R.B.K. Trivedi, J.
1. This habeas corpus petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed challenging order dated 15.2.1998, passed by District Magistrate, Chandauli, directing detention of petitioner under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Prayer has also been made to release the detenu-petitioner from detention. The order of detention dated 15.2.1998 has been filed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. Along with the impugned order of detention, petitioner was also supplied the grounds for passing the same. Narration of the facts in the grounds supplied is as under :
2. That on 17.9.1997, at 10.00 p.m. in the night Amjad, son of Mahboob and Pappu, son of Haji Madar abducted one Chhote Lal, sonof Ram Swarup, resident of village Karvat, police station Mughalsaral, district Chandauli and killed him. The offence was registered at police station Mughalsaral as Case Crime No. 306 of 1997, under Section 364/302/201, I. P. C. which is under consideration of the Court. On 20.9.1997, at about 8.00 a.m. while Shivnath and Sukhnath, both real brothers; residents of village Bhisaudf, police station Mughaisaral, were going to their fields and were discussing about the abduction and murder of Chhote Lal Palel, and reached in the lane passing through the front of the house of Mahboob, the petitioner along with his companions dragged Sukhnath inside the lane and gave several knife blows in his abdomen. Sukhnath in injured condition could run about twenty steps, then fell down and died. Shivnath escaped and gave a call. By that time petitioner with 18-20 persons of his community, armed with lathis, dandas and knives, attacked persons of Hindu community. They forcibly entered in the betel and general merchant shop of Surendra and looted it, destroyed the tea-stall of Ganga, son of Raghunath and sweet and tea shop of Khaje, son of Babu Nandan and also destroyed the roof of the shop, set the shop of Ram Surat on fire which burnt down to ashes, caused injuries by Danda and Knife to Nathuni, son of Ram Chandra. A report of this incident was lodged in police station Mughalsarai same day which was registered as Case Crime No. 306A of 1997. under Section 147/148/149/ 302/435/436/323/324/504/506/395/ 397/427. l.P.C. which is under consideration of the Court.
3. On account of the aforesaid action of the petitioner and his companions, a sense of commotion and terror prevailed in village Bhisaudi, the adjoining villages and in the market. The entire area was under fear. The normal life in the area disrupted and it became difficult to maintain public order. It has been further said that the petitioner is in custody and he has made application for bail in the Court and there is every likelihood of his being releasedon bail and if he is released, he shall again indulge in similar activities and it shall become impossible to maintain public order. It has also been said that if the petitioner is allowed to remain free, it shall be against the maintenance of public order and shall also be against peace-loving citizens of Bhisaudi and nearby area. From the aforesaid activities of the petitioner public order and even tempo of life in village Bhisaudi and adjoining area has been disturbed and public order has been affected. The authority has recorded his satisfaction that the petitioner 'by his criminal activities shall disturb the public order as he is of criminal habits. There is every possibility that he will indulge in such activities again which shall affect the public order and to prevent petitioner from indulging in such activities it is necessary to detain him under the provisions of the Act. Petitioner has also been informed that he has right to make a representation to the State Government and the Central Government against his detention which he may submit through the Jail Superintendent. He has also been informed that the case of detention of the petitioner shall be considered under Section 10 of the Act by Advisory Board and he may submit the representation within three weeks against his detention. It has also been stated that if he desires a personal hearing by the Advisory Board, it should also be mentioned in the representation. Along with the grounds of detention, petitioner has been supplied as many as 23 documents on which basis the authority formed his subjective satisfaction for passing the order of detention,
4. Copy of the order of detention and other material was forwarded to the State Government by the detaining authority. The State Government approved the order under Section 3(4) of the Act on 20.2.1998. Petitioner filed his representation on 28.2.1998 which was forwarded by the District Magistrate to the State Government on 3.3.1998. The representation was received by the State Government on 4.3.1998. Afterconsideration, the representation was rejected by the State Government on 12.3.1998 and the order was communicated to the petitioner on 17.3.1998. The case was referred to the Advisory Board by the State Government in 21.2.1998. Copy of the representation was sent to the Advisory Board on 4.3.1998 ; petitioner was personally heard by the Advisory Board on 5.3.1998. On 11.3.1998 opinion of the Advisory Board was received by the Government. The detention order was confirmed under Section 12 of the Act by the State Government with the direction that the petitioner shall be detained for a period of 12 months with effect from 16.2.1998. A copy of the order dated 24.3.1998 has been filed as Annexure-25 to the writ petition.
