Pathak, J.
1. This reference by a Division Bench raises some important questions concerning the respective areas of jurisdiction of the judges of this Court sitting at Allahabad and the judges of this Court sitting at Lucknow.
2. In the instant writ petition, the following four questions have been referred for the opinion of the Full Bench:
'1. Can a case falling within the jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench of this Court be presented at Allahabad?
2. Can the Judges sitting at Allahabad summarily dismiss a case, presented at Allahabad, pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench?
3. Can a case pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench, presented and entertained at Allahabad, be decided finally by the judges sitting at Allahabad, without there being an order as contemplated by the second proviso to Article 14 of the U. P. High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948?
4. What is the meaning of the expression 'in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh' used in the first proviso to Article 14 of the High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948? Has this expression reference to the place where the case originated or to the place of sitting of the last court or authority whose decree or order is being challenged in the proceeding before the High Court?'
3. In the connected writ petition, Sri H.N. Tilhari, learned counsel for the petitioners, at first questioned the competence of the reference to a Full Bench out subsequently he abandoned the objection and, indeed, pressed for a decision of the question which arises therein. Having regard to the terms of the order of reference, we have framed the following question and learned counsel for the parties are agreed that this is the question:--
'5. Whether this writ petition can be entertained and heard by the judges sitting at Lucknow?'
4. At the outset it is necessary, we think, to set out the historical background against which the questions must be considered.
5. In the North Western Provinces of the Presidency of Fort William the Court of Sadar Diwani Adalat and Sadar Nazamat Adalat sat at Agra dealing with appeals in civil and criminal cases from the provincial courts. The Indian High Courts Act, 1861, enacted by the British Parliament, gave to the Crown authority to establish High Courts at Calcutta, Madras, Bombay and at one other place. The Sadar Court was abolished, and the Letters Patent of March 17, 1866 constituted a High Court for the North Western Provinces called the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.
6. In 1856, the territories falling within Oudh had been brought under the British Crown, and a hierarchy of courts established. By the Oudh Civil Courts Act, 1879 the Judicial Commissioner was constituted the head of the judiciary.
7. The year 1901 saw the creation of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. The judicial administration in the two regions of the province, however, continued to remain separate. Subsequently, the Oudh Civil Courts Act, 1879 was repealed by the Oudh Courts Act, 1925, and the Court of the Judicial Commissioner was replaced by the Oudh Chief Court with jurisdiction extending over the same area. The two judicial administrations wielded jurisdiction over the two separate regions of the United Provinces for many years. Then, in deference to a growing volume of opinion in favour of a single judicial administration throughout the United Provinces, the Governor General made the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948. The Amalgamation Order came into force on July 19, 1948.
8. Article 3 of the Amalgamation Order provided that as from the appointed day, namely, July 26, 1948, the High Court in Allahabad and the Chief Court in Oudh would be amalgamated and would constitute one High Court by the name of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The judges of the existing High Courts, namely the Allahabad High Court and the Oudh Chief Court, became judges of the new High Court. The Chief Justice of the existing Allahabad High Court became the Chief Justice of the new High Court Article 7 provided:
'(1) The new High Court shall have in respect of the whole of the United Provinces, all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as, under the law in force immediately, before the appointed day is exercisable in respect of any part of that province by either of the existing High Courts.
(2) The new High Court shall also have in respect of any area outside the United Provinces all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as under the law in force immediately before the appointed day is exercisable in respect of that area by the High Court in Allahabad.'
9. The practice and procedure in the existing High Court in Allahabad were, by Article 9, to apply with necessary modifications to the new High Court, but power was given to the Chief Justice in his discretion to order that the practice and procedure hitherto obtaining in the Oudh Chief Court would, until varied or revoked by new rules or orders for the new High Court, apply with necessary modifications in relation to the new High Court sitting at Lucknow. Article 11 provided for a seal of the new High Court and the custody of the seal. Article 14, which is the principal provision for consideration, provided:--
'14. The new High Court, and the judges and division courts thereof, shall sit at Allahabad or at such other places in the United Provinces as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor of the United Provinces, appoint:
Provided that unless the Governor of the United Provinces with the concurrence of the Chief Justice otherwise directs, such judges of the new High Court, not less than two in number, as the Chief Courts may from time to time nominate, shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh as the Chief Justice may direct, the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the new High Court:
Provided further that the Chief Justice may in his discretion order that any case or class of cases arising in the said areas shall be heard at Allahabad.'
10. In regard to pending proceedings, in either of the existing High Courts, Article 16 directed that they would stand transferred to the new High Court and would be continued as if they had been proceedings instituted in that High Court. Article 17 repealed the Letters Patent dated March 17, 1866 and the Oudh Courts Act, 1925 except for the purpose of construing or giving effect to the provisions of the Amalgamation Order. Finally, Article 18 declared that nothing in the Amalgamation Order would prejudice the application to the new High Court of the Government of India Act 1935 and the Amalgamation Order would have effect subject to future provisions that may be made with respect to the new High Court by any competent legislature or authority.
11. On January 26, 1950, the Constitution of India was brought into force making India a Union of States with Uttar Pradesh as one of the States. By virtue of Article 214 of the Constitution, the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad constituted by the Amalgamation Order was deemed to be the High Court for the State of Uttar Pradesh.
12. The first three questions raise the point whether upon a true construction of Article 14 of the Amalgamation Order the High Court Judges sitting at Lucknow are alone competent to exercise the jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of cases arising in the areas of Oudh specified by the Chief Justice or it is a power enjoyed concurrently by them with the High Court judges sitting at Allahabad.
13. Certain basic considerations need to be made clear first.
14. It is well settled that the nature and extent of the jurisdiction enjoyed by a court and the manner in which that jurisdiction will be exercised are twodistinct matters. There is a catena of cases affirming that proposition and two of them, where the earlier cases have also been considered are Govind Prasad v. Pawankumar AIR 1952 Nag 278 (FB) and Calcutta National Bank (in liquidation) v. Abhoy Singh Sahela : AIR1959Cal464 . By jurisdiction is meant the authority which a court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. How and where the jurisdiction will be exercised by the judges is governed by the practice and procedure prescribed by law and the place of sitting appointed for them.
15. The jurisdiction of the new High Court as on the date of the Amalgamation Order is defined by Article 7. That jurisdiction will be exercised in accordance with a number of other provisions, and one of them is Article 14. Article 14 is concerned essentially, with the seat of the new High Court and the place where its judges will sit.
16. Article 14 speaks of the new High Court and separately of its judges and division courts. That is because 'the High Court' and 'the judges' refer to two distinct conceptions. One distinction is that the term 'court' applies to an organisation of a permanent nature. The court continues even though one or more judges may change, and its identity is not altered by a mere change in its composition. A judge is a physical person whereas a court is a being in imagination, an incorporeal being comparable to a corporation.
17. The seat of the court is the place where it transacts its business and maintains its office and records. When the court sits at more than one place, one of those places is appointed as its principal seat. That is the place where the essential control over its business is exercised.
