ORDER
V.V.S. Rao, J.
1. The petitioner impugns the intimation dated 22-2-2003 sent by the first respondent whereby and whereunder the first respondent informed the petitioner that Kapra Municipality will take necessary action in granting building permission for construction of house in Plot Nos. 8 and 9 in Sy.Nos. 13 and 14 of Hasthinapuri, Ammuguda Village, Ranga Reddy District, only after disposal of the suit heing O.S.No. 778 of 2001 on the file of the Court of the Principal Junior Civil Judge (East and North), Ranga Reddy District. He seeks a declaration that refusal to grant permission for construction of house is illegal. He also seeks a consequential direction to the first respondent Kapra Municipality to grant permission for construction of house on the said plots. The writ petition raises an important question as to true construction of Section 215 read with various other provisions of the A.P. Municipalities Act, 1965 ('the Act'). To appreciate the controversy, it is necessary to refer to the admitted facts in brief.
2. The land comprised in Sy.Nos. 13 and 14 of Hasthinapuri, Ammuguda Village originally belonged to one Sankariah, He sold an extent of Acs. 42.00 through his wife Ankamma. One B.S. Setty appears to have purchased an extent of Acs. 41.00 from Sankariah, The sons of Sankaraiah viz., Balaraj and Narayana filed a suit being O.S. No. 28 of 1982 on the file of the Junior Civil Judge, Medchal. They sought relief of cancellation of sale deed and recovery of possession. During the pendency of the suit, B.S. Setty, who claims to have purchased the land from Sankaraiah died. His sons were brought on record as legal representatives.
3. The suit being O.S.No. 28 of 1982 was decreed in favour of Balaraj and Narayana. Be that as it is, during the pendency of the suit, Hasthinapuri Cooperative Society was impleaded as defendant as they claimed that they purchased an extent of Acs. 20.00 from B.S. Setty. After the suit was decreed in favour of the sons of Sankaraiah, Hasthinapuri Co-operative Society filed an appeal on the file of the Court of the District Judge, Ranga Reddy District being A.S.No. 49 of 1996. Hasthinapuri Cooperative Society entered into compromise with Balaraj and Narayana for an extent of Acs. 20.00 and decree of trial Court in relation to other extent of land became final.
4. The petitioner herein purchased Plot Nos. 8 and 9 admeasuring 493 Sq.yds. and 500 Sq. 0yds respectively from the sons of Sankaraiah under two registered sale deeds dated 1-6-2001. Thereafter, he submitted an application to the first respondent under Section 209 of the Act seeking permission to construct a residential house duly paying building fee and betterment charges of Rs. 52,000/-. In the meanwhile, one Anantha Kishan Yadav claiming to be GPA holder of B.S. Lakshmi (alleged second wife of B.S. Setty) sold Plot Nos. 8 and 9 of Hasthinapuri (same plots which were purchased by the petitioner) to Smt. Suguna Bala and Uma Devi. These sales were effected on 25-10-2001. After purchasing the plots, these two women filed O.S.No. 692 of 2001 on the file of the Court of the Principal Junior Civil Judge (East and North), Ranga Reddy District, against the petitioner and obtained ad interim injunction pending the suit. They also allegedly sold the two plots in favour of the second respondent herein, who happens to be the Councillor of Kapra Municipality.
5. The second respondent also filed another suit being O.S. No. 778 of 2001 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge (East and North), Ranga Reddy District against the sons of Sankaraiah, petitioner, Kapra Municipality and the Commissioner. The learned Junior Civil Judge granted ad interim injunction in favour of the second respondent but refused to grant a direction to the Municipality to grant permission for construction of a residential house in the said plots. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner herein filed CM.A. No. 42 of 2001 on the file of the Court of the Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Ranga Reddy District. The second respondent as well as sons of Sankaraiah also filed two separate appeals being C.M.A. Nos. 84 and 88 of 2001 on the file of the same Court. The learned District Judge disposed of the CMAs by a common order dated 21-8-2001 holding that there is no evidence to show that B.S. Lakshmi is the second wife of B.S. Setty, that the sons of Sankaraiah got prima facie title and that it cannot be said that the second respondent is in possession of the property. Against the common order, the second respondent filed two civil revision petitions before this Court being C.R.P. Nos. 5284 and 5377 of 2002. These two CRPS were disposed of by a common order dated 27-11-2002 holding that the suit in O.S. No. 28 of 1982 filed by the sons of Sankaraiah attained finality and that it was premature for the civil Court to come to any conclusion as to who are the valid title holders to the property. This Court also observed that the second respondent prima facie established title. The order passed by the Additional District Judge was confirmed and the trial Court was directed to dispose of the suit on priority basis.
