C.V. Ramulu, J.
1. In all these writ petitions, almost common question of fact and law arise for consideration and as such, they are being disposed of by this common Judgment.
2. According to the petitioners, Sri Venkateswara Institute of Medical Sciences (SVIMS) was established at Tirupathi in the year 1992 with the financial aid and assistance of Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanams (TTD). Since in the initial stages, there were no sanctioned posts in the Institute, the respondent-SVIMS appointed and engaged suitable persons on daily wage basis for various posts for the smooth running of SVIMS. Petitioners in W.P.No. 32836 of 1997 were engaged as drivers, petitioners in W.P.No. 32952 of 1997 as Laundry workers in the year 1994, petitioner in W.P.No. 33134 of 1997 as Supervisor, petitioners in W.P.No. 33814 of 1997 as Helpers under the control of the Civil Engineer at Tirupathi and petitioner in W.P.No. 33422 of 1997 in Class IV service as Pest Control Boy. They claim that they have been working since a long time and discharging their duties to the utmost satisfaction of their superiors without any adverse remark whatsoever. They are qualified and eligible to hold the said posts. They are holding responsibilities and functions on par with the regular employees in SVIMS. Though several similarly situated persons have been absorbed by the respondent-SVIMS and put them on time scale and some of them have also been declared as approved probationers, yet the SVIMS did not consider their cases for absorption on regular basis. It is also asserted that there is sufficient work in SVIMS and they are being continued in service on daily wage basis with artificial breaks. They have made several representations to the respondent-Institute to absorb them on regular basis and put them on time scale, but all their efforts went invain. Be that as it may, they came to know on 5-12-1997 that the respondent-Institute is taking steps to discontinue them from service and entrust the work to a third party to avoid their permanent absorption and putting them on regular pay scale. In fact, their services were terminated and attached to a named contractor after 5-12-1997 on various dates. The said action of the respondent-SVIMS is arbitrary, illegal and invalid.
3. Petitioners in W.P.No. 27959 of 1998 claim that they are all working in the Canteen maintained by TTD in the SVIMS premises on daily wage basis in the categories of Cooks, workers for serving and cleaning, maid servants and sweepers with effect from February, 1994. In fact, TTD was running the canteen on 'no profit no loss' basis and thus they are deemed to be the employees of TTD only. At any rate, as they are working for the last 4 years (as on the date of filing the writ petition) continuously, they are entitled for regularisation of their services with effect from February, 1994. When their services were sought to be attached to the contractor, they had filed W.P.No. 34422 of 1997 seeking regularisation of their services and the same is pending before this Court. While the matter stood thus, TTD in its Board meeting vide Resolution No. 123, dated 30-4-1998/ 1-5-1998 took a decision to grant Rs. 5.00 lakhs annually to the SVIMS to meet the wages of daily rated workers. Further, it requested to run the canteen by SVIMS on its own, which means under its administrative control. Whereas, contrary to the said resolution, the 2nd respondent-TTD has taken decision to withdraw the canteen of the 1st respondent-Institute with effect from 1-11-1998 and further directed the 1st respondent to run the canteen by calling open tenders. In fact, this was done with a mala fide intention and to defeat their rights, which are subjudice before this Court in W.P.No. 34422 of 1997.
4. M/s. T. Suryakaran Reddy and V. Jagapathi, learned counsel for petitioners, contended that when the Institute was in its formative stage and when there was no regular cadre strength available, petitioners were engaged to run the institute smoothly. Even after regular cadre strength was sanctioned, the respondents instead of absorbing the petitioners, though they are qualified and eligible to hold the respective posts, have not considered their cases and in fact, many of the juniors to the petitioners were considered and absorbed into the said posts. While the matter stood thus, after 15-12-1997, petitioners' services were attached to a contractor and they were asked to work under him and receive the payment through the contractor, instead of regularizing their services though there is continuous work available in the institute. The very fact that a contractor was engaged to supply various labour itself shows that there is continuous work and the petitioners could not have been directed to work under a named contractor. Attaching the services of the petitioners to a named contractor amounts to termination of their services in the SVIMS without notice and also amounts to altering the service conditions without any notice to them. Therefore, the petitioners are entitled for a declaration from this court that they are the daily wage employees of SVIMS directly and as such, they are entitled for a declaration for absorption of their services on regular basis and also entitled for the pay scale attached to the posts in which they are working.
5. Sri T. Suryakaran Reddy, learned counsel for petitioners in W.P.Nos. 34422 and 1997, also submitted that the canteen was established and run by TTD directly and the resolution passed in the year 1998 categorically states that the canteen is funded by TTD and as such, they are entitled to be treated as employees of TTD and they are also entitled for declaration for being absorbed on regular basis. He also argued that altering the service conditions of the petitioners amounts to violation of the statutory provisions of Section 9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as the provisions of the said Act are attracted in case of canteen workers, as it is an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act. It is further argued that the very fact that the petitioners are being continuously engaged through a named contractor from 1-11-1998 itself shows that there is every need for the Institute to absorb the petitioners on regular basis. The very nature of the works attended to by the petitioners i.e., driving, cooking, cleaning, sweeping etc., show that this is a perennial in nature and connected to the main activity of SVIMS and as such, even otherwise, continuing them under a contractor for a long time is nothing but adopting unfair labour practice.
6. The bone of contention of Sri D. Prakash Reddy, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the respondent SVIMS, is that in view of the Andhra Pradesh (Regulation of Appointments to Public Services and Rationalization of Staff Pattern and Pay Structure) Act, 1994 (Act 2 of 1994), the very appointment/engagement of the petitioners was illegal, as the Act prohibits engagement of daily wage workers. SVIMS had engaged contractors and instead of disengaging the petitioners, who have no right whatsoever, were accommodated and attached to the contractor. In fact, SVIMS requested the contractor to engage the same workers to avoid any inconvenience to the petitioners. Thus, the petitioners should have been thankful to the respondents, instead they made a tirade against SVIMS. Merely engaging a contractor and asking him to consider the case of the petitioners for being engaged by him does not amount to termination of services nor altering the service conditions of petitioners under Section 9-A of the I.D. Act. SVIMS had taken a pragmatic view of the fact that the very appointment of the petitioners in various capacities was contrary to Act 2 of 1994, as they were all engaged after the Act came into force. Once the very engagement of the petitioners by the respondents is illegal, it must be deemed that the initial engagement was void ab initio and the petitioners cannot complain either of termination of services or alteration of their service conditions contrary to the provisions of I.D. Act.
7. Learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the petitioners were neither sponsored through Employment Exchange nor were subjected to any selection process and as such, they have no right to seek regularization of their services with the respondent-management. Petitioners have no right whatsoever and as such, the question of violating the principles of natural justice does not arise.
8. Learned Additional Advocate General drawn the attention of this Court to various provisions of Act 2 of 1994 particularly to the definition of 'daily wage employee' under Section 2(ii), which reads as under:
(ii) 'daily wage employee' means any person who is employed in any public service on the basis of payment of daily wages and includes a person employed on the basis of nominal muster roll or consolidated pay either on full-time or part-time or piece rate basis or as a workcharged employee and any other similar category of employees by whatever designation called other than those who are selected and appointed in a sanctioned post in accordance with the relevant rules on a regular basis;
and submitted that according to Section 3(i), the appointment of any person in any public service to any post, in any class, category or grade as a daily wage employee was totally prohibited. It is also-statutory to face penal action in case of violation of the said provisions. Government also issued Circular Memo No. 44742-E/412/41/BC-O/IT, dated 4-11-1997 and instructed all the departments that any post created in contravention of the provisions of the Act 2 of 1994 i.e. without prior permission of the competent authority would entail disciplinary action apart from sentence with minimum of six months extending upto 2 years under Section 13(1) of the Act. Under these circumstances, the daily wage workers were continued under the contractor after 5-12-1997 and thus there was no arbitrary decision by SVIMS.
9. In the light of the above submissions, the following four important questions fall for consideration:
(i) Whether Act 2 of 1994 applies to SVIMS or not?
(ii) Whether SVIMS is an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of I.D. Act?
(iii) Whether the petitioners are workmen as defined under Section 2(s) of I.D. Act? And
(iv) Whether engaging the petitioners by SVIMS through a contractor amounts to altering of service conditions in violation of Section 9-A of the I.D. Act and/or amounts to termination of their services without following Section 25-F of I.D. Act?
10. Before going into all these questions, it is necessary to examine the following provisions of Act 2 of 1994:
'Preamble: An Act to regulate appointments and prohibit irregular appointments in Offices and Establishments under the control of the State Government, Local authorities, Corporations owned and controlled by the State Government and other bodies established under a law made by the Legislature of the State to rationalize the staff pattern and pay structure of employees therein and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
Definitions: 2. In this Act unless the context otherwise requires,--
(i) ...............
