ORDER
1. The short question, which is of general importance, that arises for our consideration is whether the State Administrative Tribunal constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 ('the act' for brevity) has jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the review petition, notwithstanding the negative language voiced in Rule 19 of A.P. Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1989.
2. The facts germane to the reference before the Full Bench in Writ Petition may be stated in nutshell as under:
The petitioner while working as Deputy Inspector of Schools was placed under suspension pending enquiry on 3-9-1986. He filed R.P.No. 2009 of 1988, which was disposed of on 19-12-1988 with a direction that the enquiry should be completed within three months or else he should be reinstated. He was reinstated into service on 21-2-1989 and also retired from service on reaching the age of superannuation on 31-1 -1992 as per the order passed by the Regional Joint Director of School Education, Warangal dated 27-1-1992. The said order recites that petitioner was permitted to retire on tine after noon of 31-1-1992 without prejudice to the right of the department of take disciplinary action against him on charges/allegations pending against him now and that may arise in future. Complaining that no enquiry is pending against him nor he has received any notice of enquiry he is not being paid pension filed OA No. 22397 of 1989 which was disposed of with a direction that the petitioner's service during the period of suspension should be treated as duty because no punishment was imposed on him pursuant to disciplinary enquiry as contemplated under FR 54(B) and directed to pay the pension and other benefits within four months from the date of receipt of the order. In spite of the said direction petitioner's pensionary benefits were not paid. He got issued a legal notice to the respondents for implementing the order passed in R.P.No. 22397 of 1989 dated 3-6-1993. Since there was no response, petitioner filed Contempt Application 450 of 1993. During the pendency of Contempt Application the respondent filed review MASR 17105 of 1994 in R.P.No. 22397 of 1989. As there was a delay of 1 year 7 months and 29 days in filing the above review, MA(SR) No. 993 of 1995 was filed to condone the delay in filing review.
3. On disposal of R.P.No. 22397 of 1985 the Regional Joint Director of School Education, Warangal issued a Memo No. 459/SER.II/88-23 Education dated 16-10-1993 read with proceedings Rc.No. 112/A1/B1/86-III dated 29-10-1993 communicating the enquiry report of the enquiry officer calling upon the petitioner to submit his explanation. Questioning the legality and propriety of the said memo petitioner filed O.A.No. 6748 of 1993. The Tribunal by the impugned common order held that it got power to condone the delay in filing the application for review, since it is vested with the power to entertain the original application filed after the expiry of limitation period as per Sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the Act. Accordingly, it condoned the delay. On such condoning the delay it recalled the order passed in R.P.No. 22397 of 1989 dated 3-6-1993 and disposed of the same with a direction to the respondents to complete the enquiry pending against the applicant/petitioner and take necessary action as warranted under the Rules basing on the final decision in the enquiry proceedings. Consequently O.A.No. 6748 of 1993 was disposed of directing the petitioner to submit his explanation, if not already given, to the show cause notice impugned in the O.A. within two months and respondents were directed to pass appropriate orders on receipt of such explanation and C.A.No,450 of 1993 was accordingly dismissed.
4. Challenging the order in recalling the judgment in R.P.No. 22397 of 1989 dated 23-9-1993 petitioner filed the present writ petition. When the writ petition was taken up for hearing, the learned Division Bench of this Court comprising of Justice Bilal Nazki and Justice D.S.R. Varma referred the matter to the Full Bench in view of negative language voiced in Rule 19 of the Rules and the question had caught the attention of the Full Bench in which one of the learned Judges Justice S.B. Sinha, Chief Justice as he then was, was of the view that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply even in relation to matters which are not covered by Section 21 of the Act, but the two learned Judges Justice S.R. Nayak and Justice G. Raghuram though that it was not necessary in that case to consider the question as they found that the delay condoned by the Tribunal could have not been condoned.
5. That is how the matter is posted before the Full Bench.
6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that Tribunal cannot condone the delay in filing the review application and any such review, if filed, beyond period of 30 days shall not be entertained. Power conferred on the Tribunal to admit the applications after a period of one year under Sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the Act is applicable only to the original applications but the same cannot be made applicable to the review filed under Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. Since Rule 19 of the rules made by the Central Government in this behalf do not authorize the Tribunal to condone the delay in filing the review it had no jurisdiction to condone the same. Before answering the reference, it is useful to extract Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which provides as under:
'22. (1)-(2)
(3) A Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of discharging its functions under this Act, the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely-
(a) - (e)
(f) reviewing its decisions;
(g) - (i)
In exercise of rulemaking power under Section 37 of the Act, the rules were framed known as A.P. Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1989 (for short 'the Rules'). Rule 19 of the rules lays down as under:
'19. No application for review shall be entertained unless it is filed within thirty days from the date of the order of which the review is sought.'