18. At this point one important controversy may be disposed of. Where is the principal seat of the new High Court situated? Article 14, in its main provision, declares that the new High Court shall sit 'at Allahabad or such other places' as may be appointed by the Chief Justice with the approval of the Governor. Besides, this, the first proviso requires that some judges will sit at Lucknow. Therefore, the High Court sits at Allahabad, at Lucknow and at other places appointed by the Chief Justice. It sits at all these places. But, its seat at Allahabad is a permanent seat. That follows not only from its description in Article 3, namely, the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. It follows also fromthe necessary implications involved in the second proviso to Article 14.
Under that proviso the Chief Justice has power to order that a case or class of cases which would ordinarily be heard at Lucknow should be heard at Allahabad instead. He has no power to transfer those cases to any other place, not even to places appointed by him under the main provision of Article 14. As regards Lucknow, as we shall presently show, it was never intended to be a permanent seat. That leaves Allahabad as the one identifiable permanent seat, and, therefore, the principal seat of the High Court. The word 'or' in the main provision of Article 14 must, in our opinion, be construed as 'and'.
19. We shall now consider the point raised by the first three questions.
20. Article 14 deals with the place where the judges will sit to exercise the jurisdiction of the High Court. The jurisdiction is exercised in respect of cases brought to the court from all over the State. So far as cases arising in the Oudh areas specified by the Chief Justice are concerned, at least two judges must sit at Lucknow hear them. In other words, such cases must be heard at Lucknow. The first proviso to Article 14 declares that '............... judges ............... shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh as the Chief Justice may direct, the jurisdiction and power ............... vested in the new High Court.' It requires that judges will sit at Lucknow for the purpose of hearing cases arising in the specified Oudh areas, that is the Oudh areas specified by the Chief Justice.
That purpose functions as a determinant fixing Lucknow as the place where cases of that category will be heard and, therefore, as the place where the judges will sit. When it is said that cases of a certain category will be heard at Lucknow it is necessarily contemplated that all case's of that category will be heard at Lucknow and especially so, because there are no words of exception or limitation in the first proviso to exclude any cases from that category. The language is not 'cases arising in such areas in Oudh, as the Chief Justice may direct, other than those filed at Allahabad.'
21. Construed in this manner, it is apparent that the first proviso in its entirety is concerned with the place of sitting of the judges. In doing so, it deals with the same matter to which the main provision of Article 14 relates. In other words, the first proviso operates in accordance with its natural function. It is settled now that a proviso is 'of necessity ............... limited in its operationto the ambit of the section which it qualifies.' Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd. v. Modern Cars & Caravans (Kingston) Ltd., 1966-1 QB 764 at p. 780. And the proper function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment. M. & S. M. Rly. v. Bezwada Municipality & Commr. of Income-tax v. Indo Mercantile Bank : [1959]36ITR1(SC) . That is the general rule, and should be applied unless the proviso must plainly be construed as a substantive provision operating independently of the main section. Ishwar Lal Thakorelal v. Motibhai Nagjibhai : [1966]1SCR367 .
22. The interpretation which we give to the first proviso is supported by the terms of the second proviso. The first proviso, we have said, contemplates that all cases arising in the specified Oudh areas will be heard at Lucknow. The second proviso creates an inroad into this rule. It empowers the Chief Justice to order that any case or class of cases arising in the specified Oudh areas shall be heard at Allahabad. The judges at Allahabad will then be empowered to hear those cases. The positive language in which the second proviso is expressed is significant. Not only does it imply that those cases will not be heard at Lucknow, it states in positive terms that they will be heard at Allahabad. Language In that positive form was necessary to confer power upon the judges at Allahabad to hear those cases. If the judges at Allahabad had already possessed that power, it would have been sufficient to state merely that those cases would not be heard at Lucknow.
Those cases then, without anything more, would be heard at Allahabad. It is also significant that there is no provision in Article 14 empowering the Chief Justice to order that a case or class of cases arising in the specified Oudh areas should not be heard at Allahabad but at Lucknow. Such a provision could have been possible only if the judges at Allahabad already enjoyed a concurrent power to hear such cases. This further reinforces our conclusion that the judges at Lucknow are alone competent to hear cases from the specified Oudh areas and that it is only the order of the Chief Justice under the second proviso which enables such cases being heard at Allahabad.
23. It is desirable to explain that when the second proviso speaks of a case being 'heard' at Allahabad, it refers not merely to the actual hearing of the case in the strict sense of the word but includes the preceding stage of its institution by the party and its being entertained by the court. All that is comprehended with the expression 'heard' in the second proviso. It must not be forgottenthat the Amalgamation Order is an organic instrument constituting a judicial authority of superior jurisdiction and, therefore, its provisions must be construed liberally and not in any narrow and pedantic sense. In British Coal Corporation v. The King AIR 1935 PC 158 the Privy Council observed:--
'In interpreting a constituent or organic statute, that construction most beneficial to the widest amplitude of its power must be adopted.'
24. We are unable to agree with the observation of Jagdish Sahai, J. in Uma Shanker v. State : AIR1971All96 that the second proviso must be limited to the actual hearing of such cases, and that their institution must be at Lucknow. It is noteworthy that the expression 'class of cases' in the second proviso suggests that the Chief Justice can make an order also in respect of 'such cases which have not yet been filed but which may be filed in future. If such an order is passed the cases covered by it cannot properly be instituted at Lucknow but only at Allahabad for being heard there.
25. A change in perspective opens another approach to the problem before us. It proceeds upon a change in emphasis. Instead of treating the entire first proviso as dealing with the place of sitting of the judges for deciding cases from the specified Oudh areas, the proviso may be considered as consisting of two parts. The first part requires that at least two judges will sit at Lucknow, and from this point of view it may be construed as a proviso to the main provision of Article 14 in the sense that while under the main proviso the Chief Justice has the discretion to appoint any other place besides Allahabad as the seat of the High Court the first proviso overrides that discretion by insisting on Lucknow as a place of sitting until the Governor otherwise directs. The second part of the first proviso specifies the work which the judges at Lucknow will do.
It can be described as amounting in substance to a statutory allocation of the category of cases mentioned there to the judges at Lucknow. It is reasonable to infer that such allocation necessarily implies that other judges will not do that class of work, unless it is also expressly allocated to them. In the entire spectrum of power conferred upon the High Court ranging over diverse cases of different categories, open to classification on the basis of innumerable criteria, including territorial nexus, subject-matter and pecuniary valuation, if out of that entire range one category of cases is entrusted to specifically determined judges it can be clearly presumed that all cases of thatcategory have been excluded from the ambit of the jurisdiction of the other judges.
26. The second proviso qualifies the second part of the first proviso. It also deals with cases arising in the specified Oudh areas, and provides an exception to the rule stated in the second part of the first proviso. The effect of reading the two provisions together is that the judges at Lucknow are alone competent to hear cases arising in the specified Oudh areas except where the Chief Justice orders that any such case or class of cases shall be heard at Allahabad.
