Judgment:
ORDER
1. Petitioner, Heera Lal Verma,held a fire-arm licence, it being licence No. 35054, under the authority of which he acquired 588L gun No. Ya 20707. By means of a notice dated 10-11-1986, he was required to show cause as to why the said licence be not cancelled. The relevant portion of the notice as reproduced below, enlists in all five grounds for cancelling the licence issued to the petitioner.
1- vkids ifjokj dh 'kksgjr Mxksyhls [kjkc gS rFkk vkidk ifjokj ,dtqV gksdj >xMk djus dks vkeknk gksrk gS A
2- vki ds rFkk vkids ifjokj dhmxz dk;Zokfg;ks ls Mxksyh ds lHkh yksx vkrafdr gS A
3- tkp ds nkSjku vk;s Jh ,- ,l-u;ky] ijxuk eftLVsV ckxs'oj ds lkFk cgwr mxz rFkk vHknz O;ogkj dk izn'kZu fd;kA
4- vki] txnh'k flag cksjk iq= Lo-Jh cgknqj flag cksjk gky deZpkjh Mkd foHkkx ds ifjokj dks /kefd;k nsdjvkrafdr dj jgs gS vkSj mUgs canqd ls [kRe djus dh /kedh nsrs gS A
The petitioner put in reply to the allegations made in the aforesaid show cause notice and at the same time he deposited the fire arm in the Malkhana. In reply, the petitioner repudiated the allegations made in the show cause notice and stated that his son Rajendra Lal Varma was murdered by one Vikram Singh, a suspended Patwari and son-in-law of one Jagdish Singh Boara; that no enquiry whatsoever was held by the Sub Divisional Magistrate as alleged, and that he never misbehaved with the Sub Divisional Magistrate, namely A. S. Nayal, and on the contrary, it was alleged that Sri Nayal had been won over by Sri Jagdish Singh Boara, who claimed Sri Nayal as his relative. According to the petitioner, his son having been murdered, the fire-arm was practically necessary for the protection of his life and property. The petitioner ascribed the proceedings having been launched against him without any legitimate basis and born of reports which were tainted with mala fide.
2. Upon receipt of the reply, to the show cause notice, the District Magistrate rescinded the licence vide order dated 31-9-88. The relevant portion of the order is quoted below.
eSaus nksuksa i{kksa ds fo}kucdhyksa dh cgl lquh vkSj i=koyh es miyC/k leLr vfHkys[kksa dk v?;;u fd;k A ;gLi'V gS fd Jh txnh'k flag cksjk rFkk Jh ghjk yky cekZ ds chp lEcU/k fcydqyvPNs ugh gS vkSj dbZ fnuks ls buds chp dbZ okjnkrs gks pqdh gS A bl ckr ds mijvf/kd cy nsuk esjs fopkj ls vuko';d gS fd /kkjk 107 tk- iks- ds ekeys es vafrefu.kZ; ugh gks ik;k gS A ;kfu /kkjk 107 ds vUrxZr uksfVl tkjh gksus dk ;gh vFkZgksrk gS fd 'kkafr Hkax gksus dh vk'kadk gS A fdUgh dkj.kkaas ls ,sls ekeys esavfUre fu.kZ; ugh fy, tk ldrs gS A ijUrq blls 'kkfUr Hkax gksus dh lEHkkouk deugh gksrh gS A ;g Hkh Li'V gS fd ykblsUl /kkjh Jh ghjk yky cekZ ds iq=jktsUnz cekZ ds gR;k esa f'kdk;rdrkZ ds nkekn foe flg tks vfHk;qDr Fks osnks'keqDr ik;s x;s A ftlds fo:) ykblsUl /kkjk }kjk ek- mPp U;k;ky; esa vihyizLrqr dh x;h gS A blls iwjh laHkkouk gS fd nksuksa i{kksa ds chp rukoiw.kZfLFkfr dk;e jgsxh D;ksfd vihy izLrqr djus dk ;gh vFkZ gS fd Jh ghjkyky cekZ l=U;k;ky; ds vkns'kks ls lUrq'V ugh gS A eS bl rdZ ls lger ugh gw fd pwfd Jhghjk yky cekZ ds fo:) ,d gh f'kdk;rdrkZ gS vr% iwjs xko es 'kkfUr Hkax gksus dhlaHkkouk ugha gS A 'kkfUr Hkax rc gksrh gS tc nks O;fDr;ksa ds chp >xM+kgksrk gS vkSj vU; yksx blesa lfEefyr gks tkrs gSa A ge fo'okl ugha dj ldrs fd;fn nksuksa ds chp >xM+s pyrs jgs rks vU; xzkeoklh blesa lfEefyr ugha gksxs A,slh ifjfLFkfr esa ykblsUl /kkjh Jh ghjkyky cekZ ds ikl cUnwd jguk esjs fopkjesa tu 'kkfUr ds fgr esa lqjf{kr ugh gksxk A
3. Aggrieved by the order terminating in the cancellation of the licence, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital and by order dated 20-12-1988, the Commissioner dismissed the appeal of the petitioner, giving rise to the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the learned Standing Counsel. I have also been taken through the relevant papers on record and upon a consideration of the submissions made at the bar I feel that the impugned orders bristling with infirmities in law inasmuch as the order cancelling the licence is not founded on any of the grounds mentioned in the show cause notice. Rather, it is premised on the grounds far removed from the ones mentioned in the show cause notice and they are that Vikram Singh, son-in-law of the complainant Jagdish Singh Bora, had been arrayed as accused in the 'murder case of the petitioners' son and the trial in the court of the Sessions Judge had ended in acquittal of the accused, but the matter was taken to the High Court in appeal as a result of which tension between them was simmering and according to the District Magistrate, this could escalate into breach of peace in the village.