6. It may also be mentioned that after disposal of the civil revision petition by this Court, the petitioner also filed a suit on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District for declaration of title in respect of Plot Nos. 8 and 9 situated at Hasthinapuri, Ammuguda Village, Kapra Municipality. When the Commissioner passed the impugned order on 22-2-2003, it was not brought to his notice about the petitioner's suit. The fact remains that the suit was filed sometime in January 2003 and the impugned order was passed in February 2003.
7. As stated earlier, the petitioner made an application for construction of house on 29-6-2001 followed by a reminder dated 9-11-2002 subsequent to the disposal of the appeal in C.M.As by the Fast Track Court. In view of the pendency of the suit, the matter was not proceeded with by the Kapra Municipality. Placing reliance on the observations made by this Court and the legal opinion of the Standing Counsel, the petitioner was informed that necessary action will be taken after disposal of the suit.
8. Learned Senior Counsel Sri K. Subrahmanya Reddy appearing for the petitioner submits that Section 215 of the Act mentions grounds on which permission to construct or reconstruct building can be refused. The said provision does not empower the Commissioner to reject permission or sit over the matter on the ground that title dispute is pending before the civil Court. The learned Senior Counsel also invited the attention of the Court to Sections 209 to 214 as well as Schedule of the Act containing building rules in support of the contention that the Legislature has specifically excluded a ground that title to building site being in litigation. It is nextly contended that by the impugned intimation, the Commissioner has not rejected permission and only postponed the decision till the adjudication of the dispute between the petitioner and respondent No. 2 and Ors. Therefore, by reason of Section 214 of the Act, it shall be deemed to have been given permission for construction of house. Learned Senior Counsel also urged that the Commissioner is bound to grant permission and cannot sit over the matter. He placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Delhi Municipality v. Kishan Dass AIR 1996 SC 386. Reliance is also placed on the decision of a Division Bench of Mysore High Court in G.V. Paily v. Town Municipal Council 1969 (2) Mys. L.J. 159, and the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in District Collector, Hyderabad v. N. Krishna Mohan : 2000(4)ALD126 , and the decision of a learned Single Judge in Hyderabad Potteries Private Limited v. Collector Hyderabad : 2001(3)ALD600 .
9. Learned Standing Counsel for Municipalities, Sri R. Thimma Reddy submits that in view of the serious title dispute between the petitioner and the second respondent, a law and problem has arisen in the area and, therefore, Kapra Municipality did not dispose of the application made by the petitioner. He also submits that the second respondent also applied for permission for construction of a residential building on the same plot and the Municipality did not grant permission in view of the dispute regarding ownership. The vendor of the second respondent also approached the civil Court and filed a suit. Similarly, the second respondent also filed a suit on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge in which the Municipality was added as a defendant. The Civil Court granted ad interim injunction and, therefore, permission was not granted. Learned Standing Counsel also made a reference to various orders passed by the trial Court, appellate Court and this Court in CRPs. He finally contends that as the petitioner and the second respondent have not established prima facie title and as the matter is sub judice before the trial Court, the Municipality sent the impugned intimation to the petitioner after obtaining legal opinion.
10. Learned Senior Counsel Sri E. Manohar, appearing for the second respondent contends that the grounds mentioned in Section 215 of the Act would enable the Commissioner to refuse permission. The Commissioner may refuse permission for one or more grounds. When the matter regarding title of rival claimants is sub judice before the civil Court, the Commissioner can legitimately refuse permission or keep the matter pending. Further, when there is likelihood of law and order problem if permission is granted, it is open to the Commissioner to withhold permission. The Commissioner has not refused the application of the petitioner as there is injunction against the respondent not to make any construction in the plots during the pendency of the suit. The same would disable the petitioner from proceeding with the construction. The relevant fact is that when the Commissioner takes decision either under Section 212 or Section 213 read with Section 215 of the Act, the petitioner filed a suit before the civil Court as there is cloud on his title. Learned Senior Counsel also submits that the petitioner has an effective alternative remedy of filing appeal before the Municipal Council under Section 345 of the Act and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in this writ petition.