27. Upon this analysis, Article 14 can be broadly divided into two provisions, one providing for the place of sitting of the judges and the other specifying the category of cases which will be heard by them. As we have shown in their action they lead us to the same conclusion to which we are compelled by the analysis effected earlier.
28. Besides the express language of Article 14, there are other considerations also which persuade us to that conclusion. In the division of work among the judges at Allahabad and at Lucknow, there will generally be a judge or a Division Bench at each of the two seats entrusted contemporaneously with work of identical jurisdiction. If the judges at Allahabad have concurrent jurisdiction with the judges at Lucknow in respect of cases from the same areas, then in the matter of filing and arguing fresh petitions and appeals a litigant from those areas is put in a position where he can choose his judge. That is a situation which arises where in the same court more than one judge or Division Bench exercises identical jurisdiction, identical in point of pecuniary valuation, subject-matter and territorial limits and other controlling criteria. The litigant will be in a position to decide whether he should file his case before the judge at Allahabad or the judge at Lucknow. It is a situation which, in our opinion, should not be ordinarily encouraged. To permit a litigant as a general rule to choose his judge from among judges in the same court would tend to introduce confusion in the working of the court.
It would give rise to an unseemly reflection on individual judges, thus impairing the reputation of the judicial system, and, therefore, endangering its effectiveness. Whether a case should be heard at Lucknow or at Allahabad has been advisedly left by the Amalgamation Order to responsible authority and not to the litigant. All cases from the specified Oudh areas are intended to be heard at Lucknow. Any variation or exception to that rule has been left immediately to the Chief Justice, and ultimately in thelast resort to the Governor who can abolish the seat at Lucknow altogether. The judicial organisation is constituted by considerations of public policy and public interest. Its form and features, its present variants and potential change are matters entrusted to public functionaries. The self-interest of an individual litigant is wholly antithetical to the primacy of those considerations.
29. The rejection of the theory of a concurrent power also avoids the confusion which could arise where in a civil case cross appeals are filed against the same decree, one appeal being filed at Allahabad and the other at Lucknow, or in a criminal case where some of the accused file an appeal at Allahabad while the co-accused do so at Lucknow.
30. In framing the Amalgamation Order and shaping its provisions, both history and policy have apparently played their part. It was probably considered necessary to avoid the considerable inconvenience and hardship which would have been occasioned in 1948 by the sudden and complete disappearance of a Judicial forum of superior jurisdiction to litigants accustomed to having their cases heard at Lucknow and to the livelihood of a Bar which had so far derived its prosperity from that judicial forum. It was perhaps thought appropriate that a transitory provision should be included to reduce that inconvenience and hardskip.
31. It has been submitted that the concept of separate territorial jurisdiction in individual judges is unknown. We are referred to Entry 78 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which speaks of 'constitution and organisation (including vacations) of the High Courts ............' and to Entry 3 of List II of that Schedule which speaks of 'administration of Justice'. It is urged that territorial jurisdiction in respect of cases is a matter relating to the constitution and organisation of the High Court as a whole and cannot be conceived of in relation to individual judges. In this connection, our attention has also been drawn to Articles 227, 230 and 231 of the Constitution. We are unable to accept that that result flows from the provisions mentioned above. We are concerned here with the specific provisions of Article 14 and, in our opinion, they reasonably lead to the conclusion to which we have come.
32. We may point out that Article 14 is not unique in the history of the judicial system of this country. Already earlier, the Letters Patent of 1916 which established a High Court in the newly constituted province of Bihar and Orissa contained Clause 35. providing that judges of the High Court would visit the Divisionof Orissa, 'in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in that Division, the jurisdiction and power ............ vested in the said High Court' and further that
'the said High Court shall have power from time to time to make rules, ............for declaring what cases or class of cases arising in the Division of Orissa shall be heard at Patna and not in that Division and that the Chief Justice may, in his discretion, order that any particular case arising in the Division of Orissa shall be heard at Patna or in that Division.'
33. So also, the High Court at Rangoon was established by the Letters Patent of 1922 for the province of Burma, replacing the Chief Court of Lower Burma and the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Upper Burma, and Clause 41 of the Letters Patent provided that
'One or more judges of the High Court of Judicature at Rangoon, as the Chief Justice may from time to time direct, shall sit at Mandalay in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in such areas in Upper Burma as the Governor of Burma-in-Council may direct the jurisdiction and power ......... vested in the said High Court provided that the Chief Justice, may, in his discretion, order, that any particular case arising in the said areas in Upper Burma shall be tried in Rangoon.'
34. Subsequently, similar provision has been made by the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960. While the Principal seat of the Bombay High Court is at Bombay. Section 4 of the Act requires a number of judges to sit at Nagpur to exercise jurisdiction in respect of cases arising in the districts specified in that section.
35. We shall now examine the cases decided by this Court which touch upon the interpretation of Article 14 of the Amalgamation Order.
36. Within two months of the Amalgamation Order being passed, this Court was called upon in Saghir Ahmad v. Rex : AIR1949All190 to consider whether an application under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by a detenu, who was a resident of district Kheri, could be made at Allahabad or at Lucknow. Bind Basni Prasad, J. referred to Notification No. 6103 dated July 26. 1948 issued by the Chief Justice directing that the judges sitting at Lucknow would exercise the jurisdiction and power vested in the High Court and held that since the case arose in an area of Oudh the application should have been made at Lucknow and could not be entertained at Allahabad.
37. To the same effect, Wanchoo, J. held in Hola Ram v. State : AIR1950All485 that an application under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the transfer of a case pending before a subordinate court in Lucknow to a subordinate court at Allahabad, being a case arising in an area in Oudh, should be made to the judges sitting at Lucknow, and the judges sitting at Allahabad had no power to entertain the application.
38. In M.A. Jalil v. Rex : AIR1952All550 two revision applications filed before the High Court at Allahabad, against appeals dismissed by the Sessions Judge of Bareilly, were transferred to the judges sitting at Lucknow. While holding that there was no power in the judges sitting at Lucknow to hear the revision applications, which properly could only be heard at Allahabad, Misra and Kaul, JJ., pointed out that the judges sitting at Lucknow could exercise jurisdiction and power in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh as the Chief Justice directed while the Judges sitting at Allahabad exercised jurisdiction and power in respect of cases arising in the remaining areas of the United Provinces.
39. Then followed Bisheshwar Nath Bhatnagar v. State : AIR1954All28 where the applicant applied to this Court for the transfer of a case from the Judicial Magistrate, Hardoi to a Magistrate at Allahabad. The application was presented at Allahabad and Mukerjee, J. held that as the application was made in a case pending at Hardoi, which fell within the jurisdiction of the Judges sitting at Lucknow, the application could not be entertained at Allahabad.
40. So far, it is clear, the view taken by the judges of this Court recognised an exclusive power in the judges sitting at Lucknow to hear cases arising in the specified areas of Oudh.
