B.L. Yadava, J.
1. By present stay application, petitioner, Zila Sahkari Bank Limited, has prayed that the implementation of the impugned award dated 22nd July, 1987, published in the notice board of the Labour Court, Gorakhpur, on 22nd July, 1987, in Adjudication Case No. 280 of 1985 between Zila Sahkari Bank Limited, Basti, and Mohan Lal Kesharwani be stayed during pendency of the writ petition in this Court.
2. A short portrayal of essential facts appears imperative. The petitioner was an employer and the respondent No. 3, Mohan Lal Kesharwani, wasa workman working as a clerk/cashier under the petitioner-Bank. His services were governed by the U.P. Co-operative Employees' Service Regulations, 1975. He was appointed on different dates for fixed period of 3 months. His services, however, were terminated or retrenched on 10th January, 1980. He raised an industrial dispute and the same was referred by the State of U.P. for adjudication, under Section 4(k) of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act'), as to whether the termination or retrenchment of the respondent No. 3 was legal and if not to what reliefhe was entitled. The Labour Court registered Adjudication Case No. 280 of 1985, and after considering the contentions of the parties and appreciating the evidence on the record, held the order of retrenchment or termination dated 10th January, 1980, to be illegal and directed reinstatement of Mohan Lal Kesharwani forthwith with full back wages since the date of termination, and with all other benefits admissible on that pay scale. Against that award dated 22nd July, 1987, the present writ petition has been filed in which the instant application for interim stay has been moved.
3. As the matter of interim stay has been argued from both the sides at a considerable length, it appears proper that the matter be decided by a detailed order.
4. Under para 3 of the writ petition details of somewhat similar other writ petitions have been given which have been admitted and where stay has been granted. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that in other similar writ petitions respective workmen have been directed to be reinstated with no back wages, rather they have been directed to be paid back wages from the date of filing the writ petition, on the basis of some interim stay passed by the Supreme Court; likewise, in the instant case also payment of back wages since the date of termination be stayed.
5. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 3 and in para 4 it has been stated that along with respondent No. 3 the services of other workmen, namely, Gopal, etc., were also terminated. They also raised industrial disputes against the orders of termination. References were made and Adjudication Nos. 270/80, 275/80, 273/80 and 281 of 1981 were registered. By award dated 19th October, 1982, termination of their services was held to be in violation of Section 6(h) of the Act and they were also directed to be reinstated. Challenging aforesaid award, Writ Petition No. 2518 of 1982 was filed by the employer but the same was dismissed by learned brother A.N. Verma, J. on 28th February, 1983 (annexure 1 to the counter-affidavit). The order dated 28th February, 1983, passed by this Court was challenged by S.L.P. No. 7912 of 1983. Thegrounds taken in the S.L.P. were that the High Court had admitted one such writ petition on the same facts while it dismissed their writ petition. Supreme Court dismissed the S.L.P. and directed that the petitioners should file a review application, before the High Court. The review application was filed but it was dismissed by a detailed order dated 23rd October, 1984. giving the reasons on which their petition was dismissed and other petition was admitted. Again, S.L.P. was filed against the order, but it was also dismissed by the Supreme Court, vide order dated 29th February, 1985 (paras 13 to 18 of the counter-affidavit). These facts were conceded by the petitioner.
6. It was further stated in the counter-affidavit that great hardship was being caused to respondent No. 3, the workman, on acount of the attitude of the petitioner, the employer. Accordingly, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 urged that it is a well known principle that every case has to be decided on the particular facts of that case; particularly no interim stay could be passed as a rule on the model of some other case, therefore, payment of back wages to respondent No. 3 since the date of termination should not be stayed.
7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, the short point for determination in persent stay application is as to whether the petitioner is entitled to the interim relief to the effect that the operation of the impugned award may be stayed and if so to want extent.
8. If interim stay is granted in mechanical form simply because it has been granted in some other case, it would computerise justice and the computer should not be accepted to work on matters of interpretation, particularly where principles of social justice are to be applied. The scope of enquiry by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution against an award of a Labour Court is not like that of an appellate court. The balance of convenience ought to be one of the considerations. The U.P. Industrial Disputes Act is a social beneficent legislation. It has to be interpreted liberally keeping in view the intention of the Legislature which did not provide any forum for an appeal. It has also to be taken into account as to whether denial of interim relief to the workman who was out of employment since. 10thJanuary, 1980, would create grave, irreparable, private injury and would shake a citizen's faith in the effectiveness of the procedure to be followed. The Court has to keep regard to the public interest. The Court must be circumspect in granting temporary injunction or in refusing the same. In such matters, primary consideration ought to be balance of convenience, irreparable injury and public interest and such similar factors worthy of consideration. Every petitioner and the respondent though against an award has to face different situations. The Court has to be conscious about the sad plight of the workman keeping in view the social considerations that he has been out of employment for the last several years. During all these days how he would have been able to keep his body and soul together would be an untold story. In such matters, the order must be of such nature which enlarges protection of social beneficent statutes and it accords with reason and justice. It is that order which has to be preferred. See Harcharan Singh v. Shivrani, (AIR)1981 SC 1284.