(ii) 'daily wage employee' means any person who is employed in any public service on the basis of payment of daily wages and includes a person employed on the basis of nominal muster roll or consolidated pay either on full-time or part-time or piece rate basis or as a workcharged employee and any other similar category of employees by whatever designation called other than those who are selected and appointed in a sanctioned post in accordance with the relevant rules on a regular basis;
(iii) to(v)............
(vi) 'Public Service' means, services in any office or establishment of,--
(a) the government;
(b) a local authority;
(c) a Corporation or undertaking wholly owned or controlled by the State Government;
(d) a body established under any law made by the Legislature of the State whether incorporated or not, including a University; and
(e) any other body established by the State Government or by a Society registered under any law relating to the registration of societies for the time being in force, and receiving funds from the State Government either fully or partly for its maintenance or any educational institutions whether registered or not but receiving aid from the Government.
Prohibition of daily wage appointments and regulation of temporary appointments:
3(1) The appointment of any person in any public service to any post, in any class, category or grade as a daily wage employee is hereby prohibited.
(2) No temporary appointment shall be made in any public service to any post, in any class, category or grade without the prior permission of the competent authority and without the name of the concerned candidate being sponsored by the Employment Exchange.
Bar for regularization of services:
7. No person who is a daily wage employee and no person who is appointed on a temporary basis under Section 3 and is continuing as such at the commencement of this Act shall have or shall be deemed ever to have a right to claim regularization of services on any ground whatsoever and the services of such person shall be liable to be terminated at any time without any notice and without assigning any reasons:
Provided that the services of those persons continuing as on 25th November, 1993 having completed a continuous minimum period of five years of service on or before 25th November, 1993 either on daily wage, or nominal muster roll, or consolidated pay or as a contingent worker on full time basis, shall be regularized in substantive vacancies, if they were otherwise qualified fulfilling the other conditions stipulated in the scheme formulated in G.O.Ms.No. 212, Finance and Planning (FW.PC.III) Department, dated the 22nd April, 1994. (Subs, by Act 27 of 1998).
Provided further that the services of a person who worked on part-time basis continuously for a minimum period of ten years and is continuing as such on the date of the commencement of this Act shall be regularized in accordance with the scheme formulated in G.O.(P)No. 212, Finance and Planning (FW.PC.III) Department, dated the 23rd July, 1997. (Ins. by Act 3 of 1998).
Provided also that in the case of workmen falling within the scope of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, one month's wages and such compensation as would be payable under the said section shall be paid in case of termination of services: (Subs. by Act 3 of 1998)
Provided also that nothing in this section shall apply to the workmen governed by Chapter V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (Subs. by Act 3 of 1998)
Explanation:- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the termination of services under this section shall not be deemed to be dismissal or removal from service within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution or of any other relevant law providing for the dismissal or removal of employees but shall only amount to termination simpliciter, not amounting to any punishment.
11. As seen from the above, the very object of Act 2 of 1994 is to regulate the appointments and prohibit irregular appointments under the State Government and other bodies established under a law made by the Legislature of the State. The daily wage employee is defined under Section 2(ii) of the Act. The appointment of daily wage employee is prohibited under Section 3 of Act 2 of 1994, apart form regularisation of temporary appointments without the prior permission of the competent authority. Thus, a cumulative reading of Sections 2 and 3 of Act 2 of 1994 goes to show that the services in SVIMS is a 'public service' as SVIMS is a body established under a law made by the Legislature of the State and Act 2 of 1994, which prohibits daily wage appointments, is squarely applicable to the facts of this case. Thus, the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that Act 2 of 1994 is not applicable to SVIMS, since the services of SVIMS is not a public service and daily wage employment thus is not prohibited in SVIMS, is not acceptable. Act 2 of 1994 very much applies to SVIMS, which is an establishment brought out by a Legislature of the State. Further, the learned Additional Advocate General while bringing the attention of this Court to Section 7 of the Act, contended that a person who is a daily wage employee appointed on temporary basis under Section 3 of Act 2 of 1994 and is continuing as such at the commencement of the Act, shall not have or shall not be deemed ever to have a right to claim for regularization of services on any ground whatsoever and the services of such person shall be liable to be terminated at any time without any notice and without assigning any reasons. Further, while rebutting the arguments of Sri T. Suryakaran Reddy, learned counsel for some of the writ petitioners, it was contended that the petitioners also do not fall within the third proviso to Section 7 of the Act, since SVIMS is not an industry and the employees are not workmen within the meaning of I.D. Act and Section 25F thereof has no application. He also emphasized that the services in the SVIMS is a public service and as such, it can never be treated as an industry. The argument of the learned Additional Advocate General that SVIMS is not an industry and as such, Section 7 has no application cannot be accepted. SVIMS is an institution established by the law made by Legislature and its aims and objectives are for establishment of a medical institute for the purpose of research and development apart from providing super-speciality health services to the needy public. A hospital or a medical institute is an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of I.D. Act and the law is well settled that a hospital or medical institute is an industry within the meaning of the said Section. That apart, it is also submitted that SVIMS is a deemed University. At this stage, it may be necessary to notice the objects of SVIMS as stated in Section 4 of Sri Venkateswara Institute of Medical Sciences University Act, 1955, which read as follows:
'4. Objects of the Institute:- The objects of the Institute shall be,--
(a) to create a centre of excellence for providing medical care, educational and research facilities of a high order in the field of medical sciences in the existing super-specialities and such other super-specialities as may develop in future, including continuing medical education and hospital administration;
(b) to develop patterns of teaching in post-graduate level and in super-specialities so as to set a high standard of medical education;
(c) to provide training in paramedical and allied fields, particularly in relating to super-specialities;
(d) to function as a referral hospital;
(e) to provide for post-graduate teaching and conduct of research in the relevant disciplines of modern medicine and other allied sciences, including inter-disciplinary fields of physical and biological sciences.'
12. Further, under Section 5 of the said Act, powers and functions of the Institute are enumerated to achieve the above objects. A conjoint reading of Sections 4 and 5 of the said Act would make it clear that SVIMS is an industry within the meaning of I.D. Act, as it is providing medical care, educational and research facilities of a high order in the field of medical sciences and functioning as a referral hospital, apart from other functions. In this connection, it is also necessary to note the law laid down by the Apex Court in Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa, : (1978)ILLJ349SC wherein while overruling the earlier judgments holding that hospital is not an industry, it was held that 'hospital' and education in its institutional form fall within the ambit of Section 2(j) of I.D. Act and it is an industry. The relevant paragraphs are extracted as under:
'124. Our conclusion is that the University of Delhi : (1963)IILLJ335SC case was wrongly decided and that education can be and is, in its institutional form, an industry.
135. ...............Even though a research institute may be a separate entity disconnected from the many industries, which funded the institute itself, it can be regarded as an organization propelled by systematic activity, modelled on co-operation between employer and employee and calculated to throw up discoveries and inventions and useful solutions which benefit individual industries and the nation in terms of goods and services and wealth. It follows that research institutes, albeit run without profit motive, are industries.
157... ............But, that by itself does not mean that a hospital cannot be regarded as an industry, profit or no profit, research or no research. We have adduced enough reasons in the various portions of this judgment to regard hospitals, research institutions and training centres as valuable material services to the community, qualifying for coming within Section 2(j)......'
By applying the above ratio, one can reach to a single conclusion that SVIMS is an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of I.D. Act and as such, all the petitioners working in various categories including canteen workers are the workmen within the meaning of I.D. Act and as such, the provisions of I.D. Act are attracted.
13. Even assuming that SVIMS is not an industry, in the admitted facts of the case, the petitioners had been directed to work under a named contractor and as such, it amounts to termination without notice and is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, apart from violating principles of natural justice.
14. It may further be noticed that from the very submissions made on behalf of SVIMS, it can be culled out that there is a device evolved by SVIMS and asked all the petitioners to work under a named contractor. This is nothing but unfair labour practice, apart from being violative of Section 25F of the I.D. Act. It is a camouflage to award a sham contract for the purpose of the same duty to some other person without following the due process of law in the guise of the respondents correcting themselves and following the law under Act 2 of 1994. This is an unfair labour practice and a clever device, which cannot be said to be bona fide, reasonable and genuine. It is settled law that industrial workers are entitled for being considered for regular absorption after completion of 240 days. If really SVIMS wanted to terminate the services of the petitioners, they would have invoked Section 25F of I.D. Act, which is even possible as per the provisions of Act 2 of 1994, but such a provision was not invoked and on the other hand, in the guise of covering up one illegality, they have committed another illegality by terminating the services of the petitioners contrary to law and principles of natural justice. While considering a similar situation, Madhya Pradesh High Court in National Thermal Power Corporation v. K.K. Shrivastava, 2003 (97) FLR 1065 held as follows:
'10. The appellant camouflaged the appointment of the respondent by awarding a sham contract for the performance of the same duty. This is an unfair labour practice. The appellant cannot take the benefit of their clever device which cannot be said to be bona fide reasonable and genuine. The material on record does not satisfy our conscience. It was not a simple case of non-renewal of contract. The learned Single Judge has rightly held that the award of contract was merely an extension of service.
