Ashok Bhushan, J.
1. Heard Sri Khurshed Alam learned Counsel for the petitioner and the Learned standing counsel.
2. By this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 7.2.2007 by which order the District Magistrate suspended the petitioner's arm license and directed him to deposit the same with the police station. By the same order a notice was also given to the petitioner to show cause as to why his license be not cancelled. The order of suspension was passed on the basis of report submitted by the In-charge Inspector, Kotwali, Circle Officer, Rudrapur and the Additional Superintendent of Police. The reason as noticed in the order for suspension was an incident which took place on 20.11.2006 in the after noon at 2.30 P.M. at the time of inauguration of the Primary Pathshala situate at village Fatehpur. At time of inauguration the petitioner along with his group killed one Ram Pravesh Nishad by his licensed pistol. A criminal case Under Section 302 I.P.C. Was also registered against the petitioner. The District Magistrate recorded his satisfaction that from the act and behaviour of the petitioner on the above date it is clear that he; is hot headed person with criminal tendency hence it is not in the interest of security of public to permit the arm license to remain with such a person.
3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner challenging the order raised following two submissions:
1. The arm license of the petitioner cannot be suspended pending enquiry for cancellation of his arm license.
2. The arm license cannot be suspended merely on ground of pendency of a criminal case against a person.
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on decisions of this Court reported in (2001) (2) JIC 453 (All) Prabhu Dayal Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh: 2001 (2) JIC 304 (All) Ranvir Singh v. District Judge Shrawasti and Anr.: 2003 (1) JIC 33 (All) Satish Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.; 2003 (1) JIC 302 (All) Dharam Vir Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. in support of above submissions.
5. Learned standing counsel refuting the submissions of counsel for the petitioner contended that the District Magistrate in the present case was fully justified in suspending the petitioner's license on being satisfied that the grounds exist for suspension within the meaning of Section 17(3) of the arms Act, 1959. He submits that the suspension is not on mere pendency of criminal case but on the basis of assessment of circumstances and events which led to registration of a criminal case. He has placed reliance on Full Bench judgments of this Court reported in 1984 A.W.C. 145 Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.: 1985 (22) A.C.C. 353 Kailash Nath and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.: 1995 All. CJ 200 Rana Pratap Singh and other v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.
6. I have considered the submissions of learned Counsel for both the parties and perused the record.
7. Section 17 of the Arms Act, 1959 empowers the licensing authority to suspend the license or revoke a license by an order in writing. Section 17 Sub-section (3) of the Arms Act is quoted as below:
17(3) The licensing authority may be order in writing suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit or revoke a licence--
(a) if the licensing authority is satisfied that the holder of the licence is prohibited by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, from acquiring, having in his possession or carrying any arms or ammunition, or is of unsound mind, or is for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act; or
(b) if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the licence; or
(c) if the licence was obtained by the suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong information provided by the holder of the licence or any other person on his behalf at the time of applying for it. Or
(d) if any of the conditions of the licence has been contravened; or
(e) if the holder of the licence has failed to comply with a notice under Sub-section (1) requiring him to deliver-up the licence.
8. The suspension of an arm licence and revocation of arm licence are two different concepts which have different consequences. The grounds for suspension of a licence or revocation of licence are same. The grounds for suspension and revocation although being same but it is left to the discretion of the licensing authority to decide either to suspend or to revoke the licence in facts of the particular case. In the present case the ground for suspension is the ground within the meaning of Section 17(3)(b) i.e. licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety. By order impugned the suspension has been done i.e. the act of suspension is complete although notice for revocation on same very ground has also been given to the holder. It is act of giving notice by licensing authority for revocation which has been formed basis for argument of the petitioner that since enquiry of revocation is pending the licensing authority has no jurisdiction to suspend the licence.