41. That view was challenged in the Union of India v. Chheda Lal Ramautar : AIR1958All652 an appeal against a decree of the civil Judge, Barabanki in a civil suit. The district of Barabanki being an area in Oudh over which the judges at Lucknow exercise jurisdiction, a memorandum of appeal against that decree should have been presented before the judges at Lucknow. It was presented to the Court at Allahabad. The question arose whether the judges at Allahabad could entertain the appeal. The matter was referred to a Full Bench, and the learned judges expressed the view that the memorandum of appeal had been properly filed at Allahabad. Mootham, C. J. and A.P. Srivastava, J., two of the learned Judges, held that in respect of cases arising in the specified Oudh areas not only the Judges at Lucknow but alsothe judges at Allahabad could exercise jurisdiction. That conclusion proceeded, it appears, from the impression that a contrary construction of the first proviso to Article 14 would result in splitting up the High Court into two Courts and that was a result wholly opposed to the very object of the Amalgamation Order and to Article 214 of the Constitution providing for a single High Court in the State.
The third learned Judge. Raghubar Dayal, J., agreed that the memorandum of appeal had been properly filed at Allahabad, but he proceeded on the view that as the presentation of every appeal was to the new High Court, whether it be at Allahabad or at Lucknow, the presentation of an appeal before a Bench at Allahabad, not competent to entertain it, was a mere irregularity and could not amount to presentation to a Court having no jurisdiction. He confined himself to the validity of the presentation of the memorandum of appeal, and while holding that it was properly presented at Allahabad did not further hold that the further jurisdiction of the High Court could be exercised in respect of the appeal by the judges at Allahabad.
42. Now, with profound respect to Mootham. C. J. and A.P. Srivastava, J., we are unable to subscribe to the view that if cases arising in the Oudh areas are to be heard at Lucknow alone it would in effect result in splitting up the High Court into two Courts. From the provisions of the Amalgamation Order already set out, it is clear that there is only one High Court, with one seal, one Chief Justice and a single body of judges, and a single code of rules and orders relating to practice and procedure which, except for a few transitional provisions operates in respect of the entire Court. The jurisdiction defined by Article 7 vests in the entire body of judges. It is a jurist diction enjoyed by every judge of the High Court and extends to all cases throughout the territories of the State. Where that jurisdiction will be exercised is a matter determined under Article 14. It may be exercised at Allahabad or it may be exercised at Lucknow or at any other place appointed by the Chief Justice under Article 14. But wherever exercised it is exercised by a judge, who equally with all the other judges, represents the High Court.
The judges at Lucknow are part of the same High Court as those at Allahabad. Whether the judge sits at Allahabad or at Lucknow, he remains a Judge of the same High Court. A judge sitting at Lucknow may sit at Allahabad and vice versa. It is only the work entrusted to him at the two places which will differ. A judge of the High Court at Lucknow will hear cases arising in the specifiedareas of Oudh except cases transferred to Allahabad, while a judge at Allahabad will exercise jurisdiction in respect of all remaining cases. The writ of the High Court runs throughout the territories of the State, and the law laid down whether by the Judges at Lucknow or the Judges at Allahabad is binding on all throughout the State, the Judges and the lay public alike.
43. The High Court is a new High Court constituted by the Amalgamation Order. It cannot be identified with the erstwhile High Court at Allahabad or With the erstwhile Oudh Chief Court. The former High Court and Chief Court were abolished with the repeal of the Letters Patent and the Oudh Courts Act by Article 17 of the Amalgamation Order. A new High Court came into existence with its own distinct identity, a new seal and a new body of judges whose jurisdiction and power, and practice and procedure, are spelled out by the Amalgamation Order. The Letters Patent and the Oudh Courts Act are no longer operative provisions, they can be referred to only for the purpose of construing or giving effect to the Amalgamation Order. The Amalgamation Order contains the operative provisions. The Letters Patent and the Oudh Courts Act have now passed into history.
44. The submission that two High Courts are created in the State cannot be sustained also when regard is had to the instability inherent in the arrangement provided by the first proviso to Article 14. The Judges at Lucknow hear cases arising in such areas in Oudh as the Chief Justice directs. It is open to the Chief Justice to reduce the areas from time to time. Cases arising in the areas so removed can no longer be heard at Lucknow. They will be heard at Allahabad or at any other place appointed under the main provision of Article 14. A stage may be reached in the process of reduction where one area of Oudh alone may remain with the judges sitting at Lucknow. There is also power in the Chief Justice, by virtue of the second proviso, to increasingly order that classes of cases arising in the Oudh areas shall be heard at Allahabad. Finally, the arrangement that some judges must sit at Lucknow may be abolished altogether by the Governor with the concurrence of the Chief Justice.
45. Upon these considerations, we find ourselves unable to agree with the majority view taken in Chheda Lal Ramautar : AIR1958All652 (supra). The correctness of that view was doubted by one of the learned judges, Jagdish Sahai, J., constituting the Full Bench which decided : AIR1971All96 . Although the observations made by him are obiter and hisreasons may differ in some respect from those which have appealed to us, he also reached the conclusion that the judges sitting at Lucknow are alone competent to exercise jurisdiction in respect of cases arising in the specified Oudh areas except where a case or class of cases was transferred to Allahabad.
46. The Patna High Court, interpreting Clause 35 of its Letters Patent, which bears close similarity to the provisions of Article 14 of the Amalgamation Order, held in Rajendra Prasad v. Gopal Prasad. AIR 1931 Pat 61 that a revision application against the order of the subordinate judge of Cuttack could not be heard by a judge sitting at Patna.
47. The question next is whether a case which can be heard by the judges at Lucknow is liable to be summarily dismissed if presented before the judges at Allahabad. We have already said that the judges, whether they sit at Allahabad or at Lucknow, are judges of the same High Court. When such a case is presented before the judges at Allahabad it is not presented to a Court without jurisdiction. Its presentation before the judges at Allahabad is a mere irregularity. The proper procedure would be for the judges at Allahabad to return the case for filing before the judges at Luck-now, and where the case has been mistakenly or inadvertently entertained at Allahabad to direct the High Court office to transmit the papers of that case of Lucknow.
48. We, therefore, answer the first three questions as follows:
Question No. 1: A case falling within the jurisdiction of the judges at Lucknow should be presented at Lucknow and not at Allahabad.
Question No. 2: However, if such a case is presented at Allahabad the judges at Allahabad cannot summarily dismiss it only for that reason. The case should be returned for filing before the judges at Lucknow, and where the case has been mistakenly or inadvertently entertained at Allahabad a direction should be made to the High Court office to transmit the papers of the case to Lucknow.
Question No. 3: A case pertaining to the jurisdiction of the judges at Lucknow and presented before the judges at Allahabad cannot be decided by the judges at Allahabad in the absence of an order contemplated by the second proviso to Article 14 of the U. P. High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948:
49. We now turn to the fourth question. What is the meaning of the expression 'in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh in the first proviso to Article 14 of the Amalgamation Order
50. The expression speaks of 'cases'. What is a 'case' has not been defined. Where it occurs in Article 14, having regard to the context it is clear that it must be understood as a proceeding which is intended to attract the jurisdiction of the Court. A case is a formal legal proceeding instituted in a court of law for the enforcement or prosecution of a right of the suitor, the enforcement of an obligation binding another in favour of the suitor, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offence.
