John Stanley, C.J. and William Burkitt, J.
1. The question in this appeal is whether the words 'shall presume,' in Sub-section (3) of Section 201 of the Tenancy Act, No. II of 1901, should be construed in their ordinary sense or as meaning 'shall conclusively presume.' If the latter meaning is to be pub upon the language a plaintiff who is recorded proprietor would be entitled to a decree in the Revenue Court as a matter of course. The question is by no means free from difficulty. A presumption of law is merely an arbitrary inference which the law directs a Judge to draw front particular facts, and which may he either conclusive or rebuttable. It is ordinarily rebuttable. The words 'shall presume' when used in the Evidence Act mean that the Court shall regard a fact as proved unless and until it is disproved. On the other hand, when one fact is declared by that Act to be conclusive proof of another, on proof of the one fact the Court is to regard the other as proved and must not allow evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it (Section 4). If the words 'shall presume' bear the same meaning in the Tenancy Act, as they do in the Evidence Act, then the fact that a plaintiff is the recorded owner is only prima facie proof which shifts the burden of proof to the defendant, who may, if he can, by evidence overbear the prima facie proof. Is there any grave reason for interpreting the words 'shall presume' as equivalent to the words 'shall conclusively presume?' It appears to us that there is no such reason either on the ground of convenience or any like matter to attach to them any other than their ordinary meaning. Indeed to do so might create much inconvenience for example, in this Province on the death, of & proprietor leaving & widow and a son or sons, the widow is very commonly recorded as owner for the sake, as it is said, of consolation. In such a case it Mould be highly inconvenient if the Revenue Court were not allowed to go behind the record and ascertain the true state of the case. If the Legislature had intended that the presumption should be conclusive, it could easily have so provided. We find in Section 19 of the Act that when the Legislature desired to provide that an entry in the khewat should be considered conclusive proof of the correctness of that entry it was careful to make a provision to that effect. On the whole we see no reason for giving conclusiveness to a presumption where the Legislature has not in express terms done so. We are supported in this view by the ruling in the case of Banwari Lal v. Niadar (1906) I.L.R. 29 All. 158. We therefore, agreeing with our brother Knox, dismiss the appeal with costs.