9. Section 17(3) of the Act came for consideration before this Court in several cases. Four Full Benches have considered Section 17 of the Arms Act i.e. 1984 A.W.C. 145 Chhanqa Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.; 1985 (22) A.C.C. 353 Kailash Nath and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.; 1995 All. CJ 200 Rana Pratap Singh and other v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.; 1989 (26) ACC 31 Balram Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.. Several Division Benches and Single Judges have also considered Section 17 and the aforesaid judgments of Full Benches. For examining the correctness of the order impugned in this writ petition, it is necessary to find out the ratio decendi of the above cases and to know as to what is the binding precedent which is to guide all authorities and courts in our State. The first Full Bench judgment is the case of three Judge Bench in Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (supra). The question which came for consideration before the Full Bench was as to whether the executive authorities have jurisdiction or power to suspend an arm licence pending enquiry in the proceedings for its cancellation and suspension and secondly as to whether it is incumbent upon the authorities to afford opportunity of hearing prior to suspension. The Full Bench repelled the argument of affording an opportunity for suspension or revocation. Following was laid down in paragraphs 8 and 9:
8. Again, a reading of the provisions contained in Section 17 and 18 of the Act, as forming part of one integrated scheme, clearly brings out that the licensee is afforded ample protection when the statute obliges the licensing authority to give reasons for revoking/ suspending a licence in writing and thereafter afford him an opportunity to be heard by the appellate authority on all relevant aspects of the matter. It is evident that having regard to the fact that licences involved in such cases are in respect of dangerous weapons, the legislature, in its wisdom, thought that an opportunity of being heard should be afforded to the licensee at a stage following suspension/revocation of the licence and not prior to it. Thus the legislature has, in its own way specified the stage at which the principles of natural justice are in such cases to become applicable and has thereby ruled out the application of such principles at any other stage.
9. It is true that in order to revoke/suspend an arms licence, the licensing authority has necessarily to come to the conclusion that facts justifying revocation/suspension of licence mentioned in grounds (a) to (e) of Section 17 exist. However, the section nowhere lays it down that before coming to such a conclusion the licensing authority should either hear the licensee or hold a formal enquiry. The licensing authority may on certain information being laid before it, for its own satisfaction proceed to hold an enquiry with a view to find out if the conditions for revoking/suspending the arms licence exist and, as already explained, it would, in such enquiry, not be necessary for the licensing authority to associate the licensee and the licensee cannot claim it as of right (statutory or that based on principles of natural justice) that he must be heard and be given an opportunity to place his version of the case before the licensing authority. We are in this view supported by a Division Bench decision of Calcutta High Court in the case of Sudhir Chandra Ghosh v. The A.D.M. 24 Parganas 0065/1980 : AIR1980Cal275 .
10. The Full Bench further laid down that if there are material before the licensing authority and it becomes apparent that possession of arm by the licensee is nothing but to endanger the public peace and safety it can straight way and without holding any enquiry proceed to suspend or revoke the arm licence after recording reasons. The Full Bench further, however, laid down that if the licensing authority embarks upon enquiry to find out as to whether the grounds exist Under Section 17(3) it has no power to suspend the licence because till then it has not made up its mind. Following was laid down in paragraphs 14 and 18:
14. The object of the enquiry that a licensing authority may while proceeding to consider the question as to whether or not an arms licence should be revoked or suspended, like to make, clearly is to enable the licensing authority to come to a conclusion as to whether or not the facts stated in Clauses (1) to (e) of Section 17(3) exist and as already explained it is not obliged to before considering that a case for revocation/suspension of licence has been made out, associate the licensee in such enquiry. In this view of the matter it can safely be taken that where a licensing authority embarks upon such an enquiry it is, till then not convinced about existence of the conditions mentioned in Clause (a) to (e) of Section 17(3) of the Act. So long as it is not so convinced no case to make an order either revoking or suspending an arms licence as contemplated by the section will be made out.
18. ... As already explained, if there already is material before the licensing authority and it becomes apparent to it that possession of arms by the licensee is going to endanger public peace and safety, it can straight -away and without holding any enquiry proceed to revoke/suspend the arms licence after recording reasons therefor and if the licensee is aggrieved by such orders, he will have a right to ventilate his grievance before the appellate authority. However, if there is no such material before the licensing authority and it is not apparent to it that there is an immediate danger to public peace and safety and it, on some information being laid before it, proceeds to find out whether there is any likelihood of public peace and safety being affected at some future date, it cannot be said that there is any such urgency so as to justify the revocation/cancellation of the licence even before the licensing authority gets so satisfied. In the circumstances, considering the nature and the object of the enquiry which a licensing authority is required to make for finding out if the facts justifying passing of an order for revocation/suspension of licence exist, it cannot be said that non-conferment of the power to suspend an arms licence pending enquiry has the effect of defeating the object of which such a power has been conferred upon the licensing authority.