11. When the work for which the employee was engaged was not for a fixed duration and it did not cease to exist on the date on which the employment was terminated and the employee was appointed on contract basis and the employer engaged certain employees for the same work, the termination without notice would amount to unfair labour practice.
12. When the intention is to by pass the provisions of the Act, action of the employer may be deemed to be tainted by malice. The subterfuge involving non-employment of certain employees continuously but offering them work on contract basis characterizing them as contractors cannot be approved.
13. The respondent has worked for more than 240 days in a year continuously immediately preceding the order of termination of service. For the purpose of eligibility for relief under the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947, it is not necessary for the workman to work in the same capacity for 240 days. In fact, the respondent has worked for more than 240 days and asking him to work on contract basis was only a device to defeat the provisions of law. Workman completed 240 days of service under the same employer, hence, he is entitled to the benefit of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947.
14. As a matter of fact, where by arithmetic count the workman is able to prove that he has completed more than 240 days, the relief of reinstatement has to be granted. We have to note that in Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala (1980 (40) FLR 373) the earlier view expressed in State Bank of India v. Sundara Money (1976(32)FLR 197) and Hindustan Steel Limited v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Orissa (1976 (33) FLR 257) was approved. The learned Single Judge did apply with care and caution the doctrine of lifting of veil in Industrial Jurisprudence and recorded that in the contextual fact and upon lifting of the veil the respondent worked for more than 240 days. The payment of contract basis was thus a mere camouflage which could be easily pierced and employer and employee's relations between the appellant and respondent easily visualized. Respondent who worked for more than 240 days cannot be retrenched....'
15. This decision is applicable with the same vigour to the facts of the case on hand, as, here it is an admitted case that only to avoid the rigour of Act 2 of 1994, respondents have committed another illegality, which cannot be approved.
16. It is contended by the learned Additional Advocate General that to avoid the rigor of provisions of Act 2 of 1994, which would have resulted in termination of the services of the petitioners, only with a humanitarian approach, the petitioners were attached to a contractor and the wages were paid through him. This further strengthens the arguments of the learned counsel for petitioners that SVIMS is an industry and the work entrusted to the petitioners is i.e. cooking, sweeping, cleaning etc., in the canteen or ancillary and perennial to the main activity of SVIMS and as such, there was no necessity for the respondent-SVIMS to terminate the services of the petitioners and make the petitioners to work under a contractor. It is nowhere stated that the services of the petitioners were not required or there was no sufficient work to engage these workmen. The only argument advanced on behalf of SVIMS was that to wriggle out of the rigors of provisions of Act 2 of 1994 the contractors were engaged and petitioners were attached to them. It is not in dispute that the petitioners working in various capacities were engaged and appointed by SVIMS initially and thereafter attached to the Contractor in view of the rigors of the provisions of Act 2 of 1994.
17. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon G.O.Ms.No. 158, dated 1-5-2001 to show that as contemplated under G.O.Ms.No. 220, dated 24-4-1999 budget was provided in the non-plan for the year 2001-02 to SVIMS at Tirupathi to meet the expenditure on account of salaries and other expenditure. Though the petitioners are entitled to receive salaries directly, only to avoid regular absorption into the services of SVIMS, they are attached to a contractor and paid through him the salaries, which is nothing but unfair labour practice adopted by the SVIMS.
18. During the course of arguments, it is brought to the notice of this Court the G.O.Ms.No. 220, dated 24-4-1999 wherein all the six medical institutions including SVIMS were handed over to TTD by the Government for synergetic management and since then the petitioners are working under the synergetic management of TTD.