5. Counter-affidavit has been filed by Sri R. S. Agarwal on behalf of respondent No. 1. State of Uttar Pradesh, Shri Ram Yadav, the then District Magistrate, Chandauli has filed his own counter-affidavit and Kapil Kishore Lal. Deputy Jailor, District Jail, Varanasl, has filed counter-affidavit on behalf of respondent No. 3.
6. We have heard Shri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned senior Advocate, assisted by Shri Madhu Tandon. Advocate, for petitioner and Shri A. K. Tripathi, learned Additional Government Advocate, for respondents. Learned counsel for petitioner has questioned the legality of the impugned order on the following grounds :
(i) It has been submitted thatthe names of the adjoiningvillages have not beenmentioned in the grounds,hence the petitioner could notmake an effectiverepresentation against theimpugned order of detention.The grounds alleged thus arevague and the impugned ordervitiated on this ground alone.
(ii) The petitioner had no concern in any way with the alleged incident of 17.9.1997 mentioned in ground No. 1,hence it could not be used for forming a subjective satisfaction so as to pass an order of preventive detention against the petitioner.
(iii) Thirdly, it has been submitted that the fact that for several days P. A. C. and additional police force remained posted has not been mentioned in the grounds. The alleged occurrence took place on 20.9.1997. The petitioner was in Jail since 24.10.1997; there was no material to show that during the period from 20.9.1997 to 24.10.1997 petitioner indulged in any activity prejudicial to the public order.
(iv) The order of detention was served on petitioner while he was in judicial custody in connection with the criminal case. There could be no threat from the petitioner to the public order. There is no allegation that petitioner belongs to any group and he could indulge in similar activities in future.
(v) The last submission of the learned counsel for petitioner was that under Section 3(3) of the Act, it was obligatory on the part of the detaining authority to mention the period of detention in the impugned order which has not been done. The period of detention was not mentioned even in the order of approval dated 20.2.1998. Thus, the impugned order of detention suffered from a manifest illegality and is liable to be quashed. Learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on certain authorities which shall be considered at the appropriate places.
7. Shri A. K. Tripathi, learned Additional Government Advocate, on the other hand, submitted that it is not necessary to mention the proposed period of detention in the order passed under Section 3(2) ofthe Act, nor the period is required to be mentioned while passing the order of approval under Section 3(4) of the Act by the appropriate Government. It is only under Sections 12 and 13 of the Act that the period of detention is required to be mentioned. Learned counsel has submitted that position in this respect has been made clear in the Judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Smt. Har Preet Kaur v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1992 SC 979.
8. So far as passing of the impugned order of detention against the petitioner while he was under detention in Jail, it has been submitted that law does not contain any prohibition against such a course. It only requires that authority should be aware of the fact that petitioner is in Jail and there should be material before him on which basis the authority may have apprehension that the detenu may indulge in similar activities in future if released on bail. It has been submitted that in the present case the authority was duly aware of the fact that petitioner was in Jail and he had made application for being released on bail in the High Court and in fact he was granted bail by this Court on 3.3.1998. There was also sufficient material on record on which basis the satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority is fully Justified. Learned counsel for petitioner in this connection has referred to the report of the inspector-in-charge of police station Mughalsarai, dated 14.2.1998 which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition, statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161, Cr. P.C.. General Diary entry dated 23.9,1997 (Annexure-14), G. D, entry dated 29.9.1997 (Annexure-20), G. D. entry dated 9.10.1997 (Annexure-21), G. D, entry dated 13.2.1998 (Annexure-22) which were supplied to the petitioner along with the grounds and other documents. Learned counsel has also placed reliance in case of Ujagar Singh u. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 350 ; Smt Vimla Rat v. Union of India. 1989 (4) SCC 509 ; Kamarunnisan u. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1640 ; David Patrick Ward and another v.Union of India and others, JT 1992 (5) SC 163 and Viramoni v. State of Tamil Nadu, JT 1994 (1) SC 350.
9. Learned Addl. Government Advocate has further submitted that the first incident dated 17.9.1997 became relevant as the dead body of Chhote Lal was recovered from village Bhisaudi where the second incident took place and the second incident dated 20.9.1997 had a close link with the first incident as the deceased and his brother Shivnath were discussing the first incident when they were attacked by the petitioner. In this connection, learned Addl. Government Advocate has referred to G. D. report No- 11, dated 20.9.1997 (Annexure-7) and statement of Surendra Patel (Annexure-10). Learned counsel has further submitted that the place from where the case has arisen has also to be taken into consideration. In the instant case in the first occurrence as well as in the second occurrence. persons of two different communities were involved. There was imminent danger of communal riot in the area and to prevent that large number of police personnel were deployed for a long time to restore the public order and even tempo of life. The traffic on the G. T, road was obstructed and there was a jam for about nine hours. The normalcy could be restored in the area after great efforts but for the detention of the petitioner who happened to be leader of the group which led the attack on 20.9.1997, it would have been difficult to restore the same. As clear from the record, the order, of detention was Justified in the facts and circumstances of the case and does not suffer from any illegality.
10. We have thoroughly considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner are being dealt with in seriatim. The first three submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner which relate to vagueness of the grounds may be taken together for consideration. It has been submitted that as in the grounds ofdetention names of the villagessituate in the vicinity were notmentioned, hence effectiverepresentation could not be made bythe petitioner. In this connection. Ithas also been submitted that in thegrounds it has not been mentionedthat P. A. C, and police remainedposted for several days in the areaand then only normalcy could berestored. It has also been submittedthat the petitioner had no connectionwith the first incident of 17.9.1997and it was totally irrelevant forpassing an order of detention againstthe petitioner. The grounds thus werevague and vitiated the order ofdetention. Reliance has been placedin the case of Kusosah v. State ofBihar, AIR 1974 SC 156. In ouropinion, the contention of the learnedcounsel 'for the petitioner has nosubstance. In ground No. 1 it ismentioned that the first incident tookplace in village Karvat in whichChhote Lal was murdered. His bodywas recovered in village Bhisaudi onthe same day, i.e., on 20.9.1997 whenthe second incident took place. Bazaradjoining village Bhisaudi was looted-and several shops were destroyed andpersons were injured. Thus, there wassufficient description of the villagesfor submitting effectiverepresentation. The apprehensionexpressed in the report of theInspector-in-charge of the policestation was that there was tensionamong the two communities as inboth the incidents, persons of the two'communities were involved. In suchcircumstances, it is difficult to acceptthat the places were not described.The incidents appear to be of suchnature which had the potentiality todisturb : the even tempo of life,commotion and fear must haveprevailed in the adjoining area alsoand possibility could not be ruled outof a communal riot. The persons ofone community assembled and heldup the traffic on the G. T. Road forabout 9 hours as reported by theinspector. There are G. D. reports onrecord in shape of Annexures-14, 20,21, and 22 which clearly state thatlarge number of police personnel andP. A. C. were deployed to maintainthe public order and to prevent a riotbetween the two communities. In our considered opinion, in the instant case it could not be said that the grounds mentioned were vague or irrelevant for passing the order of preventive detention against the petitioner who played a leading role in the entire incident. The facts in the case of Kusosah (supra) were entirely different. The facts have been discussed in para 3 of the judgment on the basis of which the Hon'ble Court found that the acts may raise a problem of law and order and it was impossible to see their impact on public order. In our opinion, the case does not help the petitioner in the instant case in any way. So far as the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was no material to show that petitioner indulged in any act prejudicial to the public order between the period 20.9.1997 to 24.10.1997 when he was taken in custody, suffice it to say that from the material on record, it is manifest that there was heavy deployment of police force in the villages of the incidents and other sensitive places and in such circumstances petitioner or his companions could not have been able to move freely to indulge in any such activity. Senior police and administrative officers with police force were camping at the main points. Thus, there is material on record to show that there was no further flare up of communal tension in the area on account of the extra vigilance and effective steps taken by the administration. Petitioner cannot claim any benefit on the basis of the absence of any untoward incident during the said period. In this connection, it may be further mentioned that along with the grounds, petitioner was supplied as many as 23 documents some of which have been mentioned above. They are to be taken as part of the grounds as the detaining authority based his subjective satisfaction on the entire material supplied to the petitioner. In the documents supplied in the shape of various General Diary reports, there was sufficient indication about deployment of additional police force and P. A. C. for maintaining thepublic order. From the reports, it is evident that it took long time in restoring normalcy in the area, in such circumstances, if the factual aspect contained in these reports was not mentioned in the grounds, it could not be of any consequence. Petitioner was supplied the entire material which was considered by the detaining authority and they were part of the grounds for passing the impugned order. In our opinion, the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no substance and the impugned order does not suffer from any error of law.