11. After laying down above the Full Bench concluded that licensing authority has no power to suspend the licence pending enquiry into its cancellation/suspension.
12. The next judgment is a judgment of five Judges Full Bench in Kailash Nath and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (supra) case. The writ petitions were filed challenging the orders passed by the District Magistrate cancelling the gun licence. The District Magistrate felt satisfied that there was immediate apprehension of breach of peace from the petitioner and with the object of preserving peace and preventing the petitioner from using the fire arm, the order for cancellation of arm was passed. The argument raised before the Full Bench was that the orders have been passed in violation of principles of natural justice, since no opportunity was given to the petitioner before passing the order. The earlier judgment of Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (supra) case was also considered by the Full Bench and following was laid down:. The impugned order expressly recited that there was immediate apprehension of breach of peace from the petitioners if they were allowed to retain their fire arms. Hence, cancellation of their fire arms licences without any prior notice to them might be justified but the ingredients of natural justice would not be satisfied until the petitioners were subsequently afforded an opportunity of hearing and making representations against the impugned order. This being the legal aspect of the case I am of the opinion that the law laid down in paragraph 16 in Chhanga Prasad Sahu's case (supra) extracted in the earlier part of this judgment must be supplemented by the further observations that after making the provisional action of immediate revocation of the licence the licensing authority must issue notice to the licence holder giving him an opportunity to file objections against the preliminary order and after hearing him proceed to pass the final order which may either affirm or revoke the provisional order. In other words, it is incumbent upon the licensing authority to refrain from attaching finality to the order of cancellation until the aggrieved petitioner has been heard by such authority and his objections have been adjudicated. The licensing authority can also for the furtherance of his immediate remedial action exercise the incidental power or directing the license holder to surrender his licence until the objections have been decided. It follows that in the event of the objections being allowed the licence as well as the fire arm must be restored to the licence holder. In Smt. Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) the Supreme Court in its final order did not set aside the impugned order of impounding the passport, instead it merely allowed the petitioner to make a representation and direction that the representation should be dealt with expeditiously by the Passport Authority.
11. In view of the law as stated above I allow the petitioners two weeks, time from today to file their representations or objections before the District Magistrate, Banda and order the District Magistrate to decide the same within three weeks from the date of filing such representations or objections. It is not necessary to set aside the impugned order and I accordingly dispose of these writ petitions without passing any such formal order. There will be no order as to costs.
13. This order of cancellation was upheld on the basis of the order of the District Magistrate recording satisfaction within the meaning of Section 17(3) for cancellation. Full Bench held that there was no need to give any prior notice to the petitioners but petitioners are given opportunity to represent against revocation order and the Full Bench observed that finality to revocation order be attached only after deciding the objection. Thus the order of revocation was upheld which was passed without notice which recorded satisfaction of the licensing authority within the meaning of Section 17(3).
14. The third Full Bench judgment was of three Judge Bench in Balram Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) laid down ' In view of the discussions aforesaid, it is to be held that the licensing authority is vested with the powers to suspend the licence during proceedings for its suspension or revocation Under Section 17 of the Act'.
15. The last Full Bench which considered the provisions of Section 17(3) and earlier three Full Benches is five Judge Full Bench. In Rana Pratap Singh and other v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra). The five Judge Full Bench noted in extenso various paragraphs of the judgments of Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra), Kailash Nath and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) and Balram Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra). The view taken in Balram Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) that Kailash Nath and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) demolished the Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) , was not accepted. The ratio laid down in Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) and Kailash Nath and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) was endorsed. Paragraph 18 of Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) was specifically extracted by five Judge Full Bench in Rana Pratap Singh and other v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) in paragraph 28. The question of suspension of arm licence during the enquiry was clarified in paragraph 32 of the judgment in Rana Pratap Singh and other v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) in following words:
32. As regards suspension of an arms licence by the licensing authority during the enquiry, this, it may be clarified, may be done only in the manner as explained in the judgment in C.P. Sahu's case (supra) and not without application of mind and recording of reasons by the licensing authority with such reasons and circumstances being in consonance with the provisions of the Arms Act.