11. The facts and events leading to filing of the writ petition and the rival contentions made before this Court would throw up only question for consideration as to true construction of Section 215 of the Act and the effect of pending litigation on the decision-making process by the Commissioner under Sections 212, 213 and 215 read with Schedule of the Act.
12. Relevant Provisions of A.P. Municipalities Act, 1965 : Chapter IV of the Act deals with building regulations. By reason of Section 213, Building Rules contained in Annexure III of the Act also govern construction and reconstruction of the buildings and structures in the municipal areas, If we look at the title of the Chapter, the building regulations contained in Sections 202 to 228 are general powers. Though under Section 205, the power to regulate future construction of certain classes of buildings in particular streets or localities, the power to receive applications for permission to construct a building and the power to grant permission or reject permission is conferred on the Commissioner. At the outset, it is necessary to read Sections 209 and 211 of the Act as enacted. They are as under:
209. Application to construct or reconstruct buildings :-(1) If any person intends to construct or reconstruct a building other than a hut, he shall send to the Commissioner-
(a) an application in writing for the approval of the site, together with a site plan of the land, and
(b) an application in writing for permission to execute the work together with ground-plan, elevations and Sections of the building, and a specification of the work.
Explanation :-'Building' in this Sub-section shall include a wall or fence of whatever height bounding or abutting on any public street.
(2) Every document furnished under Sub-section (1) shall contain such particulars and be prepared in such manner as may be required under rules or bye-laws.
13. The A.P. Municipalities Act, 1965 was amended by A.P. Municipal Laws (Amendment) Act, 1992. By reason of the said amendment, Clause (c) was included in Sub-section (1) of Section 209. After amendment, Section 209 reads as under:
209. Application to construct or reconstruct buildings :-(1) If any person intends to construct or reconstruct a building other than a hut, he shall send to the Commissioner-
(a) an application in writing for the approval of the site, together with a site plan of the land, and
(b) an application in writing for permission to execute the work together with ground-plan, elevations and Sections of the building, and a specification of the work.
Explanation :-'Building' in this Sub-section shall include a wall or fence of whatever height bounding or abutting on any public street.
(c) a copy of the title deed of the land duly attested by a Gazetted Officer of the Government together with an urban land ceiling clearance certificate or as the case may be, an affidavit referred to in Section 184.
(2) Every document furnished under Sub-section (1) shall contain such particulars and be prepared in such manner as may be required under rules or bye-laws.
210. Necessity for prior approval of site :- The Commissioner shall not grant permission to construct or reconstruct a building unless and until it has approved of the site or an application made under Section 209.
211. Prohibition against commencement of work without permission :-The construction or reconstruction of a building shall not be begun unless and until the Commissioner has granted permission for the execution of the work.
14. As per Section 209, any person intending to construct building shall have to make an application to the Commissioner together with approved site plan, building plan, copy of title deed and such other documents that are required under the rules and the bye-laws. Section 210 deals with approval of the site and mandates that the Commissioner shall not grant permission unless the site on which construction is to be made is approved. Section 211 prohibits any person from making any construction unless the Commissioner grants permission for execution of the work. Here, the Building Rules in Schedule El may also be briefly noticed.
15. The Building Rules in Schedule IE form part of the Act and as per the legislative intent, the expression in Section 213 may have to be read as part of Chapter IV of the Act. Rule 2 thereof enumerates the documents which should accompany an application for permission to construct a building. Rule 4 stipulates that Commissioner may withhold permission in certain cases. The other rules deal with application, nature of the site, super-structures, height and size of the room, lighting and ventilation, drains and sanitary conveniences, staircases etc. Section 229 of the Act enables to exempt any building from the provisions of Chapter IV other than Section 215 and specifically confers power on the Commissioner to decide cases of temporary structures like temporary huts of sheds for stabling, for watching crops, for storing tools or materials etc.
