Judgment:
Knox and Blair, JJ.
1. This is an application for leave to appeal to His Imperial Majesty in Council. The subject-matter of the suit in the Court of first instance was under ten thousand rupees in value, but in an affidavit, which is attached to the application, it is stated that the title to an eight-anna share in mauza Kot Kamarhya of Pandit Hira Nand Chaube and of Pandit Chattardhari Chaube depends on the decision of the same question, and that the title of other purchasers to the rest of the villages mentioned in the schedule annexed to the petition depends on the same question. In this way it is sought to make out that, though the value of the matter directly in dispute is below ten thousand rupees, yet the decree of this Court involves indirectly questions to or respecting the entire property mentioned in the schedule, which is valued at about 1,50,000 rupees. None of the properties which are said to be affected by the decree of this Court, and which are not in dispute before us, are or have been made the matter of any suit yet instituted. They may or may not hereafter be subject-matters of suits. Our decree may or may not involve, directly or indirectly, a claim or question to, or-respecting them. At present all this is a matter of pure conjecture. The application is therefore opposed on the ground that as the value of the subject-matter is not ten thousand rupees this application should be rejected. The question of law, too, which is involved, is not a question of great public or private importance, and it is urged that for these reasons it cannot be held to come within the term 'a substantial question of law.' In support of this contention reference is made to the case of Radha Krishn Das v. Rai Krishn Chand (1901) I.L.R. 23 All. 415 and to the case of Banarsi Prasad v. Kashi Krishna Narain (1901) I.L.R. 23 All. 227 p. 231. We have examined the question which is said to be involved, and we determine that it is not a substantial question of law within the meaning of the terms of Section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We are also of opinion that when it is laid down that the decree must involve, directly or indirectly, some claim or question to or respecting property of ten thousand rupees in value or upwards, the reference is to suits in existence and not to suits, if we may so term it, in gremio futuri. In this view we are supported by what is stated as the unanimous opinion of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Moofti Mohummud Ubdoollah v. Baboo Mootechund (1837) 1 Moo. I.A. 363. We may also refer to the observations made in the case of Baboo Gopal Lall Thakoor v. Teluk Chunder Rai (1860) 7 Moo. I.A. 548. We therefore direct that this application stand dismissed with costs.