7. A bare reading of the aforementioned provision, which was extracted above, would indicate that power of review available to the Tribunal under Section 22(3)(f) is subject to other provisions of the Act and of any rules made by the Central Government. The power of the Tribunal to review its judgment has been explained by the Supreme Court in Ajit Kumar Rath v. State of Orissa, : AIR2000SC84 is the same as has been given to a court under Section 114 or under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. The power is not absolute and is hedged in by the restrictions indicated in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. The power can be exercised on the application of a person on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. The power can also be exercised on account of some mistake of fact or error apparent on the face of record or for any other sufficient reason. A review cannot be claimed or asked for merely for a fresh hearing or arguments or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier, that is to say, the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent error of law or fact which stares in the face without any elaborate argument being needed for establishing it. It may be pointed out that the expression 'any other sufficient reason' used in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC means a reason sufficiently analogous to those specified in the rule.
8. Any other attempt, except an attempt to correct an apparent error or an attempt not based on any ground set out in Order XLVII would amount to an abuse of the liberty given to the Tribunal under the Act to review its judgment.
9. Keeping the above guidelines in the background of the case, we have to see whether the tribunal can entertain such review as and when approached with the plea of discovery of new and important fact or evidence, which was not brought to the notice of the Tribunal while passing the order which resulted in miscarriage of justice. If so, whether the Tribunal can entertain such review and can condone the delay by taking the aid and assistance of Sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the Act which enables the Tribunal to entertain the original application. It is well settled that exercise of power will be circumscribed by the relevant statutory provisions and the rules made thereunder.
10. In K. Ajit Babu v. U.O.I., : (1997)IILLJ749SC the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the power of Tribunal to exercise review under Rule 17 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules wherein it was held as under.
'......The right of review is not a right of appeal where all questions decided are open to challenge. The right of review is possible only on limited grounds, mentioned in Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Although strictly speaking Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure may not be applicable to the tribunals but the principles contained therein surely have to be extended. Otherwise there being no limitation on the power of review it would be an appeal and there would be no certainty of finality of a decision. Besides that, the right of review is available if such an application is filed within the period of limitation. The decision given by the Tribunal, unless reviewed or appealed against, attains finality. If such a power to review is permitted, no decision is final, as the decision would be subject to review at any time at the instance of the party feeling adversely affected by the said decision. A party in whose favour a decision has been given cannot monitor the case for all times to come. Public policy demands that there should be an end to law suits and if the view of the Tribunal is accepted the proceedings in a case will never come to an end. We, therefore, find that a right of review is available to the aggrieved persons on restricted ground mentioned in Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure if filed within the period of limitation. (Underling is ours)
11. Even assuming that the Limitation Act is not expressly excluded by the Administrative Tribunals Act or the Rules made thereunder, we have to see whether the scheme of the special law i.e. in this case Administrative Tribunals Act/Rules and the nature of remedy provided therein are such that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern all the matters provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is found that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. In our view, even in case the Act/Rules does not exclude the provisions of Section 4 - 22 of Limitation Act by an express reference, it would none the less has to be examined whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject matter and the scheme of the Act/Rules exclude their operations. The provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act envisage that a suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed. Whereas Rule 19 of the Rules which gives an preemptory command that no application for review shall be entertained unless it is filed within thirty days from the date of the order of which the review is sought.
12. Even otherwise the provisions of the Limitation Act which unless expressly excluded would be attracted can be made applicable to the nature of the proceedings under the Act/Rules, but the same is not what Section 29(2) of the Act says because it provides that Sections 4 - 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. If none of them are excluded all of them are applicable whether those sections are applicable or not is not determined by the terms of those sections, but by their applicability or inapplicability to the proceedings under the special or local law. Section 6 of Limitation Act, which provides for the extension of the period of limitation till after the disability in the case of a person who is either minor or insane or an idiot, is inapplicable to the proceedings under the Act/Rules. Similarly Sections 7 - 24 are in terms inapplicable to the proceedings under the Act, particularly in respect of filing of applications and the procedure to be followed under the Act/Rules. The applicability of those provisions has, therefore, to be judged not from the terms of limitation Act but by the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 and the Rules made thereunder relating to the filing of original applications and review applications and their disposal to ascertain whether it is a complete code in itself which does not admit of the application of any of the provisions of the Limitation Act mentioned in Section 29(2) of the Act.
13. Rule 19 is couched in negative form and disables the person from seeking review under Section 22(3)(f) of the Act, in case review is not filed within 30 days of the order. However, in the Act nowhere it is stated the method or manner or time limit to file such review except Rule 19. In view of the same, the power of Tribunal to condone the delay under Section 21 of the Act is applicable only to the applications filed under Section 19, but the same cannot be made applicable to the review sought under Section 22(3)(f). Sub-section (1) of Section 22 puts an embargo on exercise of such power by the Tribunal, namely that the power of the Tribunal shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and of any rules made by the Central Government. In the absence of any provisions prescribed for condoning the delay either in the Act or in the Rules, the Tribunal will not have jurisdiction to condone the delay in taking aid and assistance of Section 5 of the Limitation Act on the premise that Limitation Act is made applicable in view of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act.
14. In the view we have taken, we answer the reference holding that the Administrative Tribunals Act and the Rules made thereunder are impliedly infer that the Tribunal will not have jurisdiction to condone the delay by taking aid and assistance of either Sub-section (3) of Section 21 of the Act or Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.
15. Registry is directed to post the writ petition before the appropriate bench for disposal on its own merits and in accordance with the principles laid down in this judgment.