Judgment:
Pankaj Mithal, J.
1. Heard Sri Ramesh Chandra Gupta, learned Counsel for the appellant and Sri Ashok Pandey learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 2 is only a formal party.
2. A dispute arose between the appellant and respondent No. 1 with regard to transaction of 1,300 shares of Reliance Capital Limited which was referable to Arbitration under the bye laws of U. P. Stock Exchange Association Limited. The Arbitral Tribunal vide award dated 16.10.2006 directed the appellant to make payment of Rs. 91,220 to the respondent within three months in full and final settlement of 1,300 shares of Reliance Capital Limited which were the subject-matter of dispute. Against the said award appellant filed objection under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Besides, the two other objections that the award is against the public policy of India and that the Tribunal lacked authority, the primary objection of the appellant before the court below was that that the claim raised by the respondent was barred by time. The said objections have been rejected by the court below by the impugned judgment and order dated 25.2.2009, inter alia on the reasoning that the arbitral award is not liable to be set aside on the point of limitation as this is not the ground which has been provided for setting aside the award under Section 34 of the Act.
3. Aggrieved the appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 37(b) of the Act.
4. In appeal the only point argued is that the claim was time barred and therefore the award was liable to be set aside. In support reliance has been placed upon the bye-law No. 269 which provides that the Investors Services Committee of the U. P. Stock Exchange shall not accept and take cognizance of any complaint, difference and dispute other than of bad delivery of shares if it is not referred to it within four months of the date when it arose.
5. On the basis of the aforesaid bye-law it has been contended that the last transaction giving rise to the dispute is of 10.5.2005, whereas, dispute was raised for the first time on 27.12.2005 and as such was patently barred by time.
6. Be as it may be, the arbitral Tribunal has considered this aspect of the matter and has rejected the plea of claim being barred by time while making the award holding that in view of appellants own letter dated 7.2.2006 which is not disputed the cause of action did not last arose on 10.5.2005 but continued to arise thereafter also.
7. Now in appeal the relevant question is not as to whether the claim was time barred but whether an award of the Arbitral Tribunal can be set aside on the ground that the claim was barred by time.
8. The answer to the above question posed can be had on the plain reading of the provisions of Section 34 of the Act which provides for the grounds on which an arbitral award can be set aside on the objections of the parties. I am afraid that none of the grounds specified under Section 34 of the Act covers the case of the appellant. There is no provision in Section 34 of the Act enabling the Court to set aside an arbitral award for the reason that the claim was raised beyond time particularly when the party raising such a plea had participated in the arbitral proceedings, was not under any incapacity to effectively participate and otherwise had full opportunity of hearing. Thus, I am in firm agreement with the decision of the court below and hold that an arbitral award cannot be set aside for reasons other than those which have been set out in Section 34 of the Act. The aforesaid ground not being covered therein, the court below committed no error of law in refusing to set aside the arbitral award on the point of claim being barred by time.
9. The claim raised was otherwise covered by the arbitration clause and the dispute was referable to arbitration under the bye-law of the U. P. Stock Exchange Association Limited.
10. In the end learned Counsel for the appellant has made a faint effort to assail the finding on limitation as recorded by the Arbitral Tribunal. The correctness of the said finding cannot be examined in this appeal. This appeal is directed only against the judgment and order of the court below rejecting the objections of the appellant and once this Court finds that the rejection order does not suffer from any error of law, it is beyond the appellate court's power-to examine the arbitral award on merits.
11. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I find no force in this appeal which is hereby dismissed summarily but with no costs.