16. Reverting back to the Building Rules, Rule 18 confers power on the Government either suo motu or on application to exempt any building or class of building from the operation of all or any of the provisions of the rules and Sections 212 and 213 prescribe the period within which the Commissioner may approve or disapprove and the Commissioner may grant or refuse permission to execute the work. These two provisions read as under.
212. Period within which Commissioner is to signify approval or disapproval:-Within sixty days after the receipt of any application made under Section 209 for approval of a site or of any information or further information required under rules or bye-laws, the Commissioner shall, by written order, either approve the site or refuse on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 215 to approve the site.
213. Period within which Commissioner is to grant or refuse to grant permission to execute work:-Within sixty days after the receipt of any application made under Section 209 for permission to execute any work or of any information or of documents or further information or documents required under rules or bye-laws, the Commissioner shall be written order ether grant such permission or refuse on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 215 to grant it:Provided that the said period of sixty days shall not begin to run until the site has been approved under Section 212.
17. Section 212 of the Act requires the Commissioner to pass appropriate orders either accepting or refusing the approval of the site. Likewise, Section 213 requires the Commissioner to grant or refuse to grant permission for construction of a building. Li both the cases, the Commissioner is required to pass orders within sixty days after receipt of an application under Section 209 of the Act. Further, in either case, the Commissioner may refuse approval/ permission on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 215. Section 214 contains a deeming provision. It reads as under:
214. Effect of delay in grant or refusal of approval or permission :-If within the period prescribed by Section 212 or Section 213, as the case may be, the Commissioner has neither given nor refused its approval of a building site, or its permission to execute any work, as the case may be, such approval or permission shall be deemed to have been given; and the applicant may proceed to execute the work, but not so as to contravene any of the provisions of this Act or any rules or bye-laws made under this Act.
18. The purport of Section 214 is that if within sixty days after receipt of an application for approval of the site or permission for construction of a building, if the Commissioner fails to pass orders refusing approval/permission, as the case may be, such approval or permission shall be deemed to have been given and it is open to the applicant to proceed with the construction without contravening the provisions of the Act, Building Rules or bye-laws. However, it must be kept in mind that by reason of Section 210 of the Act, unless and until the site on which a building is to be constructed is approved, the Commissioner cannot grant any permission for construction of building. Therefore, logically, unless and until an applicant has prior approval of the site, he cannot take advantage of Section 214 of the Act. To say in other words, if a person has already applied for approval of the site and the Commissioner approved the site, then only the person can take advantage of Section 214 of the Act. A person cannot claim that he has deemed permission and, therefore, the construction made or is to be made is not illegal. He has to prove that the Commissioner has already approved the site after making inspection. The approval of the layout should not be confused with the approval of the site. There could be a difference between the two. The Commissioner may refuse to approve the site if it is not in accordance with the Building Rules in Schedule ID, especially Rule 5 thereof. Though the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner refutes the contention that as the Commissioner failed to pass orders refusing permission within sixty days as stipulated in Sections 212 and 213, permission is deemed to have been given by the Commissioner for construction of the building. This should be appreciated in the light of Section 212 read with Section 215 of the Act. Doing so, I am not able to agree with the learned Senior Counsel. No material is placed before me to show that the Commissioner has approved the site under Section 210 nor the impugned order reflects the same. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be said to have been granted permission. Indeed, as presently seen, even when the second respondent approached the civil Court, though interim injunction was granted initially, the Court refused to grant a direction to the Commissioner to grant permission.
19. As already pointed out, the second has to be appreciated with reference to Section 215 of the Act. The said Section deals with grounds on which approval of the site or licence to construct or reconstruct a building may be refused. It reads as under:
215. Grounds on which approval of sites for or licence to construct or reconstruct building may be refused :-The only grounds on which approval of a site for the construction or reconstruction of a building may be refused are the following, namely:
(1) that the work, or use of the site for the work or any of the particulars comprised in the site plan, ground plan elevations, Sections or specification would contravene some specified provision of any law or some specified order, rule, declaration or bye-laws made under any law;
(2) that the application for such permission does not contain the particulars or is not prepared in the manner required under rules or bye-laws;
(3) that any of the documents referred to in Section 209 have not been signed as required under rules or bye-laws;
(4) that any information or documents required by the Commissioner under rules or bye-laws have or have not been duly furnished;
(5) that streets or roads have not been made as required by Section 184.