51. Mr. Justice Brandeis of the United States Supreme Court, in Tutun v. United States, (1925) 70 L Ed 738 = 270 US 568 explained:--
'Whenever the law provides a remedy enforceable in the courts according to the regular course of legal procedure, and that remedy is pursued, there arises a case.'
52. As a remedy under the civil law, a case is a proceeding in a civil court in which the jurisdiction of the Court is invoked for the determination of some claim or right legally enforceable. S.S. Khanna v. F.J. Dillon : [1964]4SCR409 .
53. Under the criminal law, a case ordinarily means a proceeding for the prosecution of a person accused of having committed an offence. Bhimappa v. Laxman : 1970CriLJ1132 .
54. It is evident that a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution also constitutes a case for the purpose of Article 14 of the Amalgamation Order.
55. A contention has been raised that the judges sitting at Lucknow are not competent to exercise the jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution. It is urged that when the first proviso to Article 14 declares that the judges at Lucknow shall exercise 'the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the new High Court' those judges are limited to the jurisdiction and power residing in the new High Court on the date of the Amalgamation Order. The expression 'for the time being', it is contended, refers to that point of time and is confined to it. It is urged that Article 225 of the Constitution confines the judges to the powers exercised by them before the Constitution came into force. Therefore, it is said the judges at Lucknow enjoy no greater power than they did when they first sat under the Amalgamation Order. The contention, in our opinion, ignores important and fundamental consideration.
The Amalgamation Order, as we have observed, is an organic instrument and must be construed accordingly. It must be taken to refer to jurisdiction not only exercisable immediately before it came into force but also to jurisdiction whichcould be conferred on the High Court in the future even though not within the possible contemplation of those who framed the Amalgamation Order. The ambit and extent of jurisdiction in the High Court is necessarily open to change and variation. Existing jurisdiction can be curtailed, it can also be enlarged. Article 226 of the Constitution is an example of further jurisdiction.
56. In National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick and Bros. : [1953]4SCR1028 the Supreme Court considered a similar argument in respect of Section 108. Government of India Act, 1915 which declared that each High Court could provide for the exercise by its judges and division courts of the original and appellate jurisdiction vested in the Court. It observed:--
'It is thus difficult to accept the argument that the power vested in the High Court under Sub-section (1) of Section 108 was a limited one, and could only be exercised in respect to such jurisdiction as the High Court possessed on the date when the Act of 1915 came into force. The words of the sub-section 'vested in the court' cannot be read as meaning 'now vested in the court.' It is a well-known rule of construction that when a power is conferred by a statute that power may be exercised from time to time when occasion arises unless a contrary intention appears. This rule has been given statutory recognition in Section 32. Interpretation Act. The purpose of the reference to Section 108 in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent was to incorporate that power in the charter of the Court itself, and not to make it moribund at that stage and make it rigid and inflexible. We are therefore, of the opinion that Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915 conferred power on the High Court which that court could exercise from time to time with reference to its jurisdiction whether existing at the coming into force of the Government of India Act, 1915 or whether conferred on it by any subsequent legislation.' The first proviso to Article 14 employs the expression 'for the time being', and it appears to us that what is intended is 'from time to time.' In other words, when a question arises as to the jurisdiction and power of the High Court at any point of time, the range of jurisdiction and power at that point of time must be considered, whether it may have expanded or contracted since the framing of the Amalgamation Order. It is now well accepted that the language of a statute is generally extended to new things, which were not known and could have been contemplated when the Act was passed, when the Act deals with a genus and the things which afterwardscomes into existence is a species of it. (Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes: 12th Edn. p. 102). We are therefore, of definite opinion that the judges at Lucknow are competent to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. What are the limitations within which they may do so will be considered presently.
57. What is true of a petition under Article 226 in this regard is also true of a petition under Article 227 or 228 of the Constitution. Both petitions can be described as cases for the purposes of Article 14 of the Amalgamation Order: And a petition for a Certificate under Article 132, Article 133 or Article 134 of the Constitution is merely an extension of the case decided by the High Court from which an appeal is proposed to the Supreme Court.
58. In our opinion, all such 'cases' are comprehended within the scope of Article 14 of the Amalgamation Order.
59. We must now examine the question: Where can a case be said to 'arise' for the purposes of the first proviso to Article 14? A case arises at the place, where it originates, where it springs up or is born. A civil case arises where the cause of action wholly or in part arises. A criminal case arises where the offence has been committed. In the case of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, various situations may arise. Where, the validity of legislation or a statutory order is challenged by the petitioner the case arises where the legislation or statutory order affects or threatens to affect the rights of the petitioner. Where a statutory duty is sought to be enforced by a writ in the nature of mandamus, it is the place where the performance of the duty will affect his rights, where a writ in the nature of prohibition or certiorari is claimed, it is the situs of the rights and obligations affected by the impugned order or proceeding. In the case of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus, it is the place where the subject is unlawfully or unjustifiably detained: Where a writ in the nature of quo warranto is applied for, it is the place where the office said to be usurped is located.
60. There may be cases where an original order made in favour of the petitioner has been reversed or modified on appeal or revision. On the other side, there may be cases where the original order has been confirmed by the appellate or revisional order. In either event, when a writ is claimed against the appellate or revisional order, the case must be said to arise where the petitioner's right originally arose, that is the right which was adjudicated upon by the original order. It is that right which he pursues throughout the original proceeding, the appellate proceeding and thereafter in the High Court. It matters not that the original order has merged in the appellate court. The petition arises at the place where the right of the petitioner first arose:
61. Where an original civil or criminal proceeding arises in a specified Oudh area and it is transferred for trial to a court outside the specified Oudh areas an appeal or revision against the judgment, order or decree of the latter court will still lie before the Judges at Lucknow. That is plainly because the cause of action arose or the offence committed in the specified Oudh areas. Correspondingly, where the original civil or criminal proceeding arises outside the specified Oudh areas and it is transferred for trial to a court within a specified Oudh area, the appeal or revision from the trial court judgment would lie to the judges at Allahabad.
62. We are unable to agree with the view adopted in Uma Shankar, : AIR1971All96 (supra) that the place where a case can be said to arise has to be determined by reference to the stage of the case when the jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, and that if the ultimate or appellate order was passed by an authority within a specified Oudh area the judges at Lucknow would have jurisdiction even though the controversy originally arose, and the original order was made by an authority outside the specified Oudh areas. In our opinion, it would not be correct to say that in all cases the case arises where the order impugned before the High Court was passed. In most cases where an appeal or revision lies to the State Government, the impugned order would be made at Lucknow. In all such cases, then, if the view taken in Uma Shanker (supra) is accepted, a writ petition filed in the High Court would arise at Lucknow. To accept that would be to reduce the words 'arising in such areas in Oudh' to comparative insignificance because what was comprehended as applying to several areas in Oudh is now confined to Lucknow alone. On that view, hardly any writ petition would arise anywhere except Lucknow.