16. The above pronouncement by five Judge Full Bench clears the mist created by effect and consequence of earlier three Full Bench judgments. Paragraph 32 of the judgment specifically shows that the suspension can be done during the enquiry but it immediately gives a caution that it can be done only in manner as explained in the judgment of ChhangaPrasad Sahu and other v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) as quoted above.
17. Five Judge Bench in Rana Pratap Singh and other v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) is the Full Bench which had considered all the earlier three Full Benches and has clarified the law in paragraph 32 of the judgment. Thus from the above pronouncement it is clear that suspension of arm licence pending enquiry is not a phenomena which is unknown Under Section 17 but suspension of arm licence during enquiry is hedged by certain conditions as laid down in Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) and clarified in Rana Pratap Singh and other v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) i.e. to again extract Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra):.If there is already material before the licensing authority and it becomes apparent to it that the possession of arm by the licensee is going to endanger the public peace and safety, it can in straight away and without holding any enquiry proceed to revoke/ suspend the arm licence after recording reasons therefor....
18. Thus the condition precedent for suspension of arm licence pending enquiry as deducible from the above judgment is:
1. there is already material before the licensing authority to be satisfied that the possession of arm by the licensee is going to endanger the public peace and safety;
2. after recording reasons therefore; thus the suspension can be ordered pending enquiry of revocation only when there is already material before the licensing authority and on the said materials the licensing authority is satisfied that it is necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to suspend the licence.
19. The above proposition also conversely lays down that if there are no materials before the licensing authority to be satisfied that it is necessary for the security of public peace or public safety to suspend the licence , it cannot suspend during pendency of enquiry. Thus if the licensing authority is still in process of making enquiry and not satisfied with the ground, there is no jurisdiction to suspend the licence. To note the observations of the Full Bench following relevant observation has been made by the Full Bench in Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.' case (supra) in paragraph 14:
14. ... In this view of the matter it can safely be taken that where a licensing authority embarks upon such an enquiry it is, till then not convinced about existence of the conditions mentioned in Clauses (a) to (e) of Section 17(3) of the Act. So long as it is not so convinced no case to make an order either revoking or suspending an arms licence as contemplated buy the section will be made out.
20. The scheme of the Act i.e. Section 17 itself contemplated suspension or revocation on two independent counts; when challenge is made to suspension directed by the licensing authority; the ground for suspension is to be scrutinised to find out as to whether it falls under the scheme of Section 17(3) or not. The action of suspension if found justified and in accordance with the provisions of Section 17(3) its affect and validity shall not be denuded only because the licensing authority wants to give an opportunity before cancelling the licence. As laid down by all the Full Benches the revocation order can be made if satisfaction is recorded Under Section 17(3) without giving an opportunity to the licensee. However, five Judge Full Bench in Kailash and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) has observed that finality to such revocation be not attached unless the licensee is given an opportunity to represent against such revocation. Although power is given to revoke a licence on being satisfied with the grounds Under Section 17(3) but in a case where licensing authority wanted to give an opportunity before passing the revocation order, the said action cannot denude the jurisdiction and power of the licensing authority to suspend the licence. Each case has to be examined from the orders passed by the licensing authority to test it whether the suspension has been ordered without forming requisite opinion or the authority has not formed opinion and wanted to enquire before forming opinion, as noted above, if the authority has not formed a definite opinion and is in process of enquiry to come to a definite conclusion suspension cannot be ordered. However, if the opinion is recorded and there is already material, suspension of arm licence cannot be faulted with.