5. In the light of the contents in the order of the District Magistrate, it would be useful to examine the provisions of S. 17(3) of the Arms Act, 1959, which provides that the Licensing Authority may, by order in writing, . suspend the licence for such period as it thinksfit or revoke a licence.
(3)(a) If the licensing authority is satisfied that holder of the licence is prohibited by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, from acquiring, having in his possession or carrying any arms or ammunition, or is of unsound mind, or is for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act; or (b) if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the licence; or
(c) if the licence was obtained by the suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong information provided by the holder of the licence or any other person on his behalf at the time of applying for; or
(d) if any of the conditions of the licence has been contravened; or
(e) if the holder of the licence has failed to comply with a notice under sub-section(l) requiring him to deliver up the licence.'
It is evident from clause (b) of sub-sec. (3) of S. 17 of the Act that a fire arms licence can be revoked if the licensing authority deems it necessary to do so for the security of the public peace, and/or for 'public safety'. The expressions security of public peace and public safety occurring in clause (b) of subsection (3) of S. 17 of the Act, are of vital significance.
6. On the facts found by the licensing authority, it cannot be said that the cancellation of the petitioners' licence was necessitated either for' the security of the public peace or it was necessary for 'public safety'.
7. A little enunciation of the law on the subject is required. Every breach of peace does not necessarily endanger the security of public peace and public safety. The fact that notice under S. 107, Cr. P.C. initiated in proceedings u/S. 107, Cr. P.C. was issued, does not mean that cancellation of petitioners' fire arm licence was legitimately necessary for public peace and public safety. Further, the accused in the murder case of the petitioners' son was acquitted and the fact that the petitioner had filed a revision in the High Court was by itself no groundnecessitating cancellation of the petitioners' licence inasmuch as it does not bring forth a case either of security of public peace or of public safety.
8. Another salient feature of the present case is that the grounds on which the petitioners' fire-arm licence was cancelled are not founded upon the ones disclosed in the show cause notice. The cancellation of fire-arm on grounds not disclosed in the show cause notice results in violation of statutory protection guaranteed by sub-s. (1) of S. 17 of the Act. At the risk of repetition, it may be emphasised that the grounds indurating into the conclusions of the District Magistrate that the accused in the murder case of the petitioner's son has been acquitted and that the petitioner has filed a revision in the High Court against the acquittal of the accused, does not establish the necessary connection with the security of the public peace and safety. To hold that a particular licensee isnot a fit person to possess a licence as he is likely to commit dangerous offences by misusing the licencesed gun vis-a-vis the fact that the basis of such inferences that the licensee poses a threat to public security and public safety, are not borne of sufficient facts having been set out in the order of cancellation of licence, is not justifiable in law as there has been no evidence of provocative utterances of the licensee or of his suspicious movements or of his criminal designs. I am conscious of the fact that it is not possible to enlist exhaustive facts and circumstances from which an inference of threat to public security or public peace may be deduced, but there have to be some facts and evidence to enable such inference that licensee poses a threat to the security of public peace and public safety inasmuch as the right to acquire and possess a gun/firearm is a fundamental right and any order likely to affect such right can be passed only in conformity with the principles of natural justice. The ultimate aim of the natural justice is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. It leaves me in no manner of doubt that the licensing authority has to act in a quasi judicial manner in deciding whether a licence granted to a person under the Act, should be cancelled or not and as such thefinding arrived at by the District Magistrate must radiate confidence and it must appear from the order that it is necessary for the security of the public peace and public safety. These are basic requirements. The provisions of the Act do not envisage untrammelled discretion but the discretion to pass an order for cancellation of the licence must be a judicial discretion to be exercised fairly and honestly in accordance with the essential principles of natural justice and on the objective existence of the grounds or circumstances envisaged in the relevant section.
9. In the instant case, there is not an iota of facts or evidence as to suggest that the petitioner threatened public peace or public safety by any of his overt acts and merely to apprehend that because he had filed a revision against the acquittal of the accused in the murder case of his son, will not constitute threat to the security of public peace and public safety.
10. The order cancelling the licence is vitiated on yet another ground. Acquisition of fire-arm under a licence granted in accordance with the provisions of the Arms Act, 1959 is not only considered a status symbol but also a means of the security and safety of life and property of the holders of the firearm. In the instant case, the son of the petitioner had been murdered and it was therefore incumbent upon the licensing authority to have addresed himself to the question of security of public peace and public safety vis-a-vis the question of the safety of the life and property of the petitioner before descending to making an order of cancellation of the fire-arm lawfully granted to the petitioner. Thus, it is apparent that the matter has not been gone into dispassionately and in the correct perspective. Accordingly, I find that the impugned order cancelling the licence of the petitioner is vitiated by error of law. The appellate order does not in any manner cure the defects which permeated the order passed by the licensing Authority and in this view of the matter, both the orders, which as stated above, bristle with apparent errors of law are liable to be quashed.
11. In the result, the petition succeeds and allowed. The impugned orders dated 21-9-88 and 20-12-88 are quashed. The respodnents are directed to restore the licence and the gun in question to the petitioner forthwith and consider his application for renewal of the licence as and when it falls due for renewal in accordance with law without being influenced by the finding recorded in the impugned orders. No order as to costs.
12. Petition allowed.