11. The fourth submission of the learned counsel for petitioner was that petitioner was already in custody since 24.10.1997 and there was no material to Justify the order dated 15.2.1998 directing preventive detention of the petitioner. There were no compelling reasons for passing the impugned order. For this submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance in case of Vinod Singh v. District Magistrate. Dhanbad, AIR 1986 SC 2090 : Smt. Shashi Agarwal u. State of U. P., AIR 1988 SC 596 ; Surya Prakash Sharma v. State of U. P. and others, JT 1994 (5) SC 102 and Rajiv Bharti v. District Magistrate, Aligarh and others. 1995 AWC 120.
12. In case of Veeramani v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering various cases on this question concluded as under :
'From the catena of decisions of this Court it is clear that even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can validly be passed if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody, if he has reason to believe on the basis of the reliable material that there is a possibility of his being released, the detenu would in all probabilities indulge in prejudicial activities and if the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction the same cannot be struck down.'
13. In the case of Veeramani, some of the cases relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner have been considered. In the instant case, the detaining authority in para 4 and also at the end of the order has mentioned that petitioner is in custody and confined in Varanasi Jail. He has applied for grant of bail and there is every possibility of his being granted bail. Thus, the first condition as laid down in the case of Veeramani has been fully satisfied. It may be noted as a fact that petitioner was actually granted bail by this Court on 3.3.1998. i.e.. after about 18 days of passing of the impugned order. Then the authority has recorded satisfaction that there is strong possibility that the petitioner shall indulge in activities prejudicial to the public order. At the end of the order, he has again mentioned that there are satisfactory and cogent reasons that if the petitioner was released on bail, he would indulge again in criminal activities which shall prejudicially affect the maintenance of the public order. For coming to the aforesaid conclusion, the authority had before him the F.I.R. dated 20.9.1997 (Annexure-8), statements of witness Surendra Patel (Annexure- JO), Ganga Yadav (Annexure-11). Ram Surat [Annexure-12), Khaje (Annexure-13) and the G. D. reports dated 20.9.1997 (Annexure-7). G. D. entry dated 23.9.1997 (Annexure-14), G. D. entry dated 29.9.1997 (Annexure-20), G. D. entry dated 9.10.1997 (Annexure-21) and G. D. entry dated 13.2.1998 (Annexure-22). From the aforesaid documents, it is apparent that petitioner led the group of 18-20 persons who firstly assaulted Sukhnath who died, then attacked shopkeepers Surendra Patel, Ganga Yadav. Ram Surat and Khaje who narrated the incident. The petitioner and his companions committed the aforesaid offence at such a Juncture when a person of one community had already been kidnapped and murdered. There must have been tension between the two communities. The activity of the petitioner on 20.9.1997 thus, could not be seen in isolation of the earlier incident. They not only caused fatalinjury to Sukhnath but also attacked persons in the market area, destroyed property and caused injuries to shopkeepers also. If the petitioner could indulge in such activity at a sensitive period, the apprehension on the part of the authority could be justified that on being released, the petitioner may repeat his criminal activities which may seriously prejudice the public order in the locality. There were police reports that for weeks together people could not have courage to come out of their houses and the normalcy could be restored after serious and prolonged efforts on the part of the district administration. In our opinion, in the aforesaid set of facts and circumstances, there was no dearth of cogent material to record satisfaction that detention of the petitioner was necessary to maintain the public order and if he is released from custody, there could be a serious threat for disturbance of the public order from his activities.
14. The last submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner was regarding non-mentioning of the period of detention in the impugned order. It has been submitted that as the detaining authority failed to mention the period of detention, it was in violation of sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act and is liable to be quashed. However, we do not find anything in sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act requiring the detaining authority to specify the period of detention in the order of detention. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Harpreet Kaur (supra) while considering sub-section (2) of Section 3 of Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Boot-leggers and Drug Offenders Act, 1981, which is para materia to subsection (3) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, in para 22 held as under:
'..... The proviso tosub-section (2), only lays down that the period of delegation of powers, specified in the order to be made by the State Government under sub-section (2), delegating to the District Magistrate or theCommissioner of Police the powers under sub-section (1) shall not in the first instance exceed three months. The proviso therefore, has nothing to do with the period of detention of a detenu. The maximum period of detention is prescribed under Section 13 of the Act which lays down that a person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order made under the Act, which has been confirmed under Section 12 of the Act. It is, therefore, futile to contend that the order of detention in the instant case was vitiated because it was for a period of more than three months. The second argument, therefore, also fails,'
Thus, the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality as contended by the learned counsel for petitioner.
15. For the reasons mentioned above, we do not find any illegality in the order of detention. The petition has no merit and is accordingly dismissed.