63. An extreme contention before us is that a case must be said to arise in the High Court because it is filed there. The case filed before the judges at Lucknow, it is said, arises at Lucknow because it is presented there. The argument moves in a circle. The case arises at Lucknow because it is filed before the judges at Lucknow, and it is filed before the judges at Lucknow because it arises at Lucknow. The contention must clearly be negatived.
64. The observations made by us on the question where a case can be said to arise apply, where relevant, to civil and criminal cases, and to petitions under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution. A petition for a certificate under Article 132, Article 133 or Article 134 and a petition under Article 228 arise where the case out of which they stem can be said to have arisen.
65. At this stage, one other contention may be noticed. It is that the judges at Lucknow are competent to hear all petitions under Article 226 regardless of the area from which they arise. The submission proceeds on the argument that Article 226 confers jurisdiction to issue directions, orders or writs throughout the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction, and as the judges at Lucknow exercise the jurisdiction of the High Court they are competent to hear writ petitions arising from any place within the State. A misconception vitiates the argument. Article 226 cannot be invoked here. It is concerned with the jurisdiction of the High Court.
It does not concern itself with the work to be done by individual judges sitting at different places. Which judge will exercise jurisdiction in respect of which case will depend not upon the terms of Article 226 but upon the internal regulation of the business of the High Court, and that matter is governed by the provisos to Article 14 of the Amalgamation Order and the powers of the Chief Justice under the Rules of Court. In other words, whether the judges at Lucknow are competent to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 in a particular case will depend upon whether the case can be said to arise in the specified Oudh areas and has not been ordered by the Chief Justice to be heard at Allahabad.
66. In our opinion, when the first proviso to Article 14 of the Amalgamation Order declares that the judges sitting at Lucknow will exercise the jurisdiction and power of the High Court 'in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh', reference is intended to legal proceedings instituted before the judges sitting at Lucknow and having their origin, in the sense explained above, in those areas in Oudh.
67. We answer the fourth question accordingly.
68. The fifth question need not detain us long. Writ Petition No. 5833 of 1971 prays for a writ in the nature of certiorari against the orders of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Bareilly and the Director of Consolidation, U. P., Lucknow. Upon a perusal of the writ petition, we find that the dispute relates to rights in agricultural land situated in the district of Shahajahanpur.Applying the rule laid down by us, there is no escape from the conclusion that the case must be said to arise in that district. In no sense can it be said to arise in an area in Oudh. We hold that the writ petition cannot be entertained, heard and decided by the Judges sitting at Lucknow. The fifth question is answered accordingly.
69. While concluding, we may point out that we express no opinion on the validity of the notifications issued from time to time by the Chief Justice under the Amalgamation Order. No argument was addressed to us in that respect, and we do not consider it appropriate here to express any opinion in the matter.
70. Let the papers of these petitions be laid before the Bench concerned with our opinion on the questions referred.
S.N. Dwivedi, J.
71. I agree with the majority opinion on questions 4 and 5. But I regret I am unable to concur with the majority opinion on questions 1 to 3.
72. What does the second part of Clause 14 of the U. P. High Court (Amalgamation) Order. 1948 (hereinbelow called the Order) mean? Two different suggestions have been made at the bar one, it carves out an exclusive territorial jurisdiction for the Judges sitting at Lucknow over cases arising in the Oudh area; the other, the Judges sitting at Allahabad have territorial jurisdiction over the entire State so that they have concurrent territorial jurisdiction over the cases arising in the said area.
73. Clause 14 reads:--
'The new High Court, and the Judges and division Court thereof, shall sit at Allahabad or at such other places in the United Provinces as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor of the United Provinces, appoint;
Provided that unless the Governor of the United Provinces with the concurrence of the Chief Justice, otherwise directs, such Judges of the new High Court, not less than two in number, as the Chief Justice may, from time to time, nominate, shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh, as the Chief Justice may direct, the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the new High Court;
Provided further, that the Chief Justice may in his discretion order that any case or class of cases arising in the said areas shall be heard at Allahabad.'
74. The language is simple. The words are familiar. So are several rules of interpretation. But familiarity often makes them inert and uncertain guides. To begin with, take that cliche; 'findout the intention of the law-maker'. Once upon a time, people believed that their laws were given to them by a single and absolute law-giver. Then there could not have been much difficulty in discovering his intention. But these days are gone-by. In modern times a statute is in truth not made that way. There is incoherence between appearance and reality. It is still supposed in theory that the statute derives its existence from the uncontrolled will of the law maker. But in reality the ultimate shape of the statute is determined, by the resultant of the divergent pulls and pressures exercised by conflicting social, economic and various other interests.
The statute is becoming more and more an instrument of the governmental reconciliation of those conflicting interests or of their compromises and agreements or of the translation of their unresolved conflict from the law-maker to the Courts. So that the rule: 'find out the intention of the law-maker', truly implicates the rule: 'comprehend the divergent pulls and pressures of the conflicting interests. Until you have done that, the words of the statute will not reveal their inmost thoughts to you. They will sit self-shut and taciturn. It is well to remember the warning of Justice Frankfurter: 'There is no surer way to misread a document than to read it literally.' (Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co. v. United States, (1956) 352 US 128 at P. 138).
75. To return to the Order, to understand the story of the pulls and pressures of the conflicting interests which had played a role in the making of the Order is to discover the true meaning of the whole Clause 14.
76. The Order was promulgated by the Governor-General under Section 229 of the Government of India Act, 1935. It was published on some day in July, 1948. Before that date, there were two High Courts in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh; one for the area outside Oudh, and the other for Oudh. The former was named the 'High Court of Judicature at Allahabad'; the latter the 'Chief Court of Oudh'. Their territorial jurisdictions were separate and exclusive. But the High Court had a more majestic emanation, a larger territory, a longer history and a higher reputation than the Chief Court. Accordingly, it may reasonably be presumed that the High Court through its Chief Justice must have pressed for more privileges and advantages for the Judges at Allahabad as a condition to its agreeing to the unification of two Courts,
77. True, there is before us no account of the divergent pulls and pressures exercised by the High Court and the Chief Court. But the Order itself furnishes unmistakable proof of it, one,although the High Court and the Chief Court are amalgamated into a new High Court like two Corporations into a new Corporation, the New High Court is named after the old High Court. It is called the 'High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.' (See Clause 3). Two, the Chief Justice of the old High Court, and not the Chief Judge of the Chief Court, shall be the Chief Justice of the new High Court even though the Chief Justice became a Judge later than the Chief Judge (See Clause 5 (1)). Three, the permanent Judges of the old High Court shall rank senior to the permanent Judges of the Chief Court even though they were appointed Judges later than the Judges of the Chief Court (See Clause 5 (2)). Four, the practice and procedure in the old High Court shall be the practice and procedure of the new High Court. But the Chief Justice may order that the practice and procedure in the Chief Court shall be the practice and procedure for the Judges sitting at Lucknow. (See Clause 9). Five, the law regarding the custody of the seal of the new High Court shall be the law prevailing in the old High Court (See Clause 11 (2)). Clause 4 of the Letters of Patent of the old High Court provided that the seal would be kept in the custody of the Chief Justice. So the seal of the new High Court will be in the custody of the Chief Justice, who mostly sits at Allahabad. Six, the law of the did High Court relating to the form of writs and processes shall be the law of the new High Court (See Clause 12). Seven, the law of the old High Court relating to the powers of the Chief Justice, single Judges and Division Courts shall be the law of the new High Court (See Clause 13). Eight, the law of the old High Court relating to appeals to the Privy Council and the Federal Court shall be the law of the new High Court (See Clause 15). Nine, the right of audience in the new High Court shall be regulated according to the principles prevailing in the old High Court (See Clause 8 (2)).