(6) that the proposed building would be an encroachment upon Government or municipal land.
Whenever the Commissioner refuses to approve a building site for a building or to grant permission to construct or reconstruct a building, the reasons for such refusal shall be specifically stated in the order.
20. The above Section enumerates ground urged by the learned Senior Counsel six grounds. The enacting part of the Section begins with a phrase 'the only grounds on which the approval of the site....' may be refused by the Commissioner. When the Legislature shows the word 'only', did they intend that the Commissioner has no power to reject permission on any other ground which does not find place in Section 215 Section 215 of the Act is replaced by A.P. Municipalities (Amendment) Act, 1992. After amendment the Section reads as under:
215. Grounds on which approval of sites for or licence to construct or reconstruct building may be refused :-The only grounds on which approval of a site for the construction or reconstruction of a building may be refused are the following, namely :
(1) that the work, or use of the site for the work or any of the particulars comprised in the site plan, ground plan elevations, Sections or specification would contravene some specified provision of any law or some specified order, rule, declaration or bye-laws made under any law;
(2) that the application for such permission does not contain the particulars or is not prepared in the manner required under rules or bye-laws;
(3) that any of the documents referred to in Section 209 have not been signed as required under rules or bye-laws;
(4) that any information or a copy of the title deed of the land duly attested by a Gazetted Officer of the Government together with an urban land ceiling clearance certificate, or as the case may be, an affidavit referred to in Section 184 are not furnished or documents required by the Commissioner under rules or bye-laws have or have not been duly furnished;
(5) that streets or roads have not been made as required by Section 184.
(6) that the proposed building would be an encroachment upon Government or municipal land.
Whenever the Commissioner refuses to approve a building site for a building or to grant permission to construct or reconstruct a building, the reasons for such refusal shall be specifically stated in the order.
(provision in italics was inserted by Amendment Act, 1992)
21. When the law to be applied in a given case requires interpretation of statute, the Court has to ascertain the facts and then interpret the law to apply to such facts. Interpretation cannot be in a vacuum or in relation to hypothetical facts. It is, therefore, for this reason that in interpretation by applying the principles of jurisprudence differ from the interpretation of law by a law-applying organs like Courts. The ultimate interpretation of law is the province of the Court alone. Indeed, 'it is the function of the Legislature to say what shall be the law and it is only the Court to say what is law.'
General Principles of Interpretation :
22. 'Golden Rule' of interpretation of statutes was that statutes are to be interpreted according to grammatical and ordinary sense of the word in grammatical or liberal meaning unmindful of consequences of such interpretation. It was predominant method of reading the statutes. More often than not, such grammatical and literal interpretation leads to unjust result which Legislature never intended. The golden rule of giving undue importance to grammatical and literal meaning of late gave place to 'rule of legislative intent'. The world over, the principle of interpretation according to the legislative intent is accepted as more logical principle.
(a) When the law to be applied in a given case prescribes interpretation of statute, the Court has to ascertain the facts and then interpret the law to apply to such facts. Interpretation cannot be in a vacuum or in relation to hypothetical facts. It is, therefore, for this reason that in interpretation by applying the principles of jurisprudence differ from the interpretation of law by a law -applying organs like this Court or Supreme Court. The Legislature and/or the Executive may understand law by the statute law. The ultimate interpretation of law is the province of the Court alone. Indeed, 'it is the function of the Legislature to say what shall be the law and it is only the Court to say what is law.
23. In Jt. Registrar of Co-operative Societies v. T.A. Kuttappan : AIR2000SC2378 , Associated Timber Industries v. Central Bank of India : AIR2000SC2689 , Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank : [2000]2SCR1102 , K. Duraiswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu : [2001]1SCR489 , Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. : [1987]2SCR1 , Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dikshitulu : [1979]1SCR26 , Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) : 1989CriLJ1 , District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. : (2001)7SCC358 and Indian Handicrafts v. Union of India : AIR2003SC3240 , the Supreme Court applied the principle of purposive construction.
