Judgment:
Umeshwar Pandey, J.
1. Heard Sri W.H. Khan, learned Counsel for the appellant and Sri N.C. Rajwanshi, learned senior advocate, assisted by Sri Manik Chandra Misra, appearing for the respondents.
2. The learned Counsel for the parties submit that this appeal at the admission stage may be decided finally. As such the appeal is being taken up for final disposal.
The appeal be admitted.
3. The following substantial question of law is formulated.
Whether the lower appellate court, has committed patent legal error in not placing reliance upon the fact that the continuous payment of rent by the plaintiff to the defendants in respect of the disputed premises after the death of the original tenant had conferred the status of tenant on such plaintiff.
4. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court whereby the judgment of the trial court has been reversed, is under challenge in this appeal.
5. The plaintiff-appellant filed the suit for injunction to restrain the respondents-defendants from illegally dispossessing him from the house in suit without taking recourse to the procedure as prescribed under law. It has further been pleaded that the plaintiffs uncle had occupied the disputed house as a tenant and he was also living with him in the said accommodation. His uncle Ram Kripal Dwivedi died in the year 1975 leaving no issue or widow except the plaintiff as his sole heir. The plaintiff continued staying in the same house after the death of his uncle in the year 1975 and used to pay regular rent till 1981, when the defendants stopped accepting the same. The rent sent by him through money order was also refused by the defendants. After some time, in the year 1988, the plaintiff was threatened and asked to vacate the house else it would be demolished which gave rise to the cause of action for this suit which was filed for the aforesaid relief.
6. The suit was contested by the defendants stating that Ram Kripal Dwivedi who was occupying the premises as tenant died in the year 1975, but at no point of time before or after his death the defendants recognized the plaintiff as their tenant. It is just quite casually that when the plaintiff visited Banda after the death of his uncle, he was given the concession by the defendants to occupy that premises for few days and thereafter the accommodation used to be locked with key available with the defendants only. Thus, it has been asserted in the written statement that since the plaintiff did not have any right to occupy the premises as a tenant, there was no cause of action in his favour for the grant of relief of permanent injunction.
7. The trial court after recording evidence of parties and upon consideration of the entire material available, was of the view that the fact that the plaintiff had continued making payment of rent from 1975 till 1981 after the death of his uncle for long six years, his status as tenant in the premises was very much recognized by the defendants and it Is duly proved from the record through the receipts issued by the defendants and filed and proved on record by the plaintiff. The rent receipts though are in the name of the deceased Ram Kripal Dwivedi, but it is admitted that it had been issued by the defendants/landlords. The Court further found that the statement of fact about the death of Ram Kripal Dwivedi in the year 1975 is also admitted. On the basis of these materials the Court found that the status of the plaintiff in the disputed premises is nothing but that of a tenant and his eviction by force in illegal manner was not possible. The possession of the premises can be obtained by the defendants only through recourse available under law. Accordingly, the suit was decreed. Against this judgment of the trial court, the first appellate court found that when no rent receipt was ever issued by the defendants/landlords in the name of the plaintiff, it could not be validly held that the status of the plaintiff was ever recognized by them as a tenant. Since the receipts were issued in the name of Ram Kripal Dwivedi till 1981, the plaintiff could not be recognized as a tenant in the suit and he is not entitled for the relief of permanent injunction claimed in the plaint. Accordingly, the appeal of the defendants was allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court was reversed.
8. It is contended by Sri W.H. Khan appearing for the appellant-plaintiff that once the fact is admittedly proved on record that Ram Kripal Dwivedi, the original tenant, had died in the year 1975 and thereafter also rent was accepted by the defendants though receipts issued in the name of dead person, the continuous possession of the plaintiff over the disputed premises is wholly proved and his status as tenant also becomes obvious on the record. The lower appellate court has, thus, legally erred in recording otherwise findings in this regard.
9. Sri N.C. Rajwanshi, the learned senior advocate, appearing for the respondents when asked to place his reply has categorically stated that it is true that the defendants had issued receipts till 1981, but this receipts are obviously issued in the name of a dead person.
10. From the aforesaid facts and circumstances as appearing in the case, it has been clearly demonstrated on the record that once the defendants/landlords went on accepting rent for long six years period from the plaintiff, it is itself a very strong evidence to substantiate to the contentions of the plaint that the plaintiff is occupying the premises under no other capacity but as a tenant. The issue of rent receipts in the name of the deceased Ram Kripal Dwivedi is of no adverse consequence to the plaintiff. If a receipt of rent is being issued after the death of original tenant, the status of the person making payment of that rent at that point of time stands fully recognized as that of a tenant only. The substantial question of law formulated above is answered accordingly. The findings recorded by the trial court in this regard are wholly justified and the lower appellate court has committed gross legal error in reversing that. Thus, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court cannot be permitted to sustain and it has to be set aside and the appeal should be allowed.
11. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree dated 28.8.2006 passed by the lower appellate court is hereby set aside and the decree passed by the trial court is restored.
12. No order as to costs.