78. To sum up, in nine important matters the old High Court succeeded in leaving its own impress on the new High Court. On the other hand, the Chief Court came out a loser in the bargain. The second and third parts of Clause 14 demonstrate that for the Chief Court, Lucknow is granted the solatium of having at least two Judges of the New High Court. They shall sit at Lucknow. But their powers are limited. They will not exercise jurisdiction over the entire province or even over the entire Oudh. The exercise of their powers is confined to cases arising in such areas in Oudh as the Chief Justice may direct. Again, their power is liable to further limitation. The Chief Justice may take out classes ofcases arising in the areas in Oudh which have been allotted to them and direct that those cases should be heard at Allahabad. Lastly, the Chief Justice and the Governor may conjointly abolish the seat of the new High Court at Lucknow. So in contrast with its seat at Lucknow, the seat of the new High Court at Allahabad in an enduring feature of the Order.
79. In the Amalgamation of the two companies into a new company, the bigger one generally secures the lion's share at the expense of the smaller one. It is accordingly no wonder that the old High Court at Allahabad should have secured for its successors at Allahabad a preferred position in the constitution of the new High Court. I have already given nine instances in support of this inference. Here is one more instance. The old High Court had no original civil jurisdiction. The Chief Court, was, however vested with such jurisdiction. It could entertain suits of the valuation of Rs. 5 lakhs and over. By virtue of Clause 7(1) of the Order, the new High Court at Allahabad will now have original civil jurisdiction over suits of the said valuation.
80. While construing Clause 14, it is necessary to bear in mind to preferred position scheme of the Order.
81. As will appear later, a stereoscopic study of Clauses 7(1) and 14 is essential for a correct understanding of Clause 14. Clause 7(1) is in these words:
'The new High Court shall have, in respect of the whole of the United Provinces, all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as, under the law in force immediately before the appointed day. is exercisable by either of the existing High Courts.'
82. Clause 7(1) confers jurisdiction on the new High Court. It defines the jurisdiction of the new High Court with respect of territory as well as subject-matter. Its territorial jurisdiction extends over the entire province (now the State). The first limb of the first part of Clause 14 says that the new High Court shall sit at Allahabad. So the Judges sitting at Allahabad will have jurisdiction to entertain cases arising in any area of the province. This I think follows plainly from the language of Clause 7(1), for 'jurisdiction' signifies the power to entertain cases. (Hirday Nath Roy v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1921 Cal 34). The distinction between the existence of jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction is relevant only for the different results which follow from the wrong assumption of jurisdiction and the wrong exercise of jurisdiction. Authorities cited at the Bar emphasise this distinction. There is no express provision in the Order with respect to the area within which the High Court sitting at Allahabad will exercise the jurisdiction of the new High Court, For this purpose we have to fall back on Clause 7(1).
83. I do not see anything in Clause 14 which will cut down this plain implication of Clause 7(1). The first part of Clause 14 consists of two limbs. The first limb will read as: 'The new High Court, and the Judges and division Courts thereof, shall sit at Allahabad.' The second limb will read as: 'The new High Court, and the Judges and the division Courts thereof, shall sit at such other places in the United Provinces as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor of the United Provinces, appoint.'
84. The second part of Clause 14 also consists of two limbs. The first limb will materially read as: 'Provided that ............... such Judges of the new High Court, not less than two in number, as the Chief Justice may from time to time, nominate, shall sit at Lucknow.' The second limb will read as: '(The said Judges shall sit) in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh. as the Chief Justice may direct, the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the new High Court.'
85. It cannot be disputed that the first limb of the second part is not a proviso to the first limb of the first part. It is a proviso to the second limb of the first part. The second limb of the first part gives unlimited discretion to two authorities to fix the seat of the new High Court at places other than Allahabad. And the first limb of the second part restricts that discretion partially. It specifies another seat at Lucknow. In the result, the new High Court will sit at Allahabad as well as at Lucknow.
86. If the second limb of the second part were not there, there High Court sitting at Lucknow would have had jurisdiction to entertain cases arising in any area of the Province. Its territorial jurisdiction would have been co-extensive with the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court sitting at Allahabad. But the presence of the second limb limits the territorial jurisdiction of the Judges sitting at Lucknow to cases arising in Oudh or part thereof as the Chief Justice may direct. In substance, the second limb of the second part of Clause 14 deals with and confines the territorial jurisdiction of the Judges sitting at Lucknow to Oudh or part thereof as the Chief Justice may direct. It does not circumscribe the jurisdiction of the Judges at Allahabad, for it is not a proviso to the first limb of the first part of Clause 14. The word 'jurisdiction' is used in the second limb of thesecond part. But it does not stand in the way of the construction suggested by me. It is used to signify jurisdiction over subject-matter in contradiction with jurisdiction over territory.
87. When the Chief Justice has attached a particular area in Oudh to the Lucknow seat of the High Court, all cases arising in that area will be entertained in the Lucknow seat. The purpose of the third part of Clause 14 (expressed as a proviso) is to enable the Chief Justice to curtail the jurisdiction of the Lucknow seat over subject-matter. Although an area is attached to Lucknow, the Chief Justice may direct that certain classes of cases of that area shall not be entertained at Lucknow. In short, while the second limb of the second part enables the Chief Justice to circumscribe the territorial jurisdiction of Lucknow, the third part enables him to restrict the jurisdiction of Lucknow over subject-matter.
Thus the Chief Justice has already directed that Income-tax and Company Cases arising in Oudh shall not be heard at Lucknow. The third part of Clause 14 does not weaken the construction suggested by me. Again, the affirmative language of, and the mention of Allahabad in, the third part of Clause 14 is also explained by the Governor-General's intention that cases arising in Oudh should be heard at Allahabad only and not at any other seat of the new High Court if and when it is established at a place other than Allahabad and Lucknow.