21. Now comes the cases relied by the counsel for the petitioner. The first case relied by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is Prabhu Dayal Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh's case (supra). In the said case only the show cause notice was given for cancellation of the licence and the District Magistrate directed for deposit of the arm. This Court lays down that the deposit of fire arm cannot be ordered unless the licence is cancelled. In the said case no order for suspension of licence was passed and it has no application in the present case. The next case is Division Bench judgment in Ranvir Singh's case (supra) where Division Bench of this Court has , referring an earlier judgment of the learned Single Judge i.e. Sadri Ram v. District Magistrate/licensing authority. District Azamgarh and Ors. 1998 (16) LCD-1064 : 1998 (37) A.C.C. Page 830, held that the authority has no power to suspend the arm licence pending enquiry in the cancellation. The Division Bench only referred the judgment in Sadri Ram's case in its judgment in paragraph 2 and has allowed the writ petition. Sadri Ram's case the learned Single Judge was considering an order of the District Magistrate suspending the arm licence by which order the petitioner was asked to show cause as to why the licence be not revoked. In Sadri Ram's case the Court took the view that the licence can be suspended only for a specified period. The Court observed that if such period would have been mentioned the order of the licensing authority for suspending the arm licence pending enquiry could not be faulted with. Following was observed in paragraph 4:
4. In the instant case, the licensing authority seemingly formed an opinion that it was necessary for the security of the public peace and public safety to suspend and revoke the license as visualised by Clause (b) of Sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the Act. The order would not have drawn a flak, had the licence been suspended for a specified period in that Section 17(3) visualises that licensing authority may by order in writing suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit. The period of suspension has not been indicated and instead the licensee has been called upon to show cause why the licence be not revoked/cancelled.
22. In paragraph 12 following was laid down by the learned Single Judge.:
12. The propositions that emerge from the above discussion, may be summed up as under:
(a) the licensing authority has no power to suspend the arms licence pending enquiry into its cancellation/suspension nor has it the power to suspend the licence for the definite period.
(b) licensing authority has the power to suspend for specified period a fire arm licence on being satisfied as to existence of all or any of the conditions visualised by Clauses (1) to e) of Sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the Act sans any prior opportunity of hearing being given to the licence holder but such order of suspensions hall not attain finality until the aggrieved party has been heard and his objections if any, adjudicated. In other words, suspension of arms licence for specified period or its revocation Under Section 17(3) of the Act, if ordered without affording opportunity of hearing, would endure in suspended animation until the aggrieved party has been heard by the licensing authority and his objections if any, are adjudicated;
(c) the licensing authority can also for the furtherance of the immediate remedial actions, exercise in facts and circumstances of a given case, an incidental power of directing the licence holder to surrender his licence until objections have been decided and,
(d) suspension Under Section 17(3) of the Act must be for definite period to be specified in the order by the licensing authority.
23. Thus learned Single Judge in Sadri Ram's case has also held in paragraphs 12(b) and 12(a) that the licence can be suspended for specified period if the licensing authority is satisfied as to existence of all or any of the conditions visualised by Clauses (a) to (e) of Sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the Act. Paragraph 32 of five Judge Full Bench in Rana Pratap Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) has not been noticed in Sadri Ram's case and Ranvir Singh's cases.
24. In Ranvir Singh v. District Magistrate Shrawasti and Anr. case (supra) also in paragraph 2 the basic reason for allowing the writ petition was that the licence was suspended for indefinite period. Following was laid down in paragraph 2 of Ranvir Singh's case:
2. In a case of Sadri Ram v. District Magistrate. Licensing authority, District Azamgarh and Ors. 1998 (16)LCD-1064 it has been held after taking into consideration the earlier Full Bench decisions of this Court that the licensing authority has no power to suspend the arms licence pending inquiry into its cancellation/ suspension not has its the power to suspend the licence for an indefinite period. In the instant case the arms licence of the appellant has been suspended pending inquiry into its cancellation. In these circumstances, we are of the view that impugned order of suspension was liable to be quashed and the learned Single Judge fell into error in not passing an order to that effect.
25. In view of above the judgments of learned Single Judge in Sadri Ram's case and the Division Bench in Ranvir Singh's case, cannot be said to be laying down any thing different from what has been laid down in paragraph 32 of Rana Pratap Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra).