24. In Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court observed :
Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then Section by Section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the Sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each Section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place.
25. In Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dikshitulu (supra), a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed as under :
The primary principle of interpretation is that a constitutional or statutory provision should be construed 'according to the intent of they that made it' (Code). Normally, such intent is gathered from the language of the provision. If the language of the phraseology employed by the legislation is precise and plain and thus by itself, proclaims the legislative intent in unequivocal terms, the same must be given effect to, regardless of the consequences that may follow. But if the words used in the provision are imprecise, protean, or evocative or can reasonably bear meaning more than one, the rule of strict grammatical construction ceases to be a sure guide to reach at the real legislative intent. In such a case, in order to ascertain the true meaning of the terms and phrases employed, it is legitimate for the Court to go beyond the arid literal confines of the provision and to call in aid other well-recognised rules of construction such as its legislative history, the basic scheme and framework of the statute as a whole, each portion throwing light on the rest, the purpose of the legislation, the object sought to be achieved and the consequences that may flow from the adoption of one in preference to the other possible interpretation
(emphasis supplied)
26. In Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (supra), it was held :
During the last several years, the 'golden rule' has been given a goby. We now look for the 'intention' of the Legislature or the 'purpose' of the statute. First we examine the words of the statute. If the words are precise and cover the situation on hand, we do not go further. We expound those words in the natural and ordinary sense of the words. But if the words are ambiguous, uncertain or any doubt arises as to the terms employed, we deem it as our paramount duty to put upon the language of the Legislature rational meaning. We then examine every word, every Section and every provision. We examine the act as a whole. We examine the necessity which gave rise to the Act. We took at the mischiefs which the Legislature intended to redress. We look at the whole situation and not just one-to-one relation. We will not consider any provision out of the framework of the statute. We will not view the provisions as abstract principles separated from the motive force behind. We will consider the provisions in the circumstances to which they owe their origin. We will consider the provisions to ensure coherence and consistency within the law as a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences.
(emphasis supplied)
27. In District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron and Steel Co, (supra), the Supreme Court considered the question whether Case and Other Taxes on Minerals (Validation) Act, 1992 validated only the taxes on minerals already realized under invalid law or validated the right to levy tax and realize the same. A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered the question with reference to object for which the Act for the purpose of which it was enacted. After referring to the earlier judgments of the Supreme Court in State of H.P. v. Kailash Chand Mahajan 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 351, Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. (supra), the Apex Court reiterated the principles thus :
A statute is an edict of the Legislature and in construing a statute, it is necessary, to seek the intention of its maker. A statute has to be construed according to the intent of them that make it and the duty of the Court is to act upon the true intention of the Legislature. If a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation the Court has to choose that interpretation which represents the true intention of the Legislature. This task very often raises the difficulties because of various reasons, inasmuch as the words used may not be scientific symbols having any precise or definite meaning and the language may be an imperfect medium to convey one's thought or that the assembly of Legislatures consisting of persons of various shades of opinion purport to convey a meaning which may be obscure. It is impossible even for the most imaginative Legislature to forestall exhaustively situations and circumstances that may emerge after enacting a statute where its application may be called for. Nonetheless, the function of the Courts is only to expound and not to legislate. Legislation in a modem State is actuated with some policy to curb some public evil or to effectuate some public benefit. The legislation is primarily directed to the problems before the Legislature based on information derived from past and present experience. It may also be designed by use of general words to cover similar problems arising in future. But, from the very nature of things, it is impossible to anticipate fully the varied situations arising in future in which the application of the legislation in hand may be called for, and, words chosen to communicate such indefinite referents are bound to be in many cases lacking in clarity and precision and thus giving rise to controversial questions of construction. The process of construction combines both literal and purposive approaches. In other words the legislative intention i.e., the true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed,
(emphasis supplied)
(b) It is also well settled that to arrive at the intention of the legislation depending on the objects for which the enactment is made, the Court can resort to historical, contextual and purposive interpretation leaving textual interpretation aside. This principle is well settled in Indian law. A reference may be made to some of the decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with purposive interpretation.
(c) Francis Bennion in his Statutory Interpretation described purposive interpretation as under.
A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by-
(a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose, or
(b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose.
28. More often than not, literal interpretation of a statute or a provision of a statute results in absurdity. Therefore, while interpreting statutory provisions, the Courts should keep in mind the objectives or purpose for which statute has been enacted. Justice Frankfurter of U.S. Supreme Court in an article titled as Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes (47 Columbia Law Reports 527), observed that, 'legislation has an aim, it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an adequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of Government. That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evidenced in the language of the statutes, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose.' This principle of purposive and meaningful interpretation has been followed by the Supreme Court in a number of cases.
29. If the submission of the learned Senior Counsel is accepted, it would result in absurd situation. A person may apply for building permission duly enclosing a copy of the title deed, necessary plans and other documents. On a preliminary enquiry, the Commissioner, opines that copy of the title deed is forged or it is not genuine, going by pure text of Section 215 of the Act, the Commissioner would have no choice but to give sanction under Section 213 read with Section 215 of the Act. It is not disputed nor denied that if the land is a Government land or municipal land, the Commissioner can refuse permission. In case the land in respect of which building permission is sought, is also claimed by another person, can't the Commissioner refuse permission ?
30. The intention of the legislation was that the Commissioner can refuse permission if there is a doubt about the title deed or any objection is raised. It is for this reason that Sub-clause (4) of Section 215 was amended introducing the words to the effect that an applicant should enclose a copy of the title deed duly attested by a Gazetted Officer of the Government along with an urban land ceiling clearance certificate. 'Title deed' referred to in Clause (2) of Section 215, in my opinion, is the title deed in respect of property free from any encumbrance. A rival claim for the same property is an encumbrance and if there is any objection raised by anybody, the Commissioner has to consider it and exercise his discretion. Similarly, in an approved layout if somebody wants to construct a building in an area earmarked for a public or community purpose or earmarked for park, anybody can object and also challenge before appropriate forum. This interpretation is in tune with the object with which the A.P. Municipalities Act was enacted.
31. The Municipalities Act is an Act inter alis providing for disciplined and planned growth of the municipal area. The power vested in various authorities should be exercised for public good. By exercising power in a manner which would result in dispute, cannot be appreciated. The common law principle of absolute individual right is replaced by the principle of community welfare. Therefore, while passing orders under Section 213 read with Section 215, it is always open to the Commissioner to postpone the decision if there is a dispute between two rival claimants to the property in question. Indeed, when the dispute is sub judice, it shall be the duty of the Commissioner to postpone the permission, for the public authority must respect the Court's decision and implement it and/or aid in implementing the same. In this context, a reference may be made to Article 144 of the Constitution of India which is to the effect that all authorities, civil and judicial in the territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court.
32. In G.V. Paily v. Town Municipal Council (supra), a Division Bench of Mysore High Court was considering the effect of Section 187(3) of the Mysore Municipalities Act, 1964 and the power of the Municipal Council to reject permission to construct a Church. In the said case, permission was refused inter alia on the ground that it was likely to result in conflict between the claimants of the same site. The Division Bench held that such rejection is only on extraneous grounds not mentioned in Section 187 of the Mysore Municipalities Act. The said provision empowered the Municipal Council to reject permission or alter or add to the construction plan on the grounds mentioned therein. The judgment does not extract Section 187(3). Therefore, it is not possible to arrive at any conclusion under what context the Division Bench of Mysore High Court held so. In the facts and circumstances of the said case, the High Court came to a conclusion that the grounds on which permission was refused are not found in Section 187(3). In this case, by reason of the amendment in 1992, an applicant is required to annex a copy of the title deed to the application. Dealing with this aspect of the matter, I have already held that title deed is only title deed in relation to a property where there is no encumbrance or dispute about the title. It must be remembered that a ratio in one case may not be applicable to another case even if there is a slight variation in the provision or if the fact-situation is different. The principle is well settled and does not require any further elaboration.