88. It is not legitimate to implicate the idea of 'allocation' of business of the Court in the second limb of the second part of Clause 14 and then to spell out a derivative implication of the limitation of the jurisdiction of the Judges sitting at Allahabad only to cases arising outside Oudh. Firstly, the word 'allocation' is not used 'in the Order. Secondly, implications cannot be made to 'contradict the expressed intent of the statute, for obviously the intent as expressed must prevail over the intent reached by implication.' (Crawford: Statutory Construction, page 267). Clause 7 and the first part Clause 14 clearly manifest the intention that the Judges sitting at Allahabad would exercise jurisdiction and power over the entire province and not over any specific area of the Province. Thirdly, only a necessary implication may be read in a statute. 'Mere desirability or plausibility alone will not meet the test.' (Crawford: Statutory Construction page 266). In my view, the 'allocation' implication is not necessary to give efficacy to the second limb of the second part of Clause 14.
It can efficiently work without any crutch. A suitable procedure may be introduced and has indeed been introduced now to prevent the possibility of two inconsistent decisions in connected cases or cross-appeals where one of them is heard at Allahabad and the other at Lucknow. Lastly, the 'allocation' implication (and the exclusive jurisdiction argument as well) runs counter to the central object of the order. Clause 7(1) constitutes one High Court exercising territorial jurisdiction over cases arising in the whole Province, The effect of the two arguments is that neither the High Court sitting at Allahabad nor the High Court sitting at Lucknow can exercise jurisdiction over the entire Province. Clause 7(1) appears to me to be plain beyond doubt. It invests the High Court sitting in Allahabad with territorial jurisdiction over the entire province.
89. It is difficult to appreciate the relevance of the two rules of interpretation (1) the general does not derogate from the special and (2) power required to be exercised in a particular manner must be exercised in that manner only to the problem of construction of Clause 14.
90. On January 17, 1951 Chief Justice Malik passed an order under Clause 14 to the effect that petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution arising in Oudh could 'be filed either at Lucknow or at Allahabad.' This order has been operating till now for twenty years, and writ petitions arising in Oudh are being filed also at Allahabad. The exclusive jurisdiction agreement, if accepted, will render that order invalid and put an end to twenty years' old concurrent jurisdiction of the judges sitting at Allahabad over cases arising in Oudh. Chief Justice Malik was, I believe, one of the key figures who had a hand in the shaping of the Order. If that is so, it will not be improper to take notice of his understanding of Clause 14. His understanding of Clause 14 supports the concurrent jurisdiction construction.
91. It is said that the concurrent jurisdiction construction will allow a litigant to choose between a Judge or Judges sitting at Allahabad and a Judge or Judges sitting at Lucknow in the hearing of case. That is so. But it cannot be a legitimate ground for rejecting the construction. Even now a litigant may choose his Judge among the Judges sitting at Allahabad or at Lucknow by selecting the remedy under Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure or Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution. A revision lies before a single Judge; a petition under Article 226 before two Judges; and a petition under Article 227 before a Judge who does not hear revision. Against some orders a litigant may file a criminal revision under Section 435 Code of Criminal Procedure or an application under Section 561-Aof the Code and thus choose his Judge. Indeed it is common knowledge that the practical administration of Justice allows some freedom to the litigant, to choose his forum.
92. Saghir Ahmad v. Rex : AIR1949All190 ; Hola Ram v. State : AIR1950All485 and Basheshwar Nath v. State : AIR1954All28 give no reasons in support of the exclusive Jurisdiction construction. There appears to have been no serious argument in support of the concurrent Jurisdiction construction : AIR1952All550 is a case of converse type. There the argument that a case which had arisen outside Oudh could be heard at Lucknow was not accepted. In an obiter dictum it is remarked that the Judges sitting at Allahabad could not hear cases arising in Oudh. But no reasons are given in support of the remark.
93. In : AIR1958All652 the majority of the Full Bench took the view which I am taking. In Shital v. State, 1964 All LJ 448 a Division Bench also took the same view.
94. I do not see how AIR 1931 Pat 61 is helpful to us. Clause 35 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court provided that every case arising in the division of Orissa would be heard by the Judges of the Court visiting that division by Circuit unless it was a case or falls within the class of cases which according to the rules of Court could be heard at Patna or unless the Chief Justice had ordered that it should be heard at Patna. The Patna High Court made Rules under Clause 35. Rule 5 of Chapter 22 of the Rules of Court expressly provided that all cases, except those specified in Rules 2, 3 and 4. 'arising in the division of Orissa shall be instituted and heard in Orissa.' There was thus allocation of work under the Rules of Court. Again, the history, language and scheme of the Order, as discussed earlier by me, is not the history, language and scheme of Clause 35.
95. It can hardly be denied that the existence of a High Court exercising jurisdiction over the entire State is vital to the growth of an efficient Bar and efficient administration of justice. (See the Report of the Law Commission of India, Vol. I. pp. 104-105). The 'allocation' and exclusive jurisdiction construction fills me with apprehension for the future of the High Court sitting at Allahabad. Today it is Lucknow which cuts down its territorial jurisdiction; tomorrow it may be Meerut. As and when other regional interests succeed in establishing seats of the High Court in 7 or 8 more regional 'capitals', the High Court sitting at Allahabad will be left with territorial jurisdiction over the district of Allahabad only: It will be sad day for the High Court at Allahabad, blessed with aglorious and preferred position in the Order. So I have given my anxious consideration to the issue. In the end, it has appeared to me that as the language of Clause 14 can also fairly bear the concurrent jurisdiction construction, I should opt for it. But I have not been able to persuade my brethren to my point of view. So their view will prevail.
BY THE COURT
96. We answer the questions referred as follows:--
Question No. 1:-- A case falling within the jurisdiction of the judges at Lucknow should be presented at Lucknow and not at Allahabad.
Question No. 2:-- However, if such a case is presented at Allahabad the judges at Allahabad cannot summarily dismiss it only for that reason. The case should be returned for filing before the judges at Lucknow, and where the case has been mistakenly or inadvertently entertained at Allahabad a direction should be made to the High Court office to transmit the papers of the case to Lucknow.
Question No. 3:-- A case pertaining to, the jurisdiction of the judges at Lucknow and presented before the judges at Allahabad cannot be decided by the judges at Allahabad in the absence of an order contemplated by the second proviso to Article 14 of the U. P. High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948.
Question No. 4:--- The expression 'in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh' used in the first proviso to Article 14 of the High Courts (Amalgamation), Order, 1948 refers to legal proceedings, including civil cases, criminal cases, petitions under Articles 226, 227 and 228 of the Constitution and petitions under Articles 132, 133 and 134 of the Constitution instituted before the judges sitting at Lucknow and having their origin, in the sense explained in the majority judgment, in such areas in Oudh as the Chief Justice may direct. The expression 'arising in such areas in Oudh' refers to the place where the case originated in the sense explained in the majority judgment and not to the place of sitting of the last court or authority whose decree or order is being challenged in the proceeding before the High Court.
Question No. 5:-- Writ Petition No. 5833 of 1971 cannot be entertained, heard and decided by the judges sitting at Lucknow.
97. Let the papers of these petitions be laid before the Bench concerned with our opinion on the questions referred.