Sakalraj Dube and anr. Vs. Mt. Jadu Rani - Court Judgment |
| Civil |
| Allahabad |
| Jun-19-1924 |
| AIR1925All58 |
| Sakalraj Dube and anr. |
| Mt. Jadu Rani |
.....of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase..........the appellant was absent as well as his vakil. possibly he was running after him to see if he could find him, but even if he had been corporeally present in the sense in which the judge whose order is appealed from appears to mean we think that in eyes of the law he was not present in such a sense as to prevent the absence of the vakil from being a default. if a judge is anxious to assist a party in distress he can give him a little time to obtain the assistance of a new vakil, or adjourn the case, and make him pay costal or something of that sort, but for a default of this kind we do not think that, subject to the penalty usually inflicted the client should be deprived of the right of having his appeal heard.2. we, therefore, allow this appeal though not as a matter of right. the appellant must deposit in the court below the costs of the successful application for restoration and of the appeal, and when he has deposited those costs either in cash or by way of security so that they can be paid out to the other side on the order of the judge, the case must be restored to the pending file and the appeal re-heard on the merits.
1. We think that the learned judge who has disposed of this application has missed the point. When a vakil re-presents his client the right of audience is, for the time being, vested in him. For the purpose of continuing the hearing oil commencing the hearing, he is the appellant. If he is absent there is default. According to the entry in the order-sheet the appellant was absent as well as his vakil. Possibly he was running after him to see if he could find him, but even if he had been corporeally present in the sense in which the judge whose order is appealed from appears to mean we think that in eyes of the law he was not present in such a sense as to prevent the absence of the vakil from being a default. If a judge is anxious to assist a party in distress he can give him a little time to obtain the assistance of a new vakil, or adjourn the case, and make him pay costal or something of that sort, but for a default of this kind we do not think that, subject to the penalty usually inflicted the client should be deprived of the right of having his appeal heard.
2. We, therefore, allow this appeal though not as a matter of right. The appellant must deposit in the Court below the costs of the successful application for restoration and of the appeal, and when he has deposited those costs either in cash or by way of security so that they can be paid out to the other side on the order of the judge, the case must be restored to the pending file and the appeal re-heard on the merits.