ORDER
C.Y. Somayajulu, J.
1. This is an application by A3 in C. C. No. 1150 of 2002 on the file of the Court of V Addl. Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada, to quash the said proceedings.
2. 1st respondent filed the above case alleging that he subscribed to a chit being run by A1 company and after paying 28th instalment he became the highest bidder for Rs. 1,25,000/- and was given a cheque bearing No. 753845 dated 8-1-2000 for Rs. 3,75,000/- by A2 on behalf of A1 towards the amount payable to him and since he had no Bank account at Vijayawada and has a Bank account at Guntur, A2 and A4 convinced him that they would encash the cheque and send that amount to his Bank account at Guntur by way of transfer, took his signature on the reverse of the cheque, after assuring him that it would not be misused, but failed to send the amount, and so he made enquiries and came to know that the said cheque was encashed by A2 and A4 with the connivance of the petitioner, who is the Manager of the Bank and so, the petitioner and other accused are liable for punishment under Sections 120-B, 420 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned V Addl. Metropolitan Magistrate, Vijayawada took cognizance of the case and issued summons to the petitioner and others. As stated earlier, this petition is filed by A3 to quash the complaint against him.
3. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that even if the allegations in the complaint are taken to be true, no offences as alleged in the complaint, can be said to have been committed by the petitioner, because the cheque, which is alleged to have been signed by the 1st respondent, in fact, would not come to the desk of the petitioner for passing, and he would not even have knowledge of the presentation or passing of the cheque in question. It is his contention that since 1st respondent does not deny his signature on the cheque, the Bank crediting the amount to the account of the persons mentioned above the signature of the 1st respondent on the reverse of the cheque, cannot be an offence, and so the case against the petitioner is liable to be quashed. The contention of the learned counsel for the 1st respondent is that since the complainant does not have an account in the Bank of which the petitioner was the Chief Manager, he was under an obligation to verify and satisfy himself that the signature on the cheque presented belonged to the payee, before crediting the amount covered by the cheque to the account of the person mentioned above the signature of the payee and since the petitioner failed to discharge such obligation in company with A2 and A4, he also is liable for punishment, and hence there are no grounds to quash the complaint against the petitioner. He placed strong reliance on State of Maharashtra v. I. P. Kalpatri 1996(1) ALD (Cri) 139 : (1996 Cri LJ 1127) in support of his contention that the complaint cannot be quashed.
4. The ratio in Kalpatri case supra relied on by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent is that the High Court while dealing with the petition under Section 482 Cr. P. C. cannot go into the merits and demerits of the contentions raised on the sustainability of the charge at the time of trial and quash the proceedings on the basis that there is no merit in the case set up in the complaint. The Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, : 1992CriLJ527 and State of Karnataka v. Devendrappa, : 2002CriLJ998 laid down the principles governing the quashing of complaints and FIRs. As per the ratio in those decisions, when the allegations made in the complaint, if taken to be true, do not show the commission of any offence, the complaint can be quashed. The case of the first respondent is that petitioner in his capacity as the Manager of the Bank, in which A2 and A4 have an account, conspired with A2 and A4 and allowed the cheque to be passed without taking care to see if the signature on the reverse of the cheque is that of his or not. The allegation in the complaint show that first respondent affixed his signature on the reverse of the cheque issued in his favour by A1 on the assurance given by A2 and A4 that the amount covered thereby would be sent to him. So it is clear that first respondent is not denying his signature on the reverse of the cheque. So it would be an 'endorsement in blank' as defined in Section 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (the Act) which reads;
'If the indorser signs his name only, the indorsement is said to be 'in blank' and if he adds a direction to pay the amount mentioned in the instrument to, or the order of, a specified person, the indorsement is said to be 'in full', and the person so specified is called the 'indorsee' of the instrument.'
5. Section 49 empowers the holder of a negotiable instrument 'indorsed in blank' to convert it into an endorsement in full. So, if A2 and A4 converted the 'endorsement in blank' into an 'endorsement in full', and presented it for passing -- petitioner even assuming that he has a role to play in passing of the cheque cannot be said to have committed any offence by his passing the cheque 'without caring to verify the signature of payee' on the reverse of the cheque, and crediting it to the account of the person shown above the signature of the payee, because admittedly the signature on the reverse of the cheque drawn in favour of the first respondent, is that of the 1st respondent. If it were the case of the first respondent that the signature on the reverse of the cheque drawn in his favour, is not that of his may be the petitioner would have to explain as to how he passed the cheque without taking proper care to see if the signature on the reverse of the cheque is that ofthe payee or not.
6. Since the conspiracy attributed to the petitioner is his passing the cheque in connivance with A2 and A4 and since there is no other allegation against him, and since petitioner cannot be said to have acted in violation of the provision of the Act in passing the cheque, which admittedly contains the signature of the first respondent, he cannot be said to have committed any offence against the first respondent. Thus, even if all the allegations in his complaint are taken to be true, since no offence is made out against the petitioner the complaint against him is liable to be quashed.
7. Hence, the complaint against the petitioner is quashed. Petition is allowed.