M. Venkateswara Reddy, J.
1. This appeal, under Section 30 of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, is directed against order dated 31-8-1999, made in WC Case No. 57 of 1997, on the file of the learned Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Nalgonda.
2. The insurance company, which is the second respondent before the Commissioner, is the appellant herein.
3. Respondents 1 to 6 herein are the claimants before the Commissioner. They claimed compensation for the death of one Singam Pitchaiah, as his dependents. It is not disputed that the said Pitchaiah died in an accident during the course of employment while on duty on 8-10-1994 at about 0630 hours. The 7th respondent herein is his employer owning lorry bearing No. ADB 8467, on which the deceased was working. The appellant does not dispute that the deceased died during the course of employment. The learned Commissioner awarded total compensation of Rs. 1,35,833/-. He has taken the salary as prescribed under the Minimum Wages Act i.e., Rs. 1,716/-per month and fixed the age of the deceased at 35 years and came to the conclusion that he is entitled to Rs. 1,35,262/-, as per the formula prescribed under the Act and also costs and Advocate's fee.
4. The only contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that while fixing the monthly salary, the learned Commissioner has taken into account the salary as fixed under the Minimum Wages Act as on the date of the disposal of the case, but not the salary as prescribed under the Minimum Wages Act as on the date of death.
5. This question is covered by a decision of the Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity Board and Anr. Petitioners v. Valsala K. and Anr. : (1999)IILLJ1112SC . The question that arose before the apex Court was whether the amendment of Section 4 and 4A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 made by Act 30 of 1995, with effect from 15-9-1995, enhancing the amount of compensation and rate of interest, would be attracted to cases where the claims in respect of death or permanent disablement resulting from an accident caused during the course of employment, took place prior to 15-9-1995? The Court held:
2. Various High Courts in the country, while dealing with the claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act have uniformly taken the view that the relevant date for determining the rights and liabilities of the parties is the date of the accident.
3. A four Judge Bench of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata : (1976)ILLJ235SC speaking through Singhal, J., has held that an employer becomes liable to pay compensation as soon as the personal injury is caused to the workmen by the accident which arose out of and in the course of employment. Thus, the relevant date for determination of the rate of compensation is the date of the accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim.
4. A two Judge Bench of this Court in The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. V.K. Neelakandan (CA Nos. 16904-09 of 1996, decided on 6-11-1996), however, took the view that Workmen's Compensation Act being a special legislation for the benefit of the workmen, the benefit as available on the date of adjudication should be extended to the workmen and not the compensation which was payable on the date of the accident. The two Judge Bench in Neelakandan's case (supra), however, did not take notice of the judgment of the Larger Bench in Pratap Narain Singh Deo's case (supra), as it presumably was not brought to the notice of their Lordships. Be that as it may, in view of the categorical law laid down by the Larger Bench in Pratap Narain Singh Deo's case (supra), the view expressed by the two-Judge Bench in Neelakandan 's case (supra), is not correct.
5. Our attention has also been drawn to a judgment of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Alavi (1998) 1 KLT 951 (FB), wherein the Full Bench precisely considered the same question and examined both the above noted judgments. It took the view that the injured workman becomes entitled to get compensation the moment he suffers personal injuries of the types contemplated by the provisions of the Workman's Compensation Act and it is the amount of compensation payable on the date of the accident and not the amount of compensation payable on account of the amendment made in 1995, which is relevant. The decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, to the extent it is in accord with the judgment of the Larger Bench of this Court in Pratap Singh Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata : (1976)ILLJ235SC (supra), lays down the correct law and we approve it:
6. Having answered the question posed in the earlier part of the judgment in the negative, we shall take up this batch of special leave petitions for consideration.
7. Insofar as these special leave petitions are concerned, we find that the accident took place long time back. Compensation became payable to the workmen, as it is not disputed that the accidents occurred during the course of employment, as per the law prior to the amendment made in 1995. Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases, pettiness of the amounts involved in each of the cases and the time that has since elapsed, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned orders, decided on the basis of the 1995 amendment, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, dismiss the special leave petitions, but, after clarifying the law, as noticed above.
6. Though the apex Court clarified the position of law holding that the relevant date for determining the rights and liabilities of the parties is the date of accident, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the cases before their Lordships, the pettiness of the amounts involved in those cases and the time that has since elapsed, held that their Lordships were not inclined to interfere with the impugned orders decided on the basis of the 1995 amendment Act and dismissed the special leave petitions.
7. Here also the accident occurred on 8-10-1994. Now more than 12 years have lapsed. Unsettling the position may cause any amount of hardship to the dependents of the deceased. Following the view of the Supreme Court, I am of the opinion that this is a fit case for dismissal, in view of the 12 years lapse of time between the date of accident and the date of disposal of the case.
8. In the result, the CMA is dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs.