Judgment:
ORDER
Ravi S. Dhavan, J.
1. The charges of having committed contempt has been accepted by Suresh Chandra, the contemnor, other Honarary Secretary, Committee of Management, S. M. College, Chandausi, District Moradabad. In reply to the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner, it was submitted on behalf of the contemner, by Mr. V. S. Saxena, Advocate, that to argue the matter would only make the position worse, and that it would be better prudence that the contemnor, Suresh Chandra, leaves himself to the mercy of the Court.
2. The contempt petition was heard at length, and orders were reserved after parties had an opportunity to apprise themselves with the record of the court, afresh, and the law as applicable, in reference to the contempt. This judgment will be incomplete without the facts as already noticed by this Court in it's order dated 15 November, 1990 as a consequence of which the charges had been framed. Rather than notice the facts all over again, it would he better to refer to the order of 15 November, 1990, which runs as under:
'This contempt petition arises out of a pending writ petition No. 16115 of 1988 : Rajneesh Saxena v. Committee of Management S. M. College, Chandausi and Ors.. The contempt petition is directed against the acts of one Suresh Chandra, Honorary Secretary, Committee of Management S. M. College, Chandausi District Moradabad. The Allegations against Suresh Chandra rest on the order of the Bench in the aforesaid writ petition which gave directions that the petitioner Rajnees Saxena, an ad hoc teacher at the institution shall be paid his salary. The conditions are set in the order. The order is reproduced below:
'Issue notice.
We have heard Sri P. S. Baghel holding brief of Sri V. B. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri R. G. padia, who appeared on behalf of the respondent No. 1 at considerable length.
We are satisfied that it is a fit case for grant of interim order. We, therefore, in modification of our order dated 29-9-1988 direct that the petitioner shall continue to work as ad hoc teacher in the respondent institution and shall be paid his salary as and when it falls due in accordance with law till a regularly selected candidate by the Commission becomes available for appointment or the services of the petitioner are terminated in accordance with law whatever is earlier.'
When the petitioner presented this order to the Honorary Secretary, it is alleged the he declined to follow the order. The petitioner further alleges that the opposite party Suresh Chandra in his capacity as Honorary Secretary of the College would neither permit him to join his duties no receive the arrears of pay. The opposite party aforesaid filed a counter affidavit as a defence. In his defence he justified and accepted the position that there was an order of the Division Bench and that its compliance was not made. Thus, the opposite party gave his reasons on his defence. The petitioner replied by a rejoinder affidavit giving his submissions that the defence taken to explain away the situation on legal technicalities was wrong. What remained between the defence of the opposite party and the allegations of the petitioner was a situation that there was an ad hoc appoinment on the basis of which an order of the High Court dated December 19, 1989 had to be complied with.
One aspect is very significant. After the' pleadings were exchanged, last of them being the rejoinder of the petitioner, served on counsel for the opposite party on May 8, 1989, and filed on record of the court on July 19, 1989, the opposite party took up another defence. This aspect is noticed in the application of the opposite party on August 8, 1989 supported by an affidavit, affirmed on August 7, 1989. In this affidavit, the opposite party took a summersault by accepting that he would now continue to permit the petitioner to work as he is ready and willing to abide by the interim order dated December 9, 1988 passed by a Bench of this High Court. The opposite party thereafter submits in his affidavit that the court consider his unqualified apology and take a lenient view of the matter and pardon the opposite party. Then came an affidavit served on the petitioner on April 24, 1990 placing on record that arrears of pay admissible to the petitioner consequent upon the order of the Division Bench is an amount of Rs. 38,373. In this affidavit he submits that it is beyond his power to pass bills as the salary hills have to be passed by the District Inspector of Schools. The record must be set right in reference to the present contempt petition. That the issue in this case is not as to who has to pass the hills but who occasions denial of the salary and recognition of the petitioner as an ad hoc teacher.
In para 7 of the supplementary affidavit served on the opposite party on 11 April 1990 there is an averment to the effect that the opposite party threatened the petitioner that should be desire recall of the termination order then he must withdraw his contempt petition. A reply to this paragraph is given in the counter to the supplementary affidavit received by the petitioner on April 24, 1990 and sworn on the same date. In the allegations made by the petitioner on April 24, 1990 and sworn on the same date. On the allegations made by the petitioner this opposite party terms the petitioner's submissions 'clock and bull story narrated by the petitioner'. Thus aspect is not relevant but becomes one by subsequent events on record. The contemnor offered his apology unconditionally in Aug. 1989 by an affidavit. The matter come up before this court on January 2, 1990. After it was heard it was demonstrated to the court that the stay order of the Division Bench dated December 9, 1989 had yet to be complied with. Clearly the record stood as compromising the order of the Division Bench after the apology had been tendered and the issues, thus, became one of questioning and considering on what was the apology worth if consequential steps had not been taken by the opposite party. The apology of the opposite party was, thus, now in doubt and its bonafides were suspect. Beyond this action of the opposite party the issue on which this contempt action is based, the issue did not cease. On January 2, 1990 a submission had been made on behalf of the opposite party, by a Senior Advocate, appearing for him, that he will ensure that the salary as is payable on an ad hoc teacher, strictly according to the direction in the order of December 7, 1988, is delivered to the petitioner on this assurance the court gave no directions. This court set on record of the order sheet the following observations:
'In these circumstances this court considers it appropriate in the interest of justice that the said respondent must have an opportunity to comply with the court's order. Learned counsel for the respondent seeks one month's time to comply with the order of 9-12-1989'.
When the apology was given by an affidavit in August, 1989, the opposite party was simultaneously giving an undertaking that the order of the Division Bench will be complied with. Upon the forgiveness sought a further indulgence was pleaded. This court acted on the faith which the opposite party gave in an affidavit. The undertaking given in the affidavit of August 1989 was not acted upon. The opposite party was on test again. A further indulgence and opportunity was pleaded on January 2, 1990.
Now the court was testing the opposite party whether he had the intention to comply with the order of the Division Bench.
His intention is now available in another record being with petition No. 8241 of 1990. The record in so far as the opposite party is concerned rests thus; (a) he gave an affidavit of apology in August seeking forgiveness for past action with an assurance that he would comply with the order of the Bench of Decm. 9, 1988; (b) the assurance was not kept; (c) he sought further time to act on his assurance on January 2, 1990; (d) further time sought was one month; and (e) the assurance given on 2-1-1990 was also not kept within the time taken by opposite party.
The opposite party had other designs.
Disregarding the apology given to the court on an affidavit with an undertaking and further indulgence sought on January 2, 1990, he passed an order of termination against the petitioner on February 27, 1990. This left the petitioner with no recourse except to come rushing to the court by another writ petition. Another Division Bench of this High Court on April, 11, 1990 stayed the termination order and gave directions to pay the salary to the petitioner. The order of the Division Bench referreds to above is reproduced below:--
'Issue notice.
Sri N. S. Chaudhary has accepted notice on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Sri N. S. Chaudhary prays for and is granted one week's time to file a counter affidavit. Sri L. P. Naithani, learned counsel for the university may also file a counter affidavit within three weeks. The petitioner will have one week thereafter to file a rejoinder affidavit.
Until further orders the operation of the order dated 27th February 1990 shall remain stayed.
The respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are directed to pay the salary to the petitioner in accordance with law and continue to pay the same till further orders of this court.
Sd/- S.D.AJ.Sd/-G.K.M.J.11-4-1990'.Thus, the record now makes one thing absolutely clear and beyond reasonable doubt that the affidavit of apology of the petitioner and the forgiveness which he was seeking by pleading to the court that a lenient view be taken was worthless and he had no intention of acting on his apology nor on the undertaking given to the court. A further opportunity to purge his contemptuous action was violated with impugnity, when further time taken on January 2, 1990 to act on the order of the Division Bench, the indulgence granted was abused. This brought around the court to view the situation that the apology given was only for the purposes of purchasing time and harassing the petitioner and the contemnor at every given time knew that the further indulgence which he was seeking on 2-1-1990, would not be honoured and, given an occasion, he would thwart it.
The contemnor by his legal trickery is rendering the record as such that he is totally conscious of what the stay order is about, and what an apology and undertaking means and has utter disregard to the solemnly (sic) of an affidavit, the sanctity of an undertaking and respect to the orders of the court.
This leaves the court with no option, judging the contemnor by the records which he has presented, to be satisfied that the contemnor is such a person who must be punished in accordance with law as he is a habitual violator of the rule of law and has disrespect for the court and is a person whose faith is not to be acted upon, and the undertaking he offers are to hood wink the court. Should this situation continue, persons like the contemnor will treat orders of this court lightly and the contemnor will encourage precipitation of apologies and undertakings, which those who will offer it, may not have the intention to act upon it.
'Regard being had to all these circumstances, the contemnor must now be available at the Bar of the court so that he get an opportunity to address the court on the charges, which this court is to consider on the acts which he has occasioned.
The opposite party is totally conscious of the charges on which he has to address the court which have already been indicated in this order, which for the sake of repetition, the court will make the opposite party conscious again. The opposite party is charged with violating the order of the Division Bench dated, December 7, 1988, the undertaking and apology in his affidavit filed on August 8, 1989 and the further indulgence sought and the undertaking given on January 2, 1990.'
'Let the contemnor have an opportunity to address this court when he appears before the Bar of this court on November 27, 1990, a date suggested by Mr. N. S. Saxena, appearing on his behalf to answer the charges against him and show cause why he ought not to be punished in accordance with law.
List on November 27, 1990.'
3. The facts as they are, what the court has to consider is how justice must treat the contemnor, in law, On behalf of the contemnor the only argument which has been made is that he leaves the entire matter at the mercy of the court. The argument, in effect, accepts the charges and the facts, of having shown contempt to the orders of the doubt. The contemnor, thus, pleads guilty and seeks mercy. In ordinary parlance this is known as contrition. In the jurisprudence which governs the law of contempt there are parameters within which an act of contrition is to be judged.
4. Logically, or logistically the contemnor has become wiser by events. The act of contrition is a phenomenon recognised in contempt proceedings. But, settled law cautions the court on the stage when realisation must come to the contemnor so that he can bonafide and with genuiness persuade the court that his repentance is true and has been realised by the contemnor prejudgment. What, after all is contrition. The word itself is derived from the word 'contrite'. Which means 'penitent, thoroughly sorry, especially for sin'. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language, 1987 Edition. Contrition means remorse. The aspect of realisation that contempt has been a matter of fact accomplished is an aspect which has been considered by the courts and a clear guideline is available. Thus, there is no occasion for the court to respond in a contempt proceedings on emotion, but judicial discretion. Thus, before the court comes to the conclusion on how law and justice must treat a contemnor; the settled law is to be seen.
5. The Supreme Court was considering an aspect of the appropriate juncture when an apology must be offered by a contemnor, if he desires that the court must accept it. In the matter of Debabrate v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1969 SC 189 : (1969 Cri LJ 401) the Supreme Court observed (para 7):
'7. The second point which the court unfortunately placed at the very forefront was failure to offer in apology and noted with great show of emotion that none was offered. Of course, an apology must be offered and that too clearly and at the earliest opportunity. A person who offers a belated apology runs the risk that it may not be accepted for such an apology hardly shows the contrition which is the essence of the purging of a contempt. However, a man may have the courage of his convictions and may stake his all on proving that he is not in contempt and may take the risk. In the present case the appellants ran the gauntlet of such risk and may be said to have fairly succeeded.'
6. In the case of Mulkh Raj v. State of Punjab, AIR 1972 SC 1197: (1972 Cri LJ 754) the Supreme Court was considering the aspect of apology and the nexus it has with contrition. The case was one of libellous attack against judges. On the issue of apology the Supreme Court observed (para 9):
'9. Apology is an act of contrition. Unless apology is offered at the earliest opportunity and in good grace apology is shorn of penitence. If apology is offered at time when the contemnor finds that the court is going to impose punishment it ceases to be an apology and it becomes an act of cringing coward. The High Court was right in not taking any notice of the appellants expression of apology 'without any further word'. The High Court currently said the 4 acceptance of apology in the case would amount to allow the offender to go away with impunity after having committed gross contempt.'
7. In the matter of principal, Rajni Parekh Articles K. B. Commerce and B.C.J. Science College v. Mahendra Ambalalal Shah, AIR 1986 SC 1074 : (1986 Cri LJ 869), the Supreme Court was considering a circumstance of flagrant violation of an order of the University and of the High Court and tendering of an apology by a contemnor at a late stage. This case is closer to the aspect being considered by this court. The Supreme Court observed as under (para 7):
'7. The apology tendered by the said Chaturvedi and the said Pathak on behalf of himself and the trustees of the said Mandal comes at too late a stage. The said Mandal the said Chaturvedi and the said Shastri as also the said Pathak who, it is stated, is also, a trustee and a member of the Board of Trustees, have acted most contumaciously. They have flouted the directions given by the Syndicate of the Gujarat University; they have flouted the order of the Vice Chancellor of the University; they have flouted the order of the Gujarat Affiliated Colleges Service Tribunal, they have flouted the orders of the Gujarat High Court; they obtained from the court a conditional order of stay of the order of the Gujarat High Court appealed against by making a statement that the amount directed to be paid to Shah will be deposited in the High Court within two months when they had no intention whatever of doing so; and they have trifled with this court by filing, the said Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 2885 of 1985 to confine this court's order passed on April 16, 1985 to the second Appellant when they knew full well that the second appellant, the said Shastri, had died eleven days Prior to the filing of the said Criminal Miscellaneous Petition. Their desire to make amends by passing the said Resolution dated March 7, 1986, when merely the result of the notice issued by this court on March 5, 1986, on which occasion, on his own showing the said Pathak was present and obviously communicated the other trustees that this court had issued notice to them on the present petition if any Court were to accept an apology of a contemnor in such circumstances. It would encourage litigants to flout the orders of the courts with impunity. We accordingly refuse to accept the apology tendered by the said Chaturvedi as also by the said Pathak on behalf of himself and the other trustees.'