19. In view of the above discussion, petitioners/workmen are entitled for a notice under Section 25F of I.D. Act as contemplated in third proviso to Section 7 of Act 2 of 1994 itself. Admittedly, no notice of any kind was issued to the petitioners and they were also not paid one month wages in lieu of notice. Generally speaking, whether a particular cadre strength are workmen or not cannot be decided by this Court. Since the facts are not in dispute and it is also not in dispute that the petitioners have worked for more than 240 days before their services were attached to a contractor after 5-12-1997 and since this court comes to the conclusion that SVIMS is also an industry, attaching the services of the petitioners to the contractor is nothing but termination of their services without following the due procedure as contemplated under Section 25-F of the I.D. Act. In this view of the matter, there is no necessity of going into the arguments advanced that the attachment of the petitioners to a contractor apart from being violative of Section 25F of I.D. Act is also violative of Section 9-A thereof.
20. Learned Additional Advocate General further argued cautiously that any interference by this Court holding that the disengagement of the petitioners and engaging them through the contractor amounts to termination of service, as the procedure contemplated under Section 25-F is not followed, it amounts to springing back of the illegality committed by the SVIMS, which is contrary to Section 2 of Act 2 of 1994, and amounts to perpetuating the illegality commenced by SVIMS. In other words, one illegality, if any committed, is declared as null and void gives life to another illegality committed earlier, which is not the intention of the Legislature. In this regard, learned Additional Advocate General relied upon the decisions in State of Bihar v. Ramdeo Yadav, : [1996]2SCR1059 , State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra, : (1996)IILLJ627SC and Santosh Kumar Verma v. State of Bihar, : (1997)IILLJ78SC in which it was held that no Mandamus would be issued directing the Government to disobey the law or to refrain from enforcing the law or to act contrary to the law.
21. The said proposition is applicable only when one illegality is struck down resulting in springing up of another illegality. This is not the situation. What all it is stated, so far as this case is concerned, it is only the procedure as required and contemplated under Section 7 of Act 2 of 1994 was not followed. Interference by this Court, only enables the respondents to legalize its acts by following due process of law as contemplated under Act 2 of 1994. This is much more so in view of the fact that the petitioners were engaged in the year 1994 and their services were terminated illegally in the year 1997, though the Andhra Pradesh (Regulation of Appointments to Public Services and Rationalization of Staff Pattern and Pay Structure) Act, 1994 came into force from 25th November, 1993. Here, interfering and issuing Mandamus amounts to directing the authorities to follow the law and not to violate or disobey the law and as such, the said decisions have no application to the facts of these cases. The argument of the learned Additional Advocate General seems to be very reasonable, but nothing prevented the 1st respondent from invoking the Proviso to Section 7 of Act 2 of 1994 and terminating the services of the petitioners by either giving one month notice or by paying one month's wages in lieu of notice.
22. It is also submitted that now there are number of vacancies available and the respondents can consider appointing and absorbing the petitioners on regular basis in the suitable posts. SVIMS wanted to get rid of the petitioners and as such, engaged a contractor. Being principal employer SVIMS cannot escape the statutory liability under the I.D. Act and also under the general service law.
23. It may be noticed that SVIMS came into existence in 1992 and admittedly, there was no cadre strength available at that time and, therefore, the petitioners were engaged for doing the work in various categories, which is perennial in nature and connected to the main activity of SVIMS and as such, as per the Circular instructions dt. 4-11-1997, the respondents could have taken the permission from the competent authority to avoid the rigor of Act 2 of 1994 as it is not in dispute that the petitioners were engaged on daily wage basis and there was a need for their engagement till the date of termination and also thereafter, as they are being engaged through a contractor, it is not the case of the respondents that there is no work and the services of the petitioners are no more required. It is also not the case of the respondents that the petitioners have been engaged by backdoor method. In fact, as the new establishment had to commence the work immediately, SVIMS engaged the petitioners in the respective categories.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, I hold that:
(i) the action of the respondents in disengaging the petitioners and engaging them through a contractor is nothing but termination of their services in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes act, 1947. In the result, petitioners are entitled for reinstatement into service with all attendant benefits except back wages.
However, this will not prevent the authorities from taking any action as per Section 7 of Act 2 of 1994, if they so desire.
(ii) Respondents may also consider the feasibility of regularizing the services of the petitioners in the respective cadres by treating them as industrial workers, since they have completed 240 days of service and have accrued a right of being absorbed on regular basis.
24. The Writ Petitions are allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs.