Judgment:
Ravi S. Dhavan and Aloke Chakrabarti, JJ.
1. This case relates to the process of promotion of certain section of the staff of Allahabad Kshetriya GramJn Bank which has been sponsored by the Bank of Baroda under the Regional Rural Banks Act. 1976.
2. The Court has heard arguments against the Judgment appealed, in Writ Petition No. 13431 of 1988, Ramayan Prasad Shukla and others v. Allahabad Kshetriya Gramin Bank and others it is the judgment dated 1st February. 1993. On behalf of the appellants, arguments were advanced by Mr. S. D. Kautilya, Advocate. On behalf of some contesting respondents, arguments were addressed by Mr. Ashok Bhushan, Advocate. On behalf of the respondent Bank Mr. P. K. Mukerji, Advocate and on behalf of other respondents Mr. P. N. Khare, Advocate were present.
3. While arguments have been lengthy, the point involved in this appeal is very short.
4. The issue before the Court is not on what criteria is to be adopted for considering the departmental candidates for picking up promotions. The issue plainly is what is the date of implementation if any change in the criterion takes place. Plainly, on a careful reading of the judgment, all counsel present admit that this point was missed in the judgment.
5. The issue : Departmental candidates were to be considered for promotion. A select list of departmental candidates was published on 14.4.1988. Since the matter related to departmental promotions, everyone is agreed that there was an obligation on the respondent bank to send letters calling the candidates for interview. There is no Issue on record that on the date when the select list was published, the criterion for considering departmental candidates. all for non-selection posts, was seniority-cum-merit. Thus, whoever was placed in the seniority list, which was duly published, and received a call for interview was under the impression that the criterion which would judge them for promotion would be seniority-cum-merit.
6. In the meantime, theregulatory authority known asNABARD formed under the NationalBank for Agriculture and RuralDevelopment Act. 1981 wascontemplating issuing standardisedguidelines with a change in criterionfor promotions. No change had beenheard of until the first communicationwas being received by the respondentBank on 29,4.1988 and thesubsequent communication dated28.5.1988. Both thesecommunications in the context referto changes which were beingcontemplated in processing promotion. The entire issue apparently had been argued before the Hon'ble Judge delivering the judgment appealed against, on the proposition whether the regulatory authority, i.e., NABARD has the discretion or Jurisdiction to issue the circulars for causing change in the criterion for future promotions. With one aspect, the Court has no issue before it that no one has challenged the power of the Regulatory Authority to issue directions. Thus, this aspect is not in issue.
7. The point which has been missed in the judgment is that if here be any change in the criteria, then what would be the date of its implementation. Simply put, it means that here cannot be a change in the rules of the game once the game has started.
8. It is admitted to all the parties that the process of considering departmental candidates for promotion the process was initiated when the seniority list was put up for publication on 14.4.1988. The fact that by the time the candidates were being interviewed, the criteria was changed, is the circumstance, that has created the complication. Thus, the first aspect which has to be seen is on what exactly the regulatory authority was suggesting for changes in the criterion for future promotions. From the record it is clear that there was a proposal under consideration for changing the criterion from seniority-cum-merit to merit-cum-suitability. On one aspect, the Court needs to place on record that at the meeting of the Board on 11.7.1988, the candidates who were to be finally selected for promotion, were approved. But this is also the date on which the change of criteria was approved. This does not reflect an administrative circumstance which inspires confidence.
9. The records of instructions which were being issued by the NABARD clearly contemplate that the changed criteria was to be considered at some future date. What this future date would be was to be consideredand decided by the respondent Bank. There are communications Issued by the Regulatory Authority (NABARD) dated 11.5.1988. Annexure-4 to the counter-affidavit, and dated 25.5.1988 at Annexure-6 to the counter-affidavit which clearly suggest that the changed criteria was to be applicable on any date after the issue of these communications. There was a meeting of the Board, of the respondent Bank, on 11.7.1988. The minutes of the meeting are at Annexure-7 to the counter-affidavit. The resume of the proceedings record that the nominee of the Reserve Bank of India raised objections. The nominee of the Reserve Bank of India was clearly pointing out, in effect, that any reference to promotions which was under consideration, the criteria stood as at the relevant time when the process of consideration was initiated, i.e.. seniority-cum-merit. He had his reservations recorded that promotion should be considered on seniority basis depending upon the number of vacancy and that the Board may reconsider its decision in giving effect to the contemplated promotions. The response to this objection was that the objection was being made only for purpose of raising an objection.
10. On behalf of the Bank, the only submission was that the Regulatory Authority NABARD only gives guidelines, but the banks are not obliged to obey the guidelines.
11. The balance which remains on record is that when departmental candidates have been short-listed and their names had been published, the candidates carry the confidence that promotions will be considered on the basis of the existing criteria, i.e., seniority-cum-merit. These candidates had not anticipated that after the process of short-listing but before finallsatlon, the criteria would be changed. This is an error which took place and this has brought injustice to those who found the changed criteria between the time they had been short-listed and other candidates were finalised, leaving out the petitioners because there was a fundamental change in rules of thegame during the course of the game itself.
12. The Court is very clear and isguided by two aspects that (a) theRegulatory Authority itself wascontemplating that theImplementation of the criteria wouldbe at some future date, and thecommunication of 11.5.1988 and25.5.1988 are much after the date ofpublishing the names of short-listedcandidates on their being called forinterview on 30.5.1988 and (b) thechange which was contemplated wasnot to affect the candidates who hadbeen short-listed and were up forconsideration on the existing criteriawhich stood as on date when the listhad been published. The nominee ofthe Reserve Bank of India waspointing out the error on the very datewhen the changed criteria was beingadopted and the selected candidateswere being approved on the changedcriteria.
13. Within the parameters of a certiorari action under the High Court's prerogative writ jurisdiction, it is not necessary for this Court to quash the appointments on the changed criteria as now it is for the Bank to do administrative justice. A writ of certiorari points out the error. The rectification has to be done by those to whom the writ issues, that is, the respondents. Clearly there has been an error in the time and chronology of making the changed criteria applicable to those candidates who had been short-listed on 14.4.1988. The changed criteria was not to apply to them.
14. Thus, the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The judgment dated 1.2.1993 in Writ Petition No. 13431 of 1988 is set aside. The respondent Bank will now be obliged to deliver administrative justice to petitioners in the writ petition who may have been affected by the changed criterion which has to be applied to them.