8. In the matter of Bigyan Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1025, the Supreme Court was reflecting upon the generality of a growing tendency to ignore the direction of the courts and multiplying instances of confrontation with court, the Supreme Court in no uncertain terms made it clear that if the judicial system is to work efficiently within the frame work of the rules of law litigants, the government not excluded, must accept the system render due obedience to orders made failing which justice must punish those who disobey. The observation of the Supreme Court are as under (at p. 1027 of AIR):-
'7. We would part with the matter by recording out serious concern and disapproval of the growing conduct of parties and public officers in particular of ignoring the directions of the courts and multiplying instances of confrontation. The Court, including the apex one, is a part of the State and is a built-inmechanism of the Constitution to administer justice in accordance with law. For discharging that duty the court has got to adopt an attitude of critical assessment of situation connected with litigation brought before it for adjudication. The manner of functioning of the court in accord with Rule of law has to be dispassionate, objective and analytical. The Judges who preside over these courts do not act with a sense of superiority; nor do they look down upon others in the community. In order that the system may efficiently work and the purpose for which the courts are established is duly served, it is necessary that everyone within the frame work of the Rule of Law must accept the system, render the obedience to orders made and in the event of failure of compliance, the rod of justice must descend down to punish. We hope and trust that everyone within the system realises this situation and does not unnecessarily get into a confrontation.'
9. The law must now be applied to the actions of Suresh Chandra, the contemnor. The order of the Division Bench, which was awaiting compliance at his hands, is dated 9 December, 1988. His affidavit of 7 August, 1989, filed after he had taken his defence in the counter affidavit justifying his actions, accepted that the violation continued. The affidavit offered an unconditional apology and an assurance to implement the order. This was eight months after the order. Six more months passed, the compliance to the High Court orders had yet to be made, as noticed in the order of these proceedings on 2 January, 1990. Another four months were to pass, only to reveal to the court that the stay order of 9 December, 1988 had yet to bear its results. This become clear from the affidavit the contemnor served on the petitioner on 24 April, 1990.
10. There was never any intention, by the contemnor to give obedience to the High Court's orders. The assurances, apology and undertaking in the affidavit of 7 August, 1989, further assurances placed on record on 2 January, 1990, were never intended to be kept. Suresh Chandra, the contemnor, far from complying with the stay order, terminated the petitioner's services on 27 February, 1990. Another Division Bench passed yet another stay order on yet another writ petition.
11. The contemnor, Suresh Chandra, had at every given occasion, never intended to comply with the stay order. His apology was a farce and not honest, his assurances to the court were deceitful and had no bonafide prespective. But, for these contempt proceedings, Suresh Chandra, aforesaid, neither cares for orders of the court nor renders respect to them. He spurned his apology and thwarted his assurances. This is not contrition, but the opposite of it. Seeking mercy on having failed to meet the charges on contempt, and after a contumacious conduct to disgrace orders of the court, does not permit this court to consider compassion. The settled law does not sanction it. It was a wise counsel holding the contemnor's brief caution him not to fish with courts orders any further, else this court would have come with more severity by passing the maximum sentence for imprisonment.
12. Suresh Chandra, aforesaid, has committed contempt with impugnity by repeatedly violating the orders of the High Court dated 9 December, 1988 in Writ petition No. 16115 of 1988 : Rajneesh Saxena v. Committee of Management, S.M. College, Chandausi and Ors., leaving this court with no option but to sentence him with fine and imprisonment both, Under Section 12(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
13. The court having found the aforesaid Suresh Chandra guilty of civil contempt upon his conteumpecious conduct and having no respect for the orders of the Court, in accordance with Section 12(3) of the Act considers it appropriate, having regard to the overall circumstances that the act of contrition was not bonafide but a ruse to escape punishment, that a fine alone will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary. This Court is not sentencing him to simple imprisonment, but does order that he be detained in a civil prison for a period not exceeding one month, and in addition pay a fine of Rupees two thousand, failing which he be detained for a further period of one month in a civil prison. This fine is to be deposited with the Registrar, High Court within fifteen days.
14. A warrant of commitment for contempt shall be processed by the Registrar, High Court, forthwith, addressed to the Superintendent (or Keeper) of the Jail concerned. The contemnor, Suresh Chandra aforesaid shall surrender himself to the Registrar, High Court, immediately.
15. The costs of these proceedings shall stand at Rupees five hundred.
16. The contempt petition succeeds, with costs as above.