronouncement.
21. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, at the last, only raised the objection as to the maintainability of the petition on the ground that the objection regarding the validity of the sanction could be raised by the petitioner before the Special Judge itself and this Court, as such, should refrain to interfere. This objection is devoid of merit and is stated only for being rejected. The amplitude of power Under Section 482, Cr. P.C. is wide enough. The statute itself prohibits in so many words that no court shall take cognizance of the offence without a sanction, which means a valid sanction, then it is always open for this court to rectify the error at the root as otherwise it will lead to injustice. In a set up governed by rule of law no interest is higher than the interest of justice.
22. Apart from this, the facts of this case also require interference by this Court so as to stop unnecessary harassment of the petitioner as investigation was prolonged against him for about 8 years and thereafter the charges were framed against him on 5-1-1986. The entire proceedings, in spite of the order of this Court, have not yet been completed, as per the statement made at the Bar.
23. Accordingly, in view of what has been stated above, I allow the petition and quash the proceedings in sessions trial No. 2 of 1983, State v. Virendra Pratap Singh and Ors., pending in the court of the Special Judge, Pilibhit, as against the petitioner. There will be no order as to costs.