26. The judgment of learned Single Judge in Satish Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. 2003 (1) JIC 33 (All) laid down that the suspension of arm licence cannot be made without opportunity. Learned Single Judge laid down that the licence cannot be suspended unless reasonable opportunity has been given tot he petitioner -licence holder to show cause. The above view of the learned Single Judge is contrary tot he Full Bench judgment of Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) and Rana Pratap Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) all the Full Benches have laid down that it is not necessary to give an opportunity before suspension or cancellation of arm licence. The arm can always be directed to be deposited even after suspension of a licence. The said judgment do not help the petitioner in any manner.
27. In view of above discussions it is to be held that the I suspension of arm licence during pendency of an enquiry for cancellation can be done only in accordance with the conditions as laid down in paragraph 18 of Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.' case (supra) and as laid down in paragraph 32 of Rana Pratap Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra). As noticed above the suspension is justified or not depends on the order of the licensing authority and on the scrutiny as to whether the conditions for suspension during the enquiry has been fulfilled or not. There is no such broad or general proposition deducible from the above noted three Full Bench judgments that the suspension of arms licence can never be ordered during pendency of enquiry.
28. Coming to the facts of the present case it is clear that the licensing authority has passed order giving reasons and has recorded satisfaction that permitting the arm licence to remain with the petitioner is against the public peace and public security and safety. Allegation against the petitioner was that on 20.11.2006 in the afternoon at 2.30 P.M. at the time of inauguration of the Primary Pathshala in the village i.e. in a public function there being dispute with the husband of the Pradhan, the petitioner along with his associates killed the son of Pradhan. If such conduct of a person exhibited in a public function, shall not endanger the public safety and public peace the power of suspension of arm licence can never be justified. Thus I am satisfied that there was material before the licensing authority and on the said material the licensing authority has recorded its satisfaction for suspension of arm licence. The suspension thus has been ordered in accordance with the conditions as laid down in paragraph 32 of Rana Pratap Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) and paragraph 18 of Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. case (supra) i.e. in accordance with the ratio of Full Bench judgment of this Court and the suspension order thus cannot be said to be illegal or unjustified.
29. Now remains the second contention of the petitioner's counsel that mere involvement in the criminal case is not sufficient for suspension of arm licence. He has placed reliance on the judgment of Dharm Vir Singh's case (supra). In Dharm Vir Singh's case following was laid down by the learned Single Judge:
6. ... The District Magistrate in the impugned order dated 14.10.1991 has stated that cancellation of the licence of the petitioner appears necessary in the public interest. There is no finding that the revocation of licence was considered necessary for the security of the public peace or public safety. Public interest cannot be equated to the term ' for the security of the public peace or public safety'. The case of Sheo Prasad (supra) has been relied in the case of Iftikhar Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. reported in 2002 (1) JIC 501 (Allahabad) and it has been held that involvement in criminal case or pendency of a criminal case cannot be a ground for revocation of the licence under the Arms Act. The ratio of Sheo Prasad Case (supra) was again affirmed in the case of Hari Kant alias Raja v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. reported in 2002 (1) JIC 714 (Allahabad).
30. There cannot be any dispute with the proposition laid down in the above case that the involvement in criminal case or pendency of criminal case cannot be ground for revocation of licence. The suspension or revocation can be ordered when the conditions as mentioned in Section 17(3) is fulfilled. Thus without recording a finding that the security of the public peace or public safety is endangered the suspension cannot be ordered only on the ground that a criminal case is pending against a person. Present is not a case of passing of suspension order merely on the ground of pendency of the criminal case. The incident which took place on 20.11.2006 has been taken into consideration and it is the happening on that particular day which has formed the basis of suspension of arm licence. Unless registration or pendency of criminal case can be said to have nexus with endangering the public peace or public safety, the mere pendency or registration of a criminal case cannot be a ground for suspension. Thus on the second submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner the order of suspension of arm licence cannot be held to be illegal.
31. In view of foregoing discussions no grounds have been made out to interfere with the order suspending the arm licence of the petitioner. It is , however, observed that the final decision regarding proceedings for cancellation of arm licence may be taken expeditiously by the District Magistrate.
32. With the above observations the writ petition is dismissed.