33. The decision of the Supreme Court in Delhi Municipality v. Kishan Dass (supra), is not of much assistance to the petitioner. It was laid down therein as under:
It is clear from Section 336 of tile Corporation Act, that the Commissioner has to give sanction for the erection of a building or the execution of a work, unless such building or work would contravene any of the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 336 or the provisions of Section 340, Therefore, in order to sustain the validity of the order of rejection passed by the Commissioner the Corporation has to establish that the proposed building or the use of the site for the building, by the petitioner would contravene the provisions of any other law.
34. In this case, the Municipality had discharged the burden and has shown valid reasons for postponing the decision on the application to the petitioner for grant of permission.
35. A Division Bench of this Court in District Collector, Hyderabad v. N. Krishna Mohan (supra) deals with a case where the applicants established their possession and enjoyment to the land where they wanted to construct a building, the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad advised the applicants to obtain No Objection Certificate from the District Collector. It was refused. A learned Single Judge quashed the order. In appeal, the Division Bench while confirming the order of the learned Single Judge observed as under:
For the purpose of this case, it is sufficient to note that when once the petitioners established their possession and enjoyment of the land in question, the 2nd respondent-MCH should have granted permission in favour of the petitioners for construction of buildings instead of driving them to 1st respondent-Collector to obtain No Objection Certificate. Obtaining of No Objection Certificate arises only when any law presupposes, Mere circular or an executive order informing the petitioners to obtain No Objection Certificate before asking for conversion of land etc., have no legal sanctity, because there is no such statutory provision which compels the MCH to insist a person seeking permission to construct a building to obtain and produce No Objection Certificate from the Collector....
36. A reading of the Division Bench judgment in District Collector, Hyderabad v. N. Krishna Mohan (supra) shows that there was no dispute as to possession and enjoyment to~ the land in question and this Court was not deciding any dispute between the applicants and the Government. Therefore, this Court came to a conclusion that it is not proper for the MCH to direct the applicants to obtain No Objection Certificate from the District Collector. The said decision is of no help to the petitioner.
37. The decision of the learned Single Judge in Hyderabad Potteries Private Limited v. Collector, Hyderabad (supra) is also not of much help to the petitioner. In the said case, dealing with the power of MCH, it was held that the Commissioner cannot refuse permission only on the ground that entries in Town Survey Land Register show that the land is Government land. It was held that the Commissioner is not entitled to decide any dispute as to title between the claimants and he is authorised to find out the title and lawful possession of the applicant. The relevant ratio is as follows:
Of course, the Commissioner has to consider the objections, if any, raised for grant of permission. But, an objection raised by a member of the Committee itself would not be enough to reject the application for grant of permission. The Commissioner is required to make pragmatic assessment of the material available on record and decide the question of prima facie title and lawful possession of the applicants. The applications for grant of permission cannot be rejected solely on the basis of TSLR entries. After-all, the decision to grant permission itself would not confer any title upon the applicant, nor it would take away the rights of the objector(s), whether the Government or any individual, for asserting their right, title and interest in the land in respect of which permission has been granted and dispute the title in any manner known to law. Similarly, the Commissioner is not entitled to decide any disputed questions of title or the ownership. All that the Commissioner required to do is to find out prima facie title and lawful possession of the applicant and obviously such consideration is confined to only for the purposes of granting permission and nothing more.
38. In the above decision, this Court observed that it is always open to the Commissioner to come to a prima fade' conclusion and reject permission and advise the parties to go before a civil Court to decide the title dispute.
39. A reading of the various orders passed by the Court of Junior Civil Judge, I Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District and this Court in C.R.P.Nos. 5284 and 5377 of 2002 would show that the Courts at all levels did not permit construction of any building on the disputed land either by the petitioner or anybody. Further, the anxiety of this Court is to give expeditious quietus to the dispute between the warring groups. A reading of the impugned order would show that the Commissioner postponed the decision under Section 213 of the Act only because the matter is sub judice before the Courts. Thus, the intimation given to the petitioner does not suffer from any illegality much less the vice of contravening Section 215 of the Act. This Court has already directed the Trial Judge to complete the trial expeditiously. The Commissioner is justified in issuing the impugned intimation. The same does not warrant any interference by this Court as the civil Court has already passed orders to maintain status quo as to possession and also from proceeding further with the construction of the building.
40. In the result, for the above reasons, the writ petition is devoid of any merit and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.