9. Much emphasis was laid by learned counsel for the petitioner that interim order in the present petition may be passed in the same terms as it has been passed in other petitions (annexure 3 to the petition) on the basis of some interim stay granted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, but the facts of the Supreme Court case and the circumstances under which that order was passed are not available. Learned single Judge has also just made a reference to some order of the Supreme Court without quoting the same. Copy of the stay order granted by the Supreme Court has not been filed here. Facts and circumstances of each case differ from the other. No doubt, obiter dicta of the Supreme Court is also binding under Article 141 of the Constitution, but in order that any observation of the Supreme Court may be binding, the law must be declared by the Supreme Court. In the instant case, neither the complete interim stay has been filed nor the facts of that case in which interim stay was passed have been indicated. It would not be out of place to mention some observations pertaining to the relevance of the precedents. In Quinn v. Leathern, (1901) AC 495 at p.506, it was observed as below:
'Now before discussing the case of Alien v. Flood (1898) AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character, which I wish to make and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts, proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it'.
10. In Gasket Radiators Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, (1985-I-LLJ-506), it was observed that the judgments of courts are not to be construed as Acts of Parliament nor can we read a judgment on a particular aspect of a question as a Holy Book covering all aspects of every question whether such questions or facts of such question arose for consideration or not in that case. See General Electric Co. v. Renusagar Power Co., (1987) 4 SCC 137 at p.156.
11. In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (AIR) 1982 SC 1325, importance of 'stare decisis' was pointed out by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court as follows:
'Stare decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action but not a universal and inexorable command. The rule of adherence to precedents is a rule of practice adopted by the courts for the purpose of ensuring uniformity and stability in the law. Blind and mechanical observance of the rule of stare decisis would dwarf and stultify the growth of the law and affect its capacity to adjust itself to the changing needs of the society. There are certain issues of momentous significance which transcend technical considerations of stare decisis and if such issue is brought before the court it would be nothing short of abdication of its constitutional duty for thecourt to refuse such issue by taking refuge under the doctrine of stare decisis'.
12. In view of the aforesaid observations about the importance of the precedent, stare decisis cannot be followed mechanically as that would dwarf and stultify the growth of law and adjustment to the changing needs of the society. The dispensation of the justice must be consistent with the change in the society and the justice must not be in the computerised form. Interim stay passed in a particular case must be in accordance with the facts and circumstances of that particular case without being influenced by model of interim stay passed under the circumstances of any particular case, particularly when the details of that interim stay or the facts and circumstances under which that interim stay was passed are not available. The concept of distributive justice has to be kept in mind before passing an interim stay, particularly in a case where contest is between the employer and workman. I am conscious of the practical difficulty that this is a contest between two unequals. The equity between the two is to be adjusted. At the same time the court has to remain conscious that the justice must not be defeated. The workman was out of employment since 10th January, 1980, and the order of termination or retrenchment has been held to be illegal by the Labour Court. No appeal is provided under the Act which evinces the intendment of the law-givers that the award of the Labour Court has to be taken as final, subject, of course, to the extaordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
13. It is by now well settled that the purpose of passing interim stay in a writ petition underArticle 226 of the Constitution ought to be to evolve a workable formula or arrangement to the extent called for by the situation so that the unemployed workman's agony is not extended. This is, of course, a delicate balance which is to be maintained after considering the pros and cons of the matter so that the larger public interest is not jeopardized and the socialist, democratic republic goal under the preamble of the Constitution and the goal of bringing about social revolution and establishment of welfare State is not kept in oblivion. Further, the object of social and economic justice must be kept in mind. Keeping all these considerations in the mind in the present case, ends of justice require that interim stay may be granted to the petitioner but in the following modified form which will maintain delicate balance between the employer and the workman till the disposal of the writ petition.
Meanwhile, operation of the award dated 22nd July 1987, shall remain stayed provided the petitioner deposits half of the back wages payable to respondent No. 3, Mohan Lal Kesharwani, since 10th January 1980, the date of termination till the date of reinstatement, with the Labour Court by 8th September 1988, and the said amount shall be paid to respondent No. 3 within a period of two weeks thereafter. Respondent No. 3 shall be entitled to his full salary to which he would be entitled under the law treating him to be in coutinuous service since the date of reinstatement till the disposal of the writ petition. Certified copy of this order may be given to learned counsel for the parties within three